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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 – Problem Statement  
In this study, I argue the restraints induced through neoliberal ideology and the potential 
of democracy in regional development. Neoliberal ideology holds a dominating role in 
premising the inputs and determining the outcomes of development processes, in the 
sense that it overpowers facts, unbiased information, and individual intent. Democracy 
is challenged when neoliberal ideology retains a hegemonic position, but democracy can 
also be efficient in challenging the hegemonies.  
The focal point of the study is to inquire into some of the processes associated 
with the transformation and changes towards a regional system of governance, and ask: 
Why is democracy disappearing from regional development? This means that this study 
is oriented towards how some recent regional change processes have affected 
democratic values on a system/regional level. Explicitly this thesis examines how meta 
steering of regional governance networks can influence and change both democratic and 
development practises in regions.  
1.2 – Relevance 
When I first started working on the Value Creation 2010 project one of the things in the 
project that appealed to me was the concept of broad participation, the principle of 
democratic involvement of all concerned in development (Gustavsen, Finne, & 
Oscarsson 2001; Levin 2002; Fricke & Totterdill 2004: 457). The Value Creation 2010 
project also had other aims and characteristics, for instance the promise development, 
innovation, and economical growth in enterprises, and it had regional and network 
development ambitions. However, it was the idea of broad participation, and especially 
the ambition of testing to what extent industrial democracy could be brought into a 
regional context in a meaningful and effective way that directly appealed to me about 
the Value Creation 2010 project. Fricke and Totterdill thus write: 
The crucial point of this new action research approach [referring to Value Creation 2010] 
is to integrate the ideas and interests of as many regional stakeholders as possible, thereby 
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introducing an element of industrial democracy and participation into regional 
development (Fricke & Totterdill 2004: 5). < 
My background before starting to work on the Value Creation 2010 project was a 
study of the reorganisation of the Norwegian university college sector in 1994 
(Normann 2002). This reorganisation process was a state steered and controlled process 
without much involvement or participation from those directly involved in and affected 
by the process. It lacked in a sense the idea and practice of democratic participation. 
The main research question of this thesis was developed as a result of my 
experiences from working with the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region. A 
project where we started out our work based on the idea of actively using democratic 
participation in regional development work, as a value in itself and as a tool for realising 
development aims. We experienced that it was difficult to realise our ideas about 
democracy in development, and we experienced that it was difficult to realise the 
development aims of the project. This thesis work should therefore be seen as an 
investigation into the relationship between democratic ideas and ideals and development 
work and aims. In this lies the conviction that regions that are able to systematically 
address both “soft” and “hard” values, which can realise their development aims based 
on and through democratic processes, will serve as tomorrow’s success stories, and be 
the regions that others later will try to copy.  
The focus on different aspects of democracy has been a red thread in all of the 
activities that I have been involved in and observed through the course of the Value 
Creation 2010 project at Agder. The concept of broad participation articulated through 
research and development programmes such as Enterprise Development 2000 and Value 
Creation 2010 has therefore been the direct link into my thinking on the topic of this 
thesis which is: the discrepancies between practices and normative ideals of democracy 
in regional development and change processes. 
Thus, I have had to face the realities of the field and the apparent lack of attention 
to democratic issues in regional development discourses, i.e. how democratic processes 
and system features directly and indirectly are influenced, changed, manipulated, and 
dominated by new development rationales. Where focus is on the new regional 
development discourse, which is how regional development increasingly is interpreted 
through the lenses of the regional development concepts. This narrative tells us that a 
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basic change has occurred in society, that globalisation and technological change deeply 
have altered the dynamics of change and development, that fundamentally new 
development processes are required to achieve economical growth, innovation, and the 
articulation of the idea that regions, places where people live and work, somehow are in 
competition with one another. 
The perspective in this thesis is that this new regional narrative, foremost is 
meaningful to understand as the articulation of the increased influence of neoliberal 
ideology in society and thus a constructed reality, and that this is something we, citizens 
of regions, should question and be critical of. I held the position that this is equally 
important of your interests being regional development per se, the practice of 
democracy, or as I am here in both.  
I have also had to face the lack of attention to system’s efficiency rationales, 
development rationales, and new organising principle in large portions of the public 
discourse on local democracy in Norway (Innst.S.nr.268 2001-2002; St.meld.nr.19 
2001-2002; Østerud, Selle, & Engelstad 2003; St.meld.nr.25 2004-2005; NOU 2005:6; 
2006:7). The discourses on local democracy in Norway are regrettably still too much 
focused on “classical topics”, for instance the problem of decrease in turnout at the polls 
(NOU 2006:7), and the conflict between centre and periphery in Norwegian politics1 
(A.-L. Fimreite & Selle 2006). My point is not that these are not important topics, but 
that those concerned with democracy in a regional context now should start to lay more 
emphasis on other, and what I conceive as more pressing issues, something that also 
Fimreite and Selle point to:  
[…] The discussion of a new administrative level has not come very far in Norway. We 
find an embrace of positive connotations to “networks” and “innovation”, the embrace of 
governance. But this discussion is held on a very general level and is not much 
contextualised, the understanding of democracy is vague, and possible consequences is 
far from thought-through (A.-L. Fimreite & Selle 2006: 22)2.  
There are many exceptions to such a broad picture, but if I should put forward a 
general and schematic critique of much of the research on democracy in Norway I 
would say: a) that it is primarily oriented towards deficits in representative democracy3, 
b) that it lacks interdisciplinary perspectives4, and c) to a very little extent relates to 
contemporary economically oriented development trends and the implication these 
present for current practices of democracy5. 
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Similar critiques can be forwarded against the regional development theories and 
concepts6, which mainly are concerned with how to stimulate innovative processes, gain 
economical growth, and competitiveness, but seldom relate to how their strategic 
recommendations interferes with and influences democratic systems and practices in the 
contexts where they unfold7. Johan P. Olsen has an interpretation of the situation that I 
believe is precisely on the mark, and that I am in full concord with: 
My [Olsen’s] interpretation is that the increased emphasis on the commercialisation 
aspects on the innovation concept is an expression of a shift in the power relations 
between professions, organisations, institutions, social groups, more than an expression of 
an actual societal need for more innovation and more knowledge and analysis of 
variations in the ability innovate and readjust. A consequence of this is that the innovation 
debate is being decoupled from a normative analysis of the relative significance of 
commercial and economical aims in relation to other criteria, such as democracy, the 
distribution of power, legal protection, community, health, national security, and an 
ecological sustainable society. It is frequently referred to a strong economy as a 
prerequisite for welfare and other social goods. But often is it forgot that economical 
efficiency and growth can have problematic social and political consequences, and that a 
competitive economy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the good society 
and good steering practices. This is true also in for the case of Norway (Olsen 2004)8.  
For the discourse on participatory democracy in a regional sense, the idea of 
bringing industrial democracy out into the regions (Fricke & Totterdill 2004), the main 
problems are: That its main practical function seems to be of a rhetorical and 
legitimising kind (Bevir 2004), and not is sufficiently manifested in local thinking and 
practices, discussed in this thesis. I believe it is an understatement to say that the works 
of Einar Thorsrud, Fred Emery, and associates (Thorsrud, Emery, & Trist 1964; 
Thorsrud & Emery 1970; Emery & Thorsrud 1976) do not hold a particularly dominant 
position in current Norwegian discourse and practice on participatory/industrial 
democracy9. 
This study aims at seeing these ideas about development and democracy as one 
discourse, integrated and complementary for understanding and changing current 
practices in regional governance systems. 
1.3 – Positions in the Literature 
The basic idea of this study is essentially to show how some of the new ways in which 
regions are being managed and steered, how governance networks themselves are 
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managed and steered and used as tools at specific ends, and how the practices of 
development and democracy co-exist and co-develop in such contexts.  
A debate on regional leadership is developing in the Agder region. This debate 
has partly emerged because of the introduction of a new formal regional level that will 
replace the county level, 1 January 2010. I use discourses regimes, governance, and 
democracy in order to give inputs to and widen current debates about regional 
leadership and changes in democratic practices. 
The paramount challenge facing almost every governance network aimed at 
development work is to identify the “right” balance between conflict and collaboration. 
Collaboration is good from a certain perspective, because it promote interests 
aggregations, something that is a premise for successful steering, while conflicts also 
can be constructive because they can stimulate new thoughts, creativity, development 
paths, and innovative processes. Successful regime or meta steering of governance 
networks therefore means finding the “right” balance between collaboration and conflict 
(Jessop 1998: 41; Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 51). It is also central to democracy, to 
mediate conflict, to sort between interests, and support the process of making informed 
decisions. The meta governance steering paradox is that if the development discourse is 
too hegemonic there is a risk of blocking new thoughts and lose development 
opportunities, and on the other hand, if is it too much conflict there is a risk of 
undermining network negotiations. 
This thesis discusses how what is being labelled second-generation governance 
research (Pierre 2000; Sørensen & Torfing 2005) can illuminate experiences with 
governance networks, and especially the meta governance steering paradox is addressed 
in the Agder region. My main argument is that successful and efficient social change an 
development can be achieved through democratic processes, but that this is not 
something that is automatically safeguarded by current societal change processes, and 
therefore should not be taken for granted by anyone. 
Governance and regime theory is therefore in this thesis used to give perspective 
to and analyzes of Value Creation 2010 in Agder and the politico economical system in 
the region. The findings from these analyses are in the end interpreted in light of three 
distinct theories of democracy. 
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1.4 – Method 
The research question is developed and approached through an in-depth Action 
Research study of the development of a regional development coalition called the Value 
Creation Alliance which was initiated in a collaborative effort between researchers and 
stakeholders in the Agder region. The Agder region, where the regional development 
coalition operated and practiced, is analyzed in a study of the politico economical 
system of some relevant aspects of the Agder region. Very simplified the main 
difference between an Action Research study and a more “traditional” case study, is of 
an epistemological nature. When a social scientist conducts a case study, s/he can be 
involved as an observer but is not necessarily a participant in the local knowledge 
generating process itself. In an Action Research study is this explicit, researcher 
participation and involvement is a deliberate and integrated part of the research and 
knowledge generating strategy10. 
1.5 – Outline 
This thesis is structured in the following way. In the next chapter 2, I give a brief 
description of the context of the regional development and change processes discussed 
in this thesis. I here seek to emphasize those regional characteristics I believe are most 
relevant for understanding the concepts and perspectives discussed in this thesis. In 
chapter 3, I outline the theoretical analytical tools used to interpret the data available to 
this work. Here I focus primarily on the new regional narratives; the regional 
development concepts that are meant to construct regional advantages, and that have 
proved so influential on current thinking and practices in regional development. This 
discussion is followed by an theoretical outline of governance-network theories that 
during the late 80s and 90s have become the organising metaphor for the study of 
interactive forms of political decision making (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). This 
discussion leads us to the study of regional leadership, meta governance, and regime 
theory. Three alternative interpretations of governance systems and regime theory are 
then presented and discussed. These perspectives represent three different perspectives 
on society, the rationality of man, power, and democracy. This discussion is followed 
by an discussion of three different perspectives on democracy, that later are used to 
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analyse some governance practices in the Agder region in light of democratic theory. 
This represents the main components of the analytical framework of this thesis. In 
chapter 4, I account for the methods I have used and what type of data that have been 
available and give an account of my position on theory of science. In chapter 5, I 
present data from the case, the regional development coalition that I have been involved 
with for a period of five years –the Value Creation Alliance. The case presentation is in 
the next chapter 6 followed by description of key elements in the development of and 
practices associated with the regional system of governance in Agder which the Value 
Creation 2010 case developed. In chapter 7, the data from chapter 5 and 6 is analysed 
through the analytical framework developed in chapter 3, and the three subordinate 
research questions of this thesis are discussed and analysed in this chapter. In chapter 8, 
I address the main research question and this discussion concludes the thesis.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 The political scientist Stein Rokkan phrased this as one of the central dividing lines in 
Norwegian politics, in the 1960s. 
2 My translation. 
3 See for instance the conclusions of the latest Norwegian power and democracy study (Østerud 
et al. 2003: 298). 
4 See Meyer (2003) for a critique.  
5 See Olsen (2004) for an introduction. 
6 See for instance Piore and Sabel (1984), Amin and Thrift (1994), Castells and Hall (1994), 
Lundvall and Johnson (1994), Florida (1995; 2002; 2005), Ohmae (1995a; 1995b), Etzkowitz 
and Leydesdorff (1997b), Porter (1998a; 1998b), Castells (2000), Cooke (2002), and others. 
7 There are of course many exceptions to this general critique, an example of one study where 
the case for economical development is paired with a democratic argument is Making 
democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti 1993). 
8 My translation. 
9 See Tor Claussen’s ”Arbeidslivets klassikere og dagens arbeidsliv” for a discussion in 
Norwegian (Claussen 2001). 
10 Discussed in chapter 4. 
 - 9 - 
Chapter 2 – The Agder Region 
 
There is little doubt that something is going on in Norwegian society and that this 
something has to do with a transition from the organisational patterns of the nation state 
and towards what can loosely be called regional or local patterns. 
–Bjørn Gustavsen, Participation and Local Organisation (2004b: 37). 
 
2.1 – Region  
In the following, I will give a brief background to and situate the discussions in this 
thesis. I start with a brief outline of the new regional policies “the new-regionalism 
paradigm” and I continue with a brief introduction of the regional development 
concepts, which also are some of the background for governance networks now being 
an important feature of most regions in Norway. I then go on to give some context to the 
Agder region, its political administrative structures, its industrial structure, and some 
remarks on social and cultural issues. I also give a brief overview of what I in the 
following will conceptualize as the governance networks in the Agder region.  
Introducing Regional Development Concepts 
In the Agder region the use of regional development concepts has taken on a central role 
in order to structure and give direction to the regional governance system. In the 
political industrial development debate concepts of clusters and networks have become 
increasingly important in the task of addressing what is increasingly defined as regional 
development challenges. The concepts in use and the tools applied in addressing these 
challenges are both inspired by and more or less directly applied international and often 
managerial inspired development concepts. Concepts that in nature are not much 
different from those found in the world of business and organisational development1. In 
the following, I briefly outline some of the most influential regional development 
concepts that are in use in the Agder region. A more thorough presentation is given in 
chapter 3. 
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One of the most prominent of the regional development concepts are firstly triple-
helix (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997a), which describes the institutionalised 
collaboration between academia, industry, and public government. The idea of triple-
helix is that collaboration or increased collaboration between the triple-helix actors 
stimulates innovation and economical growth. The concept of triple-helix has been very 
influential for both legitimising the existence of governance networks, and as a recipe 
for institutional design and focus of development processes in the Agder region from 
the turn of the millennium and onward. Regional stakeholder interviews in this thesis 
reveal triple-helix as the concepts most often referred to when network administrators 
and leaders are asked to explain why they work in and through network structures to 
realise regional policy agendas. 
A second influential regional development concept is that of learning regions 
(Florida 1995). The learning regions concept describes and argues in favour of the 
significance of vertical and horizontal connectors for knowledge transfer and 
information exchange. The learning region focuses on the importance of the 
“knowledge worker”, and is often contrasted with regions based on mass production 
(the old economy). The learning regions concept are locally often interpreted as an 
argument in favour of developing even more learning arenas, such as networks, 
different types of regional conferences, partnerships etc. The concept and ideas inherent 
in the learning regions concept were instrumental in the development of a regional 
strategy in the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region. 
A third influential regional/industrial development concept is Michael Porter’s 
regional cluster theory (Porter 1998b). The regional cluster concept describes the 
importance of what in reality is a relatively unspecified assembly of enterprises which 
buys and sells exchange workforce, sets demands, and stimulates competition between 
each other. The concept states that these processes stimulate focus on increased quality 
and capacity. In Agder, as in many other regions, Porter’s concepts of cluster are used in 
an instrumental way in order to stimulate economical growth. The extent of which it is 
possible to use temporary organisations to externally stimulate such processes is 
however lesser understood. 
A fourth influential regional development concept is the idea of the regional 
innovation system (RIS). A regional innovation system involves co-operation in 
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innovation activity between firms and knowledge creating and diffusing organisations, 
such as universities, colleges, training organisations, R&D-institutes, technology 
transfer agencies, business associations, and finance institutions (Asheim & Herstad 
2003: 245). Asheim and Herstads state that their conceptualisation of a RIS system 
corresponds with a definition given by Phillip Cooke and associates, who says that a 
functional RIS system consists of two sub-systems: (i) the knowledge application and 
exploitation sub-system, principally occupied by firms with vertical supply-chain 
networks; and (ii) the knowledge generation and diffusion sub-system, consisting 
mainly of public organisations (Asheim & Herstad 2003: 245). 
Other regional development concepts in use in the Agder region are the concept of 
creative class (Florida 2002), an important part of the legitimacy of the Cultiva 
foundation in the municipality of Kristiansand in the Agder region. The concepts of the 
knowledge or learning economy (Lundvall & Johnson 1994; Cooke 2002) are also 
important for legitimizing the development of the competence foundations in the Agder 
region. Other relevant development concepts and theories are industrial districts (Piore 
& Sabel 1984), interactive learning (Lundvall & Johnson 1994), and the network 
society (Castells 2000). 
These concepts are different but the differences should as Asheim and Mariussen 
(2003: 15) say not be overestimated, at least if we choose to focus on the practical and 
local interpretations of these concepts. They often seem to mean the same, a continued 
focus on and development of temporary organisations, networks, partnerships, 
development organisations, paired with a belief in that this somehow must result in 
learning, knowledge development, more innovative industries, economical growth and 
regional competitiveness and prosperity. We can choose to agree or disagree with the 
beliefs inherent in these concepts and their relevance for relatively small regions such as 
Agder. What we no longer can choose to ignore is the effect these concepts has on the 
ongoing development of governance systems, and the effect they indirectly and directly 
has on democratic processes in the region, representative democracy, the political 
system, and the direction of societal development. 
We have now reached a stage where it actually is impossible to do or to 
participate in regional development work without applying one or more of the regional 
development concepts. They dominate the discourse and they influence our thinking in 
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deeper and more profound ways than most of us realise. They are also excluding in the 
sense that if you do not speak or understand the “concept langue” you no longer have a 
role to play on the regional development arena. Thus, the Value Creation 2010 project 
both in Agder and on the national level has had to adapt to this reality and contributed to 
strengthen the influence inherent in these concepts even more. 
New Regionalism 
Over the last decade what should be understood as regionalisation processes have 
picked up much momentum in Agder just as it has in the rest of Norway. Such 
processes are theoretically often conceptualised as a shift from “old” regionalism to 
“new” regionalism (Veggeland 2003; Wallis 2003; Note 2005). The Agder region draws 
attention as one of the regions where such regionalisation processes are most successful 
in Norway (Ullern 2005: 16), and as a manifestation of a successful regionalisation 
process that also other Norwegian regions should use as a role model (Selstad 2005).  
Proponents of the recent ‘new regionalism’ movement have suggested that 
voluntary local measures and interlocal cooperation can be effective substitutes for 
centralized control (Note 2005: 2292). Veggeland suggests that new regionalism is 
based on a historical empirical claim that the “region” has become the “melting pot” 
which national states political, economical, and cultural development rests on, and more 
that the normative bias that the “region” should be put in the centre of a sustainable and 
democratic policy (Veggeland 2003: 134).  
New regionalism asserts that regional governance is superior to regional 
government. According to ‘new regionalist’ writers, the economic fate of cities and 
suburbs is so interdependent that suburbs will voluntarily aid ailing central cities. Other 
commentators, however, are unconvinced, and no ‘new regionalist’ has been able to 
point to a region in which voluntary cooperation has occurred in any significant way 
(Note 2005: 2292-3).  
Simplified “new” regionalism contrasted to “old” regionalism builds essentially 
on the following sets of assumptions and normative ideals:  
1) A shift in focus from government; old regionalism is essentially about government, to 
governance; establishing vision and goals, and setting policy to achieve them through 
cross-sectoral governing coalitions.  
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2) A shift in focus from structure; structural alternatives such as city/county 
consolidations, creation of urban counties, the formation of special purpose and multi-
purpose authorities, to process; such as visioning, strategic planning, resolving conflict 
and building consensus.  
3) A shift in focus from the closed; to clearly demarcate the region in terms of boundaries 
and jurisdictions for growth, service delivery, job markets, to the open; open, fuzzy or 
elastic boundaries.  
4) A shift in focus from coordination; through e.g. a regional authority with powers to 
determine the allocation of resources to units of government within its boundaries, to 
collaboration; voluntary agreement among equals.  
5) A shift in focus from accountability; legitimacy of coordination secured through 
procedures of accountability, to trust; trust as a binding element in relations among 
regional interests2.  
6) A shift in focus from power; power as a zero-sum game, so the power to govern must 
come from units of government above and below, to empowerment; engaging nonprofits 
and for-profits in governance decisions that were once treated as the domain of the public 
sector alone. Rather than assuming a zero-sum game, employing empowerment is based 
on the assumption that new interests bring new energy, authority, and credibility; in short, 
it grows power or capacity in order to move a regional agenda (Wallis 2003).  
These “new” regionalist constructions about the new and the old are together with 
the regional development concepts central for understanding why and how we now 
increasingly are discussing regional policy development and execution in terms of 
networks and governance instead of hierarchy and representative democracy. In this 
thesis, the rhetorical and practical combination of the new-regionalist movement and the 
influence of the regional development concepts are referred to as the new regional 
narrative. In practice however, these two ideal types of regional steering, the 
hierarchical model, and the network model are coexisting, interacting, and thus 
constituting what has become a very complex and diffuse regional landscape and 
steering system. This thesis can therefore be read as an early assessment of some of the 
consequences of this complexity and vagueness has and has had for the Agder region. 
The Agder Region 
The region does conceptualise more than just a geographical area. There is not any 
unifying definition of what a region is or what it is that constitutes a region, that is to 
say that the region does not exist as a physical or ontological reality. A region is and can 
be many things.  
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Oddbjørn Bukve writes that regions are socially constructed entities that embed 
different meanings for different people at different times (Bukve 2005: 198). Noralv 
Veggeland writes that a region should be understood as a geographical space not larger 
than that people do not experience alienation and loss of identity when they act and 
participate in the public arena (Veggeland 1996). Hans-Kjetil Lysgård writes that: “The 
question is not whether a territory can be entitled to be called a region or not, but in 
what sense it can be called a region, something that really is a question about the 
intentions behind the idea of a region” (Lysgård 2001: 50)3. Bjørn Gustavsen (2004a) 
uses the concept of “regions of meaning” to emphasise the situation where the concept 
of a region becomes an arena for the development of actionable knowledge, when 
theory and practice interact in new ways in areas of mutual inter-comprehensibility, 
which need not correspond to administrative units (Ennals 2006).  
Thus, when we talk of regions we talk of a complex structure that embeds layers 
of meanings and connotations. The Agder region is in this text foremost a context and 
reference to such processes and understandings that unfolds within what up-until 2010 
is the two counties Vest- and Aust-Agder4. 
The Agder region is located in the southernmost part of Norway, its coastline 
faces the North Sea and Denmark, and it has about 260 000 inhabitants, and is divided 
into 30 municipalities. Most of the population (ca. 75%) live and work on the coastal 
line between the cities of Mandal and Arendal, which is often conceptualized as 
Agdercity (Agderbyen) (J. P. Knudsen 1990; 2002b).  
The largest city in the Agder region is Kristiansand (ca. 77 000 inhabitants), 
which is located in Vest-Agder County, the second largest city is Arendal (ca. 44 000 
inhabitants) which is located in Aust-Agder County. There is a significant portion of 
rivalry between the two cities and counties. Rivalry that clearly is manifested in the 
political processes when government resources, workplaces, and institutions shall be 
located or re-located. The extent that ordinary citizens adapt to this rivalry varies, but 
this rivalry is one important rationale behind why regional governance institutions such 
as Agderrådet (see below) were set up in the first place. 
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Industry 
In the Value Creation 2010 application that was written to the Norwegian Research 
Council in 2001 (H. C. G. Johnsen & Normann 2001c) we saw it most meaningful to 
divide the Agder region in terms of industrial structure into four sub-regions.  
Fig. 2-1: Map of Industrial Sub-Regions in Agder, adapted from Johnsen and Normann (2001c) 
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Starting in the West the first region we identified was the “Listerregionen”, that 
consisted of the following municipalities, (numbers in brackets refers to the figure 
above), (1) Farsund, (2) Flekkefjord, (3) Sirdal, (4) Lyngdal, and (5) Kvinesdal and has 
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about 33 000 inhabitants. The industrial structure in this region was characterized by 
large energy intensive process industry enterprises that operate on (exports to) the world 
market. Most of the owners of these enterprises do not live in the Agder region. These 
enterprises are few, but employ a significant portion of the work force in this region. 
Lay offs and downscaling in the process industry would influence the social structures 
in this sub-region and Agder as a whole significantly. 
To the east of the Listerregion we find a region called “Agderbyen” that consists 
of the following municipalities: (15) Lindesnes, (16) Mandal, (17) Søgne, (18) 
Songdalen, (19) Vennesla, (20) Kristiansand, (21) Lillesand, (22) Birkenes, (23) 
Grimstad, (24) Arendal and (25) Froland. This region represents a plurality of 
industries, services, heavy industries, information technology, finances etc. No single 
group of industries is so large that it dominates alone. Approximately 190 000 people 
live in this region. 
To the north of Agderbyen we find a region that we called “Indre Agder” that 
consists of the following municipalities: (6) Marnardal, (7) Hægebostad, (8) Audnedal, 
(9) Iveland, (10) Evje og Hornnes, (11) Åseral, (12) Bygland, (13) Valle, and (14) 
Bykle. About 14 000 people live in this region, which is the largest in geographic terms. 
The municipalities in this region are the location of several large dams and hydro-
electrical power plants. These municipalities are among the wealthiest per capital in 
Norway, and use a significant amount of their resources to stimulate innovation in their 
industry, which in addition to the power plants mainly consists of tourism, farming, and 
woodworking industry. 
Farthest to the east we find “Østregionen” that consists of the following 
municipalities: (26) Tvedestrand, (27) Vegårshei, (28) Åmli, (29) Risør, and (30) 
Gjerstad. About 20 000 people live in this region. Its industrial structure is characterized 
by many small-and medium sized companies (less than 50 employees). It has developed 
niches in a national market in areas such as design and tourism.  
Traditionally the industry in the Agder region has been oriented towards the sea. It 
had a significant shipbuilder and shipping industry that laid the ground for capital build 
up and development of the districts. Arendal was for instance around 1870 the largest 
shipping city in Norway. In the beginning of 20th century, the traditional shipping 
industry entered into crisis, as a result of the technological shift away from a sailing 
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fleet. A third of the Norwegian tonnage originated from Agder in 1885. In 1927 it was 
down to 5 % (B. E. Johnsen 2002). One way of seeing this is as a “regional collapse”, 
and into the 1960s the region lost population growth relatively to the rest of the country 
in a significant magnitude. A large part of the population emigrated to the USA in this 
period. A count back to the 1890s indicates that 100 000 fewer people live in the Agder 
region now, than it would if the region had the same demographical development as the 
rest of the country. From the 1970s and onward the Agder region has been a growth 
region in Norwegian terms, a growth that has been fuelled by investments in 
infrastructure, trunk road between Arendal and Kristiansand in the 1950-60s, the airport 
in Kristiansand (Kjevik) became a hub for international and interregional transportation, 
ferries to England, Denmark, and Sweden, a railroad, and investments in harbours in 
Kristiansand and Arendal stimulated the region as a hub for freight transportation (J. P. 
Knudsen 2002b). 
Also on the cultural side the Agder region has made a mark for itself in recent 
years. The Quart festival, named after Christian IV, King of Denmark and Norway from 
1588-1648, has made a name for itself on the national and international music scene, as 
it attracts 10 000 people every day for a week, each summer to Kristiansand. The Agder 
region is also about to get its own university, as the Agder University College (with 
approximately 8 000 students) is about to gain status as the seventh University in 
Norway.  
But it is the industries dependent on hydro-electrical power that is the main 
explanatory factor for the growth in the Agder region since the 1960s and onward, thus 
making the presence of the dominating industries in the Agder region a text book 
example for Paul Krugman’s Core-Periphery Model (Krugman 1991). The industrial 
structure in Agder deviates in significant areas from the average of rest of Norway. This 
is primarily related to having a high share of heavy industries relatively to the 
commercial services and primary industries than the rest of the country. A consequence 
of this is that the Agder region has the largest export per capital ratio in Norway. 21 % 
of the Norwegian gross production within the metal processing industries comes from 
the Agder region. This industry employs about 20 000 people, and represents about a 
third of all business in the region and 5-8 % of the total of Norwegian industry 
(Andresen, Cruickshank, Jamt, Jentoft, & Vangstad 2002). 
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Politics 
Another important characteristic of the Agder region is that it politically and culturally 
is among the more conservative in Norway. For instance in the 2003 county and 
municipality elections the Norwegian Labour Party (DNA)5 got 19.3% of the votes in 
the Agder region while it got 27.4% of the votes in the rest of Norway, an 8% 
difference. The Christian Democratic Party (KrF)6 got 18.4% of the votes in the Agder 
region in 2003, while it got 6.2% of the votes in the rest of Norway, a 12% difference. 
Thus, the Christian Democratic Party and the Norwegian Labour Party are about the 
same size in the Agder region, a situation that is very different at the national level. For 
instance in the 2005 Storting (national assembly) elections the Norwegian Labour Party 
got 32.7% of the votes while the Christian Democratic Party got 6.8% of the votes7. 
This voting pattern is discussed in an article by Helge Røed called The province The 
Labour Party never grasped (Røed 2002). Here he argues that this had serious 
consequences for the level of influence the region had on government policies in the 
period of Norwegian history that were dominated by The Labour Party in government8. 
An important consequence of this is that political leaders in the region tend to 
have different political mindsets from the political leaders in central government, which 
probably has had an impact on the degree of influence they have had compared to other 
regions that have represented a better political match to the central level. It also means 
that recruitment to central level government, (cabinet ministers, parliamentary 
secretaries, under-secretaries, political advisors etc.), from the Agder region 
traditionally has been less frequent than from other regions in Norway. 
The counties in the Agder region do also get a relatively small share of the so-
called 551 funding. Funding aimed at industrial development projects in the counties 
(Haga 2006). There are many good reasons for not distributing these funds equally to 
the counties or applying to a distribution based on population figures. However, I would 
argue that a consequence of this is that those counties that get the smallest share of these 
funds are in a much weaker negotiation position when they enter partnership and 
network structures than those counties that get substantially more of the 551 chapter 
funding. The two Agder counties together are on the bottom and get less than the next 
county on the list, and only 1.7% of the total funding available (Haga 2006). 
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I will argue that these factors have contributed to a feeling among many central 
regional actors in the Agder region of being subservient to other regions and central 
government, a specific notion of the Agder region having shortcomings in their 
influence on state policies compared to other regions in Norway. I believe that this is an 
important factor for understanding the position that regional governance got for 
realizing regional aims and also contributed to the widespread notion of the importance 
of unity and consensus as crucial factors in developing the region. 
If we look at the political leadership in the two largest city municipalities in 
Agder, Arendal and Kristiansand, and in the two county municipalities in the 31 years 
from 1976 to 2006, we see that the political stability has been strikingly consistent (see 
appendix). Municipality mayors in the two largest city municipalities in the region, 
Arendal and Kristiansand, and the county mayors in Aust-Agder and Vest-Agder are 
predominantly represented almost exclusively by the two conservative parties in 
Norway, The Christian Democratic Party (KrF) and The Conservative Party of Norway 
(H)9. Signifying that the main routes to political influence the last decades primarily 
have been focused in and through these two political parties. 
As I shall return to in later chapters it is very likely that this kind of political 
stability has unintended consequences when the political system acquires more and 
stronger governance features, a political stability that in the Agder region is enhanced 
by low level political turnover. This is because when more political work is done 
outside politically elected forums in systems with governance characteristics, in forums 
such as Agderrådet, and when the political bodies, municipalities and counties are 
represented through the leaders of these institutions, typically chief officers and mayors. 
It could be argued and expected that such governance structures when they are not 
broadly put together contribute to skewing and reinforcing already dominating voting 
patterns, and thereby reducing political diversity and multiplicity of opinion in new and 
emerging network structures. This alone should be enough too call for a rethinking of 
the composition of direct political participation in governance structures. 
Social Life and Culture 
The explanations for this voting pattern are not conservatism itself, but a culturally, 
socially, and historically rooted Christianity. A counter culture that is unique to the 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 20 - 
Agder region and the counties in the southwest of Norway. A counter culture that 
already in the late 1950s was described by the geographer Gabriel Øidne, as 
characterized by temperance, linguistic movement10, and pietism (Røed 2002: 105). Pål 
Repstad has written that there are more people at Agder that reckon themselves a 
Christian that in the rest of Norway and that the Christians at Agder are more 
conservative Christians than in the rest of the country (Repstad 1992). It is however 
tendencies in the cultural life in Agder many proofs of a softening-up of many of the 
conservative aspects of this type of Christianity (Repstad 2002: 133-6). 
 However, the reminisces of this culture are still an important background for 
understanding the political and social workings of the Agder region. Something that 
expresses itself in family-, cultural-, political-, economical- and social life at Agder, for 
instance is cohabiting with children in 2005 still more uncommon in the Agder region 
than in the rest of Norway, while marriages are more common. A series of statistics 
could be produced to substantiate this point, for instance the average level of 
attendances to religious services, average age of marriage, average number of chapels, 
churches and religious meeting houses, average number of different Christian religious 
communities etc., and they would all show the same tendency; that the Agder region 
scores relatively high compared with other regions in Norway. Agder has not a higher 
number of members in the state church than the rest of Norway but has many more 
independent and Free Church movements. 
Another consequence of this is on equal opportunities in the Agder region. Agder 
has the lowest share of females with longer higher education in Norway (Magnussen, 
Mydland, & Kvåle 2005: 40). Males tend to have the same amount of working hours as 
males in the rest of Norway, while employed Agder females have significantly more 
often reduced working hours (Magnussen et al. 2005: 31-2). Agder has 12% fewer 
females working fulltime (more than 30 hours a week) than the country average 
(Magnussen et al. 2005: 33). The Agder region has a significant larger share of females 
working part time than the country as a whole. Especially fertile females have a weaker 
position in work life than the rest of the country. There are also fewer women in 
management positions in Agder than in most other counties in Norway (Magnussen et 
al. 2005: 207). Also in municipality councils the Agder women are underrepresented. 
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The country average was 35.5% in 2003 while Aust-Agder had 32% and Vest Agder 
had 31.9% female participation (Magnussen et al. 2005: 48).  
The link between equal opportunities and conservative Christianity is that 
religiously active people tend to have more traditional gender role thinking than other 
less religious groups of the population. In a national survey on religion from 1998 
(NSD) 26% of those who said they were religiously active strongly agreed or disagreed 
to the statement “The role of the husband is to make money, the wife’s is to tend to the 
house and the family”. 33% in the same category responded likewise in Vest-Agder 
(Magnussen et al. 2005: 47).  
The type of Christianity that is present in the Agder region has traditionally been 
supportive of business and entrepreneurship. Repstad argues that the Agder region had a 
tradition for the coupling of sensible business and trade, piousness, self-discipline, and 
social growth that could have served as an example for Max Weber in his studies of the 
role of Protestantism in the early days of capitalism. There has also been many 
conspicuous examples of the regions industrial elite also being very active in Christian 
life (Repstad 2002: 141). That this coupling of religion and business in the Agder region 
also have resulted in the development of social structures and networks that favour 
some and disfavour others is not unlikely. However, this is something that it is difficult 
to do empirical studies of, as Repstad (2002) notes. It is however an important 
characteristic of the Agder region “real or not” since it is undisputable that it exists a 
belief among many people in the Agder region that this is how the system works, and 
that this belief has in itself many concrete and practical consequences and 
manifestations. Pål Repstad who is a professor in sociology of religion at Agder 
University College writes the following on topic: 
As long as I can remember, I have heard stories about people in the region affiliated with 
the same Christian community favouring each other in questions of business and trade. It 
is said that they do things in a “straightforward manner”, sometimes with a smile, 
sometimes with indignation. […] This can be a question of legal use of each other’s 
products and services based on knowledge, friendship, and trust. As we know that trust is 
an important type of immaterial capital in any market. I would think that this happens in 
certain degrees, and even if it were legal, would it sometimes feel morally provoking to 
those that are not in on the “game”. Consequently we should also be open to the 
possibility that frustrated outsiders exaggerate the extent of favouring based on religious 
criteria (Repstad 2002: 142)11. 
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Anne Ryen, a sociologist working at Agder University College, gives a less 
conciliatory interpretation. She writes that the traditional men’s clubs such as Rotary12 
and freemasonry have a relatively strong position in social life at Agder. Moreover, that 
where it is an overlap between elite clubs, religious groupings, and political orientation 
we should expect to find that this also represents overlapping and conserving spheres.  
Recruitment of a relatively homogenous member mass in cities or in places with a limited 
range increases the chance of the same people recruiting from their own ranks. Such 
arenas are important constructive contexts where gender stereotypes are reproduced. 
Organisations of this type have a central network forming function where consensus 
rather than conflict is a relevant characteristic of the milieu. The significance of such 
arenas, with strong male dominance in good positions in public life and industry can be 
important to understand also female’s opportunities (Ryen 2002: 178)13. 
Rotary, LIONS, and freemasonry are examples of organisations with influence on 
certain aspects of social life in the Agder region. This thesis is not directly concerned 
with such institutions, but with the more recent development of the rapid growth in 
network structures, institutions, partnerships, development organisations, funds, 
projects, permanent and temporary organisations etc. which in different ways aim at 
contributing to regionalisation and regional development processes in the Agder region. 
Such institutions are in this thesis conceptualised as the regional governance system in 
the Agder region. 
2.2 – Governance in Agder 
Collaboration between leaders in industry, industry associations, politics, and to some 
extent academic institutions is not a fundamentally new phenomena in the Agder region, 
there are in fact long traditions for it. In Agder there are many examples of such 
collaborative initiatives aimed at different development aims that both have succeeded 
and failed (H. C. G. Johnsen 1998), examples that date back long before anyone had 
ever heard or thought of ideas inherent in modern regional development ideas such 
regional innovation systems, triple-helix, learning regions etc.  
In 1998 the Kristiansand Trade Association14 celebrated its 150th anniversary. 
This association is still active, but in a restructured form. In 2003 its activities where 
integrated with the local industry association, and now it markets itself under the new 
name Kristiansand Chamber of Commerce which also has a working relationship with 
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other network institutions in the region such as Sydspissen15. Kristiansand Trade 
Association did play an active role in many of the larger investments and initiatives that 
have been made by the municipality of Kristiansand like a new harbour, city planning’, 
airport etc. In the 1960s, the association took initiative to set up a business school and 
an economical/mercantile gymnasium, which later lead to collaboration with NHH 
(Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration), located in Bergen 
about the development of a Business College in Kristiansand. Johnsen points out that 
the collaboration between NHH, Kristiansand Trade Association and Kristiansand 
municipality was instrumental for Kristiansand getting ADH (a province college) in 
1969 (H. C. G. Johnsen 1998: 40-1).  
Johnsen writes that the period before the oil crisis in the 1970s represented the 
height of the intensity of collaboration and integration between industry interests and 
the political institutions in Kristiansand. The cultural, personal, and industrial 
integration between trade and politics was stronger when society was characterized by 
optimism, a belief in instrumental planning, and uninterrupted economical growth. The 
industry politics collaboration had a setback as the functionalistic thinking started to go 
out of fashion. When local politics became more plural, when local politicians started 
questioning the market, unfettered growth ideas, private motoring, modernization etc., 
collaboration between industry and politics became more difficult and the extent of the 
collaboration was reduced, even though it was still there (H. C. G. Johnsen 1998: 69). 
Collaboration between business and politics pick up momentum during the 1990s, 
but now in a new form. The focus shifted from the city to the region. In this period the 
concept of Agdercity (Agderbyen) emerges, as a way to conceptualize the wider 
regional perspective on development (J. P. Knudsen 1990). 
The “old” collaborative initiatives between industry interests and politics where 
therefore mostly oriented towards the developments in and surrounding the largest cities 
in the Agder region. The focal point of this development work was in a sense the city or 
the municipality, and on relatively task specific issues. What has changed is that this 
self-imposed boundary of thinking oriented towards the city or the municipality 
expanded, now the rhetoric and focus have shifted towards the region and too much 
broader development issues. Communicating a narrow perspective on the interests of 
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the city is therefore no longer “Good Latin” unless it is phrased as a necessity for 
regional growth. 
This new perspective did however open up a new set of issues that had to be 
resolved. The traditional rivalry between the larger cities in the region and between the 
two counties was a challenge that had to be addressed if the idea of regional growth and 
competitiveness should be addressed in a meaningful way. “Common Goal on Agder” 
with the subtitle “a local development programme for Sørlandet” was therefore written 
(Norman, Knudsen, & Røed 1994) in 1994. The following year Agderrådet was 
established as an organ for realizing the objectives in the local initiative programme16 (J. 
P. Knudsen 2002a). Following the establishment of the Agderådet partnership a long 
range of different institutions, networks, partnerships etc. have emerged with the 
agendas and objectives that in different ways has been linked to the idea of regional 
development at Agder. These new institutions have also been linked to the “old” 
collaborative initiatives through institutions such as Sydspissen, which was established 
in 1999 as a regional chamber of commerce17. However, the most remarkable 
institutions in the emerging regional governance system are the new regional funds.  
In the wake of changes in energy laws and the liberalization of the energy market 
in the Nordic countries, a long range of municipalities in Norway started in the last half 
of the 1990s a process that involved both the reorganization of enterprises owned by the 
municipalities, (turning them into limited companies), and reorganization of ownership. 
In the municipality of Kristiansand such a process happened when KEV (Kristiansand 
Energiverk) was established in 1997 as a publicly owned limited company. This 
company merged with two other hydro electrical energy companies, Vest-Agder 
Energiverk and Aust-Agder Energiverk, into Agder Energi AS in 2000. The 
municipality of Kristiansand owned 27.8% of the stocks in this new company, while the 
rest of the stocks were owned by the other municipalities in the Agder region. In June 
2001 the City Council in Kristiansand decided to sell its shares to Statkraft Holding AS 
(a state owned energy company), NOK 1 440 million of these funds was used to set up 
the Cultiva foundation. The other municipalities in the Agder region entered into similar 
arrangements and The Competence Development Fund of Southern Norway (CDFSN)18 
(covers the municipalities in Vest-Agder County) was set up with NOK 595 million and 
a similar foundation was set up in Aust-Agder County with NOK 270 million. 
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Developments such as these lead the former the work- and administration minister 
Victor D. Norman19, to describe the public sector in the Agder region as the most 
innovative in Norway (Sydspissen 2004). 
These main developments are followed and supported by a long range of network 
and development initiatives of which Value Creation 2010 Agder is a part of and 
integrated in. A full overview of all the initiatives that would qualify as part of the 
regional governance system at Agder is very difficult to give. A rough count and some 
of the most important actors and institutions are listed in the appendix. It lists about 130 
governance institutions in the Agder region, where most of these have emerged during 
the last 6-7 years. 
The scale, the regional perspective, and the broadness of political issues integrated 
in this work represents something fundamentally new, and is significantly different from 
when Kristiansand Trade Association worked with politicians to set up economical 
education facilities in Kristiansand in the 1960s. This growth in both scale and 
sophistication has altered local politics and the interaction between industry interests 
and politics in a fundamental and unprecedented way.  
2.3 – A New Regional Policy 
However, these changes would have been impossible if they had not been supported by 
important changes also in state policies towards the regional level. Roar Amdam write 
on the topic of governance: 
The public reforms have had a big impact on the regional planning and development. We 
can talk about a shift in regional policy-making and planning characterised by a new 
process of governing. Regional governance has been added to the regional government 
structure (Amdam 2004: 5). 
The county municipalities were established in its current form 1 January 1976. In 
the period from then to now the counties have been allocated some resources while 
others have been taken away, for instance hospitals, child welfare, drug care, family 
protection etc. The most significant reduction of county authority was when the 
management and steering of somatic and psychiatric hospitals 1 January 2002 were 
moved from the county to a national, state owned, health concern, which consists of five 
regional health companies. A promised transfer to the counties of responsibility for 
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environment and agriculture (St.meld.nr.31 2000-2001) was never commenced and 
retracted in the next white paper (St.meld.nr.19 2001-2002). Something that should be 
seen as expressions of the level of political controversy that the political mid-level has 
been and still represents in Norwegian politics.  
Two political parties have removal of the representative midlevel integrated in 
their political platform. The Conservative Party of Norway writes in their election 
manifesto for the period 2005-2009 that a small country as Norway is best served with 
only two levels of government. Two levels of government, which are the state and the 
municipalities, will strengthen local democracy and provide a higher level of service. 
The Conservative Party will therefore phase out the county level (Høyre 2005: 80). The 
Progressive party (Frp)20, also negative to the county level writes in their party 
programme: 
The “new” county municipality has no legitimacy, either among people or with national 
authorities. The county level is an unnecessary and costly part of public administration. 
The tasks of the county can be addressed more effectively through other ways of 
organising, and with a better result for the users. Fremskrittspartiet has been an initiative-
taker to close down the counties as administrative units, Fremskrittspartiet’s intention has 
always been that the tasks of the county and its responsibilities can be handed over to the 
municipalities, the private sector and the state (Frp 2005: 16)21. 
The county level capacity as a coordinating and a resource-allocating unit has 
therefore weakened over time. However, in 2002 the counties got expanded 
responsibility for regional development. The background for this was that the Storting, 
when it discussed a white paper on the division of responsibilities between 
municipalities and counties (St.meld.nr.32 1994-1995), decided to set up a committee 
that should give a full account for the responsibilities, tasks, and functions between the 
three levels of government. This resulted in a committee being appointed the task in 
1998 (Oppgavefordelingsutvalget), which delivered its report in July 2000 (NOU 
2000:22). This work resulted in a white paper submitted by the Stoltenberg I 
Government (The Norwegian Labour Party) (St.meld.nr.31 2000-2001) which stated 
that there was a need for a regional level and that the government wished to strengthen 
the regional development role of the counties, in order to create an administrative 
authority with a clear responsibility for the development of the region. After the 2001 
Storting elections the Bondevik II coalition government entered office (consisted of The 
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Conservative Party, The Christian Democratic Party, and The Liberal Party22), and they 
wanted to submit their own white paper on regional development (St.meld.nr.19 2001-
2002) which considered the statements about the regional level in their joint declaration 
of politics (the Sem declaration). The Sem declaration stated that the county should not 
be a super municipality, and that changes in the responsibilities had to contribute to a 
reduction in bureaucracy. In this new white paper on regional development 
(St.meld.nr.19 2001-2002) the government indicates that the counties shall move from 
having an administrative function to being a regional development actor in close 
partnership with other state agencies, municipalities, the industry and other actors. That 
the counties are given an increased responsibility for regional development is known as 
the responsibility reform (ansvarsreformen). It was not included in the whitepaper itself 
or in the notes made in the committee work (Innst.S.nr.268 2001-2002) exactly how the 
counties should execute this new role, it was left to the counties themselves to find out. 
The counties are however instructed that regional development shall be executed in and 
through partnerships. 
The government emphasises that the actors in the regional partnerships shall have real 
influence on the arrangement of the strategies in the regional development programme. In 
a way, that regional development becomes a shared responsibility between the different 
actors. To strengthen the regional partnerships the government will also consider 
increasing the allocations to the regional level within the different state sectors? This is 
also in accordance with the main principles of the governments modernisation work 
(St.meld.nr.19 2001-2002)23. 
The main difference between the two white papers on regional development 
(St.meld.nr.31 2000-2001), Stoltenberg I government, and (St.meld.nr.19 2001-2002) 
Bondevik II coalition government is that the latter primarily views the county as the 
central development actor in partnership with many others, while the first also views the 
county as an important arena for the practice of local democracy. 
Given the vagueness in the policies indicated in the white paper (St.meld.nr.19 
2001-2002), the political controversies surrounding the county level, and that the county 
level itself does not have many free resources to do development work with24, it would 
be an understatement to say that the counties first years in the front seat as the central 
regional development actor have been troublesome. 
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In the spring of 2005, Vest-Agder County executive committee25 addressed a 
report on the counties role as regional development actor. Nordregio26 and NIBR27 
wrote the report on behalf of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development. The report expresses in part strong criticism towards the regional policies 
as it was expressed in (St.meld.nr.19 2001-2002) and the role of the county as a regional 
development actor. The report states that the Norwegian partnership ideology28 is an 
echo of the European partnership idea, but with other political and economical 
instruments than those that works in EU, this in the report is partnership as a political 
idea phrased as more new speak than new policy (J. P. Knudsen, Moen, Persson, 
Skålnes, & Steineke 2005). If the county shall mobilise heavy partnerships to strengthen 
regional development this requires larger political reforms and measures than those that 
have been executed in the last years. The counties has now few possibilities to build 
strong partnerships (J. P. Knudsen et al. 2005: 42). The report argues that it is strange 
that state institutions working regionally are given so much freedom in the way they 
want to relate to the county as a regional development actor. This lack of will or ability 
to specify the content of regional development, can therefore be interpreted to mean that 
the central government does not have a clear national development agenda, or does not 
know how to transform this into a regional agenda. This can again be interpreted to 
mean that the central government does not want to commit specific key actor to 
participate in regional development, or that they want to address eventual regional aims 
in other contexts than those that are connected to the counties development work (J. P. 
Knudsen et al. 2005: 39). The report therefore argues that regional development work 
can be strengthened by addressing the institutional conditions it is meant to operate 
under. This means that the state must set clear goals, anticipations, and ground rules for 
this work towards the actors that are involved. This is particularly important since the 
county in its current form is perceived as too weak to perform with much authority 
towards those that they are expected to work with (J. P. Knudsen et al. 2005: 40). The 
regional development ambitions live on in many different connections, within and 
without the counties. The counties themselves crumble under what is the pressure of a 
national steering debate. It is not likely that reforms within today’s regime will address 
this problem. Authority signals on what kind of system one wishes to go for in the years 
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to come are needed. The regional development work needs a significant reform that can 
create rest, authority and predictability to this work (J. P. Knudsen et al. 2005: 44). 
When the Vest-Agder County executive committee 31 May 2005 addressed this 
report, the decision recommended by the county commissioner was that the analysis 
represents an important analysis and judgement of how the county as a regional 
development actor and the partnership function. It also said that in order for Norway to 
reach its goals of a good regional development work based on the resources that are 
available it is important that the conclusions and recommendations given in the report 
are followed up on. The most important thing is however that power and authority is 
connected to a regional development responsibility. To realise this power and authority 
the county/the regional level must get more responsibility within the sectors and policy 
instruments that are important for regional development. It is crucial that the counties 
are given enough recourse to enter the role as the leading regional development actor 
(VAF 2005). 
2.4 – Summary 
In this chapter we have seen that the region as a concept is contested. We have also seen 
that the Agder region has an industrial structure that is complex and has many different 
sectors, and that it must be expected that this diversity also mean that the different 
sectors of the industry in the region have very different development dynamics and 
characteristics. 
We have also seen that the Agder region has gone from being the most 
international oriented and prosperous region in Norway in the 19th century to being the 
one with most problems related to depopulation, to once again being a growth region in 
the latter part of the 20th century. 
We have also seen that the Agder region represents a special case in the political 
and cultural life in Norway. It is a region where conservative Christianity has a stronger 
position on the social and economical life in the region than in many other places in 
Norway. This has resulted in a voting pattern that is different from the rest of Norway 
and many problems connected to equal opportunities in the region. 
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We have also seen that the Agder region has responded forcefully to the new 
regionalisation development paradigm through setting up and developing many new 
institutions and networks that are part of the emerging governance system in the region. 
We have also seen that the county level is a controversial political topic in 
Norwegian politics, and that many of the changes that we can observe on the regional 
level have been imitated by changing state policies towards the regions, changes that are 
inspired by similar processes in the EU area. 
In the next chapter, I will present the analytical tools that I will use to interpret 
and analyse the regional governance system in the Agder region. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 Concepts known best by their acronyms, for instance: TQM (total quality management), BPR 
(business process reengineering), JIT (just in time), MBO (management by objectives), 
benchmarking, and many more. 
2 This point need not be confused with the emphasis laid on accountability in New Public 
Management reforms. The focus of NPM has been mostly on managerial accountability, that is 
the obligation to provide an account for one’s actions to those in superordinate positions of 
authority, but very scarce attention has been placed on political responsibility in NPM. It is 
argued that NPM often is associated with ambiguity in political responsibility, and that this is 
sought compensated with more effectiveness and efficiency (Christensen & Lægreid 2002: 110).  
3 My translation. 
4 The future of the regional reform is when this is written still pending in the national political 
system. 
5 DNA/Ap: (Det Norske Arbeiderparti): The Norwegian Labour Party (Socialist/left party). 
6 KrF: (Kristelig Folkeparti): The Christian Democratic Party (conservative/right party). 
7 Source: Bernt Aardals homepage. http://home.online.no/~b-aardal 
8 In the period 1945-2006 had the labour party the prime minister in 45 of 61 years. 
9 H: (Høyre) The Conservative Party of Norway (conservative/right party). 
10 Norwegian term “målsak”. 
11 My translation. 
12 Rotary started to accept female memberships in 1989. 
13 My translation. 
14 Kristiansand handelsforening. 
15 See for instance http://www.kristiansand-chamber.no 
16 Agderrådet is discussed in chapter 6. 
17 Also discussed more thoroughly in chapter 6. 
18 Sørlandets Kompetansefond. 
19 Representing the Norwegian Conservative Party. 
20 Frp: (Fremskrittspartiet): The Progress Party (conservative/right party). 
21 My translation. 
22 V: (Venstre): The Liberal Party of Norway (liberal/right party) 
23 My translation. 
24 The Agder Counties got in 2006 19, 5 million NOK to do development work from the state 
(næringsrettede utviklingsmidler), which is 1.7% of the 551 chapter. 
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25 Norwegian term: “Fylkesutvalg”. 
26 Nordregio is a European centre for research, education and documentation on spatial 
development, established by the Nordic Council of Ministers. Homepage: 
http://www.nordregio.se/ 
27 NIBR: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research. Homepage http://www.nibr.no/ 
28 Partnership’s does here primarily refer to bureaucratic and administrative partnerships 
between public corporations, institutions, and services, thus a part of new public management 
administrative reform and rationalisation.  
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Chapter 3 – Regional Discourses 
[…] the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world 
is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. I am sure that 
the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual 
encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately but after a certain interval;… soon or 
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil” 
– John Maynard Keynes1  
3.1 – Introduction 
Anders Osthol and Bo Svensson (2002) state in their book Partnership Responses – 
Regional Governance in the Nordic states, that Scandinavia now are witnessing the 
gradual transformation from a system of government to a system of governance. While 
government refers to a political system based on well-defined hierarchical relations 
revolving around a central (elected and national) body, governance refers to a looser and 
more scattered distribution of both internal and external political and economic power. 
Governance is also about changing modes of interaction between the private and the 
public sphere, changes that reflect a transformation of the authority structures in society.  
In this chapter, I outline concepts suitable of interpreting the significance of this 
transformative process. I start with a discussion of what is understood as part of the new 
regional narrative, which is the regional development concepts giving direction and 
content to the ideas inherent in much of current regional development processes. This 
discussion is followed by an introduction to the institutional changes necessary to adept 
to the new regional narratives that are the gradual adaptation of governance like 
structures in regional development. However, setting up a development rationale 
through the regional development concepts and providing regions with institutions that 
shall realise the aims inherent in these concepts are, as we shall see not enough to 
achieve the desired results. The governing idea is that initiatives, processes, 
developments, aims, and policies have to be relatively stringently coordinated to be 
effective. This coordination is done at different levels for instance through the 
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government issuing new laws and white papers, or the Norwegian Research Council 
focuses its recourses into specific desired policy areas, for instance regional innovation 
policies. However, the most important steering is still done on the regional level itself. 
The regional level must find ways to coordinate the direction of development in order 
for it to be effective, or at least this is the paramount idea in much of the recent 
governance literature, and as we shall see also in practice in the Agder region. What I 
conceive as a meaningful way of understanding and interpreting these steering 
principles is through what is known as regime theory. Regimes is to be understood as a 
informal but stable group of people, with access to institutional resources, who shares 
policy aims, and has a sustained role in policy development and decision-making 
processes (Stone 1989). 
In the subchapter following a discussion of regime theory, I outline more 
specifically what is the analytical framework of this thesis. Three perspectives are here 
developed on governance and regime processes in regional development in the Agder 
region.  
First, an instrumental perspective is applied to the understanding of the 
governance system and the regional regime. In this perspective the paramount 
understanding of the governance system is that governance is horizontal interaction 
between resourceful and interdependent actors, and that the purpose of governance itself 
is to give a strategic response to institutional fragmentation. Meta governance or regime 
steering is here to manipulate the institutional and organisational aspects of the 
governance framework in accordance with paramount development policies. The 
legitimacy of meta steering of governance processes is that it is a way of securing that 
the emerging governance system does not evolve into chaos. 
The second analytical perspective I outline to interpret the workings of the 
governance system and regional regime is institutional. Here is the paramount 
understanding of the governance system that governance is interactive steering based on 
institutional norms and rules, and that the purpose of governance itself is to give a 
response to fragmented and complex steering processes where the formulation and 
implementation of public policies happens in interaction between interdependent but 
autonomous actors. Meta governance or regime steering is here to re-institutionalise, 
shape, and develop identities and capacities in specific and wanted directions. The 
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legitimacy of meta steering of governance processes is that this re-institutionalisation is 
done with a democratic mindset and that democracy is strengthened through governance 
processes in society.  
The third and last perspective used to interpret the governance system and the 
regional regime is an ideological perspective. Here is the paramount understanding of 
the governance system that governance is best understood through what kind of power it 
exerts. Here governance is an institutionalised steering rationality and technology, 
which exerts a specific form of power, and that the purpose of governance itself is to 
support the exertion of an ideologically based development agenda. Meta governance or 
regime steering is here to mobilize actor’s energies and capabilities within discursively 
constructed bounds. The legitimacy of meta steering of governance processes is that the 
ideological definition of the institutional and normative bounds of development 
contributes to transforming the society and its institutions in necessary and wanted 
directions.  
The figure below is meant to illustrate that I am going to use the perspectives to 
analyse the same set of data: the regional practices. These perspectives are in some 
instances complementary, and in some instances distinct in that they have different 
conceptualisations of power, interests, democracy, rationality of man, and society. See 
chapter 4 for a discussion of theoretical triangulation. 
Fig. 3-1: Model of Analytical Framework 
Governance Regime
Instrumental perspective
Regional 
practices, 
institutions, 
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Governance Regime
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Following this discussion, the next subchapter introduces three different 
conceptualisations of democracy, the participatory understanding of democracy, the 
competitive understanding of democracy, and procedural democracy. The discussions of 
these perspectives are in chapter 7 used to analyse some of the practices associated with 
regional governance in the Agder region. 
The subchapter following these deals with the operational research questions of 
the thesis, and chapter 3 ends with a brief summary of the discussions. 
3.2 – New Regional Narratives 
The idea behind introducing the discourses connected to the economic development of 
geographical locations into a discourse of democracy in development is simply that it 
would be impossible to comprehend recent instrumental, institutional, and ideological 
changes without glancing at the “road map”. A “map” of development is what the 
regional development concepts are, as they convincingly describes to regional and 
national stakeholders both what the current state of affairs is, what the problems are, and 
what must be done to address the challenges successfully.  
The Managerial Inheritance 
 As a global society we have developed new and powerful structures and alliances 
between theory and industry. In academic circles is it a certain path to economic success 
and academic recognition to be interpreted as relevant for industrial development. It is 
however equally important for the consultancies to be associated with academia, and the 
world of international consultancy is indeed a lucrative business. The large global 
consultancy Accenture for instance generated net revenues of US$ 11.8 billion for the 
fiscal year that ended 31 August 2003 (Accenture & EPC 2004). 
John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, two journalists of The Economist, 
discuss this phenomena in their well informed book The Witch Doctors (1997). They 
write on the topic: 
For three groups of people, the link between theory and money is particularly important: 
professors, consultants, and managers. Increasingly, academics are keen not just on 
thinking up striking new ideas, but on selling them. Once such a taste for publicity might 
have provoked academic ostracism. Now, […] every young professor dreams of writing a 
best seller; and with even the best business schools desperately competing for students, 
every business-school dean encourages him (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 1997: 58).  
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None of the international consultancies is more influential than McKinsey & 
Company; at least if we measure in terms of who gets the best pay. As a consultancy 
they contribute to setting standards, practices, and framing of current development 
discourses in both large corporations, nation states and in the development of regional 
strategies. McKinsey are not just good at picking up on the latest trends they also 
develop the new trends themselves. Thus, names such as Tom Peters, Kenichi Ohmae, 
Robert Waterman, and more McKinsey representatives are associated with a long range 
of international best sellers. McKinsey even has its own journal the McKinsey Quarterly 
that looks as the Harvard Business Review, and has its own research institute, the 
McKinsey Global Institute which aims at adding to the academic glow of the company. 
McKinsey also allegedly spends $50m-100m a year on research (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge 1997: 59). McKinsey even has their own award system, and they have 
given the honours to Michael Porter twice. This consultancy strategy of bridging 
consultancy up to academia is one where McKinsey once set the standard, and is now 
being copied by every consultancy with global aspirations, and most tend have. Thus 
consultancies such as Accenture, The Boston Consulting Group, Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, PA Consulting Group, Capgemini, KPMG 
and many more have adapted to this strategy.  
Friedrick Taylor’s; Scientific Management, Peter Drucker’s; “Management by 
Objectives”, Tom Peter’s; beyond TQM: towards wow!, Michael Hammer and James 
Champy’s; Reengenering, The quality movement etc. (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 
1997), all signifie an important insight that what this business sells is not solutions, but 
grand ideas about problems that are more or less contextually indifferent2. Micklethwait 
and Wooldridge thus write: 
Management theory, according to the case against it, has four defects: it is 
constitutionally incapable of self-criticism; its terminology usually confuses rather than 
educates; it rarely rises above basic common sense; and it is faddish and bedevilled by 
contradictions that not would have been allowed in more rigorous disciplines. […] 
Modern management theory is no more reliable than tribal medicine. Witch doctors after 
all, often got it right- by luck, by instinct or by trial and error (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge 1997: 15). 
There are exceptions to such an offhand brush off of the managerial disciplines. 
Peter Drucker for instance launched the terminology of the “knowledge worker” as 
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early as 1959, and he got it right in the sense that blue collar workers have declined in 
number in many parts of the industrial world. However, there are more examples of 
those who got it completely wrong. Tom Peters was one of them. In Search of 
Excellence he identifies 43 excellent American companies; whose organisation and 
management styles should serve as examples for other companies to follow. Less than 
five years after its publication two thirds of these miracle organisations were either 
bankrupt, faltering, or troubled (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 1997).  
One problem of managerial theories is as mentioned that when applied 
individually they have the ability to confuse and obstruct organisational development 
processes. The larger problem is that they seldom are applied individually. In 1995 Bain 
& Co, did a survey on how managers used 24 leading management techniques. They 
found that the average company used 11.8 of these techniques in 1993, 12.7 in 1994, 
and on course to 14.1 in 1995 (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 1997: 17). It does however 
not exist any managerial theory to tell managers what the implications of applying all of 
these often-competing concepts simultaneously have on the development of their 
organisations.  
The “beauty” of the system, from the consultancy industry perspective, is that the 
less they work, the more managers are in need of “new medicine” to fix the problem, 
and new managerial concepts therefore just keep popping up. Richard Pascale did in 
1990 analyse the 27 most used fads. He found that two-thirds of them had emerged just 
during the 1980s, and since then this process has just picked up speed. A frustrated 
manger told Pascale that in the last 18-months he was being told that – “profit is more 
important than revenue, quality is more important than profit, that people are more 
important than profit, that customers are more important than our people, that big 
customers are more important than our small customers, and that growth is the key to 
success. No wonder our performance is inconsistent”, he concluded (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge 1997: 68). 
The large consultancies working globally probably saw the limitations in the 
market for business internal development as the competition steadily increased in this 
market segment during the 1980s and 1990s, and thus shifted a larger part of their 
attention to the more strategic aspects of business consulting. Within this realm of 
strategy planning the qualities of the environment where businesses are located was also 
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given an important role. This is probably also part of the explanation for the attention 
regional development ideas and concepts get from many of the larger consultancies. We 
should however, given many of the discouraging experiences from the management 
theory industry, also be cautious when similar tendencies emerge in the field of regional 
development, through the regional development concepts. One of the most influential 
regional development concepts as it is used as part of national and regional policies in 
Norway and elsewhere is Michael Porter’s cluster theory, a theory which diffusion 
actively has been supported by the large consultancy firm McKinsey & Company.  
Clusters and Regional Development 
It is no longer much controversy in a statement saying that the dividing lines between 
academia, high paid consultancy, and policy or managerial reform is blurred at best, or 
as critics often say, non-existent. This is true in the field of the management theory 
industry, and it is regrettably becoming a harsh reality in the field of regional 
development as well. Where interestingly enough many of the same “players” from the 
field of management theory play key roles in the emerging field of regional 
development, and where it is not the same people it certainly are many of the same ideas 
with a slightly new wrapping. 
Up until relatively recently the region was almost non-existent within the 
economic development discourse. The development discourse mainly related to nation 
states or to corporations. This has changed. And the reason for this change is the 
emphasis that is placed on technological innovations within especially information 
technology (for instance the success of the Internet, e-mail, mobile phones etc.). Wild 
exaggerations of the implications of globalisation (for instance articulated through 
statements such as we live in a global village, MTV, Coca-Cola, CNN, etc. give us 
similar cultural preferences etc.). The internationalisation of economical commerce (for 
instance the growth in companies outsourcing parts of their production lines to low cost 
countries), and the global influence of free-market promoting institutions (such as 
NAFTA, EU, EEC, IMF, The World Bank, WTO, ASEAN etc.)  
These features of economical globalisation are, however, developments that 
apparently should disqualify a focus on the regional level, but the case is the opposite, 
and two main sets of works have made it so. Firstly a book by Michael Piore and 
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Charles Sabel The second industrial divide: possibilities for prosperity (1984), proved 
to be very influential. Many have used their study of the development of industrial 
districts in Northern Italy and similar development tendencies in other countries to 
introduce the idea that a new industrial divide has been taking place in world economy. 
The development of some special regional clusters was regarded as a proof of larger 
development tendencies that consisted of new ways of producing commodities. This 
new way of producing was characterised by local networks of SMEs which 
independently where highly specialised in their production of their products or services. 
The SMEs used advanced production equipment and was able to maintain a high degree 
of flexibility through this and notably because of a close cooperation with other firms in 
the same situation. Piore and Sabel regarded this as a development model to gain 
competitiveness alternate to vertical integrated large companies dominating the 
economy in the 1950-1970s. Piore and Sabel do however not make the case for learning 
regions since they do not have a conceptual understanding of collective learning and 
shared knowledge as important factors for regional development. Nevertheless, others 
who suggested a different mode of thinking on development later used their arguments.  
In recent years, the discourse on industrial competitiveness has increasingly 
emphasised the significance of local and regional contexts. Michael Porter, 
consultancies such as McKinsey, and business schools around the world should get 
much credit for causing this through the global spread of the cluster rationale. In his 
cluster theory, Porter (1998a; 1998b) builds on Piore and Sabel when he emphasises the 
importance of local networks of enterprises as important environments to gain 
competitive enterprises. In an article from 1998, Porter writes:  
Paradoxically, the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly 
in local things - knowledge, relationships, and motivation that distant rivals cannot match 
(Porter 1998a: 77). 
If we live in a time of global competition a focus on regional development, as 
Porter states it, should be a paradox. Economic globalisation should make localisation 
irrelevant, because of speedier transportation, new information infrastructures, and the 
global market should allow competing businesses to get anything any time. However, 
Porter, and many with him, argues that localisation remains crucial to competition. 
Michael Porter understands clusters as: 
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[…] geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a 
particular field. Clusters encompass an array of linked industries and other entities 
important to competition. They include, for example, suppliers of specialized inputs such 
as components, machinery, and services, and providers of specialized infrastructure. 
Clusters also often extend downstream to channels and customers and laterally to 
manufacturers of complementary products and to companies in industries related by 
skills, technologies, or common inputs. Finally, many clusters include governmental and 
other institutions – such as universities, standards-setting agencies, think tanks, vocational 
training providers, and trade associations - that provide specialized training, education, 
information, research, and technical support (Porter 1998a). 
Porter (1998a) explains how clusters affect competition in three broad ways: 
“first, by increasing the productivity of companies based in the area; second, by driving 
the direction and pace of innovation, which underpins future productivity growth; and 
third, by stimulating the formation of new businesses, which expands and strengthens 
the cluster itself”. The focus on the regional level also mirrors an increasing attention to 
knowledge, learning, and innovation as decisive competitive elements for businesses 
and industries. This is particularly important in high cost countries.  
The governing idea is that much of the knowledge needed for a business to be 
innovative and competitive is tacit, that is a type of knowledge that cannot be 
transferred between individuals and institutions in a written form. Knowledge must in a 
way be tapped from the knowledge milieus and people that developed it, or have access 
to this knowledge trough networks. This new and locally anchored knowledge is seen as 
particularly important because many enterprises are part of global value chains. If 
globalisation also means that information about production can be spread around the 
world relatively quickly between different enterprises in different parts of the world. 
This means that enterprises in low cost countries can use the same advanced production 
equipment as enterprises in high cost countries. Since globalisation has led to that much 
knowledge and resources are easier to acquire everywhere, the central argument is that 
knowledge and other resources that are locally anchored and difficult to copy for other 
enterprises have increased in significance. Locally anchored learning processes and the 
development of unique knowledge are then central mechanisms in order to gain and 
maintain global competitiveness in enterprises and industries in high cost countries 
(Asheim & Isaksen 2006). 
Porter’s work on cluster has become the standard concept in the field of regional 
development, and policy makers all over the world have seized upon it as a tool for 
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promoting national, regional, and local competitiveness, innovation, and growth. 
However, it is often forgotten that Porter’s cluster model is a contested theory, and that 
many issues are related to it that should make policy makers vary it.  
The main lines of this criticism are that when you focus too much resources on 
local learning processes and knowledge transfer between local actors you risk that local 
learning processes freezes up, and you experience negative lock-ins. The reasoning for 
this is that possibilities for new ideas, attitudes, and the development of new knowledge 
are exhausted when the collaboration happens in too large extents between a set core of 
local enterprises and organisations (Asheim & Isaksen 2006). 
Policy makers and academics alike should also be wary of Porter’s cluster 
concept’s ambiguity. Porter’s definition is so vague, in term of geographical scale and 
internal socio-economical dynamics that the result is conceptual and empirical 
confusion. Porter’s cluster concept lacks clears boundaries, both industrial and 
geographical. Ron Martin and Peter Sunley (2003) therefore asks:  
At what level of industrial aggregation should a cluster be defined, and what range of 
related or associated industries and activities should be included? How strong do the 
linkages between firms have to be? How economically specialised does a local 
concentration of firms have to be to constitute a cluster? […] In addition, at what spatial 
scale, and over what geographical range, do clustering processes (inter-firm linkages, 
knowledge spillovers, rivalry, business and social networks, and so on) operate? What 
spatial density of such firms and their interactions defines a cluster? The difficulty is not 
just that the boundaries of clusters, as Porter admits, are ‘continuously evolving’, as new 
firms and industries emerge and established ones shrink or decline. More fundamentally, 
the definition itself seems intentionally opaque and fuzzy (R. Martin & Sunley 2003: 10-
1). 
Policy makers should bear in mind that Porter’s clusters are theoretical constructs, 
constructs without any essential self-defining boundaries. The concept is so generic that 
it is used to cover a whole assortment of types and degrees of specialised industrial 
locations. It is therefore difficult to read this any different than that Porter argues that 
his cluster concept is a universal phenomenon, where similar mechanisms work 
approximately in a similar fashion in different political, economical, social and cultural 
contexts around the world. 
Today's economic map of the world is dominated by what I call clusters: critical masses-
in one place –of unusual competitive success in particular fields. Clusters are a striking 
feature of virtually every national, regional, state, and even metropolitan economy, 
especially in more economically advanced nations (Porter 1998a). 
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Porter’s cluster approach to competition and competitive strategy are far from 
universally accepted around the world, within business economics, industrial 
organizations, and management studies, several authors criticise Porter’s generic 
competitive strategies as being to superficial, for lacking specificity, for being too 
difficult to measure, and for not being as interdependent of one another or as universally 
applicable as Porter assumes. Especially Porter’s notion of competitiveness should be 
viewed with extreme scepticism. Nations and regions do not compete with one another 
in the way firms do, the analogy between a company and a region is false (R. Martin & 
Sunley 2003: 15). In addition, since Porter’s cluster theory is among the most 
distributed and well-known development theories at present date, we should also ask 
where the competitive advantage really lies within the theory? If clusters exist more or 
less everywhere, and if almost every policy maker is aware of the finer points of the 
theory, then should not also everyone be able to implement it? 
One of the most influential thinkers and probably one of the consultants/ 
academics alongside Porter that has contributed most to that regions are put on the map 
as a hotbed for development both by politicians and firms is Kenichi Ohmae3. Ohmae’s 
coupling of globalism and regionalism is an expression of an ideological critique of the 
nation state – it is to small for some tasks and too large for other. Ohmae argues that in 
the borderless economy the only meaningful units are the spontaneous economical units, 
regions (Ohmae 1995a). He argues his case with reference to the dissolution of 
countries in the eastern-block and that countries as Germany, Canada and Spain are 
decentralizing authorities to their federal states and regions.  
Ohmae explains these developments towards stronger regions on three levels: 
Firstly, nation state authorities loose control when capital, persons, and information 
flow freely over state borders. Secondly, executive powers loose support if it cannot 
satisfy the consumer demands that arise when the global flow of information shows the 
cheapest and best products on the marked. Thirdly, the nation state restrains growth, and 
is economically destructive because it subsidises and reallocates resources. The nation 
state does not differentiate the cost of public services on basis of varying costs to 
produce them in different parts of a nation’s territory. This is because the citizens, the 
voters, in a nation state have standardized demands and expectations to public service 
regardless of where they are located; e.g. prises on telephony, postal services, 
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electricity, education, health care and communications cannot be too much 
differentiated within a nation state. The result is that productive areas must subsidize 
less productive areas, and consequently the nation states as a whole become inefficient 
units in the borderless economy. Ohmae states that the nation states are hostages of the 
economic logic of the past, and are incapable of putting the logic of the global marked 
first. There is no average Italy, but an industrialized north and a rural south, with 
enormous economic differences. The executive body of the state must mediate these 
differences, which have enormous destructive economic consequences (Ohmae 1995a). 
Ohmae represents in this sense a vigorous advocate for neoliberal ideology and theory. 
For Ohmae the nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for 
organizing human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world. It 
represents no genuine, shared community of economic interests; it defines no 
meaningful flows of economic activity. In fact, it overlooks the true linkages and 
synergies that exist among often-disparate populations by combining important 
measures of human activity at the wrong level of analysis. Consequently, on the global 
economic map the lines that now matter are those defining what may be called region 
states. The boundaries of the region state are not imposed by political decisions. The 
deft but invisible hand of the global market for goods and services draws them (Ohmae 
1995). Ohmae’s general comments, examples, and argumentation must be seen as a 
normative argument against the nation state. The nation state should dissolve because it 
restrains global capitalism, the global market (Østerud 1999; Normann 2005).  
The Wider Regional Development Discourse 
Porter recommends that policy makers does not prioritize between clusters, and rather 
upgrade those clusters that are not performing in a desirable manner, and then let the 
market decide who survives. 
This sort of role for government is a far cry from industrial policy. In industrial policy, 
governments target “desirable” industries and intervene-through subsidies or restrictions 
on investments by foreign companies, for example -to favour local companies. In 
contrast, the aim of cluster policy is to reinforce the development of all clusters. This 
means that a traditional cluster such as agriculture should not be abandoned; it should be 
upgraded. Governments should not choose among clusters, because each one offers 
opportunities to improve productivity and support rising wages. Every cluster not only 
contributes directly to national productivity but also affects the productivity of other 
clusters. Not all clusters will succeed, of course, but market forces - not government 
decisions -- should determine the outcomes (Porter 1998a). 
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However, since the sphere of regional development, as previously discussed, 
increasingly is sharing features with the sphere of organizational development and the 
management industry it is no longer only one development concept that serves as map 
for regional policy development. What we see is a growth in the use combinations of 
cluster theory with the idea of the knowledge economy. When cluster theory and ideas 
inherent in the knowledge or new economy are combined at the regional level, policy 
makers are inclined to give priority to development of resources to those industries that 
forge clusters of what is interpreted as knowledge intensive firms. 
 Such lines of thinking are supported by Phillip Cooke (2002), who argues that we 
are facing a new type of growth dynamics in economics represented by what he labels 
the knowledge economy, he argues that innovation and growth happen in new ways in 
the knowledge economy than within the traditional economy. The main argument from 
those arguing in favour of the knowledge economy is that it has occurred and will 
continue to shift from tangible modes of production to intangible modes of production. 
This is true in the sense that a larger and larger portion of the economy in industrialised 
countries produces non-physical services. It is however, a different question all together 
if this also means that some fundamentally new principle of economics or 
fundamentally new dynamics of production, the knowledge economy, results as a 
consequence of this shift. What we see are that economies and employment in 
industrialised countries still is dependent upon the mass production of commodities. 
Such “tangible” industries are still, and can still be competitive and important in high-
cost economies because of a combination of competences, technological advantages, 
natural resources, and supportive state policies towards these industries. 
In one sense, Cooke’s perspective represents a nuance of Porter’s more generic 
cluster concept, because he argues that the dynamics of clusters vary dependent on what 
type of cluster configuration that exists. Cooke has for instance expressed deep criticism 
to the concept of regional clusters because they basically do not work, are very difficult 
to build, and that you have to be very lucky in the conditions for them to actually work. 
According to Cooke, they do not seem to play so much of an important role in the 2000s 
when the economy is more flattened out than it was when it grew rapidly in the 1990’s. 
Cooke therefore does not see it viable to use the concept of clusters as a central 
development policy (Cooke 2006). 
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The ideas inherent in the knowledge economy are important because this thinking 
fits well with both other regional development concepts, such as Porter’s regional 
clusters and triple-helix, and because they are backed up by the growth of the 
information technology industry. However, policy makers should be wary of 
emphasizing it too much, particularly regions that not already have many industries 
within this segment. The Agder region has for instance only 4% of its workforce within 
this segment (H. C. G. Johnsen & Isaksen 2005), is it then a gamble for such regions to 
put they development resources into such industries, or is it better to put their resources 
into developing already existing industries? 
A third leg, in addition to clusters and knowledge, in the current regional 
development discourse is an increased focus on the quality of and for individuals 
resident in a particular area, other ways known as people climate. That is to 
systematically develop the qualities of the people that live in a particular location, or to 
develop regions in such a way that they attract people with desired qualities. Richard 
Florida has in later years been the central proponent of such ideas with his book The 
Rise of the Creative Class (Florida 2002). Thinking inherent in the creative class and 
creative regions concepts build on another influential regional development concept also 
introduced by Richard Florida, namely the learning region (Florida 1995). The main 
argument behind talking about learning regions is that is it a restricted geographical area 
where learning and the facilitation of learning processes take place. Florida (1995) 
defines learning in regions by the same criteria that characterises knowledge intensive 
firms. This implies continuous development, innovation competencies, knowledge -
sharing, -creation, and organisational learning. Cooke (1999: 2) states that a learning 
region has both vertical and horizontal arrangements for knowledge transfer, tacit and 
explicit information exchange, and diversified formal and informal skill providers. 
Florida argues that regions are becoming focal points for knowledge creation and 
learning in the new age of global, knowledge-intensive capitalism, as they in effect 
become learning regions. These learning regions function as collectors and repositories 
of knowledge and ideas, and provide the underlying environment or infrastructure, 
which facilitates the flow of knowledge, ideas, and learning (Florida 1995: 527). Even if 
Florida sees the learning region as the central dynamo in the global economy, he also 
notes that:  
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“[…] while several outstanding studies have chronicled the rise of knowledge-based 
capitalism, outlined the contours of learning organization, and described the knowledge-
creating company, virtually no one has developed a comparable theory of what such 
changes portend for regions and regional organization” (Florida 1995: 528).  
Maybe in an attempt to address just this problem Richard Florida launches the 
idea of creative class. In this perspective, the significance of the knowledge and 
creativity in the workforce is emphasized, specially the part of the work force that is 
involved in problem solving and innovative activities. Enterprises will in this 
perspective localize where there is ample access to creative and highly educated 
workforce.  
The bottom line is that cities need a people climate even more than they need a business 
climate (Florida 2002: 283). 
The essence of Florida’s (2002) theory is that creativity and the ability to innovate 
are the most important input factors for innovation and growth in industries. Creative 
and highly educated workers are therefore decisive production factors. Locations that 
have particular qualities that are attractive to the creative class have therefore 
competitive advantages to other places (H. C. G. Johnsen & Isaksen 2005). 
The creative class theory has been highly successful. In Norway counties, for 
instance Sør-Trøndelag, and municipalities, for instance Kristiansand in Agder, are 
adapting their policies to it. Part of the strength of the theory is that it has the power to 
appeal to policy makers both on the left and on the right side of the political spectrum. It 
promises economical growth at the same time as it argues the crucial importance of for 
instance tolerance. The theory has however also been subject to much criticism from the 
political right for advocating increased public spending. Steven Malanga, an American 
conservative commentator, for instance writes: 
Florida argues, cities must dispense with stuffy old theories of economic development—
like the notion that low taxes are what draw in companies and workers—and instead must 
spend heavily on cultural amenities and pursue progressive social legislation (Malanga 
2004). 
Morten Levin and Monica Rolvsen speak of Florida’s theory as the “Emperors 
New Clothes”, and criticise academics and policy makers for uncritically jumping after 
the latest fashionable ideas. They also point to flaws in Florida’s use of the concepts of 
‘class’. Florida’s conceptualisation of a class is that it consists of higher education 
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professions, doctors, engineers, architects, lawyers etc., and extended to a group of 
people that are thought to be particularly creative. However, if the concept of class shall 
have any real meaning then it also must constitute a collective with joint interests. 
Florida fails to show that this for the creative class (Levin & Rolvsen 2004). Others 
raise questions of causality with Florida’s theory. Is it creative people that stimulate 
economical growth, or is it economical growth that attracts creative people (Gårdsvoll 
2005: 12). Another problem with Florida’s theory is that it is thought to have universal 
application and can be applied more or less generic. It has in a sense the same problem 
as Porter’s cluster theory, as it can be interpreted as being contextually indifferent. 
Many have raised this critique. Problems that have been pointed out are for instance the 
problem of explaining the phenomena of the growing economies in totalitarian regimes 
in Asia using Florida’s theory. And the city of Berlin, which apparently scores well on 
Florida’s indexes (gay, melting pot, and bohemian) and his 3 ‘T’s’ (talent, technology 
and tolerance), but as a city still struggles with low rate economical growth.  
Thus we must be open to the possibility that Florida’s creative class theory has 
more weight in explaining economical growth in multiethnic, industrially high tech, and 
large city region in the USA, than in (compared to the US relatively) monoethnic, low 
tech, small regions of e.g. Norway. Or to the possibility that creative class is not an 
explanation for economical growth at all, but one of many relatively frequent 
“symptoms” of it, and not the “medicine” itself. If the latter were the case, then 
politicians and policy makers trying to adapt their strategies to Florida’s concept would 
be comparable to recommending a suntan and nice suit instead of an education and 
social networks to a talented young person seeking a successful career in business. 
The main problem with the theory as a policy tool is however that it is extremely 
individually oriented, that it easily could be seen as promoting social injustice, and that 
it could widen class gaps when implemented. Even though Florida argues that the goal 
of the creative class theory is to include everyone into the creative class and that 
tomorrow’s winner regions will be those that have the largest part of their workforce in 
the creative economy. However, if we look at some of the success cases that Florida 
emphasises in the US much of the economical growth there is stimulated by cheap 
immigrant labour that does much of the low skilled jobs. Thus we must think that 
people living in regions adapting to Florida’s creative class concept, still need their 
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houses cleaned, children looked after, buses and cabs driven, buildings cleaned, garbage 
removed, etc., and that the demand for such services only will increase when a larger 
and larger proportion of the population gets involved in the so-called creative part of the 
economy. It is therefore difficult to see the creative class theory as making a positive 
contribution to equality and class distinction problems in societies.  
Those interested in inquiring into this subject should read Lindholm and Møller’s 
(2004) neoliberal interpretations of Florida’s theory. In their perspective is it not enough 
for policy makers to just invest in the creative class, but that the winner nations or 
regions should prioritise and invest in a small elite within what is defined as the creative 
class, thus promoting efforts that make the gap between the privileged and influential 
and those that are not, even larger. 
Regional Innovation 
It looks as though academics, business leaders, administrators, and politicians now have 
a shared understanding and agree that the answer to the regional job and growth 
challenge is innovation in itself. We also know that the dominant thoughts of how 
innovation processes actually occur and subsequently how they can be stimulated have 
changed substantially over the last fifteen years.  
The core components in the Norwegian innovation policies in the 70s and 80s 
were on research and on building strong competence centres, the MIT-model4. This was 
manifested in practice through the establishment of new regional research and 
development milieus: like e.g. regional colleges, with courses in economy and 
engineering, regional research institutions, technical and mercantile competence centres, 
etc. All these initiatives were bound together by a specific idea on how innovations 
diffuse, how technology and competence are spread. A core concept here is technology 
and knowledge transfer. The idea was that if you physically locate competences in one 
location these will somehow be transferred out into the region and stimulate innovation 
processes in enterprises which in turn will generate growth and jobs.  
This way of thinking of innovation is later labelled the linear model of innovation 
(Malecki 1991). In terms of success this model has proved fruitful for advancing lesser 
and incremental innovations. However, the question has arisen if lesser and incremental 
innovations are enough when enterprises are competing in an increasingly globalised 
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world-economy (Isaksen 1997). Within the linear innovation model, SME’s that would 
upgrade their innovative capacity had to introduce products and production process 
techniques based on formal research and development. Crevoisier5 claims that 
confidence in incremental innovations “would mean that these areas will very quickly 
exhaust the technical paradigm on which they are founded”, and since most businesses 
in Norway and elsewhere are SME’s, the strategy of building strong competence centres 
that would transfer knowledge and innovations out into businesses in the regions have 
not worked too well. The linear model is therefore now commonly regarded as flawed 
with respect to SMEs. It is in many instances irrelevant for the large multi-located 
global competing firm exactly where or in which of its units the innovative activity 
takes place. As long as it strengthens the company’s ability to compete on the global 
market. However, for the regions in question it makes a world of difference if they are 
“blessed” with a strong R&D milieu or not. Malecki (1991)6 illustrates the linear 
innovation model in the following way:  
Fig. 3-2: The Linear Innovation Model, adaptation of Isaksen (1997: 61). 
Idea and concept 
development:
Basic scientific 
research and applied 
research.
Drawings and 
descriptions:
Product and process 
development.
Production:
Manufacture a new 
product, implement 
new technology.
Diffusion:
Marketing products, 
diffusion of 
technology.
 
 
The simplified idea behind this ideal model is that the concept for an innovation 
stems from an R&D institution or the research department in a large enterprise. In the 
next phase the concept is made operational into drawings and schematics in a subsidiary 
development department, before the engineers take over and find out how the product 
can be produced or how the production process can be implemented. The last step is 
when the marketing department sells the new product, service, or process in the open 
market (Isaksen 1997).  
In the linear model research and development are separated from the production 
processes. A consequence of this view has been that large multi-located corporations 
have chosen to physically locate most of its R&D activities near or adjacent to 
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universities or other R&D institutions, where there is ample access to a skilled work 
force. Localization of other more standardized processes, like production, have been 
delegated to more peripheral parts of the country or to low-cost countries altogether, 
where a lesser skilled work force is needed. An unintended or dysfunctional 
consequence of this business strategy has been that the product or service producing 
enterprises has been lesser and lesser involved in innovative activities.  
The alternative and now dominating perspective on innovation is labelled the 
interactive model of innovation. Often associated with Post-Fordism, where knowledge 
is the most important resource and learning is the most important process (Isaksen 
1997). It is made visible through concepts like industrial districts (Piore & Sabel 1984), 
which influenced much thinking in the latter parts of the 1980s. Amin and Thrift’s 
(1994) use of the concept institutional thickness. Lundvall and Johnson’s (1994) 
coupling of the concept of innovation to interactive learning, as an opposition to a more 
one-sided transfer of knowledge, technology and competencies. Collaboration as an 
important strategy to promote innovations (Asheim 2000). The learning regions concept 
(Florida 1995), and social learning and communicative rationality (Lundvall 1993). All 
of these contributions, and more, tried to develop models that were more accurate in 
describing how the innovation processes actually occur, so that planners, politicians, 
and business leaders later could adjust their policies.  
The innovation process is in this new perspective no longer linear. This also 
means that the innovative process is much more complex and difficult to handle than it 
previously were thought to be. It is also apparent that the innovation process now 
includes more activities than just those that are strictly R&D oriented. The interactive 
model implies a sort of collective learning and development process that goes beyond 
the reach of one single actor, institution or enterprise. In addition, and most notably the 
innovation process, is in this perspective not only a technical process it is also a social 
process. 
Asheim (2000) uses Habermas’ concept of life-world to describe this. Habermas 
defines the life-world as the spheres of society where the interaction between people is 
based on communicative action (Habermas 1987). In the perspective of innovation 
theory, the main point is that “system” and “life-world” are characterised by different 
forms of rationality. While the “system” of the “economy” and “politics” spheres of 
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society are dominated by strategic, instrumental rationality, the “life-world” is 
dominated by a non-instrumental, communicative rationality. The dominating position 
of the instrumental, techno-economic rationality of modern industrial societies results in 
a colonisation of the life-world by the system, i.e. the reorganisation and 
instrumentalisation of the life-world to become part of the system (Asheim 2000). Thus, 
the ideas of interactive learning and innovation processes have gained a prominent 
position in local development agendas. 
Such ideas and more have been conceptualised as regional innovation systems 
(RIS). RIS is formulated in part, as a critique of the idea of national innovation systems 
(NIS), which in practice is a sectored approach to innovation. NIS is in the perspective 
of the RIS approach or underemphasising the horizontal interaction that is needed in 
order to produce innovations (Cooke 2006). In the underlying concept of innovation 
systems, particularly the variant known as regional innovation systems, it is often held 
that differences in economic performance between relatively more or less successful 
regions can be explained by looking at the mix of regional innovation policies and 
institutions that foster economic dynamism (Cooke & Memedovic 2006). RIS 
represents in this sense the totality of policies, public, and private institutions, R&D 
institutions, industries etc. aimed at regional development. RIS involves co-operation in 
innovation activity between firms and knowledge creating and diffusing organisations, 
such as universities, colleges, training organisations, R&D-institutes, technology 
transfer agencies, business associations, and finance institutions (Asheim & Herstad 
2003: 245). RIS systems are analytically thought to wary in type arrangement, size etc., 
and the RIS approach does therefore represent a more sophisticated approach to the 
discussion of regional development and innovation than for instance Porter’s cluster 
concept. The RIS literature therefore describes a wide variety of typologies described as 
RIS.  
The last important regional development concept I discuss here is what is known 
as triple-helix (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997b). A ‘triple-helix’ of academia-industry- 
and government relations, develops theoretically and practically as a result of a 
departure from the old social contract between academia and society, the linear model, 
to the new social contract that is more complex, and encompasses both old modes of 
thinking and working combined with new ones. Thus the originators of the concept, 
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Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff, link it up to both interactive learning and 
innovation as well as mode-2 type of knowledge production (Gibbons, Limoges, 
Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott, & Trow 1994). triple-helix does as the other regional 
development concepts promise to be a key component in any national or regional 
innovation strategy (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997b: 3-4). The triple-helix concept is 
very much linked to the idea that we now live in what essentially is a knowledge based 
economy, thus it now advocates complexity in the political system since knowledge 
production no longer is controlled from a single point (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997b: 
6)7. 
Cooke (2006) criticises Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff’s use of the triple-helix 
concept for being to generalizing, for linking the idea of the knowledge economy too 
much to the idea of triple-helix, and for emphasising the importance of collaboration 
between the triple-helix partners without saying much about the difficulties. Cooke 
states that the triple-helix concept presupposes that the three spheres easily can agree, 
thereby underestimating that industries, government and universities can have and 
represent fundamentally different interests. For instance, it can be in the interest of a 
government to increase employment in a given location, while the industry can view 
investments in that localisation as bad investments. Cooke therefore argues that triple-
helix is a top down and bureaucratic way of thinking of development and innovation 
(Cooke 2006). 
The triple-helix concept is also vulnerable to much of the same critique as the idea 
of the knowledge economy itself. Exactly how fundamentally different are the 
mechanisms in this new economy? Was not earlier economical development also based 
on the development on new knowledge? What is so different between knowledge 
associated with higher academic education, and knowledge developed through 
generations and passed on through practical education and learning? These concepts and 
ideas, triple-helix and knowledge economy, do not answer such questions, and we 
should therefore also be wary of taking their hypotheses on the future of the global 
economy as given truths. 
The strength and the positive effect of the triple-helix concept is that it contributes 
to challenge academic institutions, especially Universities, to think through the role they 
can, should, and will play in and towards the wider society. The weakness and negative 
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effect is that this new role often gets a too narrow interpretation. Henry Etzkowitz 
(1997: 141) compares modern triple-helix structures to the Iron Triangles of the 
military-industrial complex8. The fear is that triple-helix structures develop academia 
into sub contractors for certain segments of the industry, with the subsequent loss of 
academic freedom9 and industrial democracy.  
A report, part of the process10 of developing the follow up of the Value Creation 
2010 programme, reports the findings from a series of 13 regional dialogue conferences 
(NFR 2006). The result of this process VRI (policy instruments for regional innovation) 
is the merge of three Norwegian Research Council projects, “Næringsrettet 
høgskolesatsing”, “Value Creation 2010”, and “Forskningsbasert Kompetansemegling”. 
The report states that the new VRI-programme should act in accordance with three 
fundamental principles: Firstly, research must be oriented towards the needs of 
enterprises and others. Secondly, the users (enterprises) must arrange for increased use 
of research-based knowledge, and thirdly innovation work must be seen in a broad 
societal perspective, based on the insight that no single actor can overview the basis for, 
and consequences of innovation (NFR 2006: 4).  
This should indicate, at least if we talk on behalf of VRI, that the indication of a 
an extreme neoliberal variant of triple-helix that we find in (Lindholm & Møller 2004), 
is not fully manifested yet, at least if we believe that the direction indicated in this 
report is representative for current Norwegian Research Council thinking. However, it is 
worth noting a certain level of instrumentality in the perspective on research in the new 
programme, and that the programme at least at this stage is vague on the relationship 
between development work and research, consultancy and research, and between 
academic freedoms vs. the interests of the market (enterprises). And the relationship and 
responsibility research has for the wider society, for instance democratic practices (NFR 
2006). 
Summary 
To sum up is it fair to say that the regional development concepts are different, but the 
differences should as Asheim and Mariussen (2003: 15) say not be over-emphasised, at 
least if we choose to focus on the practical and local interpretations of these concepts. 
They often seem to mean much the same, a continued focus on and development of 
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temporary organisations, networks, partnerships and development organisations, paired 
with a belief in that this somehow must result in learning, knowledge development, 
more innovative industries, economical growth and regional competitiveness and 
prosperity. Even if these economical concepts rapidly have found their way into 
regional and national policies, academics still have the, now increased, responsibility of 
subjecting these concepts to the same level of scepticism and inquiry as we would any 
other theoretical concept and theory. If this were done, maybe policy makers would be 
more wary of uncritically adapting to them. Such simple observations as these, and 
others, that Porter’s cluster concept and Florida’s creative class have the uncertainty 
connected to them that it is unclear if they cause economic development or are mere 
symptoms of economic development, something that should incline policy makers into 
further inquiries before implementing policy change based on the recommendations 
inherent in the concepts. Then the main problem is that these often-faddish concepts 
direct policy makers into allocating development resources into areas where they have 
little or less impact, than if they were used in areas of the regional economy where they 
mattered. We should by now that as in modern medicine merely treating symptoms of 
an unknown illness at best only has a random effect on the underlying illness.  
In addition to this there are many combinations of these concepts in the literature, 
for instance a combination of creative class and Porter clusters, or combinations of 
Porter’s clusters and the knowledge economy, or knowledge economy and creative 
class, etc. Combinations that we can easily identify in regional practices in the Agder 
region, thus also representing combinations which consequences we know little or 
nothing about. The table below summarises my critique of the regional development 
concepts. 
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Tab. 3-1: Main Features of the Discussed Regional Development Concepts (I) 
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Tab. 3-2: Main Features of the Discussed Regional Development Concepts (II) 
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The effect these regional development concepts have had on regional practices so 
far is something that is discussed throughout this thesis. The main problem is not the 
theoretical discourse connected to regional concepts and theories, and it is neither a 
problem in itself that academics develop theories on regional development and 
innovation. This is good and should ideally help society, academia, and policy makers 
to refine and improve on their ideas and practices on development. The problem is that 
the level of sophistication, the reservations, and the relative abstract theories and 
concepts often are lost when these theories, often aided by academics and consultants, 
are translated into operative policies. Academics can only very limitedly control how 
their theories and conceptualisations later are used. But to put it bluntly, too often the 
ten slides PowerPoint variant of literally thousands of articles and books, years of 
academic discourse and controversy too often constitute the basis of many regional 
development initiatives and policies. The copy and paste approach to development 
seems to be firmly rooted. An anticipation of some of the conclusions from this thesis, a 
sketchy sum up of my general critique of the new role now acquired by the regional 
narratives are listed below:  
(1) Unsubstantiated exaggeration of the implications of globalisation and innovations in 
communications technologies have for the current regional dynamics of economics and 
development.  
(2) Faddish focus on popular, new, and well marketed development concepts as opposed 
to those ideas and theories on economical development that actually have provided 
locations with their present industrial infrastructure.  
(3) An unsubstantiated and uncritical link between the importance of innovation and 
R&D processes and economical growth in: a) lower tech business segments, b) 
enterprises and business not competing internationally, and c) small and medium sized 
businesses.  
(4) A too uncritical belief in enterprises preferences towards: a) economically risky 
innovation and R&D processes, b) taking on larger societal development responsibilities, 
and c) engaging themselves in processes that could strengthen the competition, compared 
to enterprises preferences towards engaging and dedicating themselves to proven 
profitable stable production, marketing and sales processes. 
(5) An extreme focus on the importance of networks and “high tech” knowledge intensive 
industries, followed by ignorance towards industry segments that are interpreted as old or 
traditional. 
Chapter 3 – Regional Discourses 
- 59 - 
(6) Too often a (post-) positivistic belief in the universality of concept applicability in 
different social systems and contexts.  
(7) The emergence of a narrow, uniformed, and market based perspective on the subject 
of regional development. 
(8) Emergence of a regional governance system that is too focused on realising the policy 
ends and rationales inherent in the regional development concepts. 
(9) Lack of focus on local/regional knowledge development processes, local/regional 
needs, something that contributes to a lack of context sensitiveness. 
(10) Emergence of regional practices that still are in a much too linear and autocratic 
knowledge transfer mode. 
(11) Most of the regional development concepts have gotten the regional interpretation 
that innovation and networks somehow are connected entities. Thus, we have seen almost 
an explosive growth in temporarily organisations, different types of partnerships, a 
conglomerate of different network structures, development organisations, new 
organisations projects aimed at building even more networks and partnerships.  
(12) Emergence of regional governance systems with a diffuse system of authority, 
responsibility, and accountability. 
(13) The emergence of new regional meta steering and policy developing structures 
(regional regimes). 
(14) Dysfunctional implications for the practice of democracy, in different regional 
spheres.  
These regional development concepts are spread through consultancies, policy 
advising institutions such as the OECD, European Union, the World Bank, and through 
academic professionals, and academic institutions, and have rapidly found their way 
into national and regional policies all over the world. It is often easy to forget that these 
concepts now dominate thinking on regional development and innovation are very novel 
ideas, and that it is less than ten years since most of them first were mentioned in a 
publication11. If we look at the time since they found their way into regional policies in 
the Agder region we are talking of less than half that time. Our experiences with the 
effects of trying to implement policies based on these concepts are therefore very 
limited. We should therefore realise that we are witnessing what should be regarded as a 
grand scale societal experiment where we all are guinea pigs, and that our strive for 
more innovation has put core institutions and societal values on the card table, and that 
this almost by necessity will have long term, and yet unrecognized consequences. 
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The regional development concepts are all to varying degrees instrumental in the 
sense that they come with a promise of addressing the regional and local challenge of 
economic growth, innovation and increased competitiveness. These concepts also have 
significant institutional effects, in the sense that they prescribe certain ways and 
directions of structuring and organising the institutional landscape in regions, and that 
they all to a variable extent have a specific ideological manifestation in that they set an 
almost all encompassing market oriented direction for regional policies. The most 
concrete effect of this new regional narrative is, not yet innovation, but the emergence 
of a governance system. A regional governance system that has emerged because of 
increased orientation towards market interests combined with massive institutional 
transformations modelled on the recommendations built-in the regional development 
concepts. 
3.3 – Governance 
George Frederickson (2004) argues that it was Harlan Cleveland in 1972 who first used 
the word governance as an alternative phrase to public administration. Cleveland saw 
the blurring of the distinction between public and private organizations, and he was the 
first that associated this blurring with a concept of governance and he used governance 
as a normative argument in favour of less government and more governance. Cleveland 
simply stated that the people want less government and more governance.  
The organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical pyramids with most 
of the real control at the top. They will be systems– interlaced webs of tension in which 
control is loose, power diffused, and centres of decision plural. “Decision-making” will 
become an increasingly intricate process of multilateral brokerage both inside and outside 
the organization which thinks it has the responsibility for making, or at least announcing, 
the decision. Because organizations will be horizontal, the way they are governed is likely 
to be more collegial, consensual, and consultative. The bigger the problems to be tackled, 
the more real power is diffused and the larger the number of persons who can exercise it– 
if they work at it” (Cleveland 1972: 13)12.  
Cleveland also had perspectives on the individual accountability and 
responsibility associated with horizontal multi-organizational systems. For Cleveland 
accountability for the public executive is associated with his/her problem solving 
capacity. “In a society characterized by bigness and complexity it is those individuals 
who learn to get things done in organizational systems who will have a rational basis for 
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feeling free” (Cleveland 1972: 135)13. The origin of the governance concept developed 
in a US context, where governance is based and legitimised by system effectiveness. To 
put it another way – “big government cannot govern effectively; we therefore need 
governance to solve the big problems of our societies”. 
Long after Cleveland developed the concept of governance into the dominant and 
prominent subject in public administration. The field formerly known as public 
administration is now governance. The Brookings institute for instance recently 
changed the name of its highly regarded “Governmental Studies” programme to 
“Governance Studies”. Important European Universities are now teaching graduate 
courses in governance with graduate curricula, not unlike traditional public 
administration curricula in both Europe and US. Influential journals in the field of 
public administration are including governance in its titles. Governance has become a 
virtual synonym to public administration and public management (Frederickson 2004). 
It does not exist any authoritative understanding of what governance is and more 
important what it is not. Governance has become so popular and its use so diverse and 
widespread that it in essence is becoming a meaningless concept. Governance has in a 
sense dozens of meanings. Frederickson (2004) states that because governance is a 
power word, a dominant descriptor, and the current preference of academic tastemakers, 
there has been a rush to affix to it all of the other fashions of the day. To exemplify this 
Frederickson (2004) lists a dozen of different uses of governance, the list below 
represents a brief excerpt of prevailing definitions of governance: 
“Governance is the shift from the bureaucratic state to the hollow state or to third-party 
government” (Rhodes 1997; Milward & Provan 2000).  
“Governance is market-based approaches to government” (Nye & Donahue 2002).  
“Governance is the development of social capital, civil society, and high levels of citizen 
participation” (Kooiman 1993; Hirst 2000).  
“In the United Kingdom governance is Tony Blair’s “third way”, a political packaging of 
the latest ideas in new public management, expanded forms of political participation, and 
attempts to renew civil society” (Newman 2001).  
“Governance is the new public management or managerialism” (Considine & Painter 
1997).  
“Governance is public-sector performance” (Lynn, Hill, & Heinrich 2001).  
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“Governance is interjurisdictional cooperation and network management” (Peters & 
Pierre 1998).  
“Governance is globalization and rationalization” (Pierre & Peters 2000)14. 
Frederickson (2004) summarizes his critique of the application of the governance 
concept into five main points. He questions if governance brings anything new to the 
table other than being a “rehash of old academic debates under new names”. Second, he 
criticizes the concept in itself for being woolly, so broad that virtually any meaning can 
be attached to it. Third, that it is so loaded with values that are stated in such ways that 
they seem implicit, when in fact they are not. He proceeds to state that, some 
approaches to governance wrap anti-bureaucratic and anti-government sentiments and 
contains clear sentiments for markets over government, and that this point is particularly 
relevant for understanding the democratic deficits associated with some models of 
governance. Fourth, governance is often stated to be about dynamic change, about 
reform, about getting things right. Frederickson (2004) argues that the underlying value 
of governance is not primarily about change they are about order. “Most descriptions of 
elements of governance – networks, inter-organizational and inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation, power-sharing federations, public-private partnerships, and contracting-out 
– are forms of institutional adaptation in the face of increasing interdependence” 
(Frederickson 2004). Fifth, governance is often cantered on non-state institutions both 
non-profit and for-profit contractors, non-governmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations. State-and jurisdiction-cantered theory and research 
are, from some governance perspectives, passé. Rhodes (2000)15 argues that when this 
perspective is implemented it seriously diminishes the capacity of the core state 
executive to steer. 
Independent of this, discourses on governance networks have developed as the 
organising metaphor for the study of interactive forms of political decision making 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2005). In a sense, it represented a shift from the study of pluralism 
and neo-pluralism, corporativism and neo-corporativism to the study of policy-networks 
and later governance-networks. Political networks are now of great immediate interest 
in the discourse on how political systems in the western world can be made more 
effective and legitimate. Before early 1990s networks were mainly considered as 
illegitimate and impenetrable informal characteristic features of any political system, 
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when contrasted to Weberian theories of bureaucracy and the idea of the 
parliamentarian steering chains. Interplay between networks and the wider political 
institutions should therefore not be understood as a qualitatively new phenomenon. 
What is new is that networks and partnerships now are increasingly regarded by public 
authorities as necessary to bring forth effective and legitimate societal steering. This 
wave of enthusiasm on behalf of networks is nowadays found in almost any relevant 
policy document from any political institution on the western hemisphere. 
The discourse on networks, within academia, associated to governance has 
developed out of developments within theories on pluralism and corporativism. Both 
these sets of theories shared in their time the perspective that a long range of “private” 
actors played central roles within the representative democracies of the world. They 
were however also in opposition to each other, they were in disagreement of the 
evaluation of the relative strength that should be attributed to the state in relation to 
other actors, and the consequences “private actor’s” central role had on the larger 
distribution of power and influence in society. 
The pluralists, represented by Robert A. Dahl, Charles Lindblom, and Stein 
Rokkan among others, assessed the state as relatively weak; the state was primarily 
assumed to play a mediating role between different societal groups. The thesis of “group 
competition” had a strong position; if a group did not “win” in one policy area, it would 
win in a later point in time, or in a different area. The consequences of this political 
system was by the pluralists regarded to have weaknesses compared to political ideals, 
but in sum it was seen as positive by the pluralists (Hernes 2004; Sørensen & Torfing 
2005).  
The corporatists represented by for instance Philippe Schmitter and Trond Nordby 
among many others, assessed the role of the state as stronger than what was assumed by 
the pluralists. This was because the state itself could decide on which groups it wanted 
to collaborate with, and thereby define what groups gained access to power and 
influence. The consequence of this view was for the corporativists that it was 
unfortunate for the “balance of power” in society that some groups gained access while 
others were excluded. It was assumed that what was differentiated between those who 
gained access and those who did not, was the quality of their organisation and their 
resource base (Nordby 1994; Hernes 2004; Sørensen & Torfing 2005).  
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Between pluralism in its “pure form”, often used to describe political systems in 
the USA (Dahl 1961), and the state corporative model often used to describe Fascist-
Italy and Nazi-Germany, a concept of social corporativism as a position in between 
came into operation (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979; Nordby 1994). Within the social 
corporative model it is one organization that dominates the different sectors of society, 
eventually interest organisations are ordered hierarchically in relation to each other in 
their relationship to the state. The state controls the organisations through different 
certifications and financing arrangements. The interest organisations in turn get 
monopoly to negotiate with public authority within their policy segment (Nordby 1994). 
Within the Norwegian political science research it has existed competing 
understandings of which of the different models that have been best suited to describe 
the political system in Norway. The dominating interpretation has however been a 
variant of organisational pluralism. But Trond Nordby (1994) has argued that the 
Norwegian state first shows signs of state corporativism in the period 1945-1952 (that 
the state in large controls organisational life), and thereafter develops into semi or social 
corporativism from 1952 into the 1980s. Nordby’s point is that Rokkan and those who 
argued the case for the segmented state or pluralism are not justified (Østerberg 1997). 
Nordby does in this sense present a different interpretation than that argued for by Stein 
Rokkan who argued for corporative pluralism and later for organisational pluralism. 
Stein Rokkan claimed in the 1960s that Norwegian society was closest to the pluralistic 
model. The state had no power over the organisations, while the organisations freely 
could approach the state in order to realise their goals and interests. Those who argued 
the case for the segmented state in the first power study (Olsen 1978), had a similar 
point of view. The association between the state and the organisations they claimed was 
characterised not by state supremacy but by the state’s lack of unity and consequent 
weakness. When state policies are forged in committees, where politicians and 
administrators meet knowledgeable people from the organisations, the state 
representatives lose their affection to the state, the state thereby loses its unity, and risks 
falling apart into a series of segments where special interests prevail (Olsen 1978; 
Østerberg 1997). 
Internationally the theoretical discourse between the corporativists and the 
pluralists loosened somewhat during the 1980s. Corporatists become new-corporatists, 
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which partly deemphasised their assessment of the position of the state, and partly the 
conception that it is only the most resourceful organisations that can play a role in 
policy development (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979). Pluralists become new-pluralists 
and recognise the point that “some are more equal than others”, for instance the point 
that in capitalist societies public authorities are strongly predisposed to interests and 
preferences held by industry and enterprise leaders (Lindblom 1977).  
When new-corporativist and new-pluralist theories individually and together were 
used as theoretical basis for empirical studies, it became clear that their conclusions, 
from their respective theoretical angle, became relatively similar. Their conclusion was 
–”it depends”. Different policy areas and segments such as culture, agriculture, 
research, education, industry, etc, could demonstrate large differences in how the 
relation between public authorities and private actors were organised. The state could be 
relatively strong and have much influence in some policy areas, while organisations and 
interest groups could be the dominating part in other policy areas (Jensen & Sørensen 
2003; Sørensen & Torfing 2005). 
Probably much because of this does the theoretical and empirical focus in the 
early 1990s start to shift away from more or less mechanical and generalised 
conceptions about the relationship between interest groups and public authorities, to 
concrete interaction patterns within different policy segments. Policy networks therefore 
develop as a central concept, where the focus is put on organising, mode of operation, 
and structure in different political sub-systems (Rhodes 1990; Jordan & Schubert 1992). 
These early analysis of policy-networks concluded in line with the new-corporatist that 
networks democratically problematic part because they hampered democratically 
elected authorities to implement the policies they were elected on, and partly because 
the influence between different networks was unevenly distributed. This because of the 
bias towards the continuance a network represents when it first is consolidated. When 
costs, roles, and responsibilities are distributed among network actors, it is difficult for 
politicians to withdraw this or exert direct influence. This was the argument in some of 
the early policy-network analyses. When networks were evaluated against efficiency 
and democracy criterions, the answer in the first policy-network studies was therefore 
negative on both accounts. They performed poorly in terms of steering efficiency 
because the networks seen as promoting conservatisms were blocking innovation and 
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flexible adaptation to new tasks, and poorly in terms of democracy since it made it more 
difficult to place political responsibility, because decisions were made by network 
actors that were not elected (Jensen & Sørensen 2003; Sørensen & Torfing 2005). 
During the 1990s some of the earlier conclusions from the policy-networks 
studies turned 180 degrees, and a more pragmatic approach was applied. The thinking 
seems to be that since we cannot deny the network phenomena, should we start to focus 
on how to improve them rather than trying to ignore and abolish them. Networks are 
here to stay, and “we” must meet this challenge. It was argued that it is possible that 
networks are dysfunctional, but also that they are not dysfunctional by nature or 
definition. It all depends on how they work in practice, in other words on the quality of 
the interaction and interaction processes within and between networks (Kickert, Klijn, 
& Koppenjan 1997). Networks are now starting to be regarded as a legitimate third 
steering structure of modern societies, something also reflected in Tony Blair’s new 
labour in the UK, not bureaucracy, not market, not worse or better than bureaucracies or 
markets, but a steering structure with different characteristics which fit “some” policy 
areas “some” times (Rhodes 1997). This shift in perspective is also reflected in use the 
term governance networks instead of policy networks.  
Some of the basis of this shift in perspective where governance-networks 
increasingly are regarded as important and partly necessary structures in order to 
achieve effective societal steering is a re-evaluation of the possibilities the state has to 
steer governance networks. That many governance-theories are relatively positive 
towards governance networks mean that they are more optimistic than new-
corporativist, new-pluralist, and that the earliest policy-networks analysis of the 
possibility that the state just have to control and steer governance networks (Jensen & 
Sørensen 2003; Sørensen & Torfing 2005). Rhodes (1997) argues that if we just give up 
on the conception about the “sovereign state”, then public authorities can only steer 
networks indirectly and imperfectly. Networks are not thought to be steered by aide of 
hierarchy but with authorities participating more or less directly in the governance 
networks. The argument in favour of this is that even though this means that public 
actors must subordinate to the functional conditions of the network or partnership they 
wish to participate in, this does not mean that they necessarily become “equal” to other 
actors. Public actors have a unique position that cannot be filled by other actors, for 
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instance connected to legitimacy and resources. Roughly speaking the discourse on 
governance networks has over the last 15 years or so developed from the conception of 
“evil networks” to good “networks”, and from “networks as condition” to “networks as 
tools”, even though it is yet unclear exactly what “good networks” are good at, and what 
they are best used for (Jensen & Sørensen 2003).  
The “final” judgement on the status and legitimacy that partnership based 
governance structures have, is not yet determined in this sense, understood that there 
does not exist any consensus on the judgements of governance structures as such in 
academic circles. Such assessments, understood as the desirability and importance of a 
“third steering form”, will depend upon how governance structures actually function in 
practice, both when judged on the basis of efficiency, development, steering, and 
democratic criterions. This the complexity is also increasing when we know that 
different standards and perspectives will be used as benchmarks in order to judge 
positive and negative effects on these dimensions. A review of recent publications 
within the “governance discourse” reveals many perspectives on governance, the 
efficiency of governance, and implications on democracy. In the following, I will 
briefly illustrate this through three perspectives on governance discussed in Complex 
Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector written by Kickert et al.16. 
Kickert et al. (1997) introduces three perspectives on network steering. First, an 
instrumental perspective where the focus is on for instance central actor’s steering needs 
and the governance network’s ability to adapt to these. This central actor does not have 
to be a person or an institution, it can be public authorities, but it can also be special 
interests associated with industry and work life. In this perspective governance networks 
become objects or instruments that are subjected to more or less indirect steering. The 
central success criterions depends on how close the end results are to what the central 
actor wanted to achieve. Such a perspective can be problematic because it can be 
perceived as manipulator by other actors with other ends, or if other actors experience 
their interests defined as secondary in a policy defining or development process. Such a 
perspective is by Scharpf (1994), mentioned as “networking in the shadow of 
hierarchy”. Here governance networks are believed to have the advantages over 
bureaucratic hierarchy because of its ability to absorb local information and that they 
hold local knowledge, thereby enabling central actors to overcome information overload 
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and bottleneck problems. Thus governance becomes instrumental i.e. a tool that can be 
used in order to overcome such problems.  
The second perspective discussed by Kickert et al. (1997) is a participatory 
perspective. Here are the success and failure of governance networks not evaluated 
based on the preferences of a central steering actor, but on the preferences held by those 
directly involved in the processes. In such a perspective, one would emphasize to what 
extent the network and the interplay between network actors operate in a satisfactory 
manner. Steering of governance networks will in this perspective be oriented towards 
removing obstacles and identifying and exploiting possibilities for “common ground” 
and to identify “win-win” situations. In this perspective good steering practices will be 
steering that is beneficiary to the different participants. Critics against such an 
interpretation, can as corporativist theoreticians, point to the possibilities of strong 
interests finding “each other”, and in doing so excluding other interests. Critical for 
success is thus trust, which again renders possible coordination of collective action. 
The last perspective on governance discussed by Kickert et al. (1997) is 
institutional. In such a perspective governance-networks mean to create robust and 
effective institutions within different policy-segments, something that is thought to 
ensure democracy and legitimate procedures for problem solving. Within this 
perspective are neither the interests of strategically central positioned actors nor the 
participants directly involved emphasized. Success of governance is here to build 
institutional robustness that again shall protect more fundamental norms, principles, and 
rules, for instance those connected to system’s efficiency, development, and democracy. 
This means that within this perspective there is a willingness to sacrifice a good 
immediate solution to a problem in order to secure long-term institutional dynamics.  
This brief introduction to governance network research shows that governance is 
not a unified concept, and that the perspectives and standards we ground as principles 
for the discussion determine how we evaluate and assess governance networks. Thus 
showing that applying to a larger set of criterions and perspectives are necessary in 
order to gain the broad picture of such processes. Good processes are not a guarantee for 
good results, and good results are not the same as saying that they were achieved in an 
acceptable manner (Kickert et al. 1997). Governance networks can probably achieve 
“good results” if they do not have to consider negative effects, superior prioritizing 
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easily, and resourceful elites can probably use the autonomy inherent in governance 
networks to develop and implement agendas in narrow self interest which they never 
will be held accountable for. Thus when applying to only one standard of evaluation and 
one perspective on governance, you risk that important elements of the social processes 
of governance are “lost in translation”.  
Summary 
The literature on governance networks is not unified on many areas, except in the 
recognition that governance networks play an increasingly important role in policy 
development and implementation in western societies. Based on the theoretical outline 
of governance networks, can governance networks be conceptualised as institutions 
with features similar to those listed in the table below17.  
Tab. 3-3: Features of Governance Networks  
Governance networks are: Description: 
Institutions  Governance networks are on a scale between the much unstructured social interaction and fully institutionalised and stable social interaction.  
Self organised 
 Different than for instance committees and boards appointed by the state etc. 
 Has a certain degree of autonomy in relationship to their environment, on what 
it shall do, who can and cannot participate etc. 
Loosely coupled 
 The actors in a governance network are not closely linked hierarchically, but 
are more or less on the same footing. 
 The participants have no clearly defined limits of authority and roles, in the 
same way as in many firms and public institutions. 
Inter-organisational 
 The literature on Governance refers to networks where organisations 
participate, and is therefore different from personal networks. In praxis 
personal networks are however more important within governance structures 
than it is for instance within social corporative arrangements. Since these 
institutions are less stable. 
Based on negotiations 
 Work methods within governance networks can take on different forms and are 
often described as based on negotiations. These negotiations can take on 
different forms, for instance interaction patterns based on strategic behaviour 
(egoistic), consensus oriented (compromises), or rule based (for instance with 
the use of voting).  
Based on trust  
 When networks and network participants are not hierarchically organised they 
are also dependent that different participants comply with formal and informal 
agreements. Trust in the validity and respect of such agreements are therefore 
critical to the governance networks efficacy.  
 
Governance-network research aims at filling the gap between the political 
system’s self-description (government) and its actual workings (governance). The prime 
target of first generation network research (Pierre 2000), was therefore to convince itself 
and others that this was a new and important phenomenon. It aimed at demonstrating: 
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(1) the wide-spread application of governance-networks in different areas and on 
different levels, (2) how steering through governance-networks is done, and (3) how 
governance network can be distinguished from more traditional forms of steering such 
as state, market, and civil society (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 30-1). The first series of 
governance studies were in this sense much ontologically oriented. 
From the late 90s, governance research started to transcend the initial research 
agenda, and they started to focus on a new set of questions like: (1) what conditions are 
decisive for the success or failure of network steering? (2) How can public authorities 
and other actors regulate self-regulating governance networks through different forms of 
meta governance? (3) What democratic problems and potentials are inherent in the 
interactive network-governance? Second generation governance networks therefore 
explore that governance networks are not a Columbus egg that solves all problems, but 
that this form of steering both can succeed and fail, and that there are pertinent issues 
relating to both democracy and efficiency (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 31-2). 
The paramount challenge facing almost every governance network aimed at 
development work is to identify the “right” balance between conflict and collaboration. 
Collaboration is good from a certain perspective, because it promotes interest’s 
aggregations, something that is a premise for successful steering, while conflicts can be 
constructive because they can stimulate new thoughts, creativity, development paths, 
and innovative processes. Successful regime or meta steering of governance networks 
therefore means finding the “right” balance between collaboration and conflict (Jessop 
1998: 41; Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 51). The meta governance steering paradox is that 
if the development discourse is too hegemonic, you risk blocking new thoughts and 
loose development opportunities, and on the other hand, if it is too much conflict you 
risk undermining network negotiations. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that in such a complex social system as a 
regional governance system is, where there exists a myriad of governance actors, -
institutions, and -networks, there have to exist some mechanisms at a meta level that 
coordinate and control the actors, the networks, and the activities. In fact almost every 
theory on governance makes such assumptions (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). Without 
such mechanisms some perspectives on governance hold the position that chaos will 
emerge, followed by debunking of the legitimacy of the governance system. Other 
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perspectives see meta steering as necessary in order to coordinate between network 
initiatives, others see meta steering as more or less blunt exertion of power and elite 
dominance, and others see it meta steering as necessary in order to secure democratic 
norms and accountability of governance structures. The main questions then are how 
meta steering is done in practice, to what end it is done, and what the effects of meta 
steering are on development and on democratic processes in general? These are all 
empirical questions with no blueprint answers. I am of the opinion that such meta 
steering processes can be understood through what in the following is conceptualised as 
(regional) regime theory. 
3.4 – Regime Theory  
In political science and in the studies of international relations regime theory represents 
an established body of theories. Regimes are here often used to describe the political 
steering model – ways of organising the decision-making process. In classical terms 
regimes refer to how political power is distributed and organised within nation states, 
e.g. the classical distinction between totalitarian and democratic regimes. Here regime 
theory is also broadened to include studies of international organisations, where regimes 
are understood as a set of implicit and explicit principles, rules, norms, and decision-
making procedures within a defined policy area on the international arena. It is this 
second understanding of the regime concept that is relevant to the topic of this thesis. 
Regime theory often emphasises that states, organisations, and other actors on the 
international arena are interdependent of each other and therefore mutually benefits 
from cooperation (Berntsen 1997). If we look at the literature on regimes in 
international relations theories, these are divided into different schools that hold certain 
perspectives on rationality, power, and institutions. 
Three main schools of thought are found within regime theory in the study of 
international relations – the neoliberal school, the realist school, and the cognitive 
school (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger 2000).  
The neoliberal school in international relations emphasizes the role of 
international regimes in helping states and jurisdictions achieve common interests. The 
neoliberal school share perspectives with the realist school on the actors in international 
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relations as maximising egoists that act out of self-interests. Neoliberals use economical 
theories of institutions, and focus primarily on information and transaction costs. Game 
theoretic models are often used to estimate the probability in which particular situations 
a regime will emerge. Therefore, the “structure of the situation” is the central premise 
and logic of international neoliberal regime theory (Hasenclever et al. 2000). The 
neoliberal school in international relations shares many features with the rational choice 
school in public administration (Olson 1971; Riker 1982; Niskanen 1994). 
The central concept in the realist school is power. Students of this tradition 
emphasise the significance of political power and its exercise in and by the territorial 
state. The argument is that power is as important to inter-jurisdictional cooperation as it 
is to conflict. The realist school differs from the neoliberal school because of the strong 
emphasis on the significance of the territorial state, and a claim that stable international 
regimes are much more difficult to create than the neoliberal school postulates. The 
difficulty of establishing regimes stems from that power needs to be balanced, so that 
relative losses do not accrue (Hasenclever et al. 2000). Frederickson (2004) sees 
similarities between the realist school of international relations and the realist school in 
public administration. In the public administration version of the realist school, the 
focus is on laws, constitutions, the formal separation of power, formal structures, and on 
the exercise of political and bureaucratic power in the context of such structures. 
Sometimes the neoliberal school and the realist school are together called the rationalist 
school of international relations (Frederickson 2004). 
The cognitive school or the cognitive institutional perspective in both international 
regime theory and public administration opposes the rationalist school’s approaches to 
regimes. Their main criticisms are: (1) actor preferences, and options are treated as 
given (exogenous), (2) that actors are assumed rational in an economical sense, and (3) 
actors are atomistic in the sense that that their identities, power and fundamental 
interests are prior to international society and its institutions. A central claim within the 
cognitive school is that actors are as much shaped by institutions as they shape them 
accrue (Hasenclever et al. 2000). 
A central premise within the cognitive school is that actors are bounded rational 
(narrow cognition). The notion of bounded rationality, originally developed by Herbert 
Simon (1997) just after world war II, has occupied an important place in many 
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discussions about an alternative to game-theoretical oriented neoclassical economics. 
Some of these discussions take place within the so-called “old-institutionalism”, a 
theory developed by among others Phillip Selznick in the early 1950s (Selznick 1984a; 
1984b) and within “new-institutionalism”, a successive body of theories developed in 
the 1970s and 1980s (March & Olsen 1989; DiMaggio & Powell 1991). Bounded 
rationality is here often used to denote the type of rationality that actors resort to when 
the environment in which they operate is too complex relative to their limited mental 
abilities. In their book Organizations, from 1958, James March and Herbert Simon state 
this point in the following way: 
Because of the limits of human intellective capacities in comparison with the 
complexities of the problems that individuals and organizations face, rational behaviour 
calls for simplified models that capture the main features of a problem without capturing 
all its complexities (1993: 190). 
There are different interpretations of bounded rationality: realist or rational 
schools of public administration have e.g. attempted to interpret bounded rationality 
theory within game theoretical analysis schemes. These interpretations of bounded 
rationality are not emphasised here. 
For Herbert Simon (1997), the notion of bounded rationality is constructed 
through the following steps: (1) People or organizations often pursue multiple 
objectives, which may be conflicting. (2) The alternatives from which to choose in order 
to pursue these objectives are not previously given to the decision maker, who thus 
needs to adopt a process for generating alternatives. (3) The limits in the decision 
maker's mental capacity compared with the complexity of the decision environment are 
already present at this early stage, and usually prevent him/her from considering all the 
alternatives. (4) Those limits are also present when the decision-maker has to consider 
the consequences of the alternatives, so that the decision-maker employs some heuristic 
procedure for that purpose. (6) Finally, the decision-maker adopts a satisfying rather 
than an optimising strategy, searching for solutions that are “good enough” or 
satisfactory, given some aspiration levels (Simon 1997). All this is a specific way of 
arguing, as Simon (1997) did, that human behaviour is intended rational, but only 
limitedly so. 
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Many would probably agree that James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have made 
one of the most influential arguments in the cognitive school of international regime 
theory (March & Olsen 1998). They apply the concept of appropriateness to distinguish 
themselves from those, e.g. the rationalists, who see action as driven by the logic of 
anticipated consequences or prior preferences. Within March and Olsen’s (1998) theory 
of appropriateness actions are rule based, and actors follow rules that associate 
particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for 
action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and 
more general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or 
role, and matching the obligation of that identity or role to a specific situation. In the 
cognitive school the pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with 
interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations 
(March & Olsen 1989; 1998). In this sense, March and Olsen meet some of the criticism 
that Simon's theory of bounded rationality met. Simon (1997) has been criticised for 
focusing too much on rules of thumb that may be strictly individual, and for not paying 
enough attention to the social context in which people act and interact, as well as for 
neglecting habits and the tacit aspects of institutions, see (Langlois 1986) for an in depth 
discussion of this. 
Regime theory in international relations is a broad field consisting of different 
ontological and epistemological positions that also are found within studies of public 
administration. In addition to the regime theories stemming from international relations, 
there is a body of regime theory found in urban studies. Urban regime theory has 
become one of the dominant theories for the study of local politics, and it builds on 
parts of the regime theories found within the field of international relations. Many of the 
perspectives of regime theory in international relations theories are often used, in 
slightly modified forms, to study urban regimes. Scholars from many parts of the 
western world have critically and sympathetically engaged the theory (Davies 2002). 
Urban Regime Theory 
The concept of regime applied within urban regime theory has many parallels to that of 
governance, although they are not the same. One clear difference between urban regime 
theory and the governance perspective is that urban regime theory de-emphasises the 
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role of elected officials, and emphasises the role of business leaders (Frederickson 
2004). However, urban regime theories does offer something that theories of 
governance do not, that is clarity on the object of study. The focus of urban regime 
analysis has been on case studies of individual cities. Although Clarence Stone, the 
author of Regime Politics - Governing Atlanta (1989), indicated that regime theory did 
not need to be confined within political boundaries, very few regime analysis studies 
have used the region as a unit of analysis. Hamilton (2004: 457) states that it is not 
surprising that regime analysis has not been used more extensively in the study of new 
regionalism, as this is a newly emerging field. Clarence Stone (2002: 7) argues that 
regime analysis is a promising place to start looking when reviewing the potential for 
non-coercive cooperation (partnerships). Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker (2001) 
state that urban regime theory is an elaboration of the regime concept drawn from the 
international relations literature. Urban regime theory draws on insights from the entire 
three regime schools in international relations; in specific, the realist’s emphasis on 
power, and the cognitivists’ emphasis on bounded rationality. The regime concept in 
urban regime theory is to be understood in the same ways as in international relations; 
as formal and informal arrangements that enable cooperation across boundaries, or a set 
of principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectation converge in a given issue area (Mossberger & Stoker 2001).  
Whitt Kilburn (2004) identifies Clarence Stone as regime theory’s “chief 
architect” and “most influential” theorist. But both Stephen Elkin (1987) and his study 
of Dallas, and Stone’s (1989) study about the way political power is realized in city life 
of Atlanta are usually regarded as cornerstones within urban regime theory (Davies 
2002). The key aspects of Stone’s understanding of what a regime is can be summarised 
in the following way: 
A regime is “an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional 
resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (Stone 
1989: 4), where collaboration is achieved not only through formal institutions but also 
through informal networks. Regimes bridge the divide between popular control of 
government and private control of economic resources. Beyond the inclusion of local 
government and businesses, participants in regimes may vary, including neighbourhood 
organizations or organizations representing middle-class African-Americans, for 
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example. Cooperation is not expected to exist everywhere within urban regime theory; it 
is something that has to be achieved. Stone (1989) therefore states that regimes cannot 
be assumed to exist in all cities. Neither are regimes necessarily exclusively connected 
to one specific administration, or representatives from a specific political party. Stone 
(1989) states that regimes are relatively stable arrangements that can span a number of 
administrations. For example, Stone (1989) discusses in his book the development of a 
single regime in Atlanta in the time frame of 1946 to 1988. Regime change is therefore 
not necessarily synonymous with changes in city administrations. Mossberger and 
Stoker (2001) therefore state that whether electoral turnover represents regime change 
as an empirical question. Furthermore, distinctive policy agendas can be identified (i.e. 
development regimes or middle-class progressive regimes) that are influenced by the 
participants in the governing coalition, the nature of the relationship between 
participants, and the resources they bring to the coalition. Consensus is formed on the 
basis of interaction and the structuring of resources. This is achieved through selective 
incentives and small opportunities. Regimes may not feature complete agreement over 
beliefs and values, but a history of collaboration would tend to produce consensus over 
policy (Mossberger & Stoker 2001: 813). 
Origin and Central Concepts  
Jonathan Davies (2002) traces the theoretical origins of urban regime theory back to the 
pluralist/neo-pluralist tradition as it is formulated by Robert Dahl’s ”Who Governs?” 
(Dahl 1961), and specifically to Charles Lindblom’s “Politics and markets” (Lindblom 
1977). A central point in neo-pluralist theory is the recognition that governments in 
capitalist countries believe that they are dependent on economic growth in order to 
sustain. In addition, governments can only limitedly control the rate of growth 
themselves. Neo-pluralist theory recognises business leaders as those who make growth 
decisions that affect everyone in society. Furthermore, these decisions are not subject to 
democratic control. Governments play a limited role in controlling the growth pace. The 
unrefined pluralist notion that groups in society have equal access to the decision 
making process is therefore perceived to be flawed within neo-pluralist theory (Davies 
2002).  
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Building on the neo-pluralist position both Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989) 
recognize a division of labour between state and market, were ownership of productive 
assets rests largely in the hands of the private sector while the machinery of government 
is subject to popular control. Urban regime theory is concerned with the interface 
between state and market. For Stone the regime is the ‘organism’ that mediates the 
relationship between popular control of the political sphere and the private control of 
the economy.  
Stone (1989) also builds on Lindblom (1977) in the sense that he argues that in 
market-economy based societies, governments are strongly predisposed toward the 
preferences of business leaders. In Stone’s terminology, this is labelled ‘systemic 
power’. For Stone the result of this systemic power is an indirect conflict between 
favoured and disfavoured groups. The favoured are those concerned with economical 
growth, while the disfavoured are those concerned with redistribution.  
A second central concept in urban regime theory is ‘pre-emptive power’. Pre-
emptive power is to be understood as actor’s ability to occupy, hold, and make use of a 
strategic position. Pre-emptive power derives from systemic power because the state-
market division tends to endow business interests rather than other groups in society. 
Systemic power creates the conditions in which pre-emption occurs, but pre-emption 
itself is dependent upon the exercise of those capacities. The two concepts, systemic and 
pre-emptive power, are cornerstones of urban regime theory (Davies 2002). 
If we read urban regime theory, from an equal rights perspective, or an ideal 
democratic perspective, urban regime theory could easily be read as a fundamental 
system critique of the workings of government in market-based societies. However, 
socialism is not a normative goal within urban regime theory, as it is formulated by 
Stone and Elkin; they are here in line with Lindblom when they argue that the market 
economy is the best possible social form, and prescriptions for change within urban 
regime theory are made within this framework. An example of a normative prescription 
in urban regime theory is the objective of building more inclusive regimes with the goal 
of ameliorating inequality (Davies 2002). In this sense the regime can be an important 
institutional form in the good market economy. This is interesting because Stone’s 
concept of systemic power clearly is inspired by the structuralist school of Marxism, but 
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for Stone it is not classes that represent the core dialectic in society but the contradiction 
between liberalism and democracy.  
Workings of the Regime 
In Stone’s (1989) study of Atlanta he begins with stating that what makes governance in 
Atlanta effective is not the formal machinery of the government, but the informal 
partnership between city hall and the downtown business elite. This informal 
partnership and the way it operates constitute the city’s regime; and is the mean through 
which major policy decisions are made (Stone 1989: 3). Stone makes the regime 
concept operational through his concept of the ‘governing coalition’. A governing 
coalition is a core group, a body of insiders, who come together repeatedly in making 
important decisions. This group is the centre of the workings of the regime in Stone’s 
theory of urban regimes. The coalition does not necessarily represent identical interests; 
the regime brings together different institutional capacities they control. This is 
governance through informal arrangements, and not rules in the sense of command-and-
control fashion (Stone 1989: 5). A regime is thus not just any relatively stable group 
that comes together to make decisions, but an informal but relatively stable group with 
access to institutional resources that enables it to have a sustained role in the making of 
governing decisions. Thus it is no all-encompassing structure of command that guides 
and synchronises everyone’s behaviour (Stone 1989: 5). Coordination of the regime is 
in Stone’s terminology informal and heavily dependent on tacit understandings of the 
“rules of the game”. It is arguable that it in a system of fragmented local governance, 
where formal means of coordination are weakened, likely and that such informal 
arrangement to promote cooperation can be particularly useful. Stone (1989: 5) says that 
when the informal structure is integrated with the formal political structure of authority 
it constitute a supra-institutional capacity to take action. Any informal basis of 
cooperation is in this sense empowering. It enables community actors to achieve 
cooperation beyond what formally could be commanded. Stone (1989: 5) states that 
loyalty is the code that ties politicians to this cohesive group.  
The regime indirectly produces governing-decisions, not to be understood as 
running and controlling everything, but as managing conflict and making adaptive 
responses to social change. Stone states that the actual makeup of informal 
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arrangements governing decisions differs from community to community, but 
everywhere they are driven by two needs. Firstly, institutional scope, understood as the 
need to encompass wide enough scope of institutions to mobilise the resources required 
to make and implement governing decisions. Secondly, cooperation, understood as the 
need to promote enough cooperation and coordination for the diverse participants to 
reach decisions and sustain action in support of those decisions (Stone 1989: 6).  
Given the state-market divide, governments are restrained to promote investment 
activity in an economic arena dominated by private ownership. This political-economy 
insight is the foundation for a theory of urban regimes. Stone does however emphasise 
that private interests not necessarily are confined to business figures. Labour-union 
officials, party-functionaries, officers in non-profit organisations or foundations, etc. 
may also be involved (Stone 1989: 7). One reason behind this configuration can be that 
business interests sometimes works through intermediaries, business figures can 
therefore seemingly be relatively passive because they know that someone else 
represent their interests. However, business interests are always part of the urban 
political scene.  
The study of urban regime is a study of who cooperates and how their cooperation 
is achieved across institutional sectors of community life. Further, it is an examination 
of how cooperation is maintained when confronted with an ongoing process of social 
change. Regimes are dynamic, not static, and regime dynamics concern the ways in 
which forces for change and forces for continuity play against one another (Stone 1989: 
9). 
Based on this I believe that recent changes in the Norwegian context have made 
Stone and Elkin’s analysis more relevant for understanding the political-economy 
dynamics of Norwegian regions. These changes can, as mentioned earlier, be labelled as 
transformations into a system of local-governance, from an action perspective where the 
focus is on how regions can be changed, into a more active spatial environment. 
Understood as change towards a regional policy that helps build an abundance of 
resources for organizational learning and innovation, I believe urban regime theory can 
be an important framework.  
Given bounded rationality (March et al. 1993) the politics of local agenda-setting 
tend to address challenges not as structurally caused conditions, but as a series of 
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discrete problems. With bounded rationality fostering a tendency to concentrate on 
matters of immediate interest, a series of highly circumscribed areas of concern emerge 
and give an appearance of pluralism (Stone 2002). And as Stone notes, bounded 
rationality works against the development of a comprehensive view of the community 
and its problems:  
Pluralism […] is not a hidden hand that somehow works for the best. As large forces of 
economic, demographic and social change unfold, they set in motion structural drift. 
Tending to matters close at hand fails to ameliorate intensifying problems. Put another 
way, structural drift builds, and cross-cutting problems accumulate. Single-shot and ad 
hoc responses hold little promise of making a lasting impact (Stone 2002). 
Policy agendas are selective and reactive; they reflect some concerns and not 
others. Even if an agenda proves viable, it may represent some segments of the 
population, but not others. It elevates some concerns while downplaying others, Stone 
(2002) notes. The criteria development efforts should be assessed in terms of their 
democratic qualities, Stone says, rest on two principles: 
One is the principle that no segment of the population should hold a position of privilege 
that prevents the remainder of the community from acting on problems it faces. The 
second is the principle that no segment of the community should be relegated to the 
position of permanent minority -- none should be persistent losers in the weighing of 
policy matters. Although concrete cases turn on matters of degree, these two principles 
give us a useful standard against which practice can be weighed (Stone 2002). 
A regional regime should be understood as a set of informal but stable 
arrangements by which a locality is governed, where collaboration is achieved not only 
through formal institutions but also through informal networks. That is to say a regime 
is a group of people bound together by ideology or shared principles of policy agendas 
that has been able to sustain an ad-hoc stage, thereby moving it self into a position of 
persistent informal influence over policy decisions. 
Regime theory is then as Clarence Stone articulates it; concerned with how and 
why certain interests and perspectives are able to cut-through, while others do not. The 
point is that policies do not develop by themselves, but is a result of political interaction 
between both elected and non-elected individuals. What type of policies that emerge is 
then a consequence of what type of coalitions that develops and the perspectives held by 
this group. Stone argues that those policy agendas and those coalitions dominated by 
political leaders, and which hold market perspectives tend to “win” such processes. In 
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such coalition and agenda building processes media tend to play central roles as it is 
actively used by the dominating coalition to connect local patriotism with development 
agendas in order to gain popular support. Media tend to refer to growth agendas in 
positive or in neutral terms, seldom critical or pointing to alternatives. Governing 
coalitions also tend to associate policy agendas with popular sports and culture 
institutions and engage in strategic alliances with academic institutions. Policy agendas 
are often expressed as promoting economical growth and that this will lead to more 
employment. This strategy is often successful and policy agendas therefore tend to also 
gain support from local worker’s unions. Research into localisations with and without 
such growth coalitions do not show any significant correlation between the existence of 
such coalitions and the economical growth rate of that place (Lyngstad 2003: 100-2). 
A Contextually Set Theory 
Urban regime theory as Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989) develop it is contextually 
situated in the political economy context of US cities. However, I believe that urban 
regime theory offers promising perspectives and insights on the field of local 
governance, and that it therefore, with some adjustments, can serve as an analytical 
framework for discussion of the institutional dynamics of Norwegian regions too. Urban 
regime theory needs to be adjusted to a new context because it is contextually specific 
to the democratic tradition of USA. A tradition that is significantly different from the 
redistributive political culture of the welfare states in Scandinavia. The local public 
sector is for instance relatively much smaller in the US than in Norway, and the public 
sector has more and larger responsibilities for public welfare and development in 
Norway than in the US. The local policy level in the US, for instance through property 
tax, is more dependent of its own incomes than Norwegian counties and municipalities 
which are more dependent upon central government allocations. In addition local 
government in the US is less bound both politically and functionally of central 
government. This means that there are larger differences in local policy practice in the 
US than in Norway who is more governed by concepts of equality on the level of 
service the local government often should give by law. These are indications that the 
relationships between business interests and the political level in the US, at least 
traditionally, is different than in Norway (Lyngstad 2003).  
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In addition, Stones concept of business elites is not directly compatible with the 
Norwegian context. Norway does not have business elites in the fashion and to the same 
degree as US cities. Nevertheless, regional Norway does have local regional elites, but 
they are manifested somewhat different than the elites described by Stone and Elkin. 
However, they have the values and ideology they represent, e.g. business growth, value 
creation etc., many parallels to that of the US business elites.  
The most significant difference between the US city context, in which urban 
regime theory as Stone and Elkin articulate it is set, and the Norwegian regional context 
is probably the corporative structures embedded in the Norwegian society. 
In the US context, as it is articulated by the pluralists in the 1950s and -60s, 
interest groups were independent of public institutions. They supposedly balanced each 
other out, and confronted the authorities as autonomous interest groups, at the same 
time as laws regulated their activities.  
This US pluralistic system is significantly different from the social corporativism 
characterising the Norwegian system. The softer social corporativism implies a system 
of formal and functional representation, where political institutions include interest’s 
organisations into public decision-making processes. Such corporative institutions have 
emerged as a result either of grass-root demands or as an invitation from above, thereby 
based on voluntarily participation.  
Any corporative form is ambiguous in the sense that is difficult to see if interest 
organisations have conquered the state apparatus, or if state apparatus has conquered the 
independence of voluntary organisations. Whether participating organisations are 
disciplined hostages or champion agents, is a classical corporatist research question. 
Corporativism as interest representation in public affairs therefore implies that the 
division between the private and the public realm of society become blurred. 
Corporativism is the development towards a sort of symbioses where private and public 
institutions and their interests melt together. The main effect of corporative structures in 
society is that state sovereignty and power flows into civic society through networks 
that no single group of actors can control. With its close knit of negotiations for public 
support corporativism is a type of organised capitalism, where negotiations on public 
safety nets function a guaranty against a risk filled market. Corporativism protects 
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against the market-forces on the one hand and against bureaucratic steering on the other 
hand (Østerud 1992: 81pp).  
One way of interpreting the differences between the US and the Norwegian 
context could be to argue that the urban regime in US cities functions as a substitute for 
the lack of corporative arrangements, and that it therefore is not reasonable to expect a 
dominant presence of regional regimes in Norwegian society. However, such claims 
neglect one important feature of the regime. If we assert what types of interests that are 
promoted through the urban regimes, it seems obvious that urban regimes have a 
different function in society than social corporativism. The urban regime primarily 
mediates market-interest into government. The social corporative system, as found in 
Norway, articulates the multitude’s interest, e.g. agriculture, fishing, industry, voluntary 
organisations, labour movements, social work, environment organizations, art and 
culture, religious organisations, relief work etc.  
The plausible argument is therefore not that the regimes do exist in the Norwegian 
context, but that the regime’s method of working is different from regimes set in an US 
context. Political actors in the Norwegian context are, because of corporate traditions, 
also part of, and included in the workings of the regime in a way that is different from 
the workings of US city regimes.  
Even though there are significant and important differences between the 
interaction between business interests and politics in the US and Norway, there are also 
examples of regime theory having good explanatory merits in studies of Norwegian 
society. 
Regime Theory Applied in a Norwegian Context 
A thesis work that studied decision-making processes in a medium sized Norwegian city 
municipality used regime theory to inform an analysis of the 1987 election (Lyngstad 
1997). At the core of the election campaign were three large building projects, that the 
majority of the political parties where committed to. The first was a service centre for 
the elderly (estimated to NOK 60 million), the second was a sports centre (estimated to 
NOK 60 million, where NOK 35 million would be paid by the municipality), and the 
third was a cultural centre (estimated to NOK 70-80 million where less than NOK 30 
million would be paid by the municipality) (Lyngstad 2003: 110). 
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Throughout the election campaign it became clear that it was not room in the local 
economy to finance all three projects. Analysis of the political campaigns and party 
programmes indicated that most parties prioritised the service centre for the elderly 
highest. None of the parties explicitly prioritised the other two projects above the 
service centre for the elderly. Thus, we must conclude that all of the parties asked for 
support from the voters based on a priority where the interests of the elderly came first. 
Given the idea of the parliamentarian steering chain, the realisation of the service centre 
for the elderly should be a given after the election, and certainly realized before the two 
other alternatives. This did not happen. Both the sports centre and the cultural centre 
were finished during the following 4-year election period, while the service centre for 
the elderly was not commenced. This indicates that the political programme did not 
have any influence on the practical policies and prioritising, neither did the agreements 
between the three parties constituting majority of the City Council make any difference 
since these agreements all had the establishment of the elderly centre as their top 
priority. Then what happened? (Lyngstad 2003: 111).  
Lyngstad’s study shows that it early in the decision-making process developed a 
coalition of industrial leaders, representatives from the largest soccer club, the chief 
officer, the mayor, chief city planner, and representatives from the two largest parties, 
who got a prominent position in the municipality. These people, representatives from 
the industry, administration, and politics met frequently in different forums and 
developed joint understandings of how a stronger commitment to cultural activities 
could be beneficiary for the municipality. These actors represented important 
institutions in the local community, and had in a sense systemic power based on their 
positions to set the policy agenda and to define the discourse in a way that the followers 
of the service centre for the elderly could not match. The regime was able to phrase the 
two cultural projects as expenses that would lead to future income, while the centre for 
the elderly was phrased as expenses that would lead to further expenses. It was also 
argued that the future incomes of the two cultural projects would make it easier to 
realise a new centre for the elderly. This understanding originating from the regime 
becomes broadly anchored in the political milieu after a while. The realisation of the 
culture projects was in a sense seen as policy instruments to realise other projects. The 
regime was also able to downplay the initial prioritising that were done ahead of the 
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election, and deemphasise and redefine those political factors that would have lead to 
another outcome (Lyngstad 2003: 112). 
In Stone’s terms these actors were able to make use of their pre-emptive power, 
and the understandings represented by this group were able to gain a dogmatic position, 
with a rationale it was difficult for others to question. Lyngstad describes that an 
interaction pattern developed in the governing coalition, the regime, characterised by 
shared norms, trust, and coordinated activities between the actors involved in the regime 
in the city of Bodø. The fact that the regime phrases its argumentation so its policy 
alternative becomes a policy instrument in order to realise other aims is also typical, 
according to regime theoreticians. This type of argumentation is both normative and 
idealistic because it would be difficult to measure if the “policy instruments” have had 
the desired effect afterwards. The “policy instrument argument” hide the reality that 
policy making is a struggle for limited economical recourses, and when this argument is 
used it conceals that prioritising always is done at the expense of other policy aims 
(Lyngstad 2003: 112).  
Summary 
What we can learn from this story is that when limited recourses are to be allocated, 
certain perspectives and ideas tend to be dominant and effectively set the boundary of 
the policy discourses. Steering coalitions tend to form, consisting of leading politicians, 
industry representatives, media, and others. Such coalitions can trough their political 
capital, economical resources, and administrative capacity influence the political debate 
in such a way that political decisions could seem preset. Such processes are often 
characterised by agendas that articulate the need for allocating more resources into 
projects wanted by the certain segments of the industry, and that it is legitimised by the 
fact that this economically benefits the municipality as a whole in the end. Projects that 
are defined as policy instruments are given priority over projects that are seen as, or 
defined as expenses (Lyngstad 2003: 113). 
Lyngstad’s study thus shows us that regime theory can give important insights 
also when applied in a Norwegian context. Regime theory gives an explanation to why 
and how certain steering imperatives and modes of understanding develop and get to be 
dominant. The strength of regime theory is that it provides us with the tools to 
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conceptualise and understand those processes that incline certain policy makers to 
“think alike”, something that results in the emergence of dominating perspectives on 
municipal or regional development. Regime theory also gives an explanation to why 
these dominating perspectives have a strong bias towards the market and market based 
solutions.  
3.5 – Three Perspectives on Regional Governance 
Given the outline of governance and regime theory it should be apparent that we also 
should be open to the possibilities that governance systems and regime theory can be 
interpreted in different ways and seen through different “glasses”, depending on what 
aspect of the governance system or normative model we choose to emphasise. Three 
perspectives are therefore outlined in the following in order to provide the discussions 
in this thesis with these different “glasses”. These perspectives, the instrumental, the 
institutional, and the ideological are in this thesis used to interpret the workings of the 
governance system and regime in the Agder region. These perspectives can be 
interpreted as ideal types, where different elements are “cultivated” and that we 
therefore should not expect to “find” them in their pure form in any practical reality. My 
ambition is therefore not so much to test the perspectives against each other, but to see 
how and in what way they are complementary in order to gain better understandings of 
current regional governance practices (Christensen & Lægreid 1998).  
The perspectives are heavily inspired by and borrow elements from some of the 
most central publications within governance theory, policy-analysis theory, 
organisational theory, bureaucratic theory and more. This has two major implications, 
first the theories and empirical works that underlie the perspectives are more complex 
and nuanced than what is expressed through my outline of the perspectives, thus they 
are simplifications. Second, certain aspects of the theories underlying the perspectives 
are emphasised while others are deemphasised, in order for them to be workable and 
provide the basis for a coherent analysis. This means that the perspectives should be 
read and interpreted as written. 
On the threshold of second-generation governance research, the theories and 
perspectives on governance and governance research are as over-complex as the 
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institutional landscape it theorises on. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) have in their book 
Netværkstyring, done an exemplary job in structuring some of the main theoretical and 
empirical works in the field into four perspectives. In this thesis, I adapt this idea and 
this approach, and use three perspectives to discuss the governance and regime practices 
in the Agder region18. 
In developing their four perspectives, or groups of theories, Sørensen and Torfing 
(2005) distinguish between theories on governance, based on their action theories, and 
on their perspective on societal steering. With respect to action theories, they distinguish 
between theories that argue that actor’s actions are governed by more or less rational 
and instrumental calculus between the net profit of choosing between different courses 
of action, and theories that see actor’s actions as more or less culturally or institutionally 
bound. With respect to societal steering, they distinguish between theories that see 
societal steering as fundamentally conflict filled processes, and theories that in principle 
see societal steering as more or less friction free coordination processes (Sørensen & 
Torfing 2005: 35). In my outline of the perspectives I will distinguish between to what 
degree the perspectives fundamentally sees society as an arena for competition or 
collaboration, the type of rationality they express, and understanding of governance and 
meta steering (regime steering), and finally the concept of power inherent in the 
perspectives. 
An Instrumental Perspective on Regional Governance 
It is fair to say that to view organisations and institutions through instrumental or 
rational glasses is not particularly fashionable among academics. Bogason (2004b) 
writes that in conferences and anthologies purporting to mirror the state of the art within 
policy analysis, such techniques do not take many pages. However, I believe that such 
perspectives are important at least as an adjunct to other perspectives. Not because I 
believe that they are principally, normatively justifiable, or particularly empirically 
accurate, but because they are central to the way many actors with power and influence 
over institutions and organisations think and act when institutions are designed, planned 
and implemented. This perspective is attractive to such groups, because it points out a 
direction and prescribe actions with a level of clarity that other interpretations of the 
nature of man, society and institutions cannot compete. If we think about 
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instrumentality in these terms, we can also realise that most, if not all, institutions of 
society are designed with just such rationales in mind. This also makes this perspective 
important and valuable as an analytical benchmark of practice. That institutions often do 
not work in the way that they were supposed to, have unintended consequences, or are 
so complex that rational planning becomes puzzling is a different story. 
Sørensen & Torfing (2005) outline in their two groups of theories what should be 
interpreted as being instrumental in the sense that both are based on the notion from 
rational choice theory that society consists of utility maximizing actors, and that these 
actors systematically and deliberatively work to realise their interests in competition 
with other utility maximizing actors with other interests. Their two instrumental groups 
of theories come in a “soft variant” and a “hard variant”.  
The fundamental idea of the “hard variant” of the instrumental perspective is that 
society consists of utility maximizing actors, and that these actors systematically and 
deliberatively work to realise their interests in competition with other utility maximizing 
actors with sometimes other and competing interests. The “hard variant” theory has a 
strong focus on the regulating of conflicting actor interests, and is interested in how 
governance networks contribute to coalition formation between actors that are 
interdependent of each other. Interdependent in the sense that network actors hold 
resources that other network actors are dependent upon in order to realise their aims 
(Marsh & Rhodes 1992). The “hard variant” focuses on collective actors. Collective 
actors are a group of individuals that are placed in an institutional or functional setting, 
which give them overlapping interests. When such a group comes together in an 
institutional context, where there is room for communication, collective strategies, joint 
experiences and learning, and a joint rule and norm system will emerge over time, 
which all contribute to the production of collective action (Kickert et al. 1997). The 
“hard variant” sees governance networks as institutions that produce collective action, 
based on negotiations between interdependent actors which enjoy a certain degree of 
trust of each other’s will and ability to make and comply with agreements made 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 41). The “hard variant” therefore has a positive and 
supportive perspective on the societal steering potential inherent in governance-
networks, and governance is viewed as a clear alternative to state and market steering 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2005). 
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The second softer variant of the instrumental group of theories share the 
presumption from the “hard variant” that society consists of rational actors, who act in a 
calculating manner in order to realise their aims. The “soft variant” sees governance 
networks as a tool to solve a series of pressing problems that state and market have 
failed to solve in modern societies. The state is according to the softer variant able to set 
collective aims, but unable to realise them. The market is not able to set collective aims, 
and thereby produces the aggregated results of individual actor behaviours that benefits 
no one. Governance networks can according to the “soft variant” address this problem, 
but it requires a meta steering state that is able to stabilise, control, and democratize 
governance networks (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). 
Both the “hard” and the “soft” variant are therefore here labelled instrumental 
hence the rational actor model and because governance structures are viewed as 
(effective) instruments in order to solve pressing societal problems, that the market and 
the bureaucratic state cannot solve.  
The “soft variant” focuses on the need for collective coordination of autonomous 
actors. Actors lack an orientation towards collective goals, this is, according to the “soft 
variant”, not because of lack of compromising will among actors but there is an 
insufficiency of coordinative structures in society. In this perspective, rational actors act 
based on an assumption of ceteris paribus, but if everyone do this, ceteris paribus is not 
a condition that represents the reality of the context in which rational choices can be 
made. The aggregated results of rational action under the premise of ceteris paribus are 
therefore irrational for everyone. Aggregated collective action, without collective 
steering, results in a series of negative externalities (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 64). 
Further on, the “soft variant” is also inspired by systems theories, especially the 
presumption within systems theories of a steadily increasing functional differentiation in 
society. The “soft variant”, as system theory focuses on how coordinated steering is 
possible through “invisible-hand” structuring of rational behaviour. 
Governance networks are in this context only one of many arenas for the 
institutionalised interaction between different rational actors. The success of governance 
networks in terms of contributing to successful societal steering is in this perspective 
dependent upon the networks being able to balance between order and stability on one 
side, and change and flexibility on the other. To achieve this balance, the “hard variant” 
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argues that governance networks need to be steered through meta processes. There has 
to exist some actors and/or institutions that are able to “judge” whether a governance 
institution is the “correct steering form” in that particular setting. 
The main problem in this respect is that governance networks by large, and some 
would argue per definition, are self-regulating entities. When they are exposed to 
hierarchical rules or regulations, they lose their self-regulating abilities, and thereby 
their function as steering tools. The “hard variant” therefore argues that steering of 
governance networks must be done more indirectly than what is the case within 
traditional bureaucratic state steering. Within the “hard variant” meta governance is 
defined as the “organisation of self organisation” (Jessop 1998), and recommends 
hands-on in the sense that this is steering through for instance the determination of the 
superior resource and organisational framework. This is meta governance through 
allocating resources to the network actors one wishes to promote, and through removing 
resources from the network actors you are less friendly towards. Meta or regime 
steering can in this perspective also be done through manipulation of the superior 
institutional framework in order to influence interaction and communication patterns in 
and between networks (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 53). This is hands-on and 
instrumental meta governance; it is instrumental in the sense that the goals of the 
steering process are predetermined.  
The “hard variant” also recommends more hands-on approaches to meta 
governance, but then only as process-oriented interventions and not instrumental and 
goal oriented (Rhodes 1997). The executors of meta governance can in principle be 
anyone with enough resources, according to the “hard variant”. The “hard variant” is 
however concerned with the role of public actors in such settings and positions, as it to a 
large extent recommends governance networks as a new way of organising for the 
public sector, where the new core values should be creativity, collaboration, and 
process-orientation (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). 
An historical example of a parallel perspective on such steering processes is 
Frederick Lugard’s principle of indirect rule, developed as way for the British Empire 
to steer its colonies cost effectively19. 
Within the “softer variant” of the instrumental perspective, governance networks 
are understood as qualitative different social structures than state and markets. They are 
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characterised with the existence of the plurality of autonomous actors, typical for 
markets, and on the other hand the will to pursue collective aims, typical for hierarchies 
(Mayntz 1991). 
One of the differences between the “hard” and the “soft” variant of the 
instrumental perspective is that the “hard variant” has a broader and more inclusive 
perspective on what constitutes a governance network, while the “soft variant” primarily 
focuses on networks that consist of both public and private actors. Kooiman for instance 
understands governance networks as a new form of socio-politico interaction between 
state and society, that is based on a two way traffic between those who steer and those 
who are steered (Kooiman 1993). Another difference is that while the “hard variant” 
sees governance networks as a supplement to steering through state and market, the 
“soft variant” regards governance networks as an alternative that replaces state and 
market steering. They are, according to the “soft variant”, obsolete steering forms in the 
modern society (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 69). 
In the “soft variant”, hierarchical regulations of the self-regulation together with 
governance networks are necessary in order to avoid laissez faire effects and 
destabilisation of society (Mayntz 1991). Hierarchical steering is in this sense necessary 
in order to realise the steering potentials of governance networks. However, the “soft 
variant” also stress that the autonomy of governance networks must be preserved. This 
means that hierarchical regulation of governance networks must be meta steering in an 
indirect form (Kooiman 1993). This distinguishes the “soft variant” from the “hard 
variant” which also applies to approaches that are more direct. Meta governance is in 
this variant to decide and define the framework of development, the structural context, 
and set the “rules of the game”. Meta governance is achieved through goal oriented 
strategic institutionalisation and coordination that aims at increasing actor’s dependence 
on each other and thereby their will to cooperate. For instance through influencing 
actor’s resources and a strategic incentive system, and to hold the threat that hierarchical 
steering will be applied if the network is not able to solve the tasks,. This is what 
Scharpf calls “horizontal coordination in the shadow of hierarchy” (Kooiman 1993; 
Scharpf 1994).  
The big challenge for those executing network steering consists of finding the 
right balance between state meta steering and autonomous network steering. The task is 
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to identify the balance between self organisation and political administrative 
intervention (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 80). The “shadow of hierarchy” cannot be too 
dark, and hierarchy cannot manifest itself too often to the governance network actors. 
The “soft variant” therefore expresses concern that the state intervenes too much and 
limits the governance network’s leeway too much. This is something that could lead to 
network actors loosing interest in participating in the governance networks (Sørensen & 
Torfing 2005: 80). 
The study of regimes centres the issue of how to think about power. In Regime 
Politics (1989), Clarence Stone drew the distinction between “power over” and “power 
to” as a way of differentiating a social-production model of power from a social-control 
model. The concept of systemic power “power over” within regime theory is an 
expression of power that has parallels to a traditional Weberian understanding of power. 
Systemic power is an expression of actor’s position within the socio-economic system. 
This is power over others or control power, based on status, financial capabilities, 
knowledge or individual capabilities. This understanding of power is closely linked to 
the regime theory’s pluralistic inheritance.  
Classical pluralist political analysis were concerned with the question on how to 
characterise American politics. The central question was if it was dominated by a ruling 
elite or as exhibiting pluralist democracy. For Dahl such hypothesis could only be 
strictly tested if:  
1) The hypothetical ruling elite is a well-defined group; 2) There is a fair sample of cases 
involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite 
run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested; 3) In such cases, 
the preferences of the elite regularly prevail (Dahl 1958)20.  
Power is here intentional and active, it is studied by ascertaining the frequency of who 
wins and who loses, who prevails in decision-making situations where there are 
conflicts between interests, and where interests are overt. Lukes states that the 
substantive conclusions or findings from this literature usually are ‘pluralist’, e.g. is it 
claimed that since different actors and different interest groups prevail in different issue-
areas, there are no overall ruling elite, and power is distributed pluralistically (Lukes 
2005: 5). The focus on the one-dimensional view of power thus involves a focus on 
behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable 
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conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by 
political participation (Lukes 2005: 19). 
When Lukes discusses this type of power (Lukes 1974; 2005), he argues that 
power in this perspective is not only one actor’s ability to get another actor to do 
something but this actor’s successful attempt to get another actor to do something s/he 
would not otherwise do. Thus, this type of power is “slightly” different from “Systemic 
power” since this power also conceptualises the potential capability.  
An instrumental understanding of power will in this thesis be present in those 
instances where power observable is exercised. Implying that in those instances where 
there are absence of conflict, or in instances where alternatives are not put forth, we 
have no reason to speak of power being executed using this perspective. This 
perspective on power thus is behavioural in the sense that it is only observable and 
direct power is conceptualised and observable.  
The implications of this type of power are important, but limited in governance 
systems and in policy agenda setting processes. This is because political issues of some 
importance require broad support in order to be implemented in a regional political 
system (Lyngstad 2003: 103). This understanding of power does therefore not provide 
us with the analytical tools to conceptualise and understand such agenda and discursive 
transforming processes. 
Summary 
The instrumental perspective builds on Max Weber’s ideal model of the organization as 
rational and efficient instruments, meaning that rules, regulations, instructions, etc. 
imposed by the leadership will be acceded to (Weber 1978). This perspective is also 
instrumental in the sense that it presupposes that politicians or a steering group are in 
control, (or at least can be in control), over subsidiary institutions of society, including 
governance institutions. For instance, that such institutions can be planned, designed 
and effectuated in such a way that it realises intended policy aims. It presupposes that it 
exists feedback loops from local institutional practices back into representative policy-
making institutions. So that central political stakeholders get relevant and verifiable 
information, and that this group, the elected politicians, can process this information and 
transform it into a new and improved set of policies. In turn, politicians are scrutinized 
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by the media and controlled by the voters in general elections. The instrumental 
perspective as it is articulated here, conforms to this view of instrumental rationality 
with one important amendment. The rational meta steering institution can be, but is not 
necessarily, an elected political body. This function can also be preserved attended to by 
what here is conceptualised as a regime. The regime is here conceptualised as having a 
rational function in much of the same way as the elected politicians in the Weberian 
model except from not being subject to accountability through the ballot. The nature and 
characteristics of the meta steering body are subject for discussion throughout this 
thesis. 
The main lines from this perspective as it is used in the data analysis are 
summarized in the table below. 
Tab. 3-4: Summary of the Instrumental Perspective on Regional Governance 
Dimensions: Description: 
Type of rationality   Actors are utility maximizing and rational, they are instrumental in their actions.  
Type of actors 
 Actors are conceptualised as collective actors. Further there are two 
possibilities within this perspective, collective actors can be understood as 
autonomous or as interdependent of each other.  
Perspective on society 
 There are two possibilities within this perspective. If actors are 
interdependent, then society can be an arena where different interests are 
in competition on a fundamental level and governance still being a viable 
societal steering and coordination form. If actors are autonomous, then 
society must also be an arena where actors intentionally seek common 
good solutions for governance systems to be a viable societal steering and 
coordination form. 
Conceptualisation of 
governance  
 Dependent upon the fundamental perspective of society/actors. Horizontal 
interaction between resourceful and interdependent actors or horizontal 
coordination between autonomous actors. 
Purpose of governance  To give a strategic or functional response to institutional fragmentation, or to insufficiencies of other coordinative structures in society (market and state). 
Meta governance 
 An actor(s), institution(s), coalition(s), organisation(s), or regime’s 
manipulation of the institutional and organisational aspects of the 
governance framework. If actors are viewed as autonomous there is laid 
more emphasis on steering that seeks preserving the autonomy of individual 
governance institutions. 
Workings of the regime 
 Indirect steering is emphasised (the organisation of self-organisation), and 
instrumental in the sense that the paramount governance objectives are 
predefined. If actors are viewed as autonomous then it will also be a goal to 
increase actor’s dependences on each other.  
Conceptualisation of power 
 Emphasis on the one-dimensional view of power. Focus on behaviour in the 
making of decisions on issues over which there are an observable conflict of 
(subjective) interests, interpreted as expressed policy preferences.  
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An Institutional Perspective on Regional Governance 
Organizations within the political system are often conceptualised as institutions. This 
means that when we talk and write about institutions in the contexts of policy studies 
institutions can be interest organisations, political parties, parliaments, the executive, the 
local government, but also many other forms of political life (Bogason 2004b). When 
we use this definition of an institution, we also apply to a definition of an institution that 
is dependent upon our definitions of politics and the political system. A wide definition 
of politics implies a wide understanding of institutions, and a narrow definition of 
politics for instance including just formal political organisations hence give us a narrow 
definition of institutions. This thesis views governance institutions as political 
structures, in the sense that they are articulating, adhering to, and indirectly or directly 
prioritising between different societal interests. Thus, this thesis views all structures 
associated with the regional governance system as institutional forms. 
Institutional theory is both meaningful to understand as a reaction to empirical 
(practical) changes in how democratic political system work, as an implied critique of 
the Weberian rational model, and as a new way of theoretically conceptualising how the 
political systems and its institutions actually work. Institutionalism has become a 
comprehensive body of theories and it is therefore difficult to pinpoint exactly how 
many variants there are. We find that rational choice institutionalism, organisational or 
sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism which all can be labelled as 
various “new institutionalisms” again come in different flavours within economics, 
political science and sociology (Bogason 2004a). The institutional view of the world is 
in its broadest sense so wide that all of the perspectives discussed in this thesis are 
institutional in a way. However, the institutional perspective on regional governance 
will in this thesis mainly conform to an understanding of intuitionalism as it is 
articulated in two books by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen Rediscovering 
institutions (1989) and Democratic Governance (1995). The main reason for 
emphasizing their perspective institutions is firstly that their theory has proven to be 
very influential in the sense that it becomes one of the dominant perspectives in 
organizational and political analysis, at least in Scandinavia. Secondly, they explicitly 
address institutional theory in relation to governance, and thirdly because they also 
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emphasize the democratic aspects of institutions in their perspectives, something that 
also is central to this thesis.  
There are however some commonalities between the different variants of 
institutionalism. Peter Bogason states that these are; (1) that structures matter, (2) that 
structures have some continuity (persistence), and (3) that structures create human 
regularity. Thus, institutional theories tend to understand human action as bounded 
rational. One important difference between the type of institutionalism represented by 
for instance rational choice and March and Olsen is that the rational choice variant is 
more or less value free. Bogason states that rational choice institutionalism is colour-
blind; rules and regulations can be set to reach objectives no matter what they are. 
While in March and Olsen’s variant theory of institutions place great demand on 
anchoring for instance democratic governance in values that have a more 
comprehensive content, e.g. redistribution, a good life etc. (Bogason 2004a). 
March and Olsen (1995) see governance steering as one of the most influential 
forms of societal steering ever. Their perspective is institutional, in the sense that 
individual and collective action are shaped by values, identities, knowledge, and rules 
that are bound together in socio cultural systems and institutions. Further, they see 
action as conditioned by socio cultural identities, norms, and rules, which are bound 
together in a concept of a common good. The normative integration of individual and 
collective actors gives good conditions for stable societal steering. March and Olsen 
distance themselves from rational choice inspired action theories, that condition actors 
that act based on rational calculus of consequences – logic of consequentiality, instead 
their institutional perspective sees action as culturally conditioned –logic of 
appropriateness. Appropriateness in this context signifies that actors first reflect upon 
who we are, and then identify what type of situation this is, and then act based on an 
assessment of what the institutional context of rules, norms, and conceptions define as 
appropriate in such a situation (March & Olsen 1995).  
March and Olsen see identities, action conditions, and democratic changes as 
something that are continuously changing through political negotiation processes. 
Politics and democratic steering is, in this perspective, not a question of creating and 
making political coalitions based on given preferences and limitations, but a mutual 
development and adaptation of identities, institutions, and political measures. This 
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mutual adaptation gives the political process character of consensus based coordination 
(March & Olsen 1995). This theory regards governance networks as an expression of a 
fragmented and complex steering process, where the formulation and implementation of 
public policies happen in interaction between interdependent but autonomous actors. 
March and Olsen do not conceptualise the regime as a force in governance 
processes. Therefore, we have to construct what a regime is and what the role of the 
regime is, from the premises of their perspective. In this perspective, the actors’ 
identities and capacities are decisive for governance network’s ability to contribute to 
societal steering and to adapt to new challenges. In order to steer self-steering networks, 
the prime tool, in this perspective, is to shape and develop actors’ identities and 
capacities in specific and wanted directions. This also becomes the prime target of the 
regime in this perspective. 
The regime can then meta govern actors’ identities through influencing the 
institutional rules and norms in the network, and produce specific forms of knowledge, 
tell stories of “best practice”, create symbols and rituals and systematically work with 
attitudes. All of which is meant to influence actors’ images of themselves, of others, and 
their joint mission. Meta governance of actor capacities can be done through the 
creation of new rights, resources, competencies, and new forms of political know-how, 
or through the distribution of these between different actors, networks, and levels of 
steering. 
The aim of meta governance of identities and capacities is to create a democratic 
political community, which can serve as the base for extensive political unity, thus 
without suppression of free exchange of opinions. To March and Olsen, the goal of meta 
governance is to secure and contribute to solidarity between the different parties 
involved. Meta governance shall, in this perspective, also try to limit the effect of 
conflicts, for instance through confining them only to certain arenas so that conflicts do 
not spread throughout the governance system as a whole. Meta steering must therefore 
aim at creating a balance between the wish to block unwanted tyrannical developments 
and the wish to secure effective societal steering (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). March and 
Olsen are unclear on who should be responsible for meta governance processes, but they 
refer to the political system, government, society, and modern democracy in these 
contexts (March & Olsen 1995). 
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I do not believe that it is unfair to say that power do not have a prominent position 
in March and Olsen’s conceptualisations of institutional theory. The concept of power 
in this view must be constructed based on selective (and simplistic) pickings from 
institutional theory on how institutions function and the conceptualisations of 
rationality. That organisational structures have some influence over decision-making 
processes, agendas, and what is subjected to the attention of individuals are central 
factors in a theory of institutions which applies to narrow cognition. This means that 
certain ways of organising also can give preference and probability to certain processes 
and outcomes. This also means that those who realise this and have systemic power, can 
make certain outcomes more likely than others, make certain policy outcomes disappear 
from the realm of possible outcomes of a policy development process, and make others 
pop-up through careful manipulation of certain aspects of institutional frameworks. For 
instance if an expert group of engineers, economists or a group with collective or 
market preferences is presented to the same problem, they are inclined to give different 
interpretations of both the problem and the solution or policy recommendation in the 
end. If we read the “honest” political biographies, such processes are not uncommon. In 
this sense a theory of ‘nondecisions’ (Bachrach & Baratz 1963), can meaningfully be 
complemented with a theory of institutions (March & Olsen 1989: 16).  
Bachrach and Baratz (1963) can on their end be read as a critique of the one-
dimensional view on power. They argued that power has a second face, unperceived by 
the pluralists, and undetected by their methods of inquiry. Power was not solely 
reflected in concrete decisions. If one seeks to investigate power, the researcher must 
also consider the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to 
relatively non-controversial matters, e.g. through influencing community values, 
political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are serious but latent power 
conflicts in the community (Lukes 2005: 6). Power also accrues to those who have the 
means, either consciously or unconsciously to create or reinforce barriers to the public 
airing of policy conflicts (Bachrach & Baratz 1970)21. A similar point is also found in 
one of the most quoted paragraphs in political science: 
All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kind 
of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. 
Some issues are mobilised into politics while others are organised out (Schattschneider 
1960: 71)22. 
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Bachrach and Baratz called this type of power or influencing for nondecision-making. A 
satisfactory analysis of two-dimensional power then involves examining both decision-
making and nondecision-making (Lukes 2005: 22). 
This understanding of power does provide us with the tools to conceptualise how 
certain societal interests might be excluded from policy and agenda setting processes 
which are different, more pervasive and more nuanced than the one-dimensional view 
on power. However, it is not a concept of power that provides answers into why certain 
societal interests systematically might be excluded. 
Summary 
The critical reader would rightfully note that March and Olsen’s theory of institutions is 
much broader and integrative than I give them credit for here. Their ambition is wider 
than being an adjunct to theories of rational competition, they do however endorse such 
views and uses as those applied in this text (March & Olsen 1989: 16). The institutional 
perspective can also be viewed as a profound critique of models and perspectives on 
organizational structures that view such structures as primarily governed by 
environmental dictates, rational design, or both (Brunsson & Olsen 1998). However, 
this also implies that this perspective in some instances can be viewed as 
complementary to such views. The main lines of this perspective as it is used in the data 
analysis are summarized in the table below. 
Tab. 3-5: Summary of the Institutional Perspective on Regional Governance 
Dimensions: Description: 
Type of rationality   Actors are bounded rational in their actions, and apply to logic of appropriateness.  
Type of actors  Actors are conceptualised both collectively and individually and are both interdependent and autonomous. 
Perspective on society  Society is an arena where actors intentionally seek common good solutions. 
Conceptualisation of 
governance   Interactive steering based on institutional norms and rules. 
Purpose of governance  Response to fragmented and complex steering processes. 
Meta governance 
 An actor(s), institution(s), coalition(s), organisation(s), or regime’s re-
institutionalisation, shaping, and development of identities and capacities in 
specific and wanted directions. 
Workings of the regime 
 Influencing the institutional rules and norms in the network, and produce 
specific forms of knowledge, tell stories of “best practice”, create symbols 
and rituals and systematically work with attitudes. 
Conceptualisation of power  Here is the two-dimensional view of power emphasised. Focus on the institutional conditions for decision-making and agenda setting. 
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An Ideological Perspective on Regional Governance 
The introduction of an ideological perspective can easily and understandably be 
interpreted as both arrogance and ignorance. To label some actor or collective group as 
driven by ideology is almost the same as saying that they are not acting rational, are 
unaware of the consequences of their actions, are driven by beliefs not logic etc. This is 
true in the sense that the ideological perspective just as the institutional perspective does 
not view human action as primarily driven by rational calculus of conceivable action 
alternatives. Explanations are also in this perspective primarily sought at a systems 
level. What primarily differentiates an institutional and an ideological perspective is that 
the latter has power as the central explanatory variable, while the former sees norms, 
rules, culture etc. as the most important structures. An ideological perspective does 
however beg an immediate answer to what an ideology is.  
Ideology is in this text not used in the sense that it conceptualises a necessarily 
false or systematically wrong classification of the nature of reality. In a sense it is 
uninteresting whether the particular ideology in question is correct or not about its 
conceptualisation about society. All of our ideas about society, rationality, and power 
are in sense social-constructs. What is interesting is if that particular ideology is 
influential in the sense that it is manifested into practices. In this perspective are 
ideologies such as socialism, communism, liberalism, conservatism, etc. only 
interesting to the extent that they exert any influence onto how people act and interact.  
It can be very difficult to observe an effect chain from theoretical construct or idea 
into practice, and a consequence of this is that also analysis of how important or 
influential a particular ideology is notoriously difficult. Changes in ideology are a much 
more diffuse and difficult subject to handle than the more visible institutional and/or 
rational changes. That is not to say that ideology is not important or does not have an 
impact. 
One meaningful way to approach ideology is to view ideologies as discourses or 
narratives on and about society. If we view society by default to be so complex that we 
cannot possibly fully understand it, we should be puzzled by the level of certainty that 
apparently exists about the truths of the nature of “reality” and society. Social-
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constructivism provides insights into understanding such processes. Through the 
process of being socialised into society, we are bound to be imprinted with some 
conceptions and ideas about society that we can never fully verify, but take for granted. 
Such ideas can vary from place to place and between social stratas, and thus lay the 
foundation for the emergence of both different cultures and ideologies. What is 
interesting about this is when an ideology emerging from one place or strata moves 
from one place to other places or stratas and starts to manifest. 
Thus, ideology is most visible in the ways in which language is used. In this sense 
ideology can be understood as a narrative or discourse. Discourses are a set of rhetorical 
forms and models of thought, which manifest themselves within distinct social fields 
and situations. Some discourses tend to be dominative and gain hegemony. The 
discourse then sets the limits for what can be said, represented, gain a communicative 
form, what choices that can be made and what actions can be understood. A hegemonic 
discourse is a situation where some can find and use language for their experiences, and 
to justify their actions, while others must remain silent and invisible (Meyer 2003: 72). 
Ideology can be observed through who speaks about what, but probably more important 
through an observation who do not speak, and what is not is spoken of. Power in this 
perspective is not primarily exercised with the use of force or instructional authority, but 
through agreements and certain ideas about how elements and structures of society are 
connected and interact. Such understandings and ideas can gain dominance and get a 
hegemonic position. When this happens, they effectively set the boundaries of how and 
in what way we conceptualise and understand society and our role in it. Such ideas can 
be conceptualised as ideologies, and when they are privileged in defining problems and 
societal challenges, ideology exerts power in the sense that it is the underlying basis and 
fundament of any policy agenda developed within it discursive framework (Lyngstad 
2003: 115-6). 
Earlier in this chapter, some of the current regional development concepts were 
discussed. These concepts were conceptualized as regional narratives just because of 
their function as setting and defining the dominant discourse, narrative, about regional 
development practices. These concepts express certain ideas, concepts and 
understandings about society, development and democracy that briefly can be 
summarized as: (1) a belief that economical globalization has made regions competitors, 
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(2) a unitary focus on innovation is the key to succeeding in this competition, (3) that 
innovation is the key factor to economical growth, (4) that we must be prepared to 
“sacrifice” some societal/institutional values in order to succeed/survive in the global 
competition, (5) that there are no viable alternatives to the market based solutions, (6) a 
belief that what is best for the individual is best for the society, (7) that public 
intervention outside capital transfers restrains the workings of the market, (8) that 
society should invest and prioritize in its (creative) elites, etc. Such ideas as those listed 
here do come with various emphasizes and interpretations, but at the kernel there are a 
unifying idea and belief in market mechanism as both necessary and supreme of other 
ways of organizing society. 
This is in the continuation referred to as an ideology of neoliberalism, a 
philosophy, which is most visible in attitudes to society, the individual, and 
employment. Paul Treanor defines neoliberalism in the following way: 
Neo-liberalism is a philosophy in which the existence and operation of a market are 
valued in themselves, separately from any previous relationship with the production of 
goods and services, and without any attempt to justify them in terms of their effect on the 
production of goods and services; and where the operation of a market or market-like 
structure is seen as an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide for all human action, and 
substituting for all previously existing ethical beliefs (Treanor 2004).  
Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston (2005), write that we live in an age of 
neoliberalism. That it is an ideology that strongly influences the lives of billions of 
people in every continent in most areas of societal life. They write that in less than a 
generation, neoliberalism has become so widespread and influential, and so deeply 
intermingled with critical important aspects of life, that it can be difficult to assess its 
nature and historical importance (Saad-Filho & Johnston 2005: 1).  
Given the complexity of assessing how neoliberal ideology is manifested onto 
regional development discourse and practices, I refer to concrete examples of such 
processes from the Agder region in chapter 6. The theoretical conceptualisation of the 
ideological perspective is concretised in the following, using the same dimensions as for 
the instrumental and the institutional perspective, namely rationality and society, 
governance and regime, and power. 
Between 1970 and 1984, Michel Foucault delivered thirteen annual courses of 
lectures at the Collège de France in Paris. In the lectures held in 1978 and 1979, 
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Foucault defined and explored a fresh domain of research into what he called 
‘governmental rationality’, or governmentality (Gordon 1991: 1). This work was not 
carried out by Foucault alone but in a fellowship of researchers of who many are 
contributors to the book The Foucault Effect Studies in Governmentality (Burchell, 
Gordon, & Miller 1991).  
Governmentality theory is not particularly concerned with who governs or the 
legitimacy of government but how it is governed. This theory gives an informed 
perspective on the analysis of shifting governing rationalities and their steering effects. 
It shares perspective with the institutional perspective on the importance of effects that 
culture and institutions have on actor’s steering practices. In Governmentality theory it 
is not so much the institutionalised norms and values so much as it is the 
institutionalised steering rationalities and technologies that define the framework of 
possibility for concrete steering. Another difference between the institutional and the 
ideological perspective is that the latter views steering as a specific form of power, and 
thereby also a praxis that involves the creation of antagonistic conflicts (Sørensen & 
Torfing 2005: 115-6).  
Foucault’s action theory is institutional, in the sense that actors act based on 
discursively constructed, motives, strategies, and rationalities which are embedded in 
practice. Specific power strategies, which, Foucault says, are intentional and non 
subjective forge the discursive conditions for actions (Foucault 1991). Strategies of 
power always contain a specific set of goals, means, and calculations. No single actor is 
however able to steer and control the formulation and development of different power 
strategies, which complex, polysemantic, and institutional character effectively limit 
conscious attempts at rational strategy development. According to Foucault, power is a 
strategic game without game steering actors. Foucault starts, as within the institutional 
perspective, with institutional conditions for action but does not, as March and Olsen 
(1995), believe that actors act based on their interpretation of institutional conditions 
(appropriateness), but based on a series of discursive conditions that are forged by 
crossing power strategies. In Foucault’s genealogical studies he analyses historical 
examples of how humans are subjected and subject themselves through institutionalised 
power strategies and technologies (Foucault 1991; Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 117). 
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Foucault’s genealogical thesis of power as an institutional conditioned discursive 
subjecting process, which creates distinct forms of subjectivity and action, can be read 
as the total elimination of individual freedom. This critique however misses Foucault’s 
point that power only can be exercised on free subjects, and only to the extent that they 
are free (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). If individual or collective subjects do not have 
different opportunities, and if they do not have opportunities to react in different ways, 
it is not a question of power but of dominance. The nature of power is not to enslave 
individuals to do specific tasks. The point of power is to mobilise individuals’ energies 
and capacities within a specific discursive framework. This discursive framework 
secures a certain degree of conformity to the thelos of power, but is no guarantee against 
resistance and non-intended behaviour. If it is a question of power and not dominance, 
subjects always have the possibility to oppose, Foucault says (Sørensen & Torfing 
2005: 118). The ideological perspective is thus not a question of environmental 
determinism imposed onto a social system/institution. 
On a more general analytical level governmentality can be defined as a collective 
steering rationality, which contains a more or less coherent set of knowledge, 
calculations, and techniques, which determine how steering is executed and organised. 
Government can, in this perspective, be understood as the concrete regulation of one or 
more actor’s behaviours (“the conduct of conduct”). Governmentality is a distinct type 
of steering (“art of government”), while government signifies the concrete steering 
measures (“acts of government”) (Dean 1999). Governmentality has no independent 
existence but is embedded in the implicit and explicit conceptions, rationalisations, and 
calculations of government (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 122). 
To study the historical changes in steering rationalities, Foucault argues that we 
must analyse the ongoing formulation of, and changes in, governmentality-programmes. 
These are visible in the calculating and explained recommendations of how institutions 
should be reorganised, spaces to be connected, and behaviour regulated. Examples of 
such governmentality programmes are Liberalism, Marxism, and Neoliberalism. 
Sørensen and Torfing (2005: 127), argue that if we really want to understand the growth 
of governance networks as new and legitimate steering strategy, we should regard 
governance networks as an integrated part of a new governmentality programme. 
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Foucault, who died in 1984, does not explicitly discuss governance-networks in 
his governmentality analysis. Sørensen and Torfing (2005: 122) however, see this 
perspective as useful in the analysis of governance networks, because it builds on a 
understanding of power as a network of actors, strategies and actions. This in addition to 
Foucault’s view on the state as something that is de-governmentalised, because societal 
steering increasingly is pluralized and subjugated to a long range of more or less 
autonomous actors, which are coupled together in different types of networks. Thus, 
power is not centred on the state, but is exerted in a multiplicity of social relations with 
different organisational forms; hereof also network structures in society. 
Meta governance has a central place in Governmentality theory. The dominating 
governmentality defines the conditions and bounds for steering through an interactive 
network of actors and institutions. Thus, meta governance is in this perspective, all the 
conceptions, techniques, subjectivities, and rationalities that the governmentality 
programme in question articulates, and that manifest itself to the development of 
concrete steering forms and steering measures. 
Network governance should in this perspective, be regarded as a part of the 
advanced liberal steering (governmentality) programme. It is crucial that it is steered at 
a distance without too much involvement in the specific details. According to Dean 
(1999) advanced liberal meta steering is at the same time about both subjectification and 
subjection of network actors. On the one side, meta steering is about establishing 
partnerships, partner-hearing mechanisms, mechanisms for participation and 
negotiation, establish incitements for free and active participation (subjectification). On 
the other side meta steering is about establishing a series of norms, standards, 
benchmarks, quality indicators and different hierarchical instruction- and control 
mechanisms and relations, which enables the possibility to measure, judge, and to 
sanction the steering efforts in governance networks (subjection). 
Meta/regime steering has in this perspective a built-in duality. It is supposed to 
create, develop, and mobilise actor energies, resources, and capacities, at the same time 
as these activities unfold within a defined discursively constructed framework. The 
actors must not perceive this discursive framework as external conditions that they must 
relate to, but be present in the actors own perceptions of themselves, the others, and 
their shared surroundings (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 132). 
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Using different contract technologies meta steering actors can enter into binding 
arrangements with enterprises, organisations, organised groups, and individual citizens 
who then are recruited as actors in governance networks. These governance networks 
are, through running evaluations and reporting, coerced to act within distinct social, 
political, and economical bounds. This coercion has not the character of legal sanctions 
or pecuniary loss, but of a committing norm of responsibility to joint development plans 
and to negotiated agreements and solutions (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 133). 
Power is the central concept in the ideological perspective. It is a type of power 
that in many ways are invisible compared to the other forms of power discussed in the 
two other perspectives.  
Central to regime theory is the concept of pre-emptive power. This is power that 
emerges from actors’ resources, and capabilities, to make use of their systemic power. 
This power becomes real trough the development of the shared understandings that 
emerge when actors that constitute regional regimes (from politics, interest 
organisations, consultants, development organisations, academia, etc.) directly and 
indirectly interact. The most important output from this work is the shared 
understandings and perspectives that emerge as a result of this work. A critique that has 
been raised against regime theory is that it can be unclear whether regimes built joint 
understandings, or if joint understandings are the basis of regimes (Lyngstad 2003: 
103). The most likely answer to this is that such joint understandings, discourses are a 
result of interplay between ideas and coalition building processes, and that these 
processes are mutually reinforcing and that regimes gain increased strength over time as 
a result of this. The survival of regimes is however dependent on its ability to produce 
results. Or at least their ability to get it across that they are producing good results, also 
for the larger society. As long as such results are produced, regimes tends to be 
maintained. The power expressed through the regime is in this sense not so much a 
question of or ability to control or dominate but to have the power to define the 
boundaries of the relevant discourses. Regime theoreticians therefore often emphasise 
that power within regime theory primarily is about social production and not just social 
control (Lyngstad 2003: 104). Such understandings of power are conceptualised as the 
third dimension of power by Steven Lukes (Lukes 1974; 2005). 
Chapter 3 – Regional Discourses 
- 107 - 
Lukes’ third dimension of power does not represent a complete alternative to 
Weber’s and Dahl’s concept of power, the first dimension, neither does the third 
dimension represent a complete alternative to Bachrach and Baratz concept of power, 
the second dimension. Lukes’ third dimension of power represents an addition/ 
expansion to how the concept of power previously was used. Lukes states that Bachrach 
and Baratz retreated somewhat from their earliest assessment and adjusted their view 
that it must always be some observable conflict if their second face of power is to be 
revealed. Bachrach and Baratz therefore stated that without observable conflict, we 
must assume that the consensus is genuine (Lukes 2005: 7).  
If there are no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be that there is consensus 
on the prevailing allocation of values, in which nondecision-making is impossible 
(Bachrach & Baratz 1970: 49)23.  
Based on this Lukes also characterises Bachrach and Baratz perspectives on 
power for limiting their analysis of power to where it is observable conflict.  
Lukes’ third dimension of power is to be understood as a profound critique of the 
behavioural perspectives on power articulated both by Dahl and the pluralists, but also 
on Bachrach and Baratz perspectives. Lukes does not reject their claims, but he states 
that power also is something more, and that their perspectives on power are too limiting 
for understanding the true faces of power. Lukes (2005: 26) criticizes Bachrach and 
Baratz, along with the pluralists, for adopting a too methodically individualistic view of 
power, and that both the first and the second dimension of power follow in the steps of 
Max Weber for whom power was the probability of individuals realising their wills 
despite the resistance of others. The two-dimensional view of power lacks a sociological 
perspective within which to examine, not only decision-making and nondecision-
making power, but also the various ways of suppressing latent conflicts within society 
(Lukes 2005: 59). 
Lukes lists Antonio Gramsci and his Prison Notebooks as one of the central 
inspirational sources for the third dimension of power. When imprisoned in fascist Italy 
Gramsci had grappled with the question of how consent to capitalist exploitation is 
secured under contemporary conditions, in particular democratic ones. The central 
concept to be interpreted is consent. How is it to be understood, what is it? Gramsci 
inspired many interpretations of this, and Lukes lists a few.  
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It is the contemporary social formations of the West, when class rules were 
secured by consent by means of the bourgeoisie’s monopoly over the ideological 
apparatuses (Althusser 1971; Anderson 1976)24. This interpretation of Gramsci refers to 
a psychological state, involving some kind of acceptance that not necessarily is explicit 
of the socio political order. Przeworski puts forward an alternative non-cultural, 
materialist interpretation of Gramsci. If an ideology is to orient people in their daily 
lives, it must express their interests and aspirations. A few individuals can be mistaken, 
but delusion cannot be perpetuated at a mass scale.  
The consent which underlies reproduction of capitalist relations does not consist of 
individual states of mind but of behavioural characteristics of organisations. It should not 
be understood in psychological or moral terms. Consent is cognitive and behavioural. 
Social actors, individual and collective, do not march around filled with ‘predispositions’ 
which they simply execute. Social relations constitute structures of choices within which 
people perceive, evaluate, and act. They consent when they choose particular courses of 
action and when they follow these choices in their practice. Wage-earners consent to 
capitalist organisation of society when they act as if they could improve their material 
conditions within the confines of capitalism (Przeworski 1985)25.  
Based on this, new questions emerge. What are the persistence of capitalism and 
the cohesion of liberal democracies? Where were the limits of consent beyond which 
crisis would occur? What were the proper roles of intellectuals (researchers) in 
contesting the status quo? Lukes states that it where such questions Power: A Radical 
View sought to address, and they have been even more pertinent after its original 
publication, and are still demanding answers. When Reaganism in the USA and 
Thatcherism in Britain were succeeded, after the fall of communism, by the 
extraordinary diffusion across the globe of neoliberal ideas and assumptions, such 
questions are given a renewed relevance. Does the extraordinary diffusion of neoliberal 
ideas constitute a mega-instance of hegemony? In such a context Gramsci’s original 
question; “how consent to capitalist exploitation is secured under contemporary 
conditions, in particular democratic ones?”, seems just as relevant. Charles Tilly 
paraphrases Gramsci when he asks: If ordinary domination so consistently hurts the well 
defined interests of subordinate groups, why do subordinates comply? Why don’t they 
rebel continuously, or at least resist all along the way? Tilly suggests answers to the 
problem, all of which are commented on by Lukes: 
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1) The premise is incorrect; subordinates are actually rebelling continuously, but 
in covert ways. #1) Lukes comments that this solution is highly unlikely ever to be the 
whole story. One could also add with reference to the global diffusion of neoliberal 
ideology that people in the industrial part of the world, mostly are unaware of long-term 
effects of this system, and therefore have no reason to object either overt or covert. 2) 
Subordinates actually get something in return for their subordination, something that is 
sufficient to make them acquiesce most of the time. #2) Lukes sees this as a parallel to 
Przeworski’s materialist interpretation of Gramsci, a major part of the persistence of 
capitalism, but also, one should add, this is also the case of every socio-economic 
system. 3) Through the pursuit of other valued ends such as esteem or identity, 
subordinates become implicated in systems that exploit or oppress them. (In some 
versions, no. 3 becomes identical to no. 2.) #3) Lukes argues that #2 and #3 together 
pinpoint the importance of focusing on actors’ multiple, interacting and conflicting 
interests, and that they raise the question of materialist versus culturalist explanation. 
Are material interests basic to the explanation of individual behaviour and of collective 
outcomes, rather than, for instance, interests in ‘esteem’ or ‘identity’, and if so, when? 
An additional reference (Berger & Luckmann 2000) makes this point even more 
relevant. To the individual the society appears as an objective reality, and building 
esteem and identity outside the social system they are socialised in, is probably 
something that is impossible to comprehend for most people. 4) As a result of 
mystification, repression, or the sheer unavailability of alternative ideological frames, 
subordinates remain unaware of heir true interests. 5) Force and inertia hold 
subordinates in place. 6) Resistance and rebellion are costly; most subordinates lack 
the necessary means. 7) All of the above. #4), #5), and #6) Lukes comments are relating 
specifically to power and the modes of its exercise, #5) emphasises coercion and #6) 
scant resources. It is however #4) that pinpoints the third dimension of power. The 
power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their 
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things (Tilly 1991: 594)26. Lukes argues that no view of power can be 
accurate unless it offers an account of this kind of power. A systematic arrangement of 
the distinctions between the three views of power is sketched out in the table below: 
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Tab. 3-6: Three Dimensions of Power, adapted from Lukes (1974) 
Dimensions: One-Dimensional View of Power, focus on: 
Two- Dimensional View of 
Power, focus on: 
Three- Dimensional View of 
Power, focus on: 
Behaviour a) Behaviour. a) (Qualified) critique of behavioural focus. 
a) Critique of behavioural 
focus. 
Decision-
making b) Decision-making. 
b) Decision-making and 
nondecision-making. 
b) Decision-making and control 
over political agenda (not 
necessarily through decisions). 
Issues c) (Key) issues. c) Issues and potential issues. c) Issues and potential issues. 
Conflict d) Observable (overt) conflict. d) Observable (overt or covert) conflict. 
d) Observable (overt or covert) 
conflict, and latent conflict. 
Interests 
e) (Subjective) interests, seen 
as policy preferences revealed 
by political participation. 
e) (Subjective) interests, seen 
as policy preferences or 
grievances. 
e) Subjective and real interests. 
 
The third dimension of power takes on a systemic perspective on power, power is 
embedded in the social system, often without even being articulated. In fact power is 
most effective when it is unspoken and inherent in the system. It is just the norm of 
doing and thinking, in a way as governing steering without execution. This type of 
power is only effective as long as it is not questioned, described, or recognised as a 
problem by those affected; when it is unrealised and institutionalised into a system. 
Why should e.g. universal suffrage be an interest of the population if they are unaware 
of the concept of voting and participating?  
Paradoxically, this type of power can even be unacknowledged by those with 
formal or informal decision-making power in a social system. This type of power will 
only be revealed to them if they act outside the norm of acceptance, e.g. the left-wing 
political leader who argues the supremacy of global competition for securing 
developing countries’ problems, or the right-wing leader that argues against big-
business interests, both very quickly would be isolated and out of office. Such cases are 
rare because it was through advocacy of the “correct” values, which enabled them to 
take position in the first place. 
What stands out in the third dimension of power is the concept of latent conflicts, 
which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and 
the real interests of those they exclude (Lukes 2005: 28). Are power issues or conflicts 
not present if the observer cannot uncover grievances, should the observer then 
conclude and assume that there is a genuine consensus on the prevailing allocation of 
values, do actors then have no interests that are harmed by the use of power? Is it not 
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the most supreme and insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever 
degree, from having grievances in the first place, either by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order 
of things, or because they cannot see or imagine an alternative to it, or because they see 
it as natural or unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial? Lukes therefore notes that to assume that the absence of grievance equals 
genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false and manipulated 
consensus by definitional fiat (Lukes 2005: 28).  
It is not difficult to agree with Lukes assessment that there must be a third 
dimension to power, but the question of latent conflicts and people’s real interests is 
mind-baffling. Who can then determine what a real interest is if it is not recognised by 
the actors themselves, who should as the authority decide that there are latent conflicts, 
and does not those who introduce or reveal latent conflicts, just introduce a new regime 
of latent power structures? Moreover, how can power in such forms even be studied? 
Summary 
The ideological perspective is in one sense fundamentally different from the other two 
perspectives. The instrumental perspective can be viewed as an architectural approach 
to governance, the belief that regional governance systems can be instrumentally 
designed to solve specific societal problems. The institutional perspective can again be 
read as a profound critique of the instrumental perspective, emphasising normative, 
cultural components of institutional design, but also expressing a belief in normative 
values of democracy and the governance systems potential in addressing democratic 
deficits and development challenges. The ideological perspective is in many ways very 
similar to the institutional perspective, with governance systems and its institutions as 
power structures that exert specific views and ideas about society. In order for a 
governance system to function within the ideological perspective, some specific and 
system beneficiary narratives, hegemonic ideas, and enclosed discourses must be 
present, in order for volatile institutions, such as networks and partnerships, to sustain 
and gain legitimacy and maintain an image of a coherent rationale and efficacy. A 
summary of the main elements in the ideological perspective is presented in the table 
below. 
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Tab. 3-7: Summary of the Ideological Perspective on Regional Governance 
Dimensions: Description: 
Type of rationality  
 Actors are bounded rational in their actions, and act based on discursively 
constructed, motives, strategies, and rationalities, which are embedded in 
practice. 
Type of actors  Actors are conceptualised both collectively and individually. Actors are dependent upon a discursive framework. 
Perspective on society 
 Society is an arena where different interests are in competition with each 
other. In order for societal structures such as governance networks to be 
viable, there must be a dominant idea or discourse about these institutions’ 
role in society, about development, and about democracy, that all 
contributes to rationalise and legitimise governance structures and 
processes in society. 
Conceptualisation of 
governance  
 Governance is an institutionalised steering rationality and technology, which 
exerts a specific form of power. 
Purpose of governance  To support the exertion of the dominant development agenda.  
Meta governance 
 An actor(s), institution(s), coalition(s), organisation(s), or regimes 
mobilisation of actor’s energies and capabilities within a discursively 
constructed framework. 
Workings of the regime  Steering at a distance, through premising the institutional, ideological, and normative bounds of development. 
Conceptualisation of power27  Here is the third-dimension of power emphasised. Power is exercised when there is general consent to a discursively constructed narrative. 
 
We have earlier seen that the theoretical discourses associated with corporatism, 
pluralism, policy networks studies, early governance studies, second-generation 
governance studies, and regime theory, all represent theories that in different ways 
informs discourses on democracy. For instance, we have seen that it has varied from a 
very critical to a more pragmatic stance on the extent that governance networks have 
been viewed as problematic for democracy. The instrumental, institutional, and the 
ideological perspectives give theoretical basis for different interpretations of 
governance, and therefore basis for different interpretations of the implications 
governance has for democracy. These perspectives are not directly discussed against 
democratic theory in this thesis. What I later do is to use the findings from the analysis, 
where I use the perspectives, and discuss this towards theories of democracy. I will 
therefore in the following briefly introduce and discuss some conceptualisations and 
understandings of democracy, that later will serve as basis for analysis of data about 
regional governance. 
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3.6 – Democracy 
The theoretical and practical discourse relating to democracy is large, complex and 
many faceted, it is also probably one of the most written about topics within social 
science. To give something close to a complete overview of the discourse on democracy 
far supersedes the ambitions of this thesis work. Because as Davydd J. Greenwood and 
Morten Levin writes: 
Democracy is a concept with such a multiplicity of meanings that attempts to be clear 
about it are extremely controverted. […] To some, […], the term means egalitarianism. 
For others, it evokes participation, whereas for others it conjures decision making by 
consensus, and still for others, decision by majority rule. For some democracy implies a 
homogeneous community and for others, arenas for lively debate. All of these meanings 
have their associated genealogies, theories, politics, and ethics (Greenwood & Levin 
1998: 11). 
I will therefore limit the discussions to certain perspectives that I believe are so 
different that they illuminate the point I will try to make relating to how different 
democratic values manifests in practice, and of these perspectives I only provide an 
outline that sufficiently can provide basis for analysis in chapter 7. 
Introduction 
In this subchapter, I will outline some general principles and ideas of democracy and I 
will conclude the discussions with insights provided by the writings of Robert A. Dahl 
(Dahl 1985; 1986a; 1989). Broadly speaking democratic theory has been oriented 
towards three core ideas, three ideas emphasising three different aspects of democracy 
(Rasch 2004). This is the ideas of (a) democracy as competition28, as articulated by for 
instance Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber, (b) democracy as participation, as 
articulated by for instance Carole Pateman and Carl Cohen, and (c) democracy as 
deliberation, as articulated by for instance John Dryzek and Jürgen Habermas. All of 
these core ideas of democracy builds on, are a critique of, or modifies, Age of Reason 
and Age of Enlightenment philosophy and political thought, which again readdresses the 
classical topics of government and democracy from Greek antiquity. It is the classical 
writers from the Age of Reason and Age of Enlightenment periods such as John Locke, 
Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and others that together with 
Greek political thought that constitutes what Schumpeter labels the “classical” doctrine 
of democracy. Schumpeter who writes about the failure of state, publishes his classical 
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work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1994) during the Second World War. He 
did so with the failure of society governed by capitalism and socialism with the two 
world wars in his mind, based on this Schumpeter recognises the need for firm steering. 
Schumpeter therefore conceptualise democracy as a just system in which rulers are 
selected through competitive elections, it is defended because it is the only political 
steering system in which citizens can get rid of government without bloodshed, this is 
the idea of democracy as a minimalist democracy (Przeworski 2003). It is the idea of 
society as ridden with conflicts, values of interests, economic conflicts, moral conflicts, 
cultural conflicts, that justifies a call for strong leadership, an elected elite that can steer 
society clear of troubled waters. The competitive mechanism is what secures balance of 
power and interests, and secures that the “best” leaders are elected. Thus, to Schumpeter 
democracy is “only” a method to achieve this, and not an end in it self:  
Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political—legislative and administrative—decisions and hence incapable of 
being and end in it self, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given 
historical conditions. And this must be the starting point of any attempt at defining it 
(Schumpeter 1994: 242). 
In Participation and Democratic Theory, Carole Pateman (1970) criticises this 
elitist conceptualisation of democracy. She criticises Schumpeter for vagueness about 
the notion of classical democracy, it has never existed something as a “classical” theory 
of democracy, and the classical writers did not ignore the subject of leadership Pateman 
(1970) writes. Pateman identifies Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill as the 
first theorist of ‘participatory democracy’. Pateman writes that Schumpeter has a too 
negative portrayal of the citizen’s capabilities for participation. Schumpeter for instance 
writes: 
Party and machine politicians are simply the response to the fact that the electoral mass is 
incapable of action other than a stampede, and they constitute an attempt to regulate 
political competition exactly similar to the corresponding practices of a trade association. 
The psycho-technics of party management and party advertising, slogans and marching 
tunes, are not accessories. They are of the essence of politics. So is the political boss 
(Schumpeter 1994: 283). 
This in contrast to John Stuart Mill, who introduced a double criteria for good 
governance, he said that a good governing system should make use of both the 
resources that exist in the population in a good way, and therefore result in good 
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decisions. Secondly this should be a form of governance that also develops the human 
capabilities in a good direction, something that in turn can lead to even better decisions 
(Midgaard 2004: 32). In Rousseau’s writings participation is also important, because, as 
for with Mill, is it the educative effects of participation that is important. Both Rousseau 
and Mill are therefore in their way spokespersons for broad political participation 
(Midgaard 2004: 33). Participatory action is designed to develop responsible social and 
political action. Something that once it is established becomes self-sustaining. The more 
citizens participate the better they get at doing so. This is development of the human at 
the same time as it is development of the political democratic system. Participatory 
democracy is also empowering in the sense that it gives individuals the means to better 
control of their lives. When a participatory process is the basis of the decision-making 
process, then will also the individual accept collective action easier. Last, Pateman 
argues that participatory democracy has an integrative function, it builds society, 
because it contributes to creating a sense of belonging to a community (Pateman 1970).  
The third core idea of democracy is democracy as deliberation. This is also the 
most recently developed democratic theory. The central claim of deliberative 
democracy is that democracy is defined by the existence of a free, inclusive, rational 
debate by citizens that determines the basic trust of public policy. In the course of this 
debate, citizens exchange views, persuade or are persuaded on the basis of sound 
reasons, and reach conclusions that represent a mutually agreed-upon position at the 
very least, and perhaps a vision of the common good (Rubin 2001). There is a 
substantial overlap between participatory and deliberative understandings of democracy. 
These two theories of democracy are mutually supporting. Edward Rubin writes that we 
very roughly can say that participatory democracy focuses on the quantity of citizen 
involvement, while deliberative democracy focuses on its quality. To meet the 
participatory standard all citizens must be politically active, but their involvement need 
only be sincere, not rational; to meet the deliberative standard, citizens must engage in 
rational discussion of the issues, but many need do nothing more than listen, talk, and 
vote, Rubin writes (Rubin 2001). Personally, I disagree with Rubin’s appraisal of the 
distinction of deliberative and participatory democracy. In the sense that a participatory 
democracy without deliberative features does not make much sense, if participation also 
is about education and democratic “training”, then a participatory theory of democracy 
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also must incorporate strong deliberative features for it to be meaningful. I therefore 
choose to view the distinction between participatory and deliberative democracy in 
egalitarian terms. Deliberative democracy can easily be conceptualist in elitist terms, for 
instance the deliberative processes occurring among an elected or unelected elite. 
Participatory democracy does not require that everyone participate in everything, but a 
minimum is that everyone affected by a decision should have the possibility to 
participate directly, and this participation must be governed by deliberative principles 
for it to be meaningful in an educative and a joint learning perspective29. Discussions of 
deliberative democracy are because of this not included in the further discussions. 
The discussion of democracy ends with Robert A. Dahl’s ‘procedural democracy’. 
This ideal and normative theory of democracy represents in some ways a unifying 
position, as it broadly incorporates many of the central ideas and values associated with 
the three conceptualisations of democracy discussed here. 
These three conceptualisations; competitive democracy, participatory democracy, 
and procedural democracy, are in chapter 7 discussed against some of the empirical 
findings about the regional system of regime steered governance in the Agder region. 
Participation 
The first historical record of democracy is the direct-democracy introduced in Athens 
by the aristocrat Kleisthenes some 2500 years ago (Hansen 1991: 4). Almost every 
writing on democracy starts with the distinction between direct and indirect democracy, 
or democracy and representative democracy, and it is often stated that direct democracy 
no longer exists (Sartori 1987; Hansen 1991). Such statements are true in the sense that 
they refer to direct democracy as a way of governing territorial states. The only other 
widely accepted example of direct democracy as a way of governing states, after the 
Greek city-states, is the Swiss cantons that existed in the sixteenth century. They 
constitute the only real parallel to Athenian democracy. Nowadays they do not, as they 
are only subordinate units, with limited local powers. In their day they were sovereign 
states governed by means of direct democracy (Hansen 1991). There are many other 
examples of direct democracy like for instance the New England town meetings but 
then also only at a municipal scale, or with limited political and economical power. The 
German Urdemokratie was by Montesquieu thought to be an example of direct 
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democracy, but this notion has later been abandoned by later historians and 
archaeologists (Hansen 1991: 2).  
Similar analysis of the workings of the Athenian form of democracy is made by 
Robert Dahl (1989). Dahl characterizes the Greek democracy as a predominantly 
exclusive system of governance, but of course more inclusive than other systems of 
government that existed at the time. The Greek practice of demos excluded many, as a 
large part of the adult population was denied full citizenship, the right to participate in 
political life. No women could be citizens, neither could slaves or long-term resident 
aliens (metics), in addition, both your parents had to be born in Athens in order for you 
to gain citizenship (Dahl 1989: 22). Greek democracy was also externally exclusive, 
among Greeks democracy in a “modern sense” did not exist, it existed, and in the view 
of the Greeks could only exist, among members of the same polis. Neither did the 
Greeks acknowledge the existence of any universal claims to freedom, equality, or 
rights. Freedom was an attribute of membership in polis, not membership in the human 
race. Greek democracy was therefore inherently limited to small-scale systems (Dahl 
1989: 23). 
The idea of direct participation has however lived on, not any longer as a way of 
governing nation states, but as a steering mechanism in smaller social systems. Thus it 
is central to the ideas inherent in what often is conceptualised as participatory 
democracy, workplace democracy, industrial democracy, and economical democracy 
(Pateman 1970; 2003). 
Economical democracy is here understood as worker control over enterprises and 
societal control over means of production, and should not be mistaken for Anthony 
Downs’ ‘An Economic Theory of Democracy’, which is one of the cornerstones of 
rational actors theory (Monroe 1991: ix)30. Dahl is one of the most prominent advocates 
of workplace democracy in America (Dahl 1985), he has been troubled by the different 
ways in which those who govern polities and firms are chosen in modern society 
(Mayer 2001b). Dahl notes that while democracy is the norm in the state in the 
advanced industrial nations, authoritarianism prevails in the economy. Most employees 
are subject to managers they did not elect and to rules in which they had little or no say. 
They are subordinates, a role manifestly at odds with the ideal of the democratic citizen. 
Given the “contradictions between our commitment to the democratic ideal and the 
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theory and practice of hierarchy in our daily lives” (Dahl 1979: 68)31. Dahl has 
expressed interest in re-establishing symmetry between polity and economy through the 
democratic transformation of work. 
In ‘A Preface to Economic Democracy’, Dahl claims that the self-managed firm is 
not merely desirable by contrast with the alternatives but is also a moral right of 
employees (Dahl 1985). According to this argument, labour is entitled to democratic 
voice in the firm as a matter of right, as a kind of compensation for subjection to the 
rules. In this way Dahl shifted the debate about workplace democracy from the question 
of its consequences to the question of what justice demands (Mayer 2001b). If power at 
work is a moral right of employees, then it is the entitlements of the individual that 
matter and not merely the relative desirability of this set of arrangements. Moral rights 
must be respected even if they do not benefit others. This is a position that, maybe 
especially in the US, is controversial. 
Robert Mayer notes that despite Dahl's stature as the premier democratic theorist 
in the post-war era, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to his proof for the 
existence of a moral right to workplace democracy. Most of the reviews of ‘A Preface to 
Economic Democracy’ passed over the issue in silence (Mayer 2001b).  
Dahl’s thesis of the moral right to workplace democracy has spurred objections. 
Jan Narveson, a noted libertarian philosopher, insists against Dahl that there is a moral 
right to private property and that it trumps the putative right to democratic voice at work 
(Narveson 1992)32. McMahon observes that the right to exclude others from contact 
with an item is central to ownership. Ownership thus gives the owner of an item the 
right to control the uses to which others put it in the sense that he may veto any use 
proposed by someone else. However, it does not give him any right to tell anyone to put 
that property to the use that he wants. It is not a right to command labour (McMahon 
1994)33. Ownership in itself is not a sufficient moral license to confer authority on 
managers. Hence, the fact that employers own all of the physical assets of a business 
does not entitle them to boss labour around. Conversely, a democratic reorganization of 
the enterprise would not confer power on labour to use another's property without the 
owner’s consent. For this reason of democratic rights and property, rights are capable of 
peaceful coexistence, without the need to establish a hierarchy between them, since the 
one is concerned with power over people and the other with power over things. In an 
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economic democracy, owners could keep their property and workers would retain their 
voice, and their interactions in the marketplace would be governed by contract. Instead 
of capital hiring labour, in a democratic economy labour will hire capital, leasing it at 
interest from owners, but owners might remain free to keep their property if they do not 
wish to put it to productive use (Ellerman 1990)34. 
Dahl should therefore not be regarded as a ‘radical revolutionary’. What Dahl 
seeks to take from capital is not the right to control property but the power to command 
labour (Mayer 2001b). Dahl’s response to this is that he never entailed to violate basic 
rights to property, or, for that matter, existing property rights in business firms. It could 
simply “entail a shift of ownership from stockholders to employees” (Dahl 1985: 113; 
2001). Dahl is also criticized by Mayer because of the notion that employee-owned 
firms would be less effective than share holder owned firms in achieving such 
intermediate goods as investment, growth, and employment. To this Dahl notes that 
employee-owned firms could be as efficient as American corporations at present in 
minimizing “the ratio of valued inputs to valued outputs” both in the narrow sense 
ordinarily employed by economists, for whom the outputs are those valued by 
consumers, and in a broader sense that would include outputs “we as producers value” 
(Dahl 1985: 130; 2001).  
A third set of criticism that has met Dahl is connected to the rights to a democratic 
process (Dahl 2001). Dahl explains the difference between Mayer and himself in terms 
of different ways of interpreting and understanding certain important economic and 
political aspects of the world in which they live. Dahl draws on the resemblances 
between a corporate business firm and a political system in the government of a state, to 
make his point clear. Like the government of a state, a firm's leaders are empowered to 
make decisions that are binding on those legally subject to them, that is, their 
employees. Dahl asks if employees are adequately qualified to participate in the firm’s 
decisions, should not they have the right to do so? And he continues with: 
If we agree that they have a moral right to participate in governing a state, don’t they 
have a comparable moral right to participate in governing a firm? In both cases the right 
is, in my view, contingent on two assumptions: a moral judgment that the fundamental 
interests of all persons are entitled to equal consideration and a practical judgment that in 
general adults are qualified to participate (Dahl 2001).  
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Dahl then parallels Mayer with classical economists that viewed worker’s 
acceptance of employment in a hierarchically controlled firm as a freely made choice, a 
contract, so to speak, voluntarily entered into by equals. So absolutely no coercion is 
involved. If the prospective employee signs away all “rights” to claim a voice in the 
government of the firm, she does so voluntarily. Working in a firm is not in principle 
different from joining a club. Dahl finds such line of arguing problematic and asks what 
empirical conditions would be necessary to make this description convincing? A 
perpetual state of full employment, for one thing. Dahl then rhetorically asks if Mayer 
would regard the acceptance of the employment contract as voluntary, entirely 
uncoerced, if a large numbers of workers are driven by the fear of unemployment to 
accept any job available. Dahl then notes with reference to Professor Mayer’s own 
example of himself always having the option of quitting and taking a job at the local 
McDonald’s, if circumstances compelled him to. Dahl then asks if he really would feel 
that his choice was perfectly free? Dahl therefore refuses to accept Mayer’s parallel of 
joining work-life as similar to joining a club where you must accept the rules at the 
door. How many persons are free to decide not to work? Dahl asks. Secondly, Dahl 
notes that bargaining power not is evenly distributed in work-life. Persons who possess 
scarce and valued skills, like a Professor or a creative programmer in Silicon Valley, 
can gain de facto “rights” to participate in decisions that employees lacking these skills 
and other resources cannot hope to acquire (Dahl 2001). 
Dahl is however pessimistic on the chances of such an economical democracy to 
be manifested in practice at least in any grand-scale. He lists two main reasons for this, 
firstly if employees themselves are not deeply concerned about re-casting the structures 
of ownership and control along the lines he proposed. Without their strong insistence, 
democratically governed firms are unlikely to flourish. Secondly, in the new service and 
information-based economy; efficiency may require that employees with scarce skills 
participate more in decisions. To insure a reciprocal flow of information and ideas, a 
firm’s government may need to become flatter, less hierarchical, and more cooperative. 
This quasi-democratization among a firm’s most valued employees may, however, 
effectively blunt demands for extending internal democracy to less privileged workers 
(Dahl 2001). 
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In his rejoinder to Dahl, Robert Mayer recasts his criticisms of Dahl for using 
firms and government as parallel cases. The differences between firms and polities are 
too significant to sustain the analogy (Mayer 2001a). However, advocates of workplace 
democracy can avoid that weakness if they recast the argument for the entitlement to 
voice at work. Mayer states that Dahl is forced into the parallel case because he begins 
with a minimal and uncontroversial principle of fairness: that equals should be treated 
equally. Mayer therefore suggests that we should start with a more robustly egalitarian 
principle of distributive justice as a condition for the entitlement, and that it then would 
be possible to side-step the parallel case altogether (Mayer 2001a). Mayer’s suggestion 
on how to overcome the analogy reads as follows:  
Consider this egalitarian principle of distributive justice: goods should be distributed so 
as to equalize burdens. If so, we might hold that employees are entitled to an equal share 
of power at work as compensation for the burden of obedience imposed on them as 
members of the firm. That burden cannot be eliminated, for any collective enterprise 
requires obedience in order to function, but the burden of obedience is mitigated by the 
bestowal of directive power. And if the burden is mitigated for some, it ought to be 
mitigated for all given the norm of equal burdens. Employees would therefore be entitled 
to an equal share of directive power in the firm (Mayer 2001a). 
What Robert Mayer here is suggesting is a practice of workplace democracy in the 
US that could be labelled as not economical but industrial democracy as it has been 
practiced in most Scandinavian countries since the 1970s.  
Democracy is often connected to different appendages. These appendages reefer 
to different understandings, meanings, practices, and traditions of democratic theory. 
The following distinctions should therefore be made clear. Industrial democracy is here 
understood as representative or indirect democracy within enterprises, and participatory 
democracy is here to be understood as broad participation within enterprises or in other 
spheres of society (Heiret, Korsnes, Venneslan, & Bjørnson 2003). Another way of 
clarifying the distinction between industrial democracy and participatory democracy is 
to state that industrial democracy is democracy on development, of e.g. the firm, while 
participatory democracy is democracy in e.g. a development process. 
Economical democracy was in the early 1960s a central aim both for the social-
democratic party and for the labour union in Norway, but when the social-democratic 
party took over government and the labour union got more and more involved in the 
corporative steering system such visions got less prominent (Heiret et al. 2003: 145). 
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The start of industrial democracy in Norway is often connected to the collaborative 
experiments35 that were initiated by action researchers such as Einar Thorsrud and Fred 
Emery in the early 1960s. Being inspired by the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, 
the researchers aimed at democratising Norwegian work-life based on insights from 
sociotechnical organization theory. This tradition has also been called the ‘Scandinavian 
Model’ (Foss, Kvadsheim, & Ravn 2002). A model characterised by the following 
elements: 
(1) institutionalised cooperation between employers and trade unions (and the state); (2) 
sociotechnical thinking: the interrelationship between technology and work organization 
shapes the working conditions (Trist & Bamforth 1951; Trist 1981) (3) an effective work 
organization is based in a good sociotechnical fit, and is developed through a participative 
change process involving all relevant parties in the organisation (Foss et al. 2002: 171). 
Developmental research done by Einar Thorsrud, Fred Emery and others therefore 
represented a stark contrast to Tayloristic management practices. Their work spurred 
waste experiments with self managed teams, that would collectively decide on their own 
work-situation and job design (Heiret et al. 2003). These initiatives are often listed as 
being examples of participatory democracy. These experiments also differed from the 
human relations school, where the focus was that workers should have the feeling of 
participation, the socio-technical school emphasized the importance of genuine 
participation. The technical system of the firm should therefore also physically adapt to 
the social system represented by the workers.  
Throughout the 1960s it became apparent that the researches involved and the 
labour union differed in their perspective on the significance of representative 
democracy in the work place. The researchers concluded that worker representation in 
enterprise boards is not an efficient mean in order to realize industrial democracy 
(Thorsrud et al. 1964: 11; Heiret et al. 2003). They argued that for a worker to choose 
someone to represent him/her does not matter much if the worker does not have at least 
some degree of self-determination in the daily work situation. Gustavsen writes that the 
relationship between labour and management took the form of negotiations in an 
adversarial scenario, through representatives, over quantifiable objects (Gustavsen 
2004b: 18).  
For the researchers involved in these early action oriented research efforts, the 
democratisation of work life was only part of a greater theory on how to construct a 
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more democratic society (Heiret et al. 2003). Philip Herbst argued for instance that 
democratizing workplaces is the first step to enhancing democracy in society at large 
(Herbst 1976)36. Even if they did not formally cooperate with Carole Pateman their 
ideas represent parallels to her thoughts. Pateman’s argument is that in a democratic 
society a certain degree of democratic attitude and quality is required, she criticizes 
contemporary democratic theorists for neglecting how such attitudes could be 
achieved37. John Dewey makes a similar point, he contended that democracy should be 
confined to the enlightenment of the elite, and highlighted the importance of public 
deliberation in political decision-making (Dewey 1991 [1927]). Dewey recognized that 
intervention by the public is not possible without a better organized and educated 
public, but argued that lack of education, stupidity, and intolerance lead to bad 
governance in democracies. Thus, argues Dewey, the democratic system is not 
responsible for the poor decisions of the public in local policy-making, such as the 
prohibition of the teaching of evolution in schools. For Dewey, the weaknesses of 
democracy are symptoms, rather than causes, of the problems of modern society 
(Dewey 1991 [1927]; Schugurensky 2004). 
Industry-wide programmes based on agreement that developed in the 1980s, 
between the social partners, evolved in the 1990s. This agreement led to a development 
programme labelled Enterprise Development 2000 (Colbjørnsen, Pålshaugen, & 
Gustavsen 1998; Gustavsen et al. 2001; Levin 2002). The main thrust of this 
programme was not to expose the enterprise actors with still more ideas about what they 
could do, but to make them able to grip their own situation and make ideas about 
organization serve their own purposes. This was thought done through collective efforts 
under broad participation with conversations as the core vehicle (Gustavsen 2004b: 26). 
The core unit of the programme was the module, defined as a set of enterprises and 
researchers working together (Gustavsen 2004b: 27). The Enterprise Development 2000 
programme reached its end in the summer of 2001. 
If we examine the Enterprise Development 2000 programme, in terms how much 
it contributed to a more democratic work-life, and then indirectly how much it 
contributed to a more democratic society the following points are worth noting.  
The researcher’s own assessment of the programmes working is presented in 
Morten Levin’s ‘Researching enterprise development: action research on the 
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cooperation between management and labour in Norway’ (Levin 2002). In this volume, 
Johnsen and Claussen assess the Enterprise Development 2000 programme in terms of 
democracy and participation. They note that many cases in Enterprise Development 
2000 showed major emphasis on direct participation in the developmental activities 
conducted in the different modules. They do however also note that it is the formal 
representation for instance through the union, the management, and the shop stewards, 
that seems to have been most dominant in the developmental processes. At first sight, 
there seems to be no indication that the different participatory aspects have any impact 
on the actual character of the development activities as such (H. C. G. Johnsen & 
Claussen 2002: 236). In addition, they continue with asserting that neither direct nor 
indirect participation managed to stimulate any noteworthy change of the capacities in 
the organization. They also find it difficult to grasp any articulated resistance that could 
give birth to changes and processes not outlined by the initiators of the developmental 
activities. They therefore conclude that there seems to be little or no democratic 
opposition and alternative cases articulated in the different cases in the Enterprise 
Development 2000 (H. C. G. Johnsen & Claussen 2002: 237). I think that one way of 
reading Johnsen & Claussen’s somewhat unflattering assessment of a programme that 
builds on such strong democracy traditions, achievements concerning democratization 
processes, is to recognize that the Enterprise Development 2000 programme did provide 
some opportunity for participation, in a broader sense than only indirect, but that these 
opportunities by large were unused. 
Despite of this, the Enterprise Development 2000 programme succeeded with the 
new and similar initiative Value Creation 2010. One main purpose of this programme 
was to diffuse the learning from Enterprise Development 2000 (Gustavsen 2004b: 27). 
The goal of Enterprise Development 2000 was to establish relationship between groups 
of researchers and enterprises. Value Creation 2010 aimed wider and was more complex 
in the sense that the idea of regional partnerships was more strongly applied. One of the 
aims of the Value Creation 2010 programme is to help form and strengthen already 
existing regional partnerships (Gustavsen 2004b: 28). This shift in perspective also 
leads to new perspectives and development initiatives being set on the agenda, such as 
regional innovation, regional politics, and economics. The crucial point of this new 
action research approach was to integrate the ideas and interests of as many regional 
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stakeholders as possible, thereby introducing an element of industrial democracy and 
participation into regional development (Fricke & Totterdill 2004: 5).  
The perspective on participatory development present in central texts surrounding 
the two programmes Enterprise Development 2000 and Value Creation 2010 is often 
one that highlights the importance of the communicative aspects of human interaction. 
New development initiatives are supposed to emerge from dialogue, where actors are 
partners in conversation, meaning relating to each other in certain ways (Shotter & 
Gustavsen 1999; Gustavsen 2004b). Ennals and Gustavsen (1999) define dialogue as 
conversations or discussions between equal partners, characterized by openness, 
willingness to listen, to accept good arguments, and generally to learn from each other. 
This requires trust among participants. Trustful dialogue is in this sense the one core 
element in the establishment and evolution of developmental work.  
This is because only through dialogue will it be possible for all participants to really 
learn, because dialogue is the only kind of communication that allows for learning 
through linking one’s own experiences with those of others, and in such a way that no 
initial preference is given to any of the experiences as being more valuable or more 
superior than the others (Ennals & Gustavsen 1999: 81). 
Shotter and Gustavsen describe these processes within the region’s development 
organizations ideally as a mental shift, occurring when participants including the 
researcher gain what they call a relational-responsive understanding of a region’s inner-
life. They describe this as a shared, felt sense of what, in practice, given certain 
momentary surroundings, participants’ gain of what they should do for the best. This 
responsive-relational understanding from the “inner life of a region” allows each 
individual participant, not only to gain a sense of their present place or position in 
relation to all the other relevant actors around them, but also a sense of the particular 
openings or invitations offered to them by the region for their own future actions 
(Shotter & Gustavsen 1999: 13). 
It is apparent that Ennals, Shotter, and Gustavsen see trust as a central key for 
succeeding with these regional developmental activities. They do however not prescribe 
actions to be taken where trust is lacking, or when interests are so strong and conflicting 
that they apparently cannot be mediated through friendly round the table dialogue. It is 
therefore legitimate to criticize them for not having chosen to include concepts as power 
and strategic action in their theories on how to bring industrial democracy out in the 
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regional sphere, for a discussion of this specific point see (H. C. G. Johnsen & Normann 
2004b). 
Pateman’s answer is that democratic attitudes are most importantly developed in 
the industry, because most people spend so much of their lifetime at work and the 
climate for education in collective affairs is especially promising (Pateman 1970). 
Pateman’s point is compelling even if it has been heavily criticised by other more 
orthodox democratic theorists. How can we expect a democratic society to evolve, if the 
citizens get no training and sense of what it means to be democratic? In addition, is not 
the work place the most natural place to do this training? This rather simple idea has 
spurred the notion that if we can make the work-place more democratic through action 
research why can we not also make regions more democratic through action research, 
and would this represent processes that would lead to a more democratic society 
overall? 
In order to understand the concept of democracy in a meaningful way we must go 
beyond theories about representative government and classical elite doctrines of 
democracy like those put forward by e.g. Schumpeter (Pateman 1970; 2003). Pateman 
(2003) argues that a contemporary theory of democracy, participatory democracy, must 
be built around the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be 
considered in isolation from one another. The existence of representative institutions at 
national level is not sufficient for democracy. She argues that the major function of 
participation in the theory of participatory democracy is an educative one, in the very 
widest sense. Therefore, for a democratic polity to exist, it is necessary for a 
participatory society to exist, i.e. a society where all political systems have been 
democratised and socialisation through participation can take place in all areas 
(Pateman 2003: 41). Carole Pateman’s point is that there are no fields of society, not the 
market, not industry that legitimately can be excluded from participation and the 
democratic process. Politics and democracy are not subjects that are or should be 
confined only to representative institutions, a similar argument to that found in Dahl’s A 
Preface to Economic Democracy (Dahl 1985).  
Our understandings and assessments of whether an evolving governance system is 
democratic or not, should take this important point into account. These are also the 
principles that should be institutionalised into the practical organisation of new 
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institutions we develop for meeting our regional “challenges”. Robert Dahl’s (1963: 6) 
definition a political system is in line with such views: “any persistent pattern of human 
relationship that involves to a significant extent power, rule or authority38”. If politics 
also exists outside representative institutions, then must also these processes be 
governed by democratic principles, if they shall contribute to a more democratic society 
overall. 
However, increased participation does not in it self mean increased democracy 
(Stone 2002). The development of new arenas for participation, networks, partnerships, 
development coalitions etc, in a regional sphere does not automatically mean that we 
have added positively to democracy, as discussions in previous chapters should be 
ample examples of. In assessing these institutions in terms of democracy, we must 
assess what they do, what interests they articulate, and how they are organised and 
function. Put in other words, in terms of democracy, governance structures must be 
assessed to their ability to empower all of citizens’ interests and challenges, and we 
must not let one policy agenda, dominate, and marginalise other policy agendas. If we 
do, we loose both access to new possibilities for development because of a narrow and 
exclusive focus, but also important elements in what we would like to think of as a 
democratic society. Therefore is it important for us as a society to forcefully address the 
‘democracy in development’ challenge. 
Summary  
Some of the elements in a participatory understanding of democracy is summarised in 
the table below: 
Tab. 3-8: Some Features of Participatory Democracy, adaptation of Blatter (2002) 
Conditions: Participatory Democracy 
Aim of policy and political 
institutions 
 Achieve efficiency understood as working well without waste, the measurement 
of input/output ratio. To realise the will of the people by the people.  
Criteria for Success   A predetermined goal is not the standard but evaluative efforts linked to the effort needed to reach that effect – efficiency. 
Perspective  Bottom-up. 
Necessary condition to 
implement the will of the 
people 
 Participation, learning, public discourse, recourses, and technical expertise. 
Participatory mechanism  Voice, Choice, Loyalty. 
Institutional structure  Decentralisation and fragmentation of power. 
Basis of collective action  Involvement commits individuals to collective action. 
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When we move the discourse on democracy to the societal level it is not however 
ideas related to participatory democracy that dominates the discourse. The central 
concepts here are indirect, adversary, representative, or competitive democracy. 
Competition 
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max Weber (1864-1920) were at the end of the 19th 
century dealing with the modernisation processes of society. Especially Max Weber can 
be said to have a rather cynical view on politics and modern democracy in particular. 
Weber (1990) is often regarded as the originator of the elitist understanding of 
democracy. When Weber argues in favour of elite democracy, he does this with the 
transition from the traditional rural society into the modern industrialised society in 
mind. Weber (1990) argues that for direct-democracy to work, there must be limits on 
how many who can participate, there should also be relatively small economic and 
social differentiation among citizens, the administrative functions of government should 
be relatively stable and predictable, and the participants should have a certain degree of 
objective judgment. Weber states that none of these conditions are present in modern 
society and that direct democracy therefore is impossible. 
Since Weber concluded that the ideal of direct democracy was impossible, he 
develops a functionalist, not normative, set of arguments for the supremacy of an 
indirect form of democracy. Since politics in Weber’s view primarily is a struggle for 
limited benefits, modern politics is a process where struggle for power and negotiation 
between interests, is preserved by professional politicians. Whoever is involved in 
politics strives for power, either as a mean, or as a goal in itself. Weber still sees 
functional benefits with this type of democracy, it brings forth leaders that can lead a 
nation, transparency secures that competitive points of view are put forth, indirect 
democracy secures forums, national assemblies, where compromises can be negotiated 
etc. (Weber 1990).  
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) continues Weber’s elitist perspective on politics, 
and he lays the ground for an economic theory of democracy, which later is pursued by 
Anthony Downs, and the public choice tradition. Here politics is understood as a 
parallel to economics, and political actors act only out of self-interests (Monroe 1991)39. 
Democracy has here, as previously discussed, not any value in itself; it is only the mean 
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for decisions to be made legally and legitimately. Democracy is really only the choice 
between different political elites, not people’s influence on important matters of society. 
Richard Swedberg, who has written an introduction to the 1994 edition of Schumpeter’s 
‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’, notes that:  
Through his splendid discussion of democracy, Schumpeter joins the small number of 
thinkers who have made seminal contributions to this theory. Granted this, the question 
must none the less be raised if Schumpeter does not overdo his attack on “the Classical 
Doctrine of Democracy”, and end up with a far too negative, not to say cynical view of 
democracy” (Schumpeter 1994: xix).  
The role of the people is not to produce decisions, but to produce government. 
Thus, deciding on the issues is secondary to deciding on the electorate (Schumpeter 
1994: 269). He therefore defines democracy as: 
The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote (Schumpeter 1994: 269). 
Another significant feature of the elitist model of democracy is that it rejects 
proportional representation, because it may prevent efficient government. Whoever are 
elected, are elected, and with that they get majority vote. Schumpeter writes: 
It is in fact obvious not only that proportional representation will offer opportunities for 
all sorts of idiosyncrasies to assert themselves but also that it may prevent democracy 
from producing efficient governments and thus prove a danger in a time of stress. […] If 
acceptance of leadership is the true function of the electorate’s vote, the case for 
proportional representation collapses because its premises are no longer binding. The 
principle of democracy then merely means that the reins of government should be handed 
to those who command more support than any of the competing individuals or teams. 
And this in turn seems to assure the standing of the majority system within the logic of 
the democratic method, although we might still condemn it on grounds that lie outside of 
that logic (Schumpeter 1994: 272-3).  
Summary 
The table below summarises competitive democracy as a set of principles using the 
same criterions as for participatory democracy: 
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Tab. 3-9: Some Features of Competitive Democracy, adaptation of Blatter (2002) 
Conditions: Competitive Democracy 
Aim of policy and political 
institutions 
 Achieve effectiveness understood as the ability or power to have a noticeable or 
desired effect in respect to intended, purposeful activities. To realise the will of 
the people for the people.  
Success criteria  The degree of which a predetermined goal is achieved – effectiveness.  
Perspective  Top-down 
Necessary condition to 
implement the will of the 
people (majority) 
 Political control, recourses, professionalism, and technical expertise. 
Participatory mechanism  Choice, Vote, Loyalty 
Institutional structure  Centralisation and consolidation of power 
Basis of collective action  Hierarchical order and majority vote 
 
Given the discussions and presentations of participatory and competitive 
democracy, I continue with a discussion of Robert A. Dahl’s work associated with 
‘procedural democracy’. Dahl has as we have seen been involved in a wide range, if not 
all, aspects of democratic theory, he has as few others, set the standards for the modern 
discourse on democracy, always moving fluently and easily from participatory forms of 
democracy (economical democracy), to his discussions of representative forms of 
government (polyarchies), and back. In doing this Dahl, in my opinion, is in reality 
showing us that democracy and democratic theory is not two, three, five or ten different 
things but essentially one phenomenon that, yes, is manifested on many different 
practices and levels, but that democracy itself, in essence, through its inherent values is 
only ‘one’ thing. 
A Unifying Position? 
The basis of democracy is that we are born equal, and that those in power must accept 
this equality. The democratic value equality does not stop by an equal right to vote, it 
also requires an equal right to set the policy agenda. The reason systems that we 
ordinarily think of as democratic in practice and theory are not is because that these 
systems do not fulfil the basic democratic principle of equality40. Much has been 
achieved in the 20th century with respect to political equality like the right to organise 
and vote, but with respect to economic equality, much has actually been lost41, so, what 
then qualifies democracy? 
We are living in a system with democratic features such as the right to organise 
and participate in political life, but that is not enough to characterise our political 
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systems as democratic. As long as preference is given narrow interest, equality cannot 
be obtained. Putnam argues that as long as associationalism is biased, as virtually every 
study suggests it is, basic egalitarian rights are still lacking (Putnam 1995; 2003). 
Putnam (2003: 159) also quotes Schattschneider (1960), who eloquently phrased this 
point as: “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a 
strong upper-class accent”. This point is also been made famous by the Norwegian 
political scientist Stein Rokkan: In a book, edited by Robert Dahl, Rokkan wrote 
tellingly: Votes count, resources decide (Rokkan 1966). The dilemma of pluralistic 
democracy is therefore that “ideal democracy” requires equalitarian distribution of 
recourses in order to realize the demand for political equality (Dahl 1982). 
Robert A. Dahl is a stark critic of ideological certainty, disregarding if such 
certainties stem from socialism or capitalism. Dahl’s work has always represented 
critical, methodological, conscientious, and patient examinations of ideological claims, 
through careful documentation and research. However, Dahl is also a constructive social 
scientist, pointing to alternatives when identifying dilemmas and problems with modern 
democratic practices. Democracy is therefore an ideal for Dahl, something we as 
individuals and societies should work systematically and continuously to improve 
(Hagtveit 1992). Thus Dahl, as Michael Bailey and David Braybrooke notes, is not only 
a democratic theorist, as everybody realizes. He is an unremittingly radical democratic 
theorist who, like Dewey before him, believes that the cure to the problems of 
democracy is more democracy (Bailey & Braybrooke 2003: 116). 
In ‘Democracy and Its Critics’ Dahl sets out to define democracy, to show why it 
is the best form of government, why there are no better alternatives and how democracy 
could be improved substantially (Dahl 1989). In Dahl’s terminology, representative 
democracy, as it is practiced in the industrialised world, is polyarchy, and he therefore 
reserves the concept of democracy for an ideal situation that we probably never fully 
can attain. To understand how Dahl thinks about democracy, it can be helpful to 
differentiate between two different epochs of his long career as democratic theorist. The 
early Dahl is often associated with pluralism or classical pluralism. These early writings 
of Dahl were much influenced by Schumpeter and others, Dahl sought to restore the 
tradition from political economy with scholars such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and 
Karl Marx as its founders (Fabbrini 2003: 120). A central thought within classical 
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pluralists theory is that citizens through the election channel decides who the governing 
elite will be. These elites operate much as described by Weber and Schumpeter, but he 
differs from them when he states that citizens can influence the political system through 
other channels, e.g. through organising into different forms of interests groups etc. 
Politics is now regarded as a bargaining game, not only between different elites, but also 
between the political elites and civic organisations. The idea is that the different civic 
organisations outweigh and balance each other so that representative decisions are 
secured. That different interests will differ in their bargaining power is observed, but not 
criticised.  
It is this version of pluralism that Carole Pateman criticises when she uses 
Schumpeter’s elitist democracy as her “chopping block” and singles out Berelson, Dahl, 
Sartori and Eckstein as his followers (Pateman 1970). The ‘later’ Dahl is undeserving of 
Pateman’s characterisation, and Dahl has vividly rejected that his pluralistic democracy 
theory could be paired with Schumpeter and that he then indirectly could be termed an 
elitist (Dahl 1966). 
Neo-pluralism, which was briefly discussed earlier in relation to governance and 
regime theory, builds on the following central thesis in relation to democratic theory. 
Pluralism is a result of groups and individuals in society’s wish to be autonomous of 
others whom they have an antagonistic relation to. Such tendencies can be suppressed 
and restrained by authoritarian regimes but not eliminated. Organizational pluralism is 
therefore a necessary condition for, but not an unproblematic consequence of 
democratic regimes. Organizational pluralism leads to two main problems: Inequality 
understood as unequal influence and thereby control over resource allocations in 
society. Secondly, the segmentation of inequality, where the balance of power between 
different organizations leads them to veto changes that could lead to a reduction of 
existing imbalances. This constraining relationship is demonstrated by the fact that 
although a democratic regime is safest in a capitalist market system, such market 
systems have nonetheless prevented democratic regimes from fully developing their 
potential. There has e.g. never been a democratic regime in the absence of a capitalist 
market system, but there have been several capitalist market systems that have not been 
associated with a democratic regime (Fabbrini 2003: 120). 
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Dahl sees several potential solutions to these problems. One is to gather society 
around a common interest. The problem with this approach is that what constitutes a 
common interest always will be controversial, and that in itself such an approach could 
have the effect of being dividing (pluralizing). Another is to centralize the decision-
making process. The problem with this is that when underlying organizations give up 
power to a centre, the new and stronger centre can use this opportunity to gather power 
and resources on its own hands, which in turn can be the foundation of a new ruling 
class. A third possibility discussed by Dahl is to decentralize the decision-making 
process. However, this can in turn lead to increased social and economic injustice. Dahl 
therefore concludes that there do not exist any real solutions to the dilemma of pluralism 
(Dahl 1989). 
Dahl says Democracy is an ideal that never can be fully attained, but he outlines 
what type of conditions that should be present in a system of governance in order for it 
to be labelled democratic. These conditions are formulated as five criteria of the ideal 
democratic procedure (Dahl 1985; 1986a; 1989). In the following these are used as a 
‘benchmark’ of democratic regional governance. Robert A. Dahl writes: 
Let me start by assuming that each of a number of persons has in mind the idea of 
forming an association for certain purposes, or changing an already existing association in 
order to adapt to conditions as they now understand them. […] Suppose one believes that 
the following assumptions are valid:  
(A.1.) There is a need among the members or putative members for binding decisions on 
at least some matters, and for a process that will evaluate in binding decisions on these 
matters. […] 
(A.2.) A process for making binding decisions ought to include at least two stages: setting 
the agenda and deciding the outcome. […] 
(A.3.) Binding decisions should be made only by members. […] 
(A.4.) Equally valid claims justify equal shares. […] 
(A.5.) The claims of a significant number of members as to the rules, politics etc., to be 
adopted by binding decisions are valid and equally valid, taken all around, and no 
member’s claims are, taken all around, superior or overriding in relation to the claims of 
this set by the members (Dahl 1986b: 191-4). 
Dahl then writes that these issues are central to the problem of inclusion: what 
persons have a rightful claim to be included in the demos? If these assumptions are 
valid for the group in question, then it is reasonable to hold that the procedures by 
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which the demos are to arrive at its decisions ought to meet certain criteria, which Dahl 
calls the criteria of procedural democracy (Dahl 1986b: 195). 
 The first criterion outlined by Dahl is that of voting equality. In order to make 
binding decisions it must at the decisive stage be taken into account and equally into 
account, the expressed preferences of each member of the demos as to the outcome. If 
this criterion was not met would one or more of the assumptions above be broken (Dahl 
1986b: 195-6).  
The second criterion outlined by Dahl is that of effective participation. Through 
the process of making binding decisions, one must have an adequate opportunity, and an 
equal opportunity, for expressing his or her preferences as to the final outcome. This 
means that citizens must have an equal opportunity for placing questions on the agenda, 
and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another. If some 
citizens have less opportunity than others do, then their preferences as to the outcome 
are less likely to be taken equally into account. Not to take their preferences equally into 
account is to reject the criterion of voting equality, and thus to deny the condition of 
roughly equal qualification, taken all around (Dahl 1986b: 196-7).  
The third criterion outlined by Dahl is that of enlightened understanding. In order 
to express his or her preferences accurately, each citizen ought to have adequate and 
equal opportunities for discovering and validating, in the time permitted by the need for 
a decision, what his or her preferences are on the matter to be decided. This criterion 
implies that alternative procedures for making decisions ought to be evaluated 
according to the opportunities they furnish citizens for acquiring an understanding of 
means and ends. Dahl therefore writes that it would be hard to justify procedures that 
cut off or suppressed information which, if available, might well cause citizens to arrive 
at a different decision (Dahl 1986b: 198-9).  
The fourth criterion outlined by Dahl is that of control of the agenda. On this 
criterion Dahl writes: “let us imagine during the Nazi occupation of Norway, Hitler had 
allowed the Norwegians to use their democratic political institutions for one or two 
matters—driving speed for civilian traffic, let us say—but nothing else. If the 
Norwegians had gone along with this arrangement, we might conclude that while they 
had retained some nominal degree of “democracy”, in a broad sense they had lost it” 
(Dahl 1986b: 200-1). Final control of the agenda by the demos is therefore that: “The 
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demos must have the exclusive opportunity to make decisions that determine what 
matters are and are not to be decided by means of procedural democracy” (Dahl 1986b: 
201).  
The fifth and last criterion of procedural democracy outlined by Dahl is that of 
inclusiveness. It concerns the question of the demos. Who can participate, and what 
principles can we apply in making such decisions in a democracy? Dahl starts the 
discussion with outlining two more assumptions: 
(A.5.1.) The full condition of equal qualification. With respect to all matters, citizens are 
qualified, and equally well qualified, taken all around, to decide which matters do or do 
not require binding decisions; of those that do, which matters the demos is qualified to 
decide for itself; and the terms on which the demos delegates authority (Dahl 1986b: 
202).  
(A.6) The good of each member is entitled to equal consideration, and each member is 
assumed to be the best judge of his or her own interests in the absence of a compelling 
showing to the contrary (Dahl 1986b: 222).  
Based on this, he sets his fifth criterion of procedural democracy as: “The demos 
must include all adult members of the association except transients” (Dahl 1986b: 221). 
Robert Dahl outlines what type of conditions should be present in system of 
governance in order for it to be labelled democratic in a procedural sense, and also that 
he does not expect to find these criterion met in any ‘real world’ system, but that they 
can be used to asses the democratic qualities of ‘real world’ systems: 
At best any actual polity is likely to be something of an approximation to procedural 
democracy. […] Instead, the criteria serve as standards against which one may compare 
alternative procedures in order to judge their relative merits according to the criteria of 
procedural democracy: to compare different systems in order to judge their relative 
approximations to procedural democracy; and to compare a given system over time in 
order to judge whether its trend, if any, is toward or away from procedural democracy. I 
do not hold that the criteria of procedural democracy fully define the notion of a good 
polity or good society. But to the extent that procedural democracy is worthwhile, then 
judgements of the sort I just mentioned bear directly on the relative worth or goodness of 
political arrangements (Dahl 1986b: 221-3) 
Even if Dahl writes that it cannot be expected that all of the five criteria are fully 
being met in a ‘real world’ system, there are other standards that could be met. Dahl 
(1986b: 222) writes that if the two first criteria are met: 
(C.1.) Voting equality  
(C.2.) Effective participation 
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Then will also the system approach procedural democracy in a narrow sense. If in 
addition to this, also the fourth criterion is met: 
(C.4) Final control of the agenda 
Then will also the system approach full procedural democracy in relation to a 
demos. If in addition to the these three criteria also the third criterion is met: 
(C.3.) Enlightened understanding 
Then the system will approach full procedural democracy with respect to an 
agenda and in relation to a demos. Only if the fifth criterion, in addition to the four 
others also are met: 
(C.5.) Inclusiveness 
Does the system/association also approach full procedural democracy. 
Summary 
The table below summarises the main points of procedural democracy for further 
reference: 
Tab. 3-10: Some Features of Procedural Democracy  
Conditions: Procedural Democracy 
Voting Equality 
 In order to make binding decisions must it at the decisive stage be taken into 
account and equally into account, the expressed preferences of each member 
of the demos as to the outcome. 
Effective participation  Citizens must have an adequate and equal opportunity for expressing his or her preferences as to the outcome. 
Enlightened 
Understanding 
 Equal access to information, adequate and equal opportunity for discovering 
what his or her preferences are on the matter to be decided. 
Control of the Agenda  Demos must have the exclusive opportunity to make decisions that determine what matters are and are not to be decided by means of procedural democracy. 
Inclusiveness  Demos must include all adult members of the association except transients affected by binding-decisions. 
 
The figure below is meant to schematically model the relationship between the 
different spheres of society if pluralism and equality in regional development if some of 
the ideal conditions of procedural democracy were met in a regional governance 
systems. The model should be compared to the similar but believed to be more 
empirical accurate model in chapter 7.  
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Fig. 3-3: The Networked Region – Plurality of Interests Addressed 
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The discussions of the new regional narratives, the regional development 
concepts, the three perspectives on governance and regimes, and the three models of 
democracy represents the main components of the analytical framework that is used in 
order to address the research questions of this thesis. 
3.7 – Research Questions 
In chapter 1, I introduced the main research question of this thesis. This is an enquiry 
into the rationale behind, and my experience of, that, democracy as a value and practice 
seemingly having a less than influential presence in regional development discourses 
and practices. The contextual outline, presented in chapter 2, of the Agder region 
indicates ongoing institutional and conceptual changes and transformations in the Agder 
region in direction of what is meaningful to conceptualise as a regional system of 
governance, this point is addressed separately in chapter 7. In chapter 3, we have seen 
how different theoretical conceptualisations of governance also can constitute the basis 
for different interpretations of some of the properties of the regional governance 
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systems, and we have seen that discourses on democracy provides different standards on 
how democracy in a regional governance and development context shall be evaluated. 
The main research question of this thesis, read as follows: 
 
Main RQ: Why is democracy disappearing from regional development?  
 
The research question is in part a provocation, in part a critique of current 
practices, and in part a critique of current “mainstream” theoretical discourses on both 
development and democracy, as suggested in chapter 1. However, as the critical reader 
rightfully would note, I could also recognise that change and development in society is 
not dependent upon development processes being done in a particular democratic 
fashion. Many will argue that democracy just slows down such change processes, that 
democracy is an unnecessary step that obstructs the required changes or that democratic 
values and principles can be adhered to in other ways. My objection to such arguments 
is rooted in that I apply a different set of success criteria than those putting forward such 
arguments, that I have a different normative basis for my interpretations of practice. A 
development process based on democratic principles is as I see it fundamentally 
different from a change and development process based on for instance elitist pre-
conceptualisations. I will in this thesis show examples of this, and argue that a 
development process rooted in democratic principles not only will be normatively 
preferable, but that they also can be more efficacious and substantially better in 
addressing many of the same goals as such elitist and instrumental views of society 
have. The main difference is that the democratic development process in addition to 
being different also challenges the goals of the development processes set out by the 
elitists.  
The main research question of this thesis is complex to address directly. I 
therefore approach the main research question through discussions and analysis of three 
subsidiary questions, that when addressed support the process of discussing and 
reflecting on the main research question. These subsidiary and more operative research 
questions, are formulated in such a way that they can be addressed and are relevant for 
both for the context of this study, the regional governance system in the Agder region, 
and the general theoretical outline of this study.  
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The first research question relates to an analysis of the action research project that 
was supposed to develop and work within a regional development coalition. This 
institution is in this thesis conceptualised as a regional governance institution and 
therefore also a part of the regional governance system in the Agder region. Working 
with this institution for almost 5 years is in a way the backbone of this thesis. This was a 
project that went trough many phases, see chapter 5. At one stage, the project got into a 
negative spiral of events and resulted in a conflict between the partners involved in the 
project. Such events can be personally disturbing when they unfold, but they can also be 
of special interest analytically when we analyse them in hindsight. This is because when 
conflicts emerge they teach us important lessons about rationality, institutional 
robustness, embedded power structures, perspectives on democratic processes, and 
more. Understanding the dynamics of is conflict is therefore the first stepping-stone in 
addressing the main research question of this thesis. The first subsidiary research 
question of this thesis is addressed in chapter 7, and it reads as follows: 
 
RQ1: Why did the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder result in a conflict? 
 
To understand why this happened and how it can be interpreted is important given 
the framing of the main research question. The question is if we can learn something 
from the Value Creation 2010 case that has any relevance for understanding the 
workings of the larger governance system in the Agder region. The second subsidiary 
research question addresses features of the governance system that is of a more systemic 
nature than the first question. The second subsidiary research question relates to the 
view that it would be difficult to understand a subsystem, the regional development 
coalition, without understanding the workings of the larger governance system it 
operated within. That is to say, a set of assumptions that recognises the impact of 
context, environment, the politico economical and institutional system, the Value 
Creation 2010 project at Agder aimed at influencing and changing, and it self was 
influenced and changed by.  
The idea that governance networks are systems that are governed by meta steering 
processes is common to most theories about governance, and it is an idea that is 
common to the three perspectives used in this thesis. In this thesis, such meta steering 
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processes are conceptualised as regime processes, see discussion in chapter 7. 
Development coalitions, partnerships, networks, temporary organisations, etc. aimed at 
addressing specific development issues are almost by law of nature inclined towards 
achieving consensus. A certain level of consensus is almost a functional necessity for 
such institutions in order for them to move forward and act in a constructive manner. 
The basis for this consensus can have many sources, and some are discussed in this 
thesis. However, consensus can also have unwanted and repressive effects on creativity, 
the exploration of alternative development paths, alternative models of thought, etc. The 
inherent drive towards consensus in governance institutions means that they also have a 
strong disposition towards applying to predefined problem descriptions and solutions, 
for instance those inherent in the regional development concepts, such as cluster 
thinking, creative class, learning regions, triple-helix etc. Such predefined concepts and 
ideas should not be interpreted as “empty shells” that can be filled at will with new 
meaning when placed in a new context. These concepts are often inclined to specific 
understandings of society, the direction of societal development, and what must be done 
in order for society to move in the wanted direction. They represent in this sense 
normative and highly politicised conceptual understandings of development, economics, 
and society. Nonetheless, they are also very attractive for consensus-seeking 
institutions, because they represent a focal point for attention in what otherwise, can be 
a complex, and diffuse institutional landscape. These are insights that could lead us to 
getting a broader and more complex view on the relationship between a meta steered 
regional governance systems, democratic values, system efficiency and effectiveness. 
The second subsidiary research question of this thesis, is as the first addressed in 
chapter 7, and reads as follows: 
 
RQ2: What are the central characteristics of the regional regime and 
governance system in the Agder region? 
 
The composition and analysis of this research questions using three theoretical 
perspectives then provide an additional component of the analysis and address of the 
main research question. The central concepts inherent in this research question are 
regional governance and regional regime. Thinking of these questions in terms of 
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methods and data means that we also should have a strategy to determine if, and in what 
sense such concepts are meaningful to apply on the time and place of this study. The 
following questions therefore also need to be addressed and answered: 
1) How do we, or can we know that the politico economical steering and 
development system in the Agder region can meaningfully be characterised as a 
governance system? The answer to this question is much determined by how we 
theoretically have chosen to define and conceptualise governance. This thesis has 
introduced three such understandings, and if we look at the commonalities in these 
definitions, we can narrow it down to that governance is societal steering in a particular 
policy area that to varying degrees are disintegrated from representative democracy 
and/or the market. We should therefore focus on how our data reflects on the following 
three questions: a) Which policy areas are subjugated to governance process and 
control? b) Where are political decisions made? And c) Which and what type of actors 
have access to participating in making these decisions? This topic and questions are 
addressed in the beginning of chapter 7.  
The second question I need to address in relation to this is: 2) How do we, or can 
we know that the governance system or parts of it is meta steered by a regional regime? 
The answer to this question is also much determined on how we theoretically have 
chosen to define the concept in question. The use of the regime concept has, as 
discussed, been criticised for being too descriptive, see for instance (Dowding, 
Dunleavy, King, Margetts, & Rydin 1999; Dowding 2001; Davies 2002; 2003). The 
problem according to Dowding (2001: 7) is that the “regime” label is being applied to 
any coalition of forces around a local government and becomes merely descriptive of 
the ideology or, less grandly, the policy preferences of that government. Dowding 
therefore suggest a strategy on how the regime concept can be “revitalised”. Namely to 
focus on the underlying explanatory factors which can make it powerful and which can 
be used to explain why regimes sometimes fail to maintain themselves, or to form in the 
first place (Dowding 2001: 7). Keith Dowding (2001: 14) therefore, in an effort to 
revitalise Stone’s (1989) use of the regime concept, builds on Dowding et al. (1999) 
when he identify eight particularly relevant components of the regime concept:  
In order to identify a particular local government coalition as a regime, all or most of 
these eight characteristics need to be present. They are: (1) a distinctive policy agenda, 
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which is (2) relatively long-lived and (3) sustained by coalitions of interests or personnel 
not formally or fully specified in institutional structures, often in the form of a ‘grand 
coalition’ or large-majority coalition of interests, and often with (4) cross-sectoral or 
institutional boundaries. The policy agenda should also (5) survive personnel and 
leadership changes or political successions, reflecting a specific ideology or agreement 
over fundamental values for members of the coalition, which allows continued electoral 
success. It should also (6) primarily involve the mobilization of external resources, 
creating a positive-sum game within the polity and the formation of public-private 
partnerships, often transcending partisan divisions, (7) be associated with strong or 
exceptional leadership, capable of entrepreneurially assembling an unusual coalition and 
linking it with a distinctive political vision, and (8) tend to bridge institutions and 
community interests by creating ‘partnership’ forms, especially, in European contexts, 
spanning the public-private-sector divide (Dowding 2001: 14). 
Dowding writes that not all of these eight characteristics are necessary in order for 
us to label a particular coalition as a ‘regime’, but that some subsets are required. 
Among these is probably the identification of a distinctive policy agenda / ideology the 
most important since this is what gives the regime purpose. Dowding describes 
elements 6-8 as empirical regularities often associated with regimes but not strictly 
necessary in order to label the coalition a regime. The long-lived nature (5) is neither a 
necessary criterion since it in theory has no particular reason for why regimes should 
not also be short lived. This is more likely a practical result of the epistemological 
problems associated with observing short-term regimes, Dowding writes. Dowding’s 
eight criterions (1999; 2001) are discussed and analysed in the beginning of chapter 7, 
based on data presentations in chapter 5 and 6. The goal of this approach to data 
analysis is to do as expressed by Czarniawska-Joerges in the following sentence: 
”…to look at the narratives from the field, to compare them with one another and with the 
narratives from academia, in order to see what they say and what they do, what effect 
they make and how this effect is achieved” (Czarniawska-Joerges 1997: 72)42. 
The main research questions also signal an assumption relating to democracy 
somehow being less “there” than it ideally should be. The third research question 
addresses this question directly as it seeks to investigate into how regional governance 
practices compares to the three introduced conceptualisations of democracy. Some of 
the most significant and critical events and issues relating to the development of a 
regional system of governance in the Agder region, are therefore in chapter 7 discussed 
against three different conceptualisations of democracy. This in order to seek some 
explanation into what type of democratic values that current regional development and 
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governance practices represent, and what democratic values they do not represent. The 
third and last subsidiary research question of this thesis, is as the two first addressed in 
chapter 7, reads as follows: 
 
RQ3: What democratic values can justify some of the significant regional 
governance issues discussed? 
 
The figure below aims at depicting some of the linkages between the subsidiary 
research questions and the main research question. 
Fig. 3-4: Model of Some of the Relations and Links between the Research Questions 
Main RQ: Why is 
democracy disappearing 
from regional 
development?
RQ1: Why did the Value 
Creation 2010 project at 
Agder result in a conflict?
RQ2: What are the central 
characteristics of the 
regional regime and 
governance system in the 
Agder region?
RQ3: What democratic 
values can justify some 
of the significant regional 
governance issues 
discussed?
RQ1 substantiate RQ2 through insight 
into some of the complexity relating to 
network work, and RQ2 substantiate RQ1 
directly.
RQ1 substantiate RQ3 through 
providing one example discussed up 
against three democratic theories, and 
RQ3 discussions point to an alternative 
approach related to events discussed 
on RQ1.
RQ2 substantiate the discussions  
concerning why and how democracy is 
disappearing from regional development.
RQ2 substantiate RQ3 through providing 
the four other example issues relating to 
regional governance practices discussed 
up against three democratic theories.
RQ3 informs some of the democratic 
values that current regional development 
practices represent.
 
 
All of the three subsidiary research questions presented are affiliated in that they 
all directly and indirectly aim at informing the main research question of this thesis. 
There are also connections between the three subsidiary research questions. As 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 144 - 
discussions of one question can build on discussions and analysis conducted on another 
question. 
3.8 – Summary 
The theoretical perspectives of this thesis could individually be considered as ideal type 
models, where the different elements within the perspectives to some extent are purified 
and over emphasised. Thus implying that finding a perfect match between the 
perspectives and the “regional reality” could not be expected. My ambition is therefore 
not so much to test the perspectives, but to use them as analytical tools that could 
complement, enrich, and give a broader understanding of the regional system of 
governance than if just one view or perspective were to be used. In those instances 
where the perspectives are not complementary, I will present different interpretations 
that emerge when the perspectives are used on the available data, and argue in favour 
for those interpretations I find most probable thus, I also leave the text open for other 
interpretations.  
What the theoretical models and perspectives then do is to provide us with 
“glasses” to use when the research questions are to be discussed and analysed. Given 
this it is also obvious that in some instances it is impossible for all of the perspectives to 
be “true” simultaneously. They are in some important instances in clear competition. 
This challenge is in this thesis approached through presentation and analysis of 
empirical data, thus the idea is to let the available data determine the strengths of the 
perspectives that are presented. 
This is also one of the subjects discussed in the next chapter where I clarify and 
reason methods that are applied in order to address the research questions, what type of 
data that were available, explain how the field work was conducted, and give an account 
for my position on theory of science. 
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1 Quote is from Bish & Ostrom (1973), also referred in Blatter (2002). 
2 For an extended discussion of the phenomena I refer to Brunsson (1989) and Røvik (1998).  
3 In 1994, The Economist selected him one of five top management gurus in the world. As an 
author, he has published over 100 books, most in Japanese but those in English have been 
influential, many of which are devoted to business and socio-political analyses. He was a 
partner at McKinsey & Company, Inc., the international management-consulting firm for 23 
years, and co-founded their strategic management practice. His special area of expertise is 
formulating creative strategies and developing the organizational concepts to implement them 
both for private and public sectors. His counselling is also much in demand among Asian, 
European and North American-based multinational and governmental institutions. He has also 
played a vital role in assisting Asian Governments to develop future oriented-regional strategies. 
Source: http://www.ohmae-report.com/pro/bioe.html 
4 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
5 Referred in Isaksen (1997: 60). 
6 Referred in Isaksen (1997: 61). 
7 This is of course a paradox seen in light of the regime practices in the Agder region where one 
consequence is that knowledge production is sought steered in specific directions, see 
discussion chapter 6 and the subchapter on regional meta governance. 
8 On January 17 1961, in his farewell speech to the nation, US President Dwight Eisenhower 
issued a caveat to the American people that “unwarranted influence” was being acquired by “a 
permanent arms industry of vast proportions”. Calling it the American military-industrial 
complex, Eisenhower sounded a solemn alarm. Today this American military-industrial 
complex has untold power. Defence spending in the US is the highest in American history - 
$396 billion - and it is more than the total sum allocated to all other spending sectors (Jarecki 
2005). 
9 A joint statement from Global Colloquium of University Presidents in 2005 defines academic 
freedom as: “the freedom to conduct research, teach, speak, and publish, subject to the norms 
and standards of scholarly inquiry, without interference or penalty, wherever the search for truth 
and understanding may lead” (NOU 2006:19: 12). 
10 Ongoing in September 2006. 
11 Some examples are triple-helix in 1997 (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997b), learning region in 
1995 (Florida 1995), creative class in 2002 (Florida 2002), Porter’s use of regional clusters in 
1998 (Porter 1998b). 
12 Referred in Frederickson (2004). 
13 Referred in Frederickson (2004). 
14 All of the different conceptualisations of governance is referred from Frederickson (2004). 
15 Referred in Frederickson (2004).  
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16 Presentation of perspectives in Kickert et al. (1997) follows that of Jensen and Sørensen 
(2003). 
17 The table is based on discussions found in Jensen and Sørensen (2003), and in Sørensen and 
Torfing (2005). 
18 The main implication of this compared to Sørensen and Torfing (2005) is that instead of two 
instrumental perspectives I use one. 
19 The system of indirect rule adopted by British authorities to administer their colonies in 
Africa. According to Frederick Lugard, architect of the policy, indirect rule was cost effective 
because it reduced the number of European officials in the field. By allowing local rulers to 
exercise direct administrative control over their people, opposition to European rule from the 
local population would be minimized. The chiefs, however, were to take instructions from their 
European supervisors. The plan, according to Lugard, had the further advantage of civilizing the 
natives, because it exposed traditional rulers to the benefits of European political organization 
and values. This “civilizing” process notwithstanding, indirect rule had the ultimate advantage 
of guaranteeing the maintenance of law and order (Countrystudies n.d.). 
20 Referred in Lukes (2005: 4). 
21 Referred in Lukes (2005: 6). 
22 Referred in Lukes (2005: 7). 
23 Referred in Lukes (2005: 23). 
24 Referred in Lukes (2005: 7). 
25 Referred in Lukes (2005: 9).  
26 Referred in Lukes (2005: 10-1). 
27 The reader should note that Lukes conceptualisation of the third dimension of power and 
Foucault’s use of power in his Governmentability theory shares many similarities, but are not 
overlapping. However for the more general use I make of these concepts in this thesis is it 
meaningful to threat them as consistent conceptualisations of power. Interested readers are 
referred to Lukes (2005) for a discussion of the relationship between Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of power and Lukes third dimension of power. 
28 Elite democracy as discussed here is a theoretical model of democracy, it is not a 
representation of current representative democratic practices in Norwegian society. If the aim 
was to give such would a discussion of Robert A. Dahl’s concept of ‘polyarchies’ have been 
more precise, as Dahl uses the term polyarchy, to describe the western parliamentary system 
(Dahl 1961; 1979; 1982; 1985; 1989). The idea behind discussing the elitist conceptualisation of 
democracy is of course that it represents an interesting counterpart to some of the practices 
discussed in this thesis.  
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29 Bjørn Gustavsen discusses the following set of principles: 1) the dialogue is a process of 
exchange: ideas and arguments move to and fro between the participants. 2) It must be possible 
for all concerned to participate. 3) This possibility for participation is however not enough. 
Everybody should also be active. Consequently each participant has an obligation not only to 
put forth his or her own ideas, but also to help others to contribute their ideas. 4) All participants 
are equal. 5) Work experience is the basis for participation. This is the only type of experience 
which, by definition, all participants have. 6) At least some of the experience which each 
participant has when entering the dialogue must be considered legitimate. 7) It must be possible 
for everybody to develop an understanding of the issues at stake. 8) All arguments which pertain 
to the issues under discussion are legitimate. No argument should be rejected on the ground that 
it emerges from an illegitimate source. 9) The points, arguments, etc., which are to enter the 
dialogue must be made by a participating actor. Nobody can participate “on paper only”. 10) 
Each participant must accept that other participants can have better arguments. 11) The work 
role, authority, etc. of all the participants can be made subject to discussion – no participant is 
exempt in this respect. 12) The participant should be able to tolerate an increasing degree of 
difference of opinion. 13) The dialogue must continuously produce agreements which can 
provide platforms for practical action. Note that there is no contradiction between this criterion 
and the previous one. The major strength of a democratic system compared to all others is that it 
has the benefit of drawing upon a broad range of opinion and ideas which inform practice, while 
at the same time being able to make decisions which gain the support of all participants 
(Gustavsen 1992: 3). Rules of this kind are also developed by others, but the basic 
characteristics seem to be similar, the goal is to have a discourse that is as free, open, and 
transparent as possible, see for instance also Barber (1984: 261pp) referred in Eriksen (1993: 
255-6), and the discussion of procedural democracy has also relevance to this. 
30 This theory of democracy represents a continuance of Schumpeter’s competitive democracy, 
it introduces rational actors that are rational in choosing representatives. 
31 Referred in Mayer (2001b). 
32 Referred in Mayer (2001b). 
33 Referred in Mayer (2001b). 
34 Referred in Mayer (2001b). 
35 Norwegian term: “Samarbeidsforsøkene”. 
36 Referred in Greenwood and Levin (1998: 24). 
37 Philip Herbst argument; democracy at work creates democratic participants in society (ref). 
38 Referred in Pateman (2003). 
39 Note that Schumpeter does not view “the people” as rational. As he, Schumpeter, identifies 
this as one of the chief problems of the classical doctrine of democracy (Schumpeter 1994: 269). 
People are in a sense not enlightened enough to participate.  
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40 The first time equality is expressed as a general democratic value was in 1381 in Britain 
during the peasants revolts (Benn 2005). There was then an uprising against the King, Richard 
II, who had imposed a poll (fixed) tax to finance his war against the French. This led the 
peasants to march on London and occupy the city. The King promised to fulfil all the peasants’ 
demands, but when the peasants had withdrawn from the city, the king sent his armies out and 
thousands of the peasants were slaughtered. The Hedgerow priest John Ball is famous for 
articulating the argument that the peasants were trying to put forward. Ball was so controversial 
that no bishop would give him a parish, thereby he preached in the hedgerows. An example was 
made of John Ball after the Peasant revolts were knocked down; he was hanged, drawn, and 
quartered in the presence of Richard II on 15 July 1381. To be hanged, drawn, and quartered 
was the penalty once ordained in England for treason committed by men, women found guilty 
of treason against the King were burnt at the stake. John Ball intelligently cited God as the 
grounds for his campaign for freedom: “In the beginning we were all created equal. If God 
willed that there should be serfs, he would have said so at the beginning of the world. We were 
formed in Christ’s likeness and they treat us like animals. Matters cannot go in well until all 
things are held in common” (Benn 2005). The revolts might have been victoriously shattered by 
the King, but the ideas put forward and articulated by Ball lived on and came to play a 
significant role in later developments, like; the French revolution, constitutionalism, chartists 
and suffragette movements, trade unionism etc. These are the right to freely organise, the equal 
right to vote, and the equal right to represent. 
41 George Monbiot of The Guardian asserts that the economic disparities have increased since 
the French Revolution notwithstanding all talk of equality (Mishra 2003). 
42 Referred in Kvåle (2001: 90). 
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Chapter 4 – Method 
In this chapter, I argue what the relationship between study objects, theory, data, 
analysis, and conclusions are. This relationship between the methods, will alongside my 
ontological and epistemological position, show how I have gathered data, what type of 
data that has been available to me, how I have approached the task of analyzing this 
data, and what the relationship between the research question and methods are in the 
following discussed and clarified. I end this chapter with some considerations 
concerning causality, credibility, and address issues relating to generalisability of 
conclusions. 
4.1 – Conceptual Framework 
The bounds of this thesis have yet to be explicitly defined. I seek to study how regional 
organization and regional process influences regional outcomes. These three elements 
constitute the main three basics of the conceptual framework of this thesis. The rationale 
for building a conceptual framework is to be clear on my theoretical preconceptions, 
and support the process of better knowing what data elements go in what “bin” and 
what the relationship between the different “bins” are (Miles & Huberman 1994: 18-
22). 
Fig. 4-1: Conceptual Framework 
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policy agendas
5. Regional 
democratic 
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development 
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Regional organization, (numbers in brackets refers to the figure above), is to be 
understood as current interactions in and between (1) representative democratic 
institutions, primarily but not exclusively, the county level, (2) governance networks, 
primarily those aimed at regional development in general and on regional industrial 
development in particular, and (3) regional regime, the informal coordination and meta 
steering level. The interactions in and between these three spheres of regional 
organization are in this thesis conceptualized as regional process. With regional process 
I mean, (4) regional policy agendas, which are the current policy directives and 
strategies of regional development work in the Agder region, (5) regional democratic 
practices, which are the normative ways and means of regional development work 
conducted within regional organization. Regional democratic practices are assumed (ref. 
main research question of this thesis) to influence and be influenced by (6) regional 
development practices, which can be viewed as the mechanics of development.  
Seen together, the regional processes are: policy agendas, democratic practices, 
and development practices, the strategies, mechanics, and normative framework of 
regional organization. These elements, regional organization, and process work jointly 
in influencing the (7) regional outcomes. This can be everything from concrete 
development results, or lack thereof, institutional changes and developments, and 
regional interests that have been addressed or not addressed through the regional 
development process. Analysis of (8) regional opportunities is not explicitly part of the 
data analyses of this thesis. Chapter 2 on context, can however be viewed as an 
introduction to some of the elements necessary to such considerations. It is however 
good reason to believe that regional outcomes in some form or another also influence 
regional opportunities and that this again gives input to regional organization and 
process. These linkages are however not part of analysis conducted in this thesis.  
In chapter 3, three theoretical perspectives were outlined in order to provide the 
possibility for obtaining a better and more substantiated picture of the field, and to 
provide a richer and more complete set of interpretations of the phenomenon studied 
(Berg 1995). This approach is by some called theoretical triangulation (Denzin 1978; 
Berg 1995). Denzin states that theory triangulation consists of using multiple rather than 
single perspectives in relation to the same set of objects (Denzin 1978: 295)1. The goal 
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of the theoretical triangulation process is to strengthen conceptual linkages and to 
address credibility issues (see also discussion below). The three theoretical perspectives, 
instrumental, institutional, and ideological provide us with different grounds for 
interpreting and understanding what condition actions in the regional system. These 
perspectives also provide different possibilities for interpreting normative and efficiency 
issues in the system, what the nature of the system is, workability of the system, and 
consequently what the role of democracy in regional development really is about. 
Such an eclectic approach to theory has both strengths and weaknesses. In those 
instances where the perspectives do not contradict each other, we can say that they are 
complimentary and enriching, and that they provide depth and width to the analysis. In 
some important instances however, the perspectives are in clear competition. This is 
most clearly the case if we compare the types of rationalities inherent in the 
perspectives, and it should be clear that network actors cannot be rational and utility 
maximizing with predefined interests, and socially constructed collectively oriented 
individuals simultaneously (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 177-8). How I have addressed 
the challenge this represents is discussed more in the following. 
4.2 – Questions Concerning the Knowable 
It does not make much sense to operate with more than one ontology or epistemology. 
However if we compare the three perspectives in this thesis we see that they express 
competing ontological beliefs, for instance in the instrumental perspective there is a 
belief that human action is fundamentally rational in an instrumental sense. The other 
two perspectives are, as I have interpreted them, human action best understood as 
bounded rational. It should be clear that humans cannot be both, this is as I see it a 
philosophical question that needs clarification, and it is therefore discussed below. On 
the other hand, the perspectives are also to an extent in competition on other issues 
concerning governance system actors. Are they for instance basically interdependent, or 
are they autonomous, do they act collectively or individually, what is the nature and 
purpose of the regional regime etc.? Such question is in this thesis regarded as more 
empirical than philosophical questions, and clarification of these issues will 
consequently be integrated in data analysis and discussions.  
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If we examine the three perspectives in a theory of science context, we could 
argue that the perspectives of this thesis belongs to different paradigms (Guba 1990b; 
Gephart 2004). If we by paradigm mean a set of basic beliefs that guides action, notably 
those paradigms that guides disciplined inquiry (Guba 1990a: 17-8). Paradigms can be 
characterized by the way their proponents respond to three basic questions, which can 
be characterized as the ontological, the epistemological, and the methodological 
questions: 
(1) Ontological: what is the nature of the “knowable“? Or, what is the nature of reality? 
(2) Epistemological: What is the nature of the relationship between the knower (the 
inquirer) and the known (or knowable)? 
(3) Methodological: How should the inquirer go about finding out knowledge (Guba 
1990a: 18)? 
Based on the answers to these question Guba (1990b: 17-27), three paradigms that 
have emerged to challenge some of the fundamental and basic beliefs of positivism are 
outlined, these are post positivism, constructivism, and critical theory. Three paradigms 
that, not coincidentally, match central features with the theoretical perspectives that I 
use and have constructed for the purpose of this thesis.  
The instrumental, and to some extent the institutional perceptive, belong within 
what is best labelled a post positivistic research tradition or paradigm. Ontologically 
post positivism moves away from a naïve realist (positivist) posture of discovering the 
objective reality, but are critical realist in the sense that reality exists and are driven by 
natural laws that only can be incompletely understood. Post positivists widely accept the 
notion that social science is about the study of a reality that is social in nature and that 
this nature also is socially invented. Post positivists also recognize the widely accepted 
notion that people and different societies have different views about what is real, or 
what is correct. What differentiates post positivists from constructivists, is that if a post 
positivist observes that one social group believes that “X is the case” and another 
believes that “X not is the case” then the realist believes that both cannot be correct, 
since it exists some undiscovered reality, while the relativist must believe in the position 
of multiple realities and that in fact both groups can be correct (Phillips 1990: 41). Post 
positivists are epistemology modified objectivist, objectivity remains a regulatory ideal 
but it can only be approximated through the aide of critical guardians such as a critical 
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research community (Guba 1990a: 23). The notion of objectivity is a regulatory ideal 
that underlies all inquiry. Philips argues that if we abandon such notions, it is not 
sensible to make inquiries at all, because then a sloppy inquiry would be just as valid as 
a careful one (Phillips 1990: 43). Methodological post positivists emphasize critical 
mulitiplism. Redress imbalances by doing inquiry in more natural setting, using more 
qualitative methods, depending more on grounded theory, and reintroducing discovery 
into the inquiry process (Guba 1990a). Methodical and theoretical triangulation (Denzin 
1978) is therefore central in post positivistic knowledge acquisition (Guba 1990a: 21). 
Post positivism requires methods of collecting and analyzing factual depictions of the 
world that reveal singular truths or realities and that can be used to falsify hypothesizes 
(Gephart 2004: 457).  
The institutional perspective can arguably be placed within an interpretative 
research tradition, and the interpretive research tradition here belongs within the 
constructive paradigm. The basic ontological idea of constructivism is relativism, 
meaning that “reality” is constructed local intersubjective realities composed of 
subjective and objective meanings (Gephart 2004). Here research means to produce 
descriptions of member’s understandings and definitions of situations, and to 
understand how reality is constructed. The research process consists of unveiling and 
understanding situated meanings, and to identify systematic divergences in meaning 
(Gephart 2004). Constructivists have a subjectivist epistemology, where the inquirer and 
the inquired are fused into a single (monistic) entity. Findings are literally the creation 
of the process of interaction between the two. Methodical constructivists aim at 
generating one or a few constructions on which there is substantial consensus (Guba 
1990a: 27). Similarly interpretative research uncovers, describes and theoretically 
interprets actual meanings that people use in real settings (Gephart 2004: 457).  
In their book The Social Construction of reality, Berger and Luckmann analyse 
three processes: “Society as a man made product. Society as an objective reality. Man as 
a social product.” Very simplified Berger and Luckmann’s argument is that the 
elements of society become an objective reality through the following steps; habits 
become institutionalised then institutions are objectified and at last legitimised, and gain 
an objective ontological status. Berger and Luckmann’s (2000) argument consists of a 
discussion around three concepts, externalisation, objectivation, and internalisation that 
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are in a continuous dialectic relationship with each other. Berger and Luckmann’s 
argument is in short as follows: All human activity is subject to habit, and humans are 
creatures of habit. This means that any action that is repeated often is tailored to a 
pattern that later can be reproduced without much effort. Habits are necessary because 
they make it unnecessary to define each situation from scratch, step by step, each time it 
occurs. Even if there are thousands of different ways to do a specific task, human action 
tends to fall into a pattern of repetitive habit. Habits make it possible for the individual 
to predict what actions to be taken in a given situation without embracing all of a 
situation’s potential complexity every time (Berger & Luckmann 2000). These are the 
basic elements in the constructive paradigm. 
Last, the ideological perspective can be located within a critical research tradition. 
The basic belief shared by critical theorists is that they reject the notion of or ideal of 
value freedom held by post positivists. When values enter into inquiry the question of 
what values and whose values shall govern inquiry arises. The choice of a particular 
value system tends to empower some and disempower others. Inquiry thereby becomes 
a political act. Since the goal of much critical theory is to uncover injustice and false 
consciousness, there must also exist a true real reality and a real consciousness out 
there. Critical theorist ontology is therefore critical realists in the post positivistic sense. 
Epistemologically critical theorists share much of their position with constructivists in 
that they hold a subjectivist position, in the sense that values mediate inquiry. Inquiry 
acts are intimately related to the values of the inquirer. Methodological critical theorists 
are focused on methods that are dialogic and transformative, and the goal of the 
methodological process is to eliminate false consciousness and energize and facilitate 
transformations (Guba 1990a: 23-5). Critical theory sees material and/or symbolic 
reality as something shaped by values and that it crystallizes over time. The prime 
research task is to uncover hidden interests and contradictions. Research is to be 
liberating and to develop structural or historical insights that reveal contradictions and 
allow emancipation, and spaces for silenced voices. The research process will focus on 
critical incidents, signs and symbols through understanding of the historical evolution of 
meanings, material practices, contradictions and inequalities (Gephart 2004).  
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My Position 
An eclectic approach to theory requires clarification and explanation. Sørensen and 
Torfing write that theories with different analytical premises must not stop mutual 
enrichment between theories, something in which I concur. To walk with blinkers and 
be blind to other theories contribution to the job of answering research questions is to 
me just as problematic as an eclectic combination of theories that builds on different 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. The solution to this dilemma is to choose 
a theoretical starting point, let oneself be inspired by of arguments and insights from 
other theories and positions and thereafter try to adapt and reformulate these so that they 
become meaningful within the framework of your own theoretical starting point. In such 
a way you can avoid the dangers of eclectic combination of incompatible theory 
fragments, at the same time as you make a contribution to the development of new 
theoretical and practical understandings and explanations (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 
178). 
The justifications of the eclectic approach are in my case based on preliminary 
data analysis and close interactions with practice. I have first handed experienced that 
regional actors have very different understandings and interpretations of governance, 
regional development work, and democracy, something that I have documented through 
a series of interviews with regional stakeholders. Being personally involved over a 
period of several years in regional development projects have also made me realise that 
my own ideas and understandings of the system and its characteristics have matured and 
changed over the years. In the beginning, I had something that probably is best 
understood as an instrumental interpretation of the system and systemic events. 
Somehow, I believed that it was almost possible to instrumentally predict what would 
be the outcome of initiated events. I have also experienced how powerful the post-
rationalisations of events were, and that this post rationalisation, meaning construction, 
and interpretative process were some of the more interesting features of the regional 
development and governance system. Because this insight led me to understand that the 
apparent instrumentality of the system as something socially constructed, that meaning 
was intersubjective and forged in interplay between actor’s institutions and 
overreaching rationalities. This led me to realise that interpreting the system through 
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only an instrumental, institutional, or ideological perspective or theory would provide 
less fruitful analysis than an eclectic approach. 
I have come to see myself as most affiliated with the constructivist position, but 
not as a relativist in the strictest sense of the word. I also share basic views with critical 
theory for instance the important task of social research in challenging unjust 
hegemonies. I do for instance believe that concepts such as democracy, pluralism, and 
equality have a superior position to other beliefs, such as autocracy and inequality. Just 
as most people would agree that it is better not to steal, not to murder, not to lie than to 
lie, murder, and steal. The question if such values are rooted in an existential 
ontological reality or just products of human interactions through times I simply do not 
know the answer to. However, I do not view the ontological status of moral beliefs as a 
decisive question. Personally, I consider some fundamental moral beliefs to be 
independent of religion and culture, as I perceive them as cornerstones of the very idea 
of society itself. I believe that democratic values such as equality and plurality of 
interests are such moral cornerstones of society, and that we also can use them with 
rigour in scientific analysis and as benchmark of practices in modern society. Thus, I 
see affiliation with a statement made by John Dewey some 80 years ago, where he says 
: “Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated 
life. It is the idea of community life itself” (Dewey 1991 [1927]: 148). 
I do however recognise that there are empirical indications of the existence of 
other “realities” in a critical realist meaning of the word, which deservers more 
consideration than flat out refutation. One possible candidate is as I see it Chomsky’s 
theory of natural language and universal grammar which is based on the empirical fact 
that children learn language with limited stimuli, and that the learning during the natural 
language acquisition cannot be accounted for by learning mechanisms only (Chomsky 
1968; 1986). Chomsky argues that knowledge of language is normally attained through 
brief exposure, and the character of the acquired knowledge may be largely 
predetermined (Chomsky 1968). If this is true, then the question is if this is a theory of 
the mind, some deep structure in society, or both. This question is and has been widely 
debated within the scientific community, and the answer is that we simply do not know 
what the answer to this question is. 
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Speaking in terms of epistemology, this means that I take a subjectivist position. 
To inquire into the objective is in this sense a “meaningless” idea, since if it exists it is 
very little we can know about it, so little that it becomes almost irrelevant for social 
analysis. The only thing that is stable and can be compared to the results of inquiry is 
our own moral beliefs and normative preconceptions, which we as researchers into the 
social have an obligation to clearly communicate to our readers. Thus, I do not 
necessarily think that such beliefs are universal but that some of them, such as 
democracy, should be. Fortunately, this is always up to the reader and not the writer to 
decide. 
However, to me social science’s most important task is to challenge societal belief 
systems that are either ineffective or morally unjust. My ontological grounding for such 
a position is not based on them being grounded in any ontological reality that exists 
outside society. It is based on a normative position and the moral belief that society and 
human action are better if it is governed by values that are supportive of society than by 
values that are not. The question is then if the answer to the ontological question is that 
important, if what we study are societies and human actions and interactions within 
man-made structures are not, are the presence of deep level structures crucial to our 
inquiry? If the inquirer makes his/her position clear, it should also provide the reader 
with ample opportunity to make up her/his own mind up, and in the end that is what 
matters. Then I state a pragmatic position to ontology. Stating that I do not know what 
the true nature of reality is or if any true nature of reality exists. I think the best we can 
do is to describe and communicate how we understand and immediately interpret the 
world, and that this in “reality” is the most basic relationship we can have to the world 
and our surroundings. The goal of the scientific inquiry for me is then not to uncover the 
true meaning of the world, because I cannot know what it is, but to uncover how I and 
others interpret the world, and to compare such findings to my own or widely shared 
normative belief systems, and in the end let incompatibilities between the two be the 
basis of social change and further actions. In this sense theoretical and methodological 
triangulation are not expressions of post positivistic ontology, but attempts of securing 
that the interpretations of social systems are as sophisticated and convincing as possible.  
The goal of research is as I see it not to uncover “false” consciousness in a critical 
theory sense of the word, but to argue for my interpretations of the social phenomenon I 
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study and to compare them to widely held and accepted normative standards. Respect 
for informants and their beliefs should not hamper us from putting their experiences into 
a wider context, even if we could risk that portrayal of their experiences and 
interpretations of the world in conflict with such standards. How to address such issues 
should be a central issue in a research tradition widely recognised as Action Research 
(AR).  
Action Research 
AR is an interpretative research tradition, and is therefore in kinship with other 
interpretative research traditions such as social anthropology and ethnography. All 
interpretative research traditions discuss the role of the researcher as a central 
component in their epistemology. The research role is discussed with respect to 
subjectivity, objectivity, influence, tampering etc. Central to AR is that it is explicit 
here. The action researcher is a part of practice and at the same time s/he reflects upon 
what this means for practice, and the knowledge generating process. In ethnography, 
there is also researcher participation through methods such as direct observation, 
interviews etc. However, this is often understood somewhat different from within AR. 
In ethnographical studies, you can often find discussions that stress how the researcher 
in the end of the research project becomes invisible. In other words, “The Hawthorne 
effect” became smaller and smaller and in the end not even there (Berg 1995). The 
respondents, the study objects were in the end so used to seeing the researcher(s) that 
their behaviour cannot be said to have been influenced by the presence of the 
researcher. Similar discussions are also found within the other social sciences. The 
researcher is understood as an alien, an element that does not naturally belong in the 
practice field. To put to the point; the researcher is really an interruptive element that 
corrupts data. 
A central point of AR is that the researcher shall and should have a role as a 
participant in practice. The central point of AR is not to mineralise the role of the 
researcher but to maximise it in the knowledge generating process. I believe that to what 
extent you can speak of a shared epistemological position within AR relates to just this 
aspect. The “goals” of AR, to co-generate social learning, change, and action is closely 
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interwoven with this epistemology. AR is defined as the connection between the three 
elements: research, action, and participation. 
Another central point of AR is that one rebuts the distinction between thought and 
action, a central point from Dewey. Valid social knowledge, valid theories, works in 
practice. Greenwood and Levin (1998), that here follows Dewey, argue that this is the 
only validation criterion that is important in AR. AR rejects methodological hegemony 
and rejects the widespread notion that AR is e.g. only qualitative in nature (Greenwood 
& Levin 1998). The point is that in AR it is the reflection over practice that is the core, 
what you as a researcher do methodically to reach this reflection is subordinate2. Action 
research studies therefore consist of layer by layer of spirals of planning, actions, 
observations, and reflections (Carr & Kemmis 1986). Where new spirals build on 
knowledge from previous spirals and thereby cumulative increases the amount of 
knowledge generated. One definition of AR, which makes a lot of sense to me, is this:  
In action research, the actionable knowledge produced is co-generated by the researchers, 
who bring external expertise, and the participants, who hold local knowledge (A. W. 
Martin 2004: 1)3. 
I like this definition because it is explicit on what an action researcher is and what 
s/he brings to the table, but I also see it as meaningful to supplement it with the 
definition offered by Greenwood and Levin (1998): 
AR is social research carried out by a team encompassing a professional action researcher 
and members of an organisation or community seeking to improve their situation. AR 
promotes broad participation in the research process and supports action leading to a 
more just or satisfying situation for the stakeholders. Together, the professional 
researcher and the stakeholders define the problems to be examined, cogenerate relevant 
knowledge about them, learn and execute social research techniques, take actions, and 
interpret the results of actions based on what they have learned. AR rests on the belief and 
experience that all people – professional action researchers included – accumulate, 
organize, and use complex knowledge constantly in everyday life. This belief is visible in 
any AR project because the first step professional action researchers and members of a 
community or organisation take is to define a problem that they seek to resolve. They 
begin by pooling their knowledge. AR democratizes the relationship between the 
professional researcher and the local interested parties. Because it is a research practice 
with a social change agenda, AR involves a critique of conventional academic practices 
and organisations that study social problems without trying to resolve them (Greenwood 
& Levin 1998: 4).  
Both definitions state that knowledge is co-generated between the researcher and 
the participants, but Greenwood and Levin’s definition is less explicit on that this 
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practice means that it is two different types of knowledge that is woven together. 
Martin’s definition is explicit on that it is the ‘external expertise’ of the action 
researcher and the ‘local knowledge’ of the participants that are co-generated into new 
knowledge in the action research process. Greenwood and Levin’s definition so strongly 
emphasizes the equality and democratic aspects of the research and the co-generative 
process that they lose Martin’s aspect in their definition. I therefore think that the 
combination of Martin’s and Greenwood and Levin’s definition gives a better 
understanding and a better definition of what AR is or should be, at least it does to me. 
However, this opens new and interesting discussions e.g. - what is technical knowledge? 
What does technical knowledge mean in practice - Is it methodological and theoretical 
skills? Personal abilities? Alternatively, is it deep contextual knowledge that can match 
that of the participants? All of the above factors, just a few of them, or something else? 
In addition, what can we require from the participants and their local knowledge, do 
they just need to show up, or are they also required to contribute some specific attributes 
and skills? 
In the field of AR, the researcher must face the challenge and inspiration inherent 
in the process of meeting real people, with real interests and real actions. An implication 
of this is that research in this perspective must be relevant where people are and where 
people act together to solve problems. The core idea of AR is that researchers are 
supportive in such problem solving activities. Precisely how this support is done in 
practice, will diverge much between different research milieus, between different 
varieties of AR, between capabilities of the different researchers, between different 
contexts and politico economical systems, etc. The main and shared issue of AR, as I 
see it, is however to contribute in a way that is relevant both for development processes 
and for the larger systems context of development. I view this last point as a particularly 
important task of AR, if set in politicised development and governance contexts. In this 
sense AR should not be afraid to challenge both concepts in use, and the existing ideas 
and understandings of the system that development operates within. I believe this is 
important based on particularly two insights gained from 5 years of work with the Value 
Creation 2010 project at Agder.  
In settings as those discussed here, the engaged action researcher and programmes 
such as Value Creation 2010 can choose to do one of three things: (1) Abide to the 
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discursive framework, accept it as a given entity that is impossible to change, and work 
within it, (the job secure approach to the problem). (2) Be fundamentally critical, and 
risk placing yourself on the outside of development processes, (this approach can 
probably help to give the engaged researcher a good consciousness, but would probably 
do nothing to the researchers practical influence in the field). (3) The last approach is a 
mediating one, where a critical stance is preserved but where the possibilities for 
democratic change also are explored. This last approach requires that researchers 
somehow are able to combine their criticisms of practice with constructive solutions and 
to systematically work to find a way forward. This is in the end a question of finding the 
balance between constructive conflicts and collaboration. I do not believe there has been 
published a book on methods or AR methodology yet that provides a finite solution to 
this fundamental challenge of AR. The researcher, the research team, and research 
institutions they belong to are still left to figure this out anew for every new 
participatory project they engage themselves in. We have however come to believe that 
a crucial component to succeed with such efforts is that research is placed and anchored 
within stable institutional settings that are supportive of such approaches (H. C. G. 
Johnsen & Normann 2004b).  
4.3 – The Research Process 
The Value Creation 2010 project was when it was initiated rooted in the Scandinavian 
tradition of workplace co-operation. Johnsen writes that this tradition has emphasized 
the asymmetry of power and formal authority at the workplace. And that one major goal 
of this tradition has been to make this power and formal authority more evenly 
distributed. One of the main motives for introducing the Enterprise Development 2000 
and the Value Creation 2010 change programme, based on the Scandinavian tradition, 
was to supplement traditional processes of negotiations with broader co-action through 
communication (H. C. G. Johnsen 2001). 
One of the new features of Value Creation 2010 compared to the preceding 
programme Enterprise Development 2000, was that establishment of what was then 
labelled regional development coalitions. This became one of the central 
methodological actions in the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region. Value 
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Creation 2010 Agder resulted in two such regional development coalitions that 
sustained activity over a period of several years. These are Development Coalition 
Vennesla and the Value Creation Alliance (H. C. G. Johnsen, Normann, & Fosse 2005). 
Development Coalition Vennesla is a municipal based development project. This Value 
Creation 2010 project is described and analyzed in a forthcoming thesis by Jens Kristian 
Fosse where he shows how the formation of a development coalition in the municipality 
of Vennesla have contributed to learning and change processes in the context of major 
economic restructuring in the manufacturing industry (Fosse 2007). 
Regional development coalitions are based on ideas developed within the 
framework of industrial companies being practiced and further developed at a regional, 
cross-organizational, level. The Norwegian endowers to establish regional development 
coalitions emerge from the industrial democracy tradition that links back to the works of 
John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, Carole Pateman and Eric Trist. Arguments for this 
development have been referring to both social change and economic development, but 
there has also been an argument referring to democracy. Regional development 
coalitions and regional partnerships refer roughly to the same phenomenon. The main 
distinction between these two terms is that they relate to different bodies of literature, 
and have different normative basis and different notions of democracy (H. C. G. 
Johnsen & Normann 2004a). 
The Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region was initially designed with 
regional development coalitions as the core component, where the idea was that Value 
Creation 2010 should be a Mode-2 type of research project (Gibbons et al. 1994). An 
AR project with the aim to improve innovation practices in the region through a 
regional development coalition, in co-operation between research, regional government 
authorities, businesses, and social partners are based on ideas developed within the 
framework of industrial companies and industrial democracy being practiced and further 
developed at a regional, cross-organizational, level. Ennals and Gustavsen (1999) write 
that development coalitions should constitute an arena for democratic dialogue. 
Dialogue represents for them a key feature for understanding processes of change, 
learning, and knowledge transfer. They define dialogue as conversations, or discussions 
between equal partners, characterized by openness, willingness to listen to each other, to 
accept good arguments and generally to learn from each other. Dialogue is in this sense 
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the one core element in the establishment and evolution of regional development 
coalitions. “This is because only through dialogue will it be possible for all participants 
to really learn, because dialogue is the only kind of communication that allows for 
learning through linking one’s own experiences to those of others, and in such a way 
that no initial preference is given to any of the experiences as being more valuable or 
superior than the others” (Ennals & Gustavsen 1999). Thus we regarded regional 
development coalitions as good examples of a practical attempt to create an Agora: a 
democratic forum for development through communicative action and collaboration (H. 
C. G. Johnsen et al. 2005). 
The formal start-up of the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region came 
when we got signals that the application to the Norwegian Research Council was 
accepted in early summer of 2001. In this application we write: 
The goal [of Value Creation 2010] is to succeed with value creation and welfare 
developments in the Agder region through increased innovation, based on broad 
participation through the establishment of development coalitions between enterprises, 
industrial networks, and the public sector (H. C. G. Johnsen & Normann 2001c: 4). 
The work that was done in the Value Creation 2010 project concerning the Value 
Creation Alliance is discussed in the next chapter 5. But what we did in the initial phase 
of the Value Creation 2010 Agder project was to take a lot of initiatives and explore 
possibilities for development projects, collaborations, and initiatives. Even though we 
had a relatively clear idea about the goals of the project and the main methods we would 
apply to, we did not have a firm grip on the actual contents of the processes. This was 
not problematic in this early phase of the project, because in the AR design of the 
project such issues would be integrated into the collaborative development efforts. The 
project was in this sense very much explorative in nature; we sought possibilities and 
seized them actively as they arrived. This also had the implication that we as a project 
did not have a profile that was as clear and communicative as it ought to. In order to 
gain access in those forums that we considered being important to enter into, we 
familiarized ourselves with the regional development concepts, such as triple-helix, 
learning regions, regional clusters etc, and used them instrumentally in order to 
communicate with regional stakeholders. It is probably not an overstatement to argue 
that the Value Creation 2010 project in Agder is responsible for the rapid diffusion of 
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many of the regional development concepts in the region. Because our lack of 
conceptual, systemic, and theoretical understating of the concepts and the regional 
governance system we did not foresee what the effects of this could be. The fact that we 
only thought of them as an efficient way of entering into the dialogue, and that we only 
wanted to use them as a starting point for dialogue, is no excuse for this. 
After a couple of years of work where we more or less were in this mode, we 
started to focus on more clearly defining our academic research ambitions with the 
project. We made research notes systematically and carefully through the project with 
this in mind, but without any clear idea about what our research focus and interests 
where outside the more general themes of the project. One result of this early analysis of 
our experiences was that we wanted to focus on some of the democratic aspects of the 
regional development coalitions. Based on this early analysis we brought our reflections 
and ideas back to the Value Creation Alliance. At this point two significant events 
happened. First, a dramatic conflict occurs that stalls the development work in the 
project (see next chapter 5), second does the EDWOR Ph.D. programme start up. I 
entered into EDWOR as a Ph.D. student and was given the task of designing a Ph.D. 
project based on the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region. 
I now continue to work with the regional development coalition, where I 
participate in the meetings, discussions, and contribute to the redesign of the project. I 
also do literature reviews where I seek literature, theories and concepts that will be 
useful for understanding and interpreting my experiences with the Value Creation 2010 
project. The main research question of this thesis and the systemic regional focus 
emerges in this period. Based on this I initiate new series of systematic data collection, 
interviews with regional stakeholders, which I adapt, organize, and feed back to the 
members of the Value Creation Alliance. This is done on two separate occasions. Both 
these feedbacks emphasized the role of democratic process in development. What the 
effects of these semi-interventions have been are difficult to say precisely. The 
reminiscences of a debate about governance institutions in the region in the largest 
regional newspaper Fædrelandsvennen in the spring of 2003 also contributes 
significantly (see chapter 6). But probably supported by other developments an 
increased focus from actors in the development coalitions on the special role held by 
representative democratic institutions (the counties) in regional development work has 
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been observed after this. One of the best concrete examples of this is probably that the 
counties, in the VRI4 process in the Agder region, by more people than I personally had 
expected, pointed to the counties as the natural regional leaders in this process. The 
research process of this thesis is symbolically illustrated by the figure below. 
Fig. 4-2: The Research Process Depicted 
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When I started to work on designing a Ph.D. project based on the Value Creation 
2010 project at Agder, it become evident to me that it was impossible to understand the 
work of the Value Creation Alliance or the Value Creation 2010 project without also 
understanding the context, system, and discursive framework these institutions and 
projects operated within. I have therefore integrated the AR project and the regional 
analysis into one conceptual framework. One could based on this argue that this thesis is 
dual in the sense that one part of it has the hallmarks of an action research project while 
the other part is more “conventional” social science. This means that a lot of data that 
originate from secondary sources also are used as basis for the analysis and conclusions 
of this thesis. What type of data I have, and how I have approached the job of analyzing 
these data is discussed more in the following. 
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4.4 – Data and Data Analysis 
The data of this thesis are mostly qualitative in nature5. The difference between 
qualitative and quantitative is not distinct (Berg 1995: 2). In some senses are all data 
qualitative as they refer to essences of people, objects, and situations (Miles & 
Huberman 1994: 9). Berg suggests that that the notion of quality is essential to the 
nature of things, and that quantity is elementally an amount of something. Quality refers 
to the what, how, when, and where of a thing– in essence and ambience. Qualitative 
research thus refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, 
symbols, and descriptions of things. In contrast, quantitative research refers to counts 
and measures of things (Berg 1995: 3). Qualitative researchers are then most often 
engaged in, and interested in, human arrangements, their settings, and how inhabitants 
of these settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social 
structures, social roles and so forth (Berg 1995: 7). Denzin and Lincoln argue that 
qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints 
that shape inquiry. Qualitative researchers emphasise the value-laden nature of inquiry 
and seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given 
meaning (Denzin & Lincoln 2000a: 8).  
Thus, the central question of qualitative data analysis is how we can draw valid 
meaning from qualitative data, and what method and approach to analysis that will get 
us knowledge that is practical, communicable and that others can rely on. Miles and 
Huberman argue that qualitative data can provide this because it gives us the 
opportunity to preserve chronological flow, see precisely which events led to which 
consequences, and derive fruitful explanations based on this (Miles & Huberman 1994: 
1). Miles and Huberman thus sum up the advantages of qualitative data and research in 
the following way:  
One major feature is that they focus on naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural 
settings, so that we have a strong handle what “real life” is like. That confidence is 
buttressed by local groundedness, the fact that the data were collected in close proximity 
to a specific situation, rather than through the mail or over the phone. The emphasis is on 
a specific case, a focused and bounded phenomenon embedded in its context. The 
influences of the local context are not stripped away, but are taken into account. The 
possibility for understanding latent, underlying, or nonobvious issues is strong. Another 
feature of qualitative data is their richness and holism, with strong potential for revealing 
Chapter 4 – Method 
- 167 - 
complexity; such data provide “thick descriptions” that are vivid, nested in a real context, 
and have a ring of truth that has strong impact to the reader. Furthermore, the fact that 
such data are typically collected over a sustained period makes them powerful for 
studying any process (including history); we can go far beyond “snapshots” of “what?” or 
“how many?” to just how and why things happens as they do–and even assess causality 
as it actually plays out in a particular setting. And the inherent flexibility of qualitative 
studies (data collection times and methods can be varied as a study proceeds) gives 
further confidence that we’ve really understood what was going on (Miles & Huberman 
1994: 10).  
Analyzing Democratic Governance 
Three main groups of qualitative data are available to this thesis work, interview data, 
document data, and process data.  
Firstly, who was selected for interview was based on my knowledge of the 
regional governance system and who the central actors were. In addition, the selection 
of respondents match some criterions that I had laid out in advance. I wanted to do face 
to face interviews with everyone that was and had been a participant in the Value 
Creation Alliance. I wanted to interview regional actors originating from as many 
different institutions as possible, and I wanted to cover both of the counties in the Agder 
region. In addition, I also wanted to interview persons that I knew were opinionated 
about the regional governance system or about regional development processes but who 
were not directly involved in such processes themselves, to demonstrate the plurality of 
regional interests. Such individuals where identified through newspapers and the media. 
This has become a supplement to governance participant’s self-assessments of the 
system and important in order to highlight different interpretations of the system. In 
addition to this, I have also done semi-structured interviews with other researchers 
involved in the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region. This approach to 
regional stakeholder identification has provided me with a group of individuals that 
have different roles, institutional placing, centrality, and understanding of what the 
regional development system is and how it functions. The names of those interviewed 
are not disclosed directly in this text, because of the agreement made at the interview, 
see interview guide. Some are however identified because it would be impossible to 
conceal their identify and still preserve the content of the interview. The interviews 
were conducted from 27 February to 18 May 2006, 25 interviews were carried out using 
the interview guide. The interviews averaged about an hour in length, two thirds of the 
interviews lasted between 50 and 70 minutes, two of the interviews were only about half 
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an hour in length, four interviews lasted more than eighty minutes, and one interview 
was done over two sessions (days) and lasted 115 minutes. In total do the interview data 
represent about 26 hours of conversation over the topics in the interview guide 
(enclosed in appendix). Most of the interviews were transcribed, some in full, however 
as an hours interview constitutes about 17-18 pages of text, were some of the interviews 
only partially transcribed in order to save time, and from some interviews are only some 
of the more general views and perspectives used into the final text. However, all of the 
interviews have contributed significantly to my thinking, the presentation of data, and 
the analysis conducted in this thesis. 
All of the respondents work and live in the Agder region. The interviews were 
mainly conducted in the cities Kristiansand and Arendal. All of the current members 
and some of the past members in the Value Creation Alliance were interviewed. The 
interviewees were primarily chosen because they filled a role in the region that was of 
particular interest to the research topic in this thesis. These roles were as follows: 
Current or previous member of the Value Creation Alliance, politician county-level, 
administrator county-level, network consultant/facilitator, company representative 
management-level, company representative employee-level, interest organization 
representative, region-state institution representative, R&D milieus involved in 
networks/partnerships at Agder, network and partnership participants. 
In addition to this were the interviewees chosen as respondents because they filled 
multiple roles in the regional governance-system. This choice was partly done to save 
time and partly to illustrate a typical characteristic of participants in governance 
networks – they tend to hold multiple roles. Except for some of the network consultants 
working full time on network facilitation, all of the governance network participants had 
multiple roles. The table below illustrates this: 
Tab. 4-1: Typology Interviewee Roles 
Typologies: Number: 
Company – Management level 7 
Company - Employee 4 
Interest organisations - The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) 3 
Interest organisations - Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) 2 
Interest organisations - Civil 1 
R&D (works in an institution with academic credentials)  7 
Consultancy  8 
Chapter 4 – Method 
- 169 - 
Typologies: Number: 
County-level politicians 4 
Municipality-level politicians 5 
County-level administrators 3 
Region state administrators (state policy instruments in the region) 5 
Partnership participant 14 
Network involvement 24 
Currently or previously a member of the Value Creation Alliance 11 
Organisational leadership position (public and private) 20 
 
Network and partnership participants most often (always) represent an 
organization into governance networks, they also tend to hold a leadership or another 
trusted positions in these organizations. The consequence of this is that the age of 
governance network participants in most cases is closer to 50 than 25. In addition is the 
gender profile in the governance networks skewed, I cannot give a precise number but if 
should make a qualified guess, based on a rough count of some membership lists from a 
sample of governance institutions at Agder, I would guess in the area of two thirds to 
three quarters male dominance. Ethnic-minority groups are also almost non-existent in 
these governance-networks, even though there are a couple of examples of persons 
participating with a minority background, is the fairest description at a system-level that 
minorities are not included. 
The second important source of data has been different types of document data. 
For instance the rationale of the current regional institutional configuration, official 
strategies, goals, work methods etc. Available publications and other documents such as 
media records were also important sources of information in order to form an analysis 
of the regional system; these sources are described as they are used in the text.  
The third main data type is my own experiences, which is based on direct 
participation and observation of what I would describe as a governance institution the 
Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region which is the AR project underlying this 
thesis work. The research team involved in the Value Creation 2010 project in the 
Agder region continuously produced documentation, notes, meeting memos, reports on 
the activities that they were involved in. This data has supplemented my own notes and 
reflections on the Value Creation 2010 processes, this set of data is accounted for in the 
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next chapter. The three types of data available to this thesis is summarised in the table 
below.  
Tab. 4-2: Available Data 
Data type: Short description: 
Interview data  This is data from a round of systematised interviews with regional stakeholders. Conducted in the spring of 20066. 
Document data 
 This data is publicly available data concerning different partnerships, development 
coalitions, private networks, public networks, public-private networks, etc. 
Particularly data on the networks and partnerships strategy plans, meeting memos, 
action plans, and reports, etc.  
 Government whitepapers and budget dispositions. 
 Media and newspaper articles covering critical events relating to the governance 
system in the region. 
 Research report and other research publications covering relevant features of the 
regional governance system. 
Process data 
 This is mainly data from the development of the Value Creation Alliance where I and 
other researchers have been involved in an action research design in facilitating the 
development of this partnership for a period of five years (2001-2005).  
 
The combination of different methods to analyze one phenomenon is known as 
methodical triangulation. The goal of methodical triangulation is to increase the 
credibility of analysis and results. The idea is if you can approximate the same 
interpretations of praxis based on different methodological approaches maybe you are 
close to an interpretation of praxis that others in essence can support. Another view is 
that different approaches to methods give the opportunity to communicate the same idea 
through using different kinds of stories (Denzin & Lincoln 2000a: 10). This thesis 
applies both methodological and theoretical triangulation. When applied systematically 
together they are intent to make the triangle of error as small as possible (Berg 1995: 
5). 
I therefore disagree with Guba (1990a: 21) if he is right in being interpreted as to 
see methodical and/or theoretical triangulation as an expression of a post positivistic 
research agenda or as an expression of researchers’ belief in the existence of a final 
objective reality, whether it can be uncovered or not. I see methodical and theoretical 
triangulation not as attempts to investigate the objective nature of reality, but as 
important tools in the process of researching and get a firmer grip on the unclear, the 
diffuse, and the complex systems that society and societal processes are. If the goal of 
scientific inquiry is to produce elaborate constructions into societal processes, we as 
researchers also have the responsibility to tell more than our own story. In doing this, 
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we should also do what we can to secure that our writings also include perspectives, 
interpretations, and views that not necessarily corresponds researcher bias, so that we 
can give our readers the opportunity to draw his/her own conclusions based on what we 
have written. I believe that it is in this perspective theoretical and methodological 
triangulation should be interpreted. This thesis’ combination of methodological and 
theoretical triangulation is depicted in the figure below. 
Fig. 4-3: Triangle of Error 
Development 
and 
democracy in 
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governance
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Ideological perspective Interview data 06
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The research scheme presented here is influenced by system theory thinking. 
System theory envisions institutions, organisations, and the people there as open to and 
influenced by their environments. It is assumed that organisations gather input from 
their environments and transform them into output. Environmental forces that affect 
input and output are the perceived value of the organisation’s mission or product 
demand. External political, legal, social, economical, technological, and social forces 
also play their part. The principal idea in system thinking is that organisations and the 
people in them exist not in a vacuum but in an organic world and they have to change 
and adapt to contingencies in their operating domains (Carnevale 2003). 
Systems thinking emerged through a critique of reductionism. Reductionism 
generates knowledge and understanding of phenomena by breaking them down into 
constituent parts and then studying these simple elements in terms of cause and effect. 
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In systems thinking the belief is that the world is systemic, which means that 
phenomena are understood to be an emergent property of an interrelated whole. Robert 
Louis Flood (2001) states that emergence and interrelatedness are the fundamental ideas 
in system thinking. An emergent property of a whole is said to arise where a 
phenomenon cannot be fully comprehended in terms of only properties of constituent 
parts. Therefore by applying the perspective of systems thinking you also argue that 
valid knowledge and meaningful understanding come from building up whole pictures 
of phenomena, not by breaking them into parts (Flood 2001: 133). 
One way of distinguishing soft system thinking (systemic), from systems thinking 
is that the latter takes on an objective stance while the former assumes a subjective 
position. Systems thinking are objective in the sense that there is a belief that there are 
systems in the world that can be identified and improved. In soft systems thinking 
reality is understood as the creative construction of human beings, and social reality as 
the construction of people’s interpretation of their experiences. Thereby also linked to 
interpretative theory (Flood 2001: 137). Flood describes the intellectual framework of 
soft systems thinking in the following way: 
People have intentions that lie behind each action that they perform. Neither observation 
nor theory provides sufficient understanding to be sure of those intentions, that is, what is 
happening. […] Soft systems thinking argues that a specific action concept becomes 
transparent only in the deeper context of a certain set of social rules. It is in these terms an 
actor can be said to be doing some particular thing. Social rules lead to social practice, 
that is, ways in which people live and work together. Lying behind social practice is 
constitutive meaning. Constitutive meaning ‘puts in’ meaning to the social practice, since 
it is the fundamental assumption that underlies what is done and what makes it 
meaningful. An ‘authentic’ understanding of people’s actions may be constructed this 
way (Flood 2001: 137-8). 
Systemic thinking makes us painstakingly aware of (knowing) all the things we do 
not know and is a mode of thinking that keeps people in touch with the wholeness of 
our existence. It recognises the futility and hostility of traditional forms of practice 
based on prediction and control, prominent of today’s social organisational 
arrangements. Futile because any social dynamic will always remain beyond control, 
and hostile because it attacks people’s spiritual well-being by isolating us and treating 
us as separate objects, rather than appreciating patterns of relationship that joins us all 
together in one dynamic (Flood 2001: 143). 
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Studying other institutions and their responses to environmental demands does 
therefore not only tell us something about the institutions themselves but also about the 
characteristics of the system they operate within, and thereby gives us a tool to interpret 
why and how change processes occur and consequently what actions are possible to 
take within the framework of that system. 
4.5 – Can We Trust Research?  
How can we as researchers then be sure that we have an authentic picture of what we 
are looking at, how can we know that what we present as our research results have 
firmer warrants than that of common sense, and what is the legitimacy of the research 
that has been executed? Holding a constructivist position is not the same as saying that 
every interpretation of social events can have an equal status. It is however also an 
obvious fact that some accounts of practice are better than others. See for instance the 
discussion by Davydd Greenwood (2002) for a critical discussion of the “scientific 
standards” of research into the social, where he puts forward legitimate criticisms of 
what he sees as troublesome aspects of some AR research practices. Thus, we should as 
researchers into the social, not hope to get it completely right, but we should seek to not 
get it completely wrong either as Miles and Huberman humorously note in a remark 
(1994: 277). So, how can we ensure that our qualitative research efforts are more than 
common sense, and that what we present in the end represents reasonable and 
meaningful constructs and simplifications of local practices? 
In applying a constructivist perspective it has been suggested that terms such as 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability replace the usual positivist 
criteria of internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity (Denzin & Lincoln 
2000b). So, how can confirmability, dependability, credibility, generalisability, and 
action orientation be addressed, without applying logical falsification schemes? Miles 
and Huberman (1994: 278-80) list a set of strategies, that in the following is commented 
on in relation to this work.  
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Confirmability 
The central question concerning objectivity/confirmability is whether “the conclusions 
depend on the subjects and conditions of the inquiry, rather than on the inquirer” (Guba 
& Lincoln 1981)7.  
Given the nature of an AR project it is impossible to retain objectivity through 
letting peers redo analysis and/or experiments. I have chosen to address this as a 
confirmability issue through a relatively detailed depiction of the research process and 
my own thinking processes in relationship to this. Another event is that “audit trails” 
and detailed documentation of almost every event that has taken place in the project 
Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region can be found. These records are open 
and can be accessed by anyone who is interested. Through preserving chronological 
flow of events, I have tried to make data as transparent as possible and thus opening 
data up for alternative interpretations than those I present and argue for, this is 
particularly the case for my description of the case of the Value Creation Alliance in the 
next chapter 5.  
Every text ever produced represents in essence synthesised thinking, reduction of 
data, and the writer’s bias, and this is also the case with this text. What I can say is that 
it is my honest interpretation of the events, structures, and relations that exist and work 
in the context I have studied. I have not deliberatively left out anything I thought might 
inform this analysis. There are and will always exist data and information I do not have, 
data and information that potentially could have changed my interpretations. I am open 
to such views. That being said, I feel comfortable with my perspectives and views as 
they are articulated through this thesis. To compensate for my own bias I have tried to 
give honest and thick representations of alternative interpretations in order to present 
other voices than those I happen to agree with. In addition, I believe I present enough 
data so that the readers can make their own conclusion just by reading this text. The first 
research question concerning the conflict is an example of this (chapter 7). Here I 
present many different interpretations that all have some merit to them, in the sense that 
I have heard them articulated by individuals involved in the events at some stage. This 
should be read as an attempt to address confirmability issues, when competing 
assumptions are discussed and argued for.  
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Dependability 
The central question concerning reliability/dependability is not if the “thermometer is 
working properly”, but if research has been done with reasonable care. Whether 
research and methods are dependable are the essential questions here (Miles & 
Huberman 1994: 278).  
One way of assessing the question of dependability is whether findings show 
meaningful parallelism. That is to say if other studies of other similar contexts have 
come to similar conclusions as you have. In chapter 3, I point some to such studies. 
Another feature of dependability is if the research questions, basic paradigms, and 
theoretical constructs etc. are meaningfully applied to the concrete practice in question. 
In other words is there a reasonable link between theory and practice in the final text. I 
will let others be the judge of this.  
However, one of the most important factors I have benefited from in order to 
secure dependability is that I through the period of working with the Value Creation 
2010 project and the Ph.D. have been part of a critical peer community. This group of 
researchers and consultants knew the context, have read parts of what I have written. I 
have benefited from writing and publishing together with this group, and it has been 
supportive and provided corrections and guidance when I have gotten astray. This is not 
the same as saying that we always agreed, but it has provided me with a continuous 
possibility for quality check of my own theoretical constructs and interpretations of 
practice.  
Credibility 
The central question concerning internal validity/credibility is truth value, do the 
findings make any sense, is the output credible to the readers and those involved (Miles 
& Huberman 1994: 278). As previously discussed, this thesis work does not apply to 
stringent post-positivistic language of validity, if we ask whether a result of a research 
project is valid or not, we are in reality really asking if it is true or not. The central 
questions then remain true for whom and when and in what sense. Using internal 
validity as a measurement of instrumental correspondence between our research 
instruments, our findings, and the “real world” is in this sense not a viable strategy. 
Because this type of validity requires that the researcher is able to logically falsify 
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competing hypothesizes, something that only is possible if there exists a finalized 
answer to such questions, in other words the presence of an objective ontology.  
I therefore seek clarity without applying to stringent positivistic/post-positivistic 
falsification, and I use the term assumption instead of the more familiar term 
hypothesizes. To Karl Popper a basic demand to science was that a researcher rejects a 
theory when it is demonstrated empirical evidence that are in defiance of the terms in 
the theory. Popper, concerned with the problem of demarcation, the idea of finding a 
criterion to distinguish scientific from non-scientific theories, proposed that a scientific 
theory must be falsifiable, in the sense that the theory must be incompatible with certain 
possible results of observation. Genuine scientific theories must therefore make risky 
predictions that might turn out to be false (Popper 1963)8. Using the terminology of 
hypothesis testing is strongly connected to Popperian falsification. The idea that 
experiences of social phenomena can be falsified in a stringent manner is problematic in 
social science, maybe an ideal to some, but a difficult/impossible ideal to follow in 
practice. By using the terminology of assumptions and credibility, I offer less stringency 
but more realism in the sense that I discuss to what degree empirical data offers support 
to my assumptions. 
One of the central methodological steps taken in this thesis in order to address 
credibility issues is to open analysis up to alternative interpretations of data and through 
having an eclectic theoretical approach. Methodological and theoretical triangulation 
efforts are central in this. I do not use theoretical triangulation as a mean to test the 
theories to find out which best fits data (Lincoln & Guba 1985: 307), but as a mean for 
filling in the blanks. I therefore provide explanations, theoretical and/or empirical in 
data analysis when triangulation efforts produce diverging results in order to address 
just credibility issues. I also provide explanations for when, why, and how my 
interpretations are divergent from informants and I provide the readers with ample 
examples of this and why it is so. I also seek to be clear on what I can say something 
about and what I cannot say something about given the nature of the data available to 
this thesis. Credibility is also in the same way as confirmability issues addressed by 
relatively thick case descriptions. 
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Generalisability 
The central question concerning external validity/generalisability is whether the 
conclusions of a study have any larger import, are they transferable to other contexts, 
how far can they be generalized (Miles & Huberman 1994: 279)? Internal validity, in a 
post-positivistic sense, is about approximating a final truth of propositions, inferences, 
and conclusions. External validity is in a post-positivistic sense to approximate such 
truths into other contexts than those of the original context, meaning that internal 
validity are juxtaposed into different contexts. An example of such views on external 
validity is discussed in chapter 3 in relationship to the generalization claims, diffusion, 
and marketing of Michael Porter’s cluster theory, and Richard Florida’s creative class 
theory.  
My position on generalization of social research is not congruent with such views. 
However, it is more compatible with views on generalization as those expressed by 
Noblit and Hare (1988)9. They write that the generalization process should be viewed 
more like a translating, refuting, or synthesizing process of two or more studies of 
similar phenomena. Generalization is in this sense careful interpretation, not just 
“adding up”. 
Such a view on generalization is also discussed by Greenwood and Levin (1998) 
in relationship to AR. It is only natural that most social scientists want the results of 
their research and reflections to be accessible to a wider audience, and thereby make an 
impact in other places than in the concrete context in which the research took place. 
Toulmin and Gustavsen (1996) mention critique of AR as social research that often 
builds on it being contextually bound and that one therefore should not generalise on 
basis of the research results. The discoveries and reflections made are only valid among 
those where the study was conducted. Generalisation is therefore not recommended or 
possible.  
In this sense, AR becomes a collection of more or less interesting stories from 
different local contexts that “the others” does not really have to pay any attention to. AR 
research projects, as well as other social research projects take place in unique contexts. 
Context, actions, words, and thoughts within this context meld the interplay between 
researcher, actions, and reflections that lead to new insights of the essence of AR. Kurt 
Lewin, originator of the AR concept, argued strongly that it was just through the context 
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bound case that one could understand the dynamics of social interaction. In other words, 
rather than through stylised sampling or controlled cases we should give as good a 
recapitulation as possible of “the nature” of the concrete case (A. W. Martin 2000). 
Greenwood and Levin (1998) use the following example to illustrate this point. 
Max Weber worked in his book ‘The City’ after principles that have parallels to this 
way of thinking in AR. Weber’s method was to develop ideal models of e.g. 
bureaucracy, charisma, legitimacy, authority, religion, urbanisation and so on. On basis 
of his historical cases, he abstracted a list of trans-contextual characteristics. Thereafter 
he used these characteristics to develop explanatory strategies that he then tested against 
different contexts.  
”He [Weber] gathered all the evidence he could from all over the world about the 
phenomenon of cities. On the basis of this broad reading, he developed a synthesis of the 
traits he found in each major example of cities in different places. He then took this list of 
traits and arrayed the traits together until he had a list of all the major features that he 
could find in the cities of the world. The total list of major traits made up the basis of his 
ideal type of city. This was only the beginning however. Armed with this list, Weber 
returned to each world area, to each context, to examine what traits were present or absent 
in each situation. When he found particular complexes of traits present or absent in a 
location, he re-examined the history of that place to explain the presence or the absence. 
Gradually, he developed what he calls a “casual interpretation of history” that helped him 
to understand why particular features were present or absent in particular situations, built 
over the backdrop of a general knowledge of the phenomenon of urbanization” 
(Greenwood & Levin 1998: 84). 
Greenwood and Levin (1998) therefore state that knowledge developed in one 
context can be transferred and be valid in other contexts and situations. In AR, one does 
not generalise on basis of abstraction with a consequent loss of history and context. 
Meaning and knowledge developed in one context must be studied with reference to its 
credibility in another context, through a conscious reflection of dissimilarities related to 
contextual and historical factors. Only through a historical and contextual analysis can 
or should one apply knowledge generated in one context to another. Therefore it is the 
context bound construction of meaning that determines the relevance, at the same time 
as being the process that gives us opportunity to speak and communicate our results to a 
wider audience.  
In order to address generalisation issues is it therefore important that writers 
provide descriptions that are thick and detailed enough for context unaware readers to 
relate. Certain findings should also be made into more generic statements and 
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assumptions than other interested parties can integrate in their own analysis and check 
for complementariness. 
Action Orientation 
The central question concerning utilization/action orientation is what the study does for 
participants, both researcher and “researched”, and for its “consumers” (Miles & 
Huberman 1994). In AR this is explicit since intervention is an integral and central 
aspect of research.  
To produce knowledge that is actionable is an ideal I affiliate with. If the 
knowledge that is produced through for instance a Ph.D. thesis work is actionable, it 
also is a qualitative check on the other issues previously discussed such as 
confirmability, dependability, and credibility. The action orientation of the Value 
Creation 2010 project is relatively straight forward, we, the research group, initiated 
together with local participants a long range of projects spanning several years. The 
build-up of the Value Creation Alliance is described in more detail in the next chapter, 
and two other Ph.D. thesis works from the Agder region address parallel action oriented 
issues (Fosse 2007; Karlsen 2007). What is the issue here is if and in what way or form 
conclusions and recommendations from this thesis work are relevant for future actions 
in the context of this study. The aim of such relevance is implicit in the mere topic of 
this thesis, namely that there are problematic issues that relate to both democracy and 
development that is interpreted as results of newly formed governance and regime 
institutions. I also point to and argue how regions through readdressing certain issues 
relating to democracy can improve their development aims. Such learning aims are 
however not “tested in practice” in this thesis work and will for the time being remain 
an ambition and challenge for future research. 
Causality 
The last issue I seek to discuss in relation to what extent we can trust research, relates to 
causality in qualitative studies. Miles and Huberman suggest that qualitative studies can 
be powerful in assessing causality because it can be observed as it plays out in a 
particular setting (Miles & Huberman 1994: 10). They also indicate that qualitative 
studies should look for an individual, a social process, a mechanism, a structure that is 
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at the core of the events that can be captured to provide a causal description of the 
forces at work (Miles & Huberman 1994: 4).  
This is a view I share, as the centre thesis of this work is that individual 
instrumentality, new institutional configurations, and the presence of a dominant 
ideologically based discourse have changed important aspects connected to both 
democratic practices and ideas and in what form the social system, that a region is, 
produces development results. The notion of capturing a description of this causality is 
therefore important here. This is however not a type of causality that is projected onto 
the future, something that is the same as saying that history always will repeat itself. But 
an attempt at capturing a description of causality in events that already have taken 
place. Thus I do not apply to the notion of causality in a deterministic form (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985: 129). Causality is as I see it a necessary component of social research 
because it is the cornerstone in providing explanations for the phenomena and events 
that we observe and/or take part in through the research process, and if research is not 
about providing explanations what is it then in favour of? The idea of causality is then 
about the status we ascribe to these explanations, are they absolute or are they relative to 
the context, researcher, time, resources, and abilities of the researcher and the research 
project. As I do not ascribe to a deterministic notion of causality, I simply embrace 
something that to most is common sense. If we for instance were to mount an 
organisational reform in the fifth approximate similar organisation unit, we would be 
right in assuming that there were some kind of causality, that similar processes as in the 
first four units would take place. However, the point is that since this is a dynamic 
social system we could not and cannot know this in a deterministic sense. We have to 
try it out in practice in order to know for sure. Lincoln and Guba thus suggest replacing 
such deterministic notions of causality with the concept of mutual shaping, as a way of 
capturing the complex processes of everything influencing everything, in the here and 
now.  
Many elements are implicated in any given action, and each element interacts with all of 
the others in ways that change them all while simultaneously resulting in something that 
we, as outside observers, label as outcomes or effects. But the interaction has no 
directionality, no need to produce that particular outcome (indeed, the outcome my be 
totally unpredictable morphogenetic change); it simply “happened” as a product of the 
interaction—the mutual shaping (Lincoln & Guba 1985: 151). 
Chapter 4 – Method 
- 181 - 
Such critique of the deterministic concept of causality is aimed at the use of the 
concept on events that has yet to take place. From our daily lives we know that 
qualitative methods have a superior status to quantitative methods, among non-
scientists, in assessing causality and providing explanations for events that have taken 
place. For instance, if you were to sit on a jury bench and was given the task of deciding 
on the question of guilt in a particular case. What would provide the more convincing 
explanation of causality? An argument based on a reliable, valid, and significant result 
from a statistical profiling procedure (deduction), or an argument based on statement 
from one or more reasonable trustworthy persons that were observers to the events in 
question? As the formalised court procedures of reasonable doubt in most countries 
would have it, it is only the latter that would even be considered evidence in any fair 
judicial system. That is not the case in the social sciences today and that is a fact. 
4.6 – Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the basic structure and ideas in this thesis regarding my 
basic views of research, and the research process of data collection and analysis. This 
provides us, together with the theoretical framework introduced in chapter 3, with the 
tools necessary to analyse the data which relatively descriptively are outlined in the 
following two chapters.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss the AR project that underlies this thesis work, 
and that also is the basis for addressing the first operational research question in this 
thesis. This AR project is the work that I as member of a research team have been 
involved in. This was to develop a regional development coalition known as the Value 
Creation Alliance. This institution rapidly became central and interweaved in the still 
relatively young regional governance system in the Agder region. The development of 
this project went through several phases, and these phases are chronologically presented 
in the following chapter. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 Referred in Berg (1995: 5). 
2 Assuming the research is conducted according to methodically sound principles, transparency, 
ethical, relates to the scientific community etc.  
3 Quotation stems the abstract in the submitted version of the paper; this abstract was removed 
by Academy of Management when the paper was distributed on the AOM 2004 best paper CD-
ROM. 
4 National follow-up program to Value Creation 2010. 
5 The methods of this thesis are predominantly qualitative in nature. There is however a 
quantitative method that is developed especially to study networks. This method is known as 
Social Network Analysis. Social Network Analysis was developed in the 1960’s a quantitative 
method to study social relations. Social Network Analysis combined with software such as 
UCINET provides the user with graphical representations which shows how close network 
actors are connected, how central they are, which cluster that are created, and how open or 
closed the network are. Social Network Analysis is very useful if we want to say something 
about the structure of a governance network at a macro level (Freeman, White, & Romney 
1992; Wasserman & Faust 1994; Degenne & Forsé 1999; Monge & Contractor 2003). I had 
early on planned to use Social Network Analysis in order to provide this thesis with such 
structural analysis. Constraints on time did however make this a task to be done another time. 
However, as I read up on the literature on Social Network Analysis I came to firmly believe that 
Social Network Analysis is and will be an important supplement to other methods if we are 
occupied with research on regional governance and regimes. I will therefore recommend that 
methodological approach to others that might be interested in these topics. 
6 The interviews was conducted in Norwegian, and afterwards transcribed into English. 
Translating spoken Norwegian into a text in English is not straightforward, but I have tried in a 
best possible manner to stay as close as possible to the original content/meaning both I (the 
interviewer) had when asking and the interviewee had when responding to the questions. I have 
in some instances edited the way questions was asked and answered for clarity, this in order to 
communicate the content of what was said in a more precise manner. An example of clarity 
editing is when I ask the same question two or three times, but in different ways before I let the 
interviewee answer. In the translation only one version of the question is included. Another 
example is when the interviewee gives a mixed-up and/or muddy answer, in some instances are 
these answers shortened and clarified. All of these changes are done for clarity and I do not 
believe that this type of editing have changed the content of what was said in any significant 
way. 
7 Referred in Miles and Huberman (1994: 278). 
8 Referred in Argyris, Putnam, and Smith (1985: 15). 
9 Referred in Miles and Huberman (1994: 279). 
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Chapter 5 – Regional Development Coalition  
The data presentation in this thesis is divided between two separate chapters. This 
chapter presents in some detail the start-up of the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder, 
where the emphasis is on the developing role of the Value Creation Alliance. The next 
data presentation chapter focuses on the development of the regional governance system 
in the Agder region. The idea behind presenting data in this way is that it can provide 
the opportunity to discuss governance, regimes, and democracy in regional development 
from two angles. From a process level, where the actor’s interpretation and execution of 
roles, and how these add up in collective action, serve as main explanatory variables for 
understanding process outcomes. Secondly, the system level factors that also are 
important in order to understand regional development processes are emphasised. The 
same phenomena, democracy and development, can then later be discussed and 
analysed through both a close up and personal perspective, where action events are 
interpreted through the eyes of the researcher1. Second, a more distant approach, where 
democracy in regional development processes is interpreted through what essentially is 
an systemic perspective on the region as an development system.  
5.1 – Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the first five years of the Value Creation 2010 project and the 
Value Creation Alliance in the Agder region; the emphasis is however placed on the 
first three years. I start with a presentation of the background for the Value Creation 
2010 project in the Agder region. Then I discuss the linkages to the Enterprise 
Development 2000 programme and how the involved participants interpreted the 
transition from Enterprise Development 2000 to the Value Creation 2010 programme in 
the Agder region. I then outline how the project unfolded in the Agder region; in 
practice this is done through a reconstruction of the Value Creation 2010 project into 
sequences of distinct phases, marked by significant events in the project. This means 
that the case story is chronologically organized and the aim is to give a descriptive 
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overview of what development themes were emphasised in different phases of the 
project.  
5.2 – From Enterprise Development 2000 to Value Creation 2010 
The Enterprise Development 2000 programme at Agder had a difficult start. In 
December 1994 the first application for the new national research programme was 
submitted by Agder Research to the Norwegian Research Council. This application 
suggested a focus on organisational learning, a topic that was meant illuminated through 
a series of projects that has some action research features, as it where put in the 
application. The Enterprise Development 2000 programme at Agder would use two 
existing networks, Kompetansering sør and IT-ringen agder2 to diffuse the results from 
the 10-15 enterprises where the main activities were to take place (Jenssen 1994).  
In February 1995, it became clear that this application was rejected by the 
Norwegian Research Council. Only four R&D-milieus had gotten full support from the 
Norwegian Research Council, these were Tromsø, Nordvestforum, Rogalandsforskning 
and AFI. Harald Furre, who had been the project leader of the processes of writing the 
Enterprise Development 2000 application, then initiates a process where he starts to 
mobilise many actors in the region and elsewhere in order to change this outcome. This 
mobilisation process had three main components, a) influence the central actors in the 
Norwegian Research Council as much as possible, b) increase mobilisation of regional 
stakeholders behind the project, and c) team up with IFIM (SINTEF) in Trondheim who 
did not get support in the first round either (Furre 1995). When I later discussed these 
events with Harald Furre, he responded in the following way when he was asked to give 
a brief overview on how the Enterprise Development 2000 project came to Agder: 
It is a long story; Enterprise Development 2000 was the fun part of it. I was responsible in 
Agder Research, together with several others, for producing an application to the 
Enterprise Development 2000 programme. We are back in 1994; it was an information 
meeting in NHO3 where Paul Flaa from Agder University College was with me. We saw 
that we had to team up with the college, we made an application, Jan Inge Jensen and 
some others wrote much of this. We got letters of intent from the businesses in 
Kompetansering sør, and we sent in a very solid application to the Enterprise 
Development 2000 secretariat. We got a refusal in the first round. This also happened to 
SINTEF that traditionally had a punch card into this research community with Bjørn 
Gustavsen and others. Then we experienced a very strange process, where SINTEF got 
the opportunity to improve on their application a couple of times, and we did not. In spite 
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of this, SINTEF did not get any funding. There was only room for a limited amount of 
modules in the Enterprise Development 2000 programme, and the Enterprise 
Development 2000 secretariat tried to “force marry” us with the SINTEF module. A lot of 
communication went through different channels in this time; it ended with us being 
fooled and placed on the sideline of that game. SINTEF eventually got their own module 
and we were left out. I experienced this very strongly, we were left out because we were a 
small regional milieu and they looked at us with much scepticism because of that. The big 
milieus should of course get in no matter what. Then a year or year and a half passed, we 
started to work via NHO and LO4, in order to get in anyway. We wrote a revised 
application, and got into the Enterprise Development 2000 programme, this was a big 
victory. We got Harald Knudsen to be project leader, and we made a team around that. At 
this point, I withdrew from the Enterprise Development 2000 work, when everything was 
in place. I experienced that the Enterprise Development 2000 project here at Agder 
functioned reasonably well. It was a programme with a relatively clear focus, it was 
organisational development in enterprises, based on broad participation, collaboration 
between the social partners, and it was a relatively clear agenda and goals. After a while, 
we got several good cases, that where brilliant references for quite a while, for instance 
Tinfos Titan in Odda. By no means did this approach function everywhere. However, it 
did work some places and gave very good results.  
It was not until Agder Research got support from the social partners that the 
Enterprise Development 2000 project came to Agder. Without influencing the board’s 
members and the Enterprise Development 2000 secretariat indirectly via the social 
partners at Agder – the Enterprise Development 2000 project would probably never 
have set foot in the Agder region. This was an important lesson for both Agder Research 
and for the social partners in the Agder region. They had now learned how the 
“research” system works. The Value Creation 2010 project was therefore, when it was 
launched, viewed as an opportunity for a “rematch” at Agder. Harald Furre explained 
this in the following way: 
In Norway, when programmes end we must think of something new. After a period of 3-
4-5 years with Enterprise Development 2000, the topic of regional development was 
becoming hot, and very popular nationally. I understood that the Enterprise Development 
2000 “gang”, with Bjørn Gustavsen at the centre, wanted to position Value Creation 2010 
as the regional development programme. They therefore took the Enterprise Development 
2000 tradition and put a regional development dimension into it. It was Bjørn Gustavsen 
and Torgeir Reeve that wrote the new programme for Value Creation 2010. Torgeir 
Reeve was the cluster expert here, even though he never had had anything to do with 
broad participation and the social partners before. Then I though that this was very 
exiting, I thought that this new profile fitted Agder Research very well. […] When we 
saw that the new programme Value Creation 2010 came, we saw the need for making a 
regional constellation. We took initiative to gather the social partners here, a meeting 
where also Aetat5, the counties, and some more actors participated. We did this to create a 
regional alliance, the Value Creation Alliance. It was this Alliance, in collaboration with 
Agder Research that made the application for the Value Creation 2010 programme. We 
then got that funding.  
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The Value Creation 2010 project fitted Agder Research’s profile well, the 
organisation at the time mainly consisted of a group of enterprise consultants (that had 
worked on Enterprise Development 2000), and a group of geographers and political 
scientists that were working with issues relating to regional and organisational 
development. Agder Research also benefited from a good working relationship with the 
social partners because of the regional experiences with the Enterprise Development 
2000 project. Therefore, when the new regional level was added to the Enterprise 
Development 2000 platform through Value Creation 2010 it fitted Agder Research’s 
professional profile very well. Financially, the Value Creation 2010 project was also 
looking very promising for Agder Research, this project could mark a transition in the 
institution’s history, and the possibilities for Ph.D.s and academic publications also 
loomed in the background – the stage was in reality set for the commencement of the 
“perfect” Agder Research project. 
Value Creation 2010 A Regionally Based Action Research Project 
Value Creation 2010 – Enterprise development through broad participation was 
nationally a collaborative project between the Norwegian Research Council (NFR), The 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), The Confederation of Norwegian 
Business and Industry (NHO) and The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development 
Fund (SND)6. The Value Creation 2010 programme was a direct continuation of the 
Enterprise Development 2000 programme; it took over directly were Enterprise 
Development 2000 had left off. Enterprise Development 2000 was as Value Creation 
2010 divided into regional modules, were different research milieus are responsible for 
the activities in the programme. Therefore many of the same “cases” from Enterprise 
Development 2000 continued into Value Creation 2010, and it is almost the exact same 
group of people that is involved in Value Creation 2010 that were involved in Enterprise 
Development 2000. Value Creation 2010 was “officially” launched on 1 July 2001. One 
of the main architects behind the programme, Bjørn Gustavsen, describes Value 
Creation 2010 in this way:  
Much of the same networks and patterns are carried on [as in Enterprise Development 
2000] but more emphasis is to be placed on the forming of regional umbrellas - 
development coalitions - over local development efforts in the form of what in Europe is 
generally called (regional) partnerships. Whereas the number of enterprise networks 
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participating in ED 2000 was somewhere between 10 and 15 (depending on definition) 
more than 50 such networks are in contact with the new programme (Gustavsen 2002: 2).  
The main differences, as Gustavsen describes, between the two programmes are 
the introduction of the “regional umbrella” and much more networks and a much 
stronger emphasis on the network level than in Enterprise Development 2000. The 
enterprise development efforts in Value Creation 2010 were planned to continue more 
or less along the same lines as in Enterprise Development 2000. The two programmes, 
Enterprise Development 2000 and Value Creation 2010, shared a common funding 
structure, normative and theoretical basis. The main difference then became a 
significant widening of the scope, from only focusing on enterprise development and 
some networks, to a focus on enterprise development, more networks and in addition 
regional development. 
The core of the Value Creation 2010 programme and Enterprise Development 
2000 was recognition of the significance of employees’ broad participation for learning, 
development, and innovation in enterprises. The programme supported development 
projects that were done in co-operation between researchers, private corporations, and 
other partners. 
The Regional Development Coalition 
The first thing that happened at Agder when the process of initiating the transition from 
the Enterprise Development 2000 programme to the Value Creation 2010 programme, 
was that the need to set up a regional structure or partnership of some sort to match the 
new focus in Value Creation 2010 on the regional level became evident. In our writing 
on Value Creation 2010, we describe this new structure as a regional development 
coalition. Regional development coalition was a concept that should differentiate from 
the partnership concept, and signify it as something else than a strictly administrative or 
political entity, but as a broad arena for learning and reflexivity, a reflexive arena for the 
development of regional development strategies. 
The concept of regional development coalition is the Value Creation 2010 link 
back to industrial democracy; it is the factor that was thought to bring industrial 
democracy out into the region. Regional development coalitions were meant to be 
forums for democratic dialogue, arenas that would facilitate change processes, learning 
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and knowledge transfer. Regional development coalitions have dialogue as 
conversations and discussions between equal partners, a dialogue characterised by 
openness, willingness to listen and willingness to accept good arguments, and to learn 
from each other. Richard Ennals and Bjørn Gustavsen argued their views on the strength 
of development coalitions like this in their 1999 book - Work organization and Europe 
as a development coalition: 
This is because only through dialogue will it be possible for all participants to really 
learn, because dialogue is the only kind of communication that allows for learning 
through linking one’s own experiences with those of others, and in such a way that no 
initial preference is given to any of the experiences as being more valuable or more 
superior than the others (Ennals & Gustavsen 1999: 81). 
It is worth noticing the requirement set by Ennals and Gustavsen to the 
development coalition, “that no initial preference is given to any of the experiences as 
being more valuable”, this is the crux of the regional development coalition, and 
without it, the concept of regional development coalition becomes just another network 
institution or partnership. Our initial ambition in the project was the high standard of the 
regional development coalition, and we the researchers, acted as if that also was the 
reality. 
The initial partners in the Value Creation Alliance were representatives from the 
two county authorities in Agder, the regional offices of The Norwegian Confederation 
of Trade Unions (LO), The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO), 
the regional offices of the Public Employment Agency (Aetat), Innovation Norway 
(then SND), Agder University College, the county mayors in Aust- and Vest-Agder, the 
regional office of the National Office For Social Insurance (Trygdeetaten), and The 
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS)7. Harald Furre who then 
was director of Agder Research was central in setting up the Alliance; he explains the 
process in the following way:  
I took the initiative to the first meeting in the Value Creation Alliance, where we brought 
the partners together; I also led these meetings the first couple of times. 
Question: So it was you as director of Agder Research who took the initiative to organize 
the Value Creation Alliance? 
Yes. I remember it that way, this is probably documented somewhere. I led it; it would be 
strange if someone else had taken this initiative. I experienced the start of the Value 
Creation 2010 project at Agder as a déjà vu compared to the start up of the Enterprise 
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Development 2000 project. This time around it was Agder and Agder Research that was 
“in the club” and the others that tried to come in. Those who were in the new programme 
were the same modules that had been part of Enterprise Development 2000. Other 
applicants where on the outside trying to come in, just like us in the beginning of the 
Enterprise Development 2000 programme. Some of these entered after a while. I smiled 
to my self by this I shall admit that. 
Question: Because Agder Research then was in “the club”? 
Yes then we were on the inside, and we got relatively much funding from the Norwegian 
Research Council also. Now it was much enthusiasm for Value Creation 2010, for the 
application, for our thinking etc., both nationally and regionally.  
The annual budget for the project came from a 50/50 split between the national 
programme and the regional stakeholders. The Value Creation 2010 Agder project had 
an annual budget of about NOK 5 million, and was run by a team of seven 
researchers/consultants (the core team). This provision of funds implied that the project 
had to adhere to strategies defined by both the national programme and the regional 
partners. The national board of the programme had accepted a research manager for the 
project. The regional partners in the Value Creation Alliance accepted the same person.  
5.3 – The Enthusiastic Start-up 
The following phase descriptions are divided in two halves, first I describe the activities 
on a project level, and then I describe the same period again, but from the perspective of 
the Value Creation Alliance. The timeframe of the following is April 2000 to September 
2001. 
The Projects 
The original application that was written from Agder is a story in its own; it is a 211 
page document covering a wide array of subjects (H. C. G. Johnsen & Normann 2001c). 
The literally “weighty” application did however serve its main purposes. It “kick 
started” the research team’s thinking on how to facilitate the link between regional 
development and the work that had been done in Enterprise Development 2000, and it 
got funded by the Norwegian Research Council. At the time, we also thought that it 
would serve as a framework and reference point for the development and dialogue 
between the partners in the Value Creation Alliance. The application was sent to the 
Norwegian Research Council in mid April 2001, and on 23 May 2001 Agder Research 
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was given notice that it got NOK 2.4 million to the Value Creation 2010 project at 
Agder. The application consisted of a three layered activity plan, activities on a regional 
level, on a network level, and on the enterprise level.  
The first thing that happened in the Value Creation 2010 project was that Agder 
Research did what it does best, it commenced a series of mapping projects. In the year 
following the initial grant there was initiated a value creation analysis, an innovation 
analysis, a policy instrument analysis, and a labour market analysis. In addition to this, 
activities were initiated during the summer of 2001 on regional development projects in 
the Lister region, in Mandal, and in Setesdalen. On the network level activities relating 
to travel and tourism, maritime industries, composite industries, marine industries and a 
network relating to balanced scorecard (through Kompetansering sør) were commenced. 
Resources were also given to the consultants in the team so that they could recruit at 
least ten enterprises into the project. All of this was done before the summer holidays 
started in 2001.  
In August 2001, we stopped to catch our breath, there were some need to clear up 
how the resources in the Value Creation 2010 programme could be used. Could they be 
used to subsidise consultancy work in enterprises or could they only be used to facilitate 
network activities between enterprises in networks? Agder Research contacted the 
Norwegian Research Council on the issue, and at a meeting with the Norwegian 
Research Council on 8 August 2001, it was made clear that there were no formal 
problems with using Value Creation 2010 resources on development projects in 
concrete enterprise development projects. 
During the summer of 2001 the list of active projects under the Value Creation 
2010 umbrella had grown considerably. We were now operating with four categories of 
projects under the Value Creation 2010 umbrella at Agder. The newest category was the 
“province projects”, projects of a more strategic nature like the collaboration with the 
university college, something that we called triangle projects (we didn’t use the triple-
helix concept yet), and the work to get a knowledge park to Gimlemoen. In addition 
were the mapping projects placed here, and the work to establish a Value Creation 2010 
web portal for Agder. There were now initiated twelve activities/projects on the 
“regional level”, nine activities/projects on the network level, and 14 enterprises had 
signed letters of intent with Value Creation 2010, in addition was another ten enterprises 
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on the “backburner”. Things were now looking very good and absolutely everybody 
was very satisfied with the very promising start of the Value Creation 2010 project at 
Agder.  
The Value Creation Alliance 
The central actors were invited to hold their first official meeting about a year before the 
Norwegian Research Council funded the project8. The first meeting was held on 26 
April 2000, the regional stakeholders from LO and NHO were present in addition to 
national representatives from LO and NHO. In addition to the obligatory introductions 
and presentations it was also discussed what Value Creation 2010 should be and who 
should be invited to participate in the Value Creation Alliance. The memo from the 
meeting shows that Harald Furre from Agder Research argued that 40 000 new jobs had 
to be created in the region within 2020, that the traditional industry was the core of this 
and that we had to expect a significant growth within the service sector and the “internet 
economy”. He also argued that it is the tripartite collaboration between public 
authorities, the R&D sector and the industry that will be the basis for innovations. The 
LO representative at the meeting said that the project would not be similar in every 
region, that each region had to find its own unique form that fitted that region.  
The major output of the meeting is the implied go ahead from the central LO 
representative and that it is suggested to design it as a triple-helix project. Where 
LO/NHO represent the industry, Innovation Norway, the counties and the public sector 
Agder University College and Agder Research represent academia. 
The Value Creation Alliance is then formally established at a meeting in Lillesand 
30 June 2000, where 3 people from NHO, 3 from Agder Research, 2 from LO, 1 from 
each of the counties and 1 from Agder University College participate. The point of the 
meeting is to formalise a steering group for the coming Value Creation 2010 project. It 
is also agreed to finance the application process and to expand the Value Creation 
Alliance with more institutions, Aetat is for instance invited to the next meeting 8 
September 2000. At this meeting, everyone reports that they have formally cleared that 
they will and can participate in the Value Creation Alliance. It is decided that the Value 
Creation Alliance shall develop a new body, the working committee. This group consists 
of three people: the leader of the Value Creation Alliance Tine Sundtoft from NHO, the 
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second leader Elisabeth Haaversen from LO and Kirsten Borge from Aust-Agder 
County. 
The working committee is then, on 2 October 2000, the formal sender of a grant 
application to the HF-B secretariat9 for NOK 300 000, to initiate the Value Creation 
2010 project at Agder. This application is later granted by HF-B. This money is used by 
Agder Research to finance their 211-page application for the Value Creation 2010 
project. 
The next meeting in the Value Creation Alliance is held on 6 November 2000. At 
this meeting, the partners confirm their financial commitment to the project. All of the 
partners agree to contribute equally to the project, NOK 150 000 each, in total NOK 600 
000, in addition to this HF-B has granted 350 000 instead of NOK 300 000 as applied 
for. The Value Creation 2010 project at Agder now has NOK 950 000 at its disposal. 
The project leader is also asked to adjust a strategy memo for the Value Creation 
Alliance that has been circulating, called “Agder ahead”. In this meeting the roles 
between the different bodies in the project are also discussed. The following terms and 
principles are then worked out in the meeting:  
1) The Value Creation Alliance will be responsible for a large body of projects and a 
large budget. 
2) The Value Creation Alliance cannot follow in detail every project and must therefore 
relate to the responsible project leader. 
3) The Value Creation Alliance approves the project leader based on Agder Research’s 
suggestion 
4) The Value Creation Alliance appoints a working committee consisting of three 
persons, which together with the project leader makes decisions between Value Creation 
Alliance meetings within the framework worked out by the Value Creation Alliance.  
5) The project leader discusses and works out budgets, work plans and accounts in 
collaboration with the working committee and presents them to the Value Creation 
Alliance. 
6) Every issue presented for the board shall in advance be treated by the project leader 
who shall provide a recommendation. 
7) The project leader is responsible for follow-up of active projects. 
8) The project leader presents the issues to the Value Creation Alliance. 
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9) The project leader shall collaborate with the working committee when setting the 
agenda and call new for meetings.  
The next meeting in the Value Creation Alliance is held 8 December 2000. Eleven 
issues are on the agenda; a new logo for the Value Creation 2010 is discussed as part of 
the marketing strategy of Value Creation 2010. The “Agder ahead” memo is asked to be 
revised once again. Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen the project leader who has written the 
memo has introduced some new concepts: “The new economy” and “knowledge based 
industrial development”, he is asked to write what this actually means in the later 
revision. They discuss if the county administrators10 should be invited into the Value 
Creation Alliance, and the participants agree that he should. A series of dialogue 
conferences throughout the Agder region is also planned as part of the application 
process for the national Value Creation 2010 programme. 
In January 2001 the county administrators is invited to participate in the Value 
Creation Alliance. The next meeting in the Value Creation Alliance is held 5 February 
2001, 17 people are invited to this meeting. The big issue is the new application for the 
Value Creation 2010 programme. An application was sent in September 2000 but it was 
not financed. The Value Creation 2010 programme was not ready yet; and the national 
budgets are not as big as expected. Everyone has to write a second application. Tor 
Claussen from Rogalandsforskning participates to talk about Rogaland’s strategy. A 
joint application from Rogaland and Agder is discussed, but rejected. They agree to 
collaborate on a joint project instead. Alternative ways of financing the ambitious plans 
are then discussed, and words of caution are raised by Harald Knudsen from Agder 
University College on the ambitious level of activities that are on the table. The Value 
Creation Alliance change their open invitation to the county administrators now they 
can only participate if they also contribute financially. It is discussed if the Value 
Creation Alliance should engage themselves in the military’s downsizing plans in the 
region. They agree to wait and see what happens. 
A new meeting in the Value Creation Alliance is held on 23 February 2001. The 
county mayors are welcomed into the partnership. The partners agree upon a web 
strategy, and promise to participate on a conference to recruit enterprises to the project 
on 3 April 2001. Value Creation Alliance members argue that Agder Research should 
get as much media coverage as possible on the project; it will make it easier to recruit 
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new enterprises. A draft of the application is discussed, the langue and concepts used in 
the application are the big issue. The project leader explains that this type of language is 
what the Norwegian Research Council expects. Other related applications are discussed, 
alongside more collaboration with other regions, nothing concrete is decided. The 
“Agder ahead” memo is now included in the application draft, it outlines four sub-
regions in Agder, East, Lister (in the vest), Agdercity (the centre) and Inner Agder. Each 
of the sub-regions has a distinct industrial structure that is accompanied by particular 
challenges. This is not one size fits all development. Value Creation Alliance members 
stress that the application must include activities in all of the regions and on all of the 
three levels (enterprises, network and sub-regional). 
On 4 April 2001 a new meeting in the Value Creation Alliance is held, 17 people 
are invited, 13 participates. The enterprise recruitment conference held the previous day 
is reported as a big success. Everybody that were present agreed that it was a hit, 
everything went as planned. It is also reported that NHO Aust-Agder and NHO Vest-
Agder will merge into NHO Agder, Tine Sundtoft who is the leader of the Value 
Creation Alliance is the new regional director of NHO Agder. The participants who 
have been present on the annual meeting in Agderrådet report that Agderrådet needs 
more to work with. It is argued that Value Creation 2010 could be an important subject 
on Agderrådet’s agenda. The big issue on the meeting is however the application; it is 
now just a couple of weeks away from completion. The Value Creation Alliance 
members have read the draft document and have many supportive and engaged 
comments, for instance (the full list is over two pages): 
The language is too difficult; those who write on it should find a better balance between 
accessible language and scientific credibility. The webpage should be used to compensate 
for this flaw. Agder’s important role in the national economy must be more emphasised, 
we must be clear on what Agder is particularly good at. We must also focus more on the 
international aspects. We must not create a division between research and development; 
this must be integrated on all levels of Value Creation 2010. The enterprise focus must be 
made clearer. The concept of a region must be better defined it is very important to the 
Norwegian Research Council. 
The final version of the application that was sent to the Norwegian Research 
Council was therefore both read and commented on by the members of the Value 
Creation Alliance. The application outlines that Value Creation 2010 Agder’s approach 
to development is grounded in broad participation and democratic dialogue. It stresses 
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the importance of developing knowledge that is relevant for the region, we show in the 
application that different sub- regions in Agder have different challenges, that if 
development is to succeed we must apply knowledge and expertise that is relevant for 
those particular places. We write that a one-size fits-all approach to development would 
not work. We argue that the work that shall be done is a collaborative effort between the 
partners in the project. It thoroughly explains and discusses the implications of the 
Scandinavian work-life tradition, and it introduces the concept of learning regions to 
the Value Creation Alliance members. Different methodological approaches are 
presented and discussed, special attention is given to dialogue conferences, and the 
working methods that were used in the Enterprise Development 2000 project. 
Ambitious goals are outlined in the application; it is no less than to increase the total 
welfare level in the region, and to address the challenges of those with poorest living 
conditions (H. C. G. Johnsen & Normann 2001c). 
On the next meeting in the Value Creation Alliance 31 May 2001, LO Vest-Agder 
represented by Per Kristian Finstad has taken over the leadership in Value Creation 
Alliance, Tine Sundtoft is out on maternity leave. The Value Creation Alliance is 
formally informed of the grant from the Norwegian Research Council, it is a bit smaller 
than what we applied for but everyone is relatively satisfied anyway. It is also agreed to 
do some regional conferences in addition to the planned activities, 50 000 are granted to 
a report on equal opportunities on Agder. Some of the partners ask were the media 
profiling of the project is. It is agreed that since nothing has been done in relation to the 
media yet, it can just as well wait until after the official opening of the project in 
September 2001. 
A new Value Creation Alliance meeting is held on 2 July 2001. In this meeting is 
the regional Value Creation 2010 opening conference planned, it is agreed to do it on 14 
September 2001. Some interesting discussions take place at the end of the meeting. It is 
argued that the Value Creation Alliance must be marketed more vividly as the owner of 
the project; it is now a danger that the project is considered an Agder Research project. 
The profiling strategy is discussed again, – it is argued that we must make sure that we 
are different from Sydspissen. It is also argued that Value Creation 2010 must 
collaborate more closely with Sydspissen. Sydspissen is going to arrange a meeting 
between all of the industrial development parks at Agder. Value Creation 2010 must be 
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present there. Value Creation 2010 should also support the development of an industrial 
development park in Risør. The project leader promises to follow up on the matter. He 
also reports that the consultants in Agder Research that has started to approach the 
enterprises experience it as very complicated to “sell” Value Creation 2010 to the 
enterprises. He says that Value Creation 2010 is a large and complex project and that, 
the enterprises have problems with seeing how Value Creation 2010, on a concrete 
level, can be of any use to them. He suggests starting with identifying the concrete 
needs of the enterprises, and use this information later on to find out more about how 
the Value Creation 2010 project should act.  
Afterwards some of the expectations to the project are discussed, it is said that it is 
so early that no concrete results are possible to show yet, on the other hand, not much 
money has been spent either. It is now that the project really begins. The Value Creation 
Alliance is a unique possibility to do something; it is our responsibility to create 
enthusiasm and progress in the project. We should lift our colours high, be proud of 
Value Creation 2010. Together we can contribute to processes that really create changes 
on Agder. The Value Creation Alliance members argue that it is important that we 
externally stand as one behind the project. At the same time is it important that we 
internally have open discussions, where both positive and negative aspects of the project 
are discussed. The most important thing is that we learn on the way, and take with us 
the things in which we succeed. 
5.4 – Full Exposure  
The following phase descriptions are as the previous divided in two halves, where I first 
describe the activities on a project level, and then I describe the same period again, but 
then from the perspective of the Value Creation Alliance. The described timeframe is 
September 2001 to February 2002. 
The Projects 
14 September 2001 was the date of the official launch of the Value Creation 2010 
project at Agder. 135 people participated from all of over the region in what was a two-
part event, first a conference held at Agder University College, later a party in tents 
outside Agder Research. Almost everybody working at Agder Research were mobilised 
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to do something. The conference it self was documented in a report that was written 
after the event (H. C. G. Johnsen & Normann 2001a). Thirteen people spoke at the 
conference: 
Per Kristian Finstad, from LO, the current leader of Value Creation Alliance, 
spoke of the importance of creating a common engagement for common goals. Trygve 
Reinertsen, chairman in Agder Research and director in his own software firm, argued 
in his speech the necessity of triple-helix structures in order to stimulate innovation. 
Kenneth Andresen, from Agder Research, presented data showing that Agder was 
behind the national average of people with higher education. However, more 
importantly he showed quantitative data that showed that there were significant 
differences within sub-regions at Agder on specific key indicators. Tore Westermoen, 
county mayor in Vest-Agder spoke of the new role of the counties, and how the climate 
for collaboration had improved in the latter years; though initiatives such as Agderrådet, 
Sydspissen, broadband, natural gas, the work to transform Agder University College 
into a University, CDFSN, the 100 year celebration of Sørlandet, and now Value 
Creation 2010. Ann Kristin Olsen, county administrators in Vest-Agder, used statistics 
and showed the unused potential that the low female participation in public and private 
work-life at Agder represents, and that Agder has the lowest degree of female work life 
participation in the country. Magne Dåstøl, then an R&D director at Elkem, and 
chairman of CDFSN, used examples from Elkem Materials to argue the importance of a 
knowledge in development. He to argued the importance of females in work-life and 
introduced CDFSN to the audience. He also said that the collaboration between Elkem 
and Agder University College was an experiment. The problem is, he said, is lack of 
customer orientation, for Agder University College, but also that things had gotten 
better. The most viable strategy, he said, is to invest in certain milieus at Agder 
University College. Erling Hellum, then director of SND Agder (now IN Agder), 
showed statistical data indicating that Norway was among those countries scoring 
lowest on R&D activities and that the Agder region was among the lowest in Norway. 
Tor Jan Tønnesen, director in a small software company presented their network Elinor. 
Trond Gunnar Sollund, production manager at Tinfos Titan & Iron, who had been one 
of Agder’s ”success stories” during the Enterprise Development 2000 project, presented 
their experiences with development projects based on broad participation. Terje Næss, 
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employee representative at Falconbridge (a large smelter plant in Kristiansand), argued 
the importance of mutual respect between the social partners in order to successfully 
mobilise the knowledge that the employees and the employee organisations represents. 
Pål Gundersen, from LO and HF-B, argued the importance of developing arenas that 
stimulates individual growth and learning and collaboration. Dagfinn Malnes, from 
NHO, argued the importance of Value Creation 2010 also working with small and 
medium sized enterprises. Hans Chr.. Garmann Johnsen, project leader Value Creation 
2010 Agder, argued the important role Value Creation 2010 could have for Value 
Creation at Agder. The conference ended with Ernst Håkon Jahr, rector at Agder 
University College, presented data showing that the regions in Norway with the highest 
degrees of projects financed by the Norwegian Research Council were those that 
already had a University. 
The last PowerPoint slide presented on the conference was a clipping from the 
regional newspaper, Fædrelandsvennen, showing a big picture of the Value Creation 
2010 research team at Agder Research, the heading was: 100 million to increased value 
creation at Agder. After that, the garden party outside the premises of Agder Research 
began. 
Afterwards the event was labelled a success by the research team at a project 
meeting. The projects that are planned at the different levels are now in its starting 
phase, some of the firsts meetings are already held, and others are just about to have 
their first contact with “practice”. There are now 52 different projects on the agenda of 
the project-team. The activities are distributed on the four the sub-regions, and over the 
four “levels” in the project matrix, and even more new project ideas are being discussed. 
Kai Sødal, one of the consultants that had worked on the Enterprise Development 2000 
project, suggests following up on the presentation held by Terje Næss on the opening 
conference. He suggests that we should initiate a network between employee 
representatives and managers in the region. We could probably get some extra financing 
from HF-B to do this he writes in an internal memo. This initiative from Kai Sødal is 
the start of what later is to be known as the HF-B project at Agder Research. 
In the end of October, Hans Chr., invites the Value Creation 2010 project team 
and many others from Agder Research together with members of the Value Creation 
Alliance to his Ph.D. dissertation proceedings in Copenhagen. 
Chapter 5 – Regional Development Coalition 
- 199 - 
The unintended effect of the media exposure now starts to manifest. The project 
leader is starting to receive applications for projects financing of different projects in the 
region. For instance, an industrial growth park in Mandal sends a grant application for 
50 000 on e-mail 10 October 2001, the day before the Value Creation 2010 project has 
been presented at Umoe factory in Mandal. He also get calls from other people 
investigating how much they can apply for; this matter has to be discussed in the Value 
Creation Alliance. 
This is a high intensity work period for the project team. A lot of initiatives, 
activities, meetings, and projects are initiated and carried out. The new Value Creation 
2010 web page is up and running, the Value Creation 2010 project leader posts his 
reflections on the progress in the project here. Articles about Value Creation 2010 in 
local magazines are sent and published, interviews are given. Everyone involved are 
working extremely intensively to realise the ambitious project. The project team at 
Agder Research is really putting their heart and soul into it. 
Only half of the Value Creation 2010 project team (the core-team) was involved 
in the Enterprise Development 2000 project, the rest are “newcomers”. Hans Chr. 
Garmann Johnsen initiates a series of lectures to upgrade the knowledge base in the 
core-team. In November and December 2001 a series of lectures are initiated; the 
following group of people is invited to Agder Research: 
Lars Peder Norbakken tells us about marketing, Bjørg AAse Sørensen, from AFI, 
tells us about conflicts in work-life, Morten Levin, from NTNU, introduces Action 
Research, to many of us this is the first time we are properly introduced to the subject. 
Tor Claussen, from Rogalandsforskning, talks about Norwegian work-life traditions. 
We end the series of lectures with some internal presentations of our own competencies 
and interests. Jan Magne Larssen, an Agder Research consultant, talks about how John 
Kotter has influenced his thinking. Per Anders Havnes, Hans Kjetil Lysgård, and Hans 
Chr. Garmann Johnsen, all researchers working in Agder Research, explain their 
different takes on the concept of innovation. 
Now most of the first project contacts have been done and follow-ups are being 
planned. We begin to discuss Value Creation 2010 and how we can adapt “Value 
Creation 2010” methodology in the municipalities. Jan Inge Jensen, an associate 
professor from Agder University College working part time at Agder Research, writes a 
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memo about it. By now almost half of every project that Agder Research is involved in 
one way or another linked to Value Creation 2010. 
We make a new version of the original 211 page application, a shorter one that 
only has 70 pages is again distributed to the members of the Value Creation Alliance 
(H. C. G. Johnsen & Normann 2001b). We also start to prepare for a new application 
round; this new application is only for the second half of 2002, and it has to be finished 
by February.  
The Value Creation Alliance 
On October 16 2001, a new meeting in the Value Creation Alliance is held and 14 
people participate. They discuss a long list of topics at the meeting. The Value Creation 
Alliance begins with complements of a very successful opening conference at Agder 
University College. Both the social and professional aspects of the event went very 
well. Agder Research is represented by two people, in addition to the Agder Research 
director present as partner in the Value Creation Alliance and the project leader. Agder 
Research reports that both municipalities and enterprises have made contact after the 
conference; we show the press clips surrounding the event to the Value Creation 
Alliance participants. 
The Value Creation Alliance is asked to finance the project leader’s dinner after 
his thesis defence in Copenhagen, and the Value Creation Alliance member’s 
participation on the event. There is disagreement on the extent and number of people 
that should participate among the members of the Value Creation Alliance, – we could 
risk negative press if it is exposed in the media that a large delegation goes to 
Copenhagen. On the other hand, this Ph.D. is good marketing for the Value Creation 
2010 project. They agree that two people from the Value Creation Alliance can go and 
that the Value Creation Alliance can finance the Ph.D. dinner. 
The Value Creation Alliance discuss some of the network projects, and agree to 
allocate additional funding to a composite network, – to make sure that enterprises from 
both counties are represented. 
It is discussed if Value Creation 2010 Agder shall be included in a common 
industrial development plan for both of the Agder counties. It is argued that it is a very 
good idea but that the political climate is not ready yet. They agree to intensify the 
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marketing of Value Creation 2010 project that expands the county borders, and through 
that contribute to a closer collaboration between the two counties. 
It is also suggested that Agderrådet should be a member of the Value Creation 
Alliance. It is decided that this is not necessary because Agderrådet is already well 
represented through LO, NHO and the counties, it would also be unfortunate to get 
political participation in the Value Creation Alliance. 
Most of the participants in the Value Creation Alliance are also members of a 
network called “Gassforum Agder”, an initiative that is put in place to lobby for a gas 
pipeline into the Agder shore. They agree that Value Creation 2010 shall be present at 
an upcoming conference on the subject. They argue that Value Creation 2010 also in 
this important area can function as an institution that thinks on behalf of the region. 
They agree that Value Creation 2010 systematically shall work and support efforts to 
get a gas-pipeline to Agder. They also agree to support the shop-steward/management 
network, suggested by Kai Sødal. They agree to apply to HF-B for additional funding. 
On 12 December 2001it is a new meeting in the Value Creation Alliance. Eleven 
new project activities are introduced to the Value Creation Alliance at this meeting. 
Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen, has finished his Ph.D. dissertation and says that he is now 
ready to start working full time on the Value Creation 2010 project! The atmosphere at 
this meeting is a bit sour; most of the partners have gotten significant cutbacks in the 
state budget. SND must layoff 100 people nationally in 2002. The counties free 
resources (those that they use on projects such as Value Creation 2010) have also been 
cut significantly. 
It is argued that Value Creation 2010 must be smarter; the SND representative 
says that it is not any point in Value Creation 2010 involving themselves with the 
composite industries; SND has worked with them for years, we should not tramp on 
each other’s toes. 
A debate about the profile of Value Creation 2010 starts as a result of the plans of 
getting Value Creation 2010 involved in municipalities that struggles, and has applied 
for special funds from the government. Three municipalities have applied for such aid: 
Kvinesdal, Mandal and Vennesla, and they all want support from Value Creation 2010. 
The director in Agder Research says he fears that the regional focus in Value Creation 
2010 is becoming to strong, we must focus more on enterprise development, and at the 
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same time have a clearer focus on the regional development projects. The project leader 
argues that we must take the regional development thinking in Value Creation 2010 
seriously, remember that enterprises and municipalities live in a “symbiosis” and are not 
independent of each other, he says. 
The county mayor argues that Value Creation 2010 must focus more on the 
municipalities; –we must get the municipalities engaged in Value Creation 2010 he 
argues. The Aetat representative backs this up, – the municipalities use a lot of energy 
on internal fighting, and it would be a significant contribution to value creation in the 
region if Value Creation 2010 could contribute to reduce these. 
The Value Creation Alliance agrees that Value Creation 2010 Agder shall not give 
grants to external applicants; Value Creation 2010 is a receiver of grants, not a giver, 
those that applies better redirect their inquiries directly to SND or the counties. 
However, the industrial parks that have applied for grants such as Mandal and Risør 
must be collaborated with in other ways. They decide to plan a conference in 2002 on 
the role the industrial growth parks has in the innovation system. They also decide that 
the Value Creation Alliance leadership position shall rotate between LO and NHO 
annually. The Value Creation Alliance decides to reject to participate on a regional 
conference on living conditions and health related issues on Agder, applied for by the 
county doctor11. It is on the outside of their mandate they reply. They reply positively to 
the inquiry from Kvinesdal municipality. Similar response is given to an initiative 
stemming from Evje and Hornes municipality, where is it woodwork industry needs 
some help. 
On 11 February 2002, it is time for a new meeting in the Value Creation Alliance. 
The labour market is showing worrying tendencies Aetat reports, Elkem might be facing 
lay-offs, LO reports, SND Agder must reduce 26 man-labour years. It is suggested that 
SIVA and Knutepunkt Sørlandet shall be invited into the Value Creation Alliance. On 
the other hand, it will be unjust to let some municipalities participate in the Value 
Creation Alliance while others cannot? Will it weaken the legitimacy of the Value 
Creation Alliance if they get to participate? They decide to discuss this further on the 
next meeting. Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen has been on a project leader meeting in the 
Norwegian Research Council and reports that Value Creation 2010 Agder is doing well 
in fulfilling the indicators set up by the Norwegian Research Council. All of the goals 
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that are set for 2002 are already met (in February 2002); only the enterprise’s internal 
projects are lagging somewhat behind. The project leader argues that we must continue 
to work with a clearer sense of what the Value Creation 2010 project shall work with 
and what to not work with. He suggest a pragmatic approach to the fact that the coming 
budgets are not as high as expected, let us drag it out in time rather than to cut anything 
out now, he says. The county representative argues that it must be a stronger focus on 
the small and medium sized enterprises. NHO argues that Value Creation 2010 must be 
more involved in the development of the industrial parks at Agder. They agree to 
postpone the discussion; the next meeting shall be dedicated to these strategic questions. 
5.5 – A Sneaking Sense of Realism 
The following phase descriptions are as the previous ones divided in two halves, where 
I first describe the activities on a project level, and then I describe the same period 
again, but from the perspective of the Value Creation Alliance. The described timeframe 
is February 2002 to December 2002. 
The Projects 
A new application has to be written and submitted by 15 February 2002, this time it 
only applies for six months, from June 2002 to December 2002. This is the fourth Value 
Creation 2010 application we write in under 1-1/2 years12. This time is it only 18 pages 
long, the Norwegian Research Council has asked us just to write an action plan and give 
a status report, – not write a new book. We do this and add on a self-evaluation on our 
own initiative. We apply for NOK 1.58 million. The Value Creation Alliance, the 
project leader and the project team have gotten much positive feedback both nationally 
and regionally, and we do not hold back anything in this renewed application. We write 
in the introduction, “Our experiences from the first 6 months with Value Creation 2010 
at Agder show that the ambitions that were outlined in the original application rather 
were too low than too high”.  
We outline 5 “regional” activities, Vennesla where the first dialog conference was 
arranged, Mandal/Lindesnes, where one meeting was held, Setesdal, where we linked 
ourselves to an existing institution, the Setesdal regional council, and Risør, where we 
have not done anything yet, and some activity in Kvinesdal is indicated. We outline 
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eight “networks”, as in a planning phase or commenced. A network of enterprises 
connected to “e-trade”, a network of composite enterprises, a network of aluminium 
producing enterprises, a network for maritime industries, a network for enterprises 
connected to “travel & tourism”, a network for the “woodworking industries”, and a 
network of enterprises connected to the production of “Windmills”. 
For all of the activities in the project we operated with a Demming inspired 7-
phase categorisation of where in the development process we were. And of the 14 
enterprises was 8 still in phase 1, meaning at a letter of intent phase, 6 of the enterprises 
were in phase 2, meaning that work had begun to design a development process. We 
also list the status of all of the mapping projects that had been initiated, in addition, we 
list 11 articles that were planned, and we write about some of the research topics that we 
wanted to work with. We have not worked much with our research agenda yet; there has 
not been time. When we start to work on that application, it is in fact among the first 
times that the topic is properly discussed. We are therefore very careful in what we 
write; we do not want to commit ourselves to anything. Instead of writing this is the 
research agenda of Value Creation 2010, we write suggested research topics. The 
research questions are primarily linked to measuring the effects of the work that is being 
done. None of them were ever followed up on, and none of the 11 articles indicated 
were ever written. 
Just after we sent the application we got message that three of the enterprises that 
were on the list had said that they were not interested. An enterprise that was part of 
Enterprise Development 2000 also withdrew from the project. However, on the positive 
side we also got word that two new enterprises were interested in participating and that 
the in- depth processes at two of the enterprises went well. 
Parallel to the developments in the Value Creation 2010 project Agder Research 
was struggling financially, everybody in the organisation “knew” something was wrong, 
but publicly and internally, the management at Agder Research admitted to nothing. The 
big problem for Value Creation 2010 was that the proper project steering tools were 
insufficient or nonexistent. The problem was that we did not exactly know how much 
money was used and how much was left. Every funding that Agder Research received 
was at the time put into a central account, after that, it was almost anybody’s guess what 
happened. In the Value Creation 2010 project, we were walking blind. We tried to 
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compensate by restructuring the project internally, it was now divided into 25 
subprojects, where everybody involved became responsible for their own sub-project, 
while the project leader should oversee, the activities and help out were he could. In 
addition to this had a conflict between the Value Creation 2010 project leader and the 
Agder Research director started to develop, a conflict that related to the responsibilities 
associated with the financial situation at Agder Research. 
At the same time the Value Creation Alliance’s partners do what they can in order 
to promote the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region. The counties include 
Value Creation 2010 in its county plans, the partners presented Value Creation 2010 in 
almost every forum, and network at Agder. 
In the summer of 2002, the list of enterprises that are still are listed as active in the 
project has shrunk to five, but a new network activity is up and running. It is the 
network of knowledge and industry parks at Agder. The frenetic tempo from the initial 
phase of the project is starting to slow down, we see that some of the activities we have 
initiated are not worth it, we do not think it is interesting, they are not interested etc, we 
also se a lot of potential in some activities, things that we really think are worth the 
effort. 
However, the big problem is not outside in the Agder region, it is inside at Agder 
Research, the work-climate is souring enormously. People start to threaten to quit, 
almost everybody seems to be searching for job alternatives, among them are the 
consultants experienced from Enterprise Development 2000, and now responsible for 
working with enterprises in Value Creation 2010, by the end of 2002 they all quit, 
during 2002 alone, 8 of some 30 people quit or are let from their jobs in Agder 
Research. We seem to be in need of some Value Creation 2010 “medicine” ourselves. 
In September, Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen and I start to write our fifth Value 
Creation 2010 application. This time we apply for three years, from January 2003 to 
December 2005. At this point we have realised that it is no way we are going to able to 
deliver on the expectations that has been built around the project, not only is Agder 
Research about to burst into flames, we also got less money than we applied for from 
the Norwegian Research Council. In this application, we start out in a more moderate 
tone than in the previous by saying that:  
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We have taken the intentions outlined by the national Value Creation 2010 programme 
seriously and literately, our ambition with Value Creation 2010 at Agder is no less than to 
contribute to building a learning region at Agder, together with the partners in the Value 
Creation Alliance and the enterprises. […] In 2002, we have maintained the width in the 
project activities, but it has been necessary to slow down the progress in the different sub-
projects to compensate for the decrease in funding from the Norwegian Research Council.  
We do not mention any problems in the application, we emphasise action 
research, the interaction between research and practice and the goal of creating a 
learning region in the application. The tone in the application is, in spite of the ongoing 
events, slightly optimistic, something that must be attributed more to the project leader’s 
inherent positivism and energetic working style than to the current situation. We do 
however both believe that we can work our way out the problems we are facing and 
continue to progress to face the challenges in the Value Creation 2010 project. We just 
need some time to get our feet back on the ground. We apply for NOK 9 million 
distributed over three years. 
In an internal work meeting at Agder Research, on 18 November 2002, Hans Chr. 
Garmann Johnsen reports that the Value Creation Alliance working committee has 
responded positively to the restructuring of the project that was indicated in the 2003-
2005 application. The Value Creation 2010 activities are still structured around a three 
level model, but we differentiate between the different network types in the project. For 
instance, those that are between enterprises and those that are within a municipality, for 
instance Vennesla, see also (Fosse 2007). Now eight enterprise networks are active in 
the Value Creation 2010 project, and it is ongoing development projects in four 
enterprises, another eight activities are planned but not commenced. Because of the 
consultants quitting Agder Research, there is no possibility to follow up on these until 
the organisation is re-staffed. It is in principle now only one enterprise consultant left in 
the Value Creation 2010 core team in addition to the project leader. The idea is that the 
renewed HF-B application, worth NOK 1.5 million over three years shall give the 
financial basis to hire consultants/researchers suitable to follow up on the enterprise 
development projects that lies dormant in the Value Creation 2010 project. Given the 
financial situation of the project there is no possibility to do any more work externally 
than we already do, and still has not a single research article connected to the Value 
Creation 2010 project even been started on. 
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At an internal project meeting on 2 December 2002, the one enterprise consultant 
that is left in the project, reports that the one enterprise he is working with is going well 
and that the enterprise want to renew their contract for the next year, much needed and 
happy news for the Value Creation 2010 team. 
The Value Creation 2010 project leader has been at a meeting with the Value 
Creation 2010 programme secretariat were he met with Sverre Sogge and Bjørn 
Gustavsen. He reports from this meeting that the regional partnership thinking in Value 
Creation 2010 now is more relevant than ever because of change in the underlying 
financial structure of the national Value Creation 2010 project; the ministry responsible 
for regional and municipal affairs are becoming an even more dominant sponsor of the 
national Value Creation 2010 programme. Work towards the public sector is therefore 
more relevant than ever for the Value Creation 2010 project. As usual the national 
Value Creation 2010 programme secretariat does not give any advice on how to 
organise or to work in the regional project.  
However, they said that Agder represents a model of what they want Value 
Creation 2010 to be also in other regions. Given these steering signals, we all feel 
confident, that the current orientation of the Value Creation 2010 project matches the 
national expectations and our local abilities well. This because the development and 
progress of the regional network projects that we are going to prioritise are progressing 
satisfactory. In addition, the enterprise development components are going to be 
significantly strengthened through the HF-B project funding. Things are now starting to 
look much more promising. What remains to be worked out is the internal steering 
structure in the project, the role of the working committee in relation to the full bodied 
Value Creation Alliance, and the relationship between these segments in relationship to 
Agder Research and the project leader and the core team. In addition we must clarify the 
role the Value Creation Alliance shall play in the region, for instance in relation to 
Sydspissen, Agderrådet, and the counties. Also given the increased weight partnership 
has got in recent policy documents, as regional leaders of regional development efforts, 
we must also address and clarify the role of the social partners as leaders of this work. 
Such topics have been on the agenda in the Value Creation Alliance, and the researchers 
participating in the Value Creation Alliance have increasingly been aware of the 
importance of addressing such role clarification issues. 
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This is also what we identify as important questions to address, both from a 
research perspective and from a practical development perspective. Without these 
clarifications, we believe that the project is going to run into conflict and face a 
standstill, and we feel confident that the Value Creation Alliance and the working 
committee also will see it in this way. In retrospect, I would argue that this point in time 
is the first example of the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder producing an actual 
action research “research question”.  
The Value Creation Alliance 
The Value Creation Alliance had decided that it was time to discuss some issues of a 
more strategic nature. In a meeting in the Value Creation Alliance working committee 
12 March 2002, they prepare the issue. The big problem is the need to coordinate the 
activities in the regional “innovation system”. What is Value Creation 2010’s 
relationship to Agderrådet, is it a need for a joint strategy etc. It is also discussed 
whether KS and SIVA shall be invited into the Value Creation Alliance. They agree to 
put it forward for discussion on the next Value Creation Alliance meeting. They also 
decide that NOK 100 000 shall be allocated to Risør industrial park. 
On the Value Creation Alliance meeting 11 April 2002, 14 people participate. 
They start with reporting on what is new since the last meeting, LO believes that it will 
be a conflict in the coming wage negotiations, NHO says that Agderrådet has decided 
that Agder shall escape the bottom of the equal opportunities statistics. SND must cut 
20% of their costs, and Vest-Agder County says that they still wait for signals regarding 
the municipalities that have applied for restructuring funds, Vennesla, Mandal, and 
Kvinesdal. The county administrator clarifies; his office cannot support any project 
unless the idea comes from a municipality. Supporting projects generated by the Value 
Creation Alliance is not an option given county administrators role. 
Value Creation 2010 Agder had been presented at the local Rotary club, to the 
education and research minister (Kristin Clemet), and at the opening of Risør industrial 
park. The project leader explains that the projects are on three levels, that the progress 
in the different projects varies, and that it is planned a Ph.D. programme in relation to 
Value Creation 2010. The leadership of the Value Creation Alliance also changes from 
LO and back to NHO represented by Tine Sundtoft. The juridical responsibilities of the 
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Value Creation Alliance are discussed, it is agreed that Agder Research is responsible. 
The discussion in the working committee meeting about the role of the Value Creation 
Alliance in the regional innovation system at Agder is not pursued in the meeting, 
instead a study of the topic from Agder Research is commissioned. The Value Creation 
Alliance agrees to invite KS and Trygdeetaten (social security institution) into the 
partnership as new members. Some are critical towards this, – we risk being looked at 
as a welfare alliance, we must mobilise private enterprises more. They also decide that 
the Value Creation Alliance shall not meet as often, four times a year is enough. In these 
meetings it is important that the managers and leaders of the respective partner 
organisations meet. The Value Creation Alliance meetings shall in the future only be 
concerned with strategic questions. To compensate for this the working committee shall 
be expanded and start to meet once a month. 
The following series of meetings in the working committee is mostly of an 
administrative nature, conferences and study trips are planned, the project progress is 
reported on etc. 
On 8 August 2002, it is time for a new meeting in the Value Creation Alliance. It 
is a short meeting 1-hour; it is a collision with another arrangement. Hans Chr. Garmann 
Johnsen reports that SND nationally is bailing out on the Value Creation 2010 
programme financially. One of the ministries is also reducing their budgets. It is some 
uncertainty of what consequences this will have for the work at Agder. Tine Sundtoft 
has been in contact with the HF-B secretariat and they have verbally confirmed that the 
regional aspect of Value Creation 2010 still is necessary. Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen 
runs through the project lists, the networks are well on their way now. None of the 
municipalities that had applied for restructuring funds at Agder got any funding. An 
inquiry from Kvinesdal is reported on from the LO representative, Hans Chr. Garmann 
Johnsen responds that the meeting with Kvinesdal is rescheduled to 15 August. 
Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen has been in the Østersund region (Sweden) and 
prepared a study trip for the Value Creation Alliance. The developments in Blekinge 
and Karlskrona shall serve as a learning arena for the members of the Value Creation 
Alliance. Everyone wants to go, but it is only room for 30. 
Per Kristian Finstad, from LO, reports on the consequences a new CO2 tax will 
have on Agder’s work-life. At least 10 000 jobs can be lost within the heavy industry. 
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Agder has a lot of jobs in this sector can be hit hard, he argues. Tinfos Jernverk, a 
smelter in Kvinesdal, wants to do a “ripple effect” analysis. What are the consequences 
for the community if they have to close down because of the CO2-tax? Harald Furre, the 
director of Agder Research, offers to do an analysis. The Value Creation Alliance 
members offer to pay, and agree that Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen shall develop a 
project proposal. 
On 5 September 2002, is a new meeting is held in the Value Creation Alliance. 13 
people participate. Most of the meeting is spent on information exchange of what the 
different institutions present currently are concerned with. The CO2 issue is also 
discussed, Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen has expanded on the initial “ripple effect” 
analysis, now we also want to find out how the affected industries can restructure in 
order to meet the new taxation regime. It is unclear who shall pay and how much it will 
cost. They agree to return to the issue. 
3-6 October 2002, the Value Creation Alliance and 30 other regional stakeholders 
go on a study trip to Blekinge and Karlskrona (a municipality in Blekinge). The trip is 
carefully arranged and planned by Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen and Håkon Øgaard from 
Agder Research. The Blekinge region has lost a significant amount of jobs within 
“traditional industries”, a parallel experience to Agder. In Karlskrona they learn about 
something called “Telecom City”, a network of information technology firms. They are 
also introduced to Tage Dolk, a Swedish “cluster architect”, he tells about the 
collaboration between public authorities, the market, and the university as the major 
success factor in the region, combined with a strong focus on economic growth, 
collaboration and the willpower to succeed. They also learn about the instrumental role 
that the science park, adjacent to University in Lund has played for the successes they 
are experiencing. 
The trip is reported to be a success by everyone involved, and later it is said that 
this was the first time many of the stakeholders from Agder ever heard of the triple-
helix concept13, and how the triple-helix thinking is linked to the cluster thinking and 
how instrumental successful triple-helix processes are for economic growth in the 
“knowledge economy”. 
Back on a meeting in the working committee 23 October 2002, it is business as 
usual, it is reported that Value Creation 2010 Agder got NOK 400 000 from HF-B in 
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2002. However, in order to get new funding in 2003, we must write a new application 
and present Value Creation 2010 Agder on a conference on 17 December 2002. Hans 
Chr. Garmann Johnsen takes on the responsibility of writing the application and 
preparing a presentation that Sundtoft and Finstad can use at the event. Hans Chr. 
Garmann Johnsen and the core team have, based on the initial strategy discussion in the 
Value Creation Alliance, started to write a report on the institutional mapping of Agder. 
It is time for a new Value Creation Alliance meeting on 14 November 2002. The 
project leader, who had given out group assignments to the participants on the Blekinge 
trip, get responses from the Value Creation Alliance about their thoughts. They are 
going to be included in the strategy memo and the Value Creation 2010 team is then 
asked to write it on behalf on the Value Creation Alliance. Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen 
is asked by parts of the Value Creation Alliance to talk to Jon P. Knudsen (then working 
as a researcher at Nordergio) and Erling Valvik (the Cultiva director). The Value 
Creation Alliance then discusses the role of the Value Creation Alliance, the 
expectations the Norwegian Research Council has to Agder. 
The CO2 tax is also discussed. SINTEF is working on a national report on the 
subject, – we cannot wait for this they say, the report has to be finished by January. 
They discuss a lobbying strategy against the Agder Bench at the Storting. Hans Chr. 
Garmann Johnsen asks the Value Creation Alliance to put another 100 000 on the table 
for Agder Research to work on the report. The LO representative says that such a report 
could be critical for work-life at Agder. We need documentation we can present to the 
politicians he says, this tax is a disaster for the industry. 
One of the things that starts to happen in these meetings is that when the Value 
Creation Alliance members get applications for projects directly from Agder Research, 
and not presented through the Value Creation 2010 project leader, they tend to send 
them back to Agder Research and ask Agder Research to see it in relationship to Value 
Creation 2010. Researchers and consultants working at Agder Research have previously 
always sent application directly to the members of the Value Creation Alliance, the 
counties, SND, Aetat, etc. In this meeting, Vest-Agder County reports that it got an 
application from Robert Helland-Olsen, at Agder Research on an innovation project. He 
complains and does not understand why Agder Research cannot coordinate its 
innovation project initiatives better.  
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This does represent a problem for Agder Research. People working there act in 
groups and as individuals and develop project ideas independently of each other, and 
those who are not involved in the Value Creation 2010 are understandably not 
particularly interested in being coordinated by and through their colleagues’ projects, 
which can have fundamentally different research and development orientations. This is 
something that only adds to the conflict within the leader group at Agder Research, and 
many are uncomfortable with the strong position that Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen has 
got as project leader of Value Creation 2010. They do not want to coordinate their 
“innovation projects” with Value Creation 2010 internally but at the same time some of 
their financers expect them to do so. 
The learning regions concept is the hot concept now; the county plan uses the 
concept of learning regions in its title. Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen and I are about to go 
on three separate conferences just to update ourselves even more on that subject. The 
Value Creation Alliance vision is “Agder the Learning Region”. However, in order to 
realise such an ambitious plan the steering structures in the projects must be addressed, 
both internally in the Value Creation Alliance, within Agder Research, and between the 
Value Creation Alliance and in other network and partnership institutions in the region 
such as Agderrådet. The project team at Agder Research is working on a draft document 
discussing the issue; it is also going to be discussed at the next meeting in the Value 
Creation Alliance working committee. 
The project leader calls the working committee to a meeting on 12 December 
2002. They are going to discuss Agder and the concept of learning regions, the internal 
organisation of Value Creation 2010, the further development of the industrial growth 
parks at Agder, the development process in Vennesla, the CO2 tax project, and the HF-
B application. In the meeting call, Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen writes, “we must openly 
discuss this subject of Value Creation 2010 organisation, we must now try to agree on 
work form, work procedures etc”. The working committee consists of only four people, 
the project leader, the LO and NHO representatives and the representative from Aust-
Agder County. They agree that the representative from Vest-Agder should join the 
working committee. Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen is going to coordinate the strategy 
memo for the Value Creation Alliance with Jon P. Knudsen who currently is engaged to 
do a similar job for Agderrådet14. They agree that the strategy memo shall be distributed 
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on 15 January 2003. They also agree to apply for NOK 1.5 million distributed over 
three years to HF-B. This is going to put the enterprise development part in Value 
Creation 2010 Agder into a new gear. 
5.6 – A Conflict Unfolds 
The following phase descriptions are as the previous ones divided in two halves, where 
I first describe the activities on a project level, and then I describe the same period 
again, but then from the perspective of the Value Creation Alliance. The described 
timeframe is December 2002 to April 2002. 
The Projects 
The CO2 issue had been put on the agenda by LO on a meeting in the Value Creation 
Alliance on 8 August 2002. LO is impatient on the slow progress on the issue and uses 
every meeting to push the topic higher up on the agenda, the LO representatives is being 
pushed by the local unions at Tinfos Jernverk and Elkem Aluminium Lista. The core 
team at Agder Research recognises this and decides to follow up on it. I write a memo 
on 21 October 2002, to the Value Creation Alliance where the political progress and 
schedule is accounted for, the memo also includes the status of other scientific reports 
and their relevance for Agder. After that, the first project meeting is held at Agder 
Research 12 November 2002. At this meeting the director and union leaders from 
Tinfos Jernverk and Elkem Aluminium Lista a representative from NHO Agder and the 
leader of LO Vest-Agder, together with three people from Agder Research participate. 
At this meeting is it discussed what they want Agder Research and Value Creation 2010 
to do in relation to the new CO2 tax regime. The project leader in Value Creation 2010 
Agder, Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen, opens the meeting by presenting the Value 
Creation 2010 programme. He argued that it is important that we first get a more 
complete overview over all the initiatives in relation to this topic, so that we can give a 
better assessment of what it is relevant to do now. Second, he argued that industrial 
development is more than just internal organisational change processes, that it in this 
context is as important what relationship and contribution these large enterprises give to 
their environment. Third, he argued that Value Creation 2010 programme could support 
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this initial information collection, but depending on the scale and content of the final 
project, the enterprises must be prepared to finance significant parts of it themselves. 
After this, the other participants on the meeting gave their input to what the 
project should be about. The union leader at Tinfos Jernverk argues that such a report 
must include all of the successful work that Norwegian enterprises in this industry has 
done to protect the environment. This should preferably be contrasted to countries that 
have not done as much in this area as the Norwegian enterprises. The director at Tinfos 
Jerneverk follows up on this and says that such a study must have a wider perspective 
than just the CO2 tax. The significance this industry has for society and value creation 
in general must be emphasised. The director at Elkem Aluminium Lista argues that the 
project must have a long-term perspective. 
The meeting ends with an agreement to continue with a dual approach, one part 
that the core team is responsible for, and one part that the other participants at the 
meeting is responsible for. It is agreed that Agder Research shall produce a report, or 
different reports. This report(s) should cover issues relating to emissions from the 
industry at Agder and be paralleled with analyses of the significance of the industry in a 
wide sense. The exact content of the report(s) –12 possible topics are included in the 
memo from the meeting, and how we shall proceed to produce the report, is to be 
discussed at the next meeting. It is also agreed that the industry shall organise a 
reference group and work through their channels to collect information that is more 
concrete on the issue. 
The next meeting is held at the premises of Elkem Aluminium Lista on 5 February 
2003. Leading up to this meeting the core-team has collected much data relating to the 
issue, the core team has also been responsible for the meeting agenda. The core team 
has planned a dual approach, firstly, to use the meeting to agree on what precisely the 
participants expects from such a report, then to agree on the content. Secondly, to use 
the meeting to start the work to set up a network between the enterprises that are 
involved in the project. The idea is to use this opportunity to link this network up to the 
forthcoming HF-B projects. This not taken out of thin air since both of the directors on 
the previous meeting have argued the societal responsibility and importance that they 
recognise that their enterprises have, an argument that they paired with the significance 
of long-term thinking and development within the industry relating to environmental 
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issues. The core-team’s idea is therefore to construct a network, financed by HF-B, that 
systematically should deal with these issues. The core-team has therefore invited Trond 
Haga from Rogaland research to participate on this meeting to tell the participants about 
the networks he has been working with and some of his experiences with this work. 
The meeting starts with the project leader from Value Creation 2010 Agder telling 
about the status of the work that has been done so far and he also briefly explains about 
this new initiative. Tine Sundtoft follows him, she briefly explains the Value Creation 
2010 project, Trond Haga follows her, and tells about some of his experiences from the 
network he has been working with. At this stage in the meeting, confusion occurs, the 
other participants do not seem to understand why the Value Creation 2010 people are 
talking about networks and HF-B projects. They thought this was a meeting about the 
CO2 tax, and a report that should be produced. Some of the participants seem to be 
provoked by this turn of events, as some of them believe that the report is off the table. 
After some discussions, however a common understanding is reached. It is agreed that 
Agder Research shall produce a key statistics report, with the help of the participants, 
and that the presentation of this report shall be in done in a setting where all of the 
relevant participants for such a network is present on 3 April 2003 in Kristiansand. LO 
and NHO representatives agree that they together with the core team are responsible for 
recruiting participants to this meeting. 
On the car trip home, we evaluated the meeting briefly. We all agreed that it could 
have been handled better. The problem at the meeting was that the regional LO leader 
verbally had opposed the whole network idea. We had forgotten to brief him in advance, 
just thinking that he would understand the relevance and importance of linking this 
initiative to the HF-B project intuitively. He did not and this was probably the main 
reason for the amount of confusion occurring at the meeting. The representatives from 
the enterprises were in the end, sympathetic but had also a healthy wait and see attitude 
to the network component in the project. Even though we agreed that the meeting could 
have been arranged in a better way by us, we were satisfied with the result. This could, 
if we did a good report and planned the 3 April meeting in a good way, be the start of 
the first HF-B financed network at Agder. 
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In this period two other project activities was running intensively, the first was the 
start up of the development project in Vennesla, and the other was the actual process of 
writing an application to the HF-B secretariat. 
The project leader of Value Creation 2010 Agder first presented the HF-B project, 
as it came to be called, to the Value Creation Alliance on 16 October 2001. This project 
was supposed to represent the Value Creation 2010 Agder’s main intervention toward 
the enterprise level in the Value Creation 2010 project. The core-team was therefore 
very surprised when we were asked by the director of Agder Research to help on a HF-
B application that had been sent back for revision on 5 December 2002. It turned out 
that HF-B wanted a project description that integrated the HF-B project with the Value 
Creation 2010 project at Agder. 
It turned out that another enterprise consultant not associated with Value Creation 
2010 Agder had been given the job of writing an application to HF-B. He had used the 
copy and paste approach were bits and pieces of text from reports and applications 
written by the core team, were used uncritically and without any form of reference to 
the original work. We found this to be very provoking and reacted relatively strongly to 
this. We did however agree to take responsibility for writing a new application, but set 
the term that HF-B was to be an integrated part of Value Creation 2010 Agder, meaning 
that the project leader of Value Creation 2010 Agder also had oversight and 
responsibility for the content of the project activities in the HF-B project. We 
interpreted the go-ahead from the director at Agder Research as an acceptance of these 
terms. We also prepared a presentation that the LO and NHO representatives from 
Agder used when they presented the Agder project at a national HF-B meeting at 
Halvorsbøle on 17 December 2002. This project was then eventually also funded by 
HF-B with NOK 1.5 million stretching over a period of three years.  
The Value Creation Alliance 
The situation in Value Creation 2010 Agder was early in 2003 relatively confusing for 
the participants in the core-team. We felt and experienced that we were being opposed 
internally in Agder Research. We also saw that this was a good possibility to address the 
challenges we were facing in the project in a meaningful way. The problems we were 
facing internally at Agder Research we saw as problems connected to Agder Research 
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and not to the Value Creation 2010 project. We therefore thought that if we could 
complete the work that we had started on developing a discussion memo for the strategy 
of the Value Creation Alliance in the region, and in addition address the internal 
steering structure in the project, then the challenges the project was facing could be 
solved.  
Our idea was simple, if we could initiate a principle discussion based on the core 
ideas in the Value Creation 2010 project, a discussion where everybody was given the 
chance to state their points of view and ambitions for the project we could also address 
the challenges in a meaningful way and start to solve them. After all, many of the 
projects initiated through Value Creation 2010 Agder were starting to show promising 
developments. It is also true that many activities did not show any significant progress 
at all and was more or less given up on by the core team. Nevertheless, we meant that 
the mismatch between the activities initiated in the early phases in the project and those 
currently active was defendable given the reduced budget in 2002. In addition, it was 
only to be expected, we thought, that not every project we initiated through Value 
Creation 2010 could be a success story. It could work some places and with some 
people but it was not reasonable to expect that it would work everywhere. 
On 23 January 2003 a draft of the strategy memo was presented to the working-
committee in the Value Creation Alliance. They discuss it and agree to discuss it further 
on the next meeting in the Value Creation Alliance were all of the Value Creation 
Alliance participants are present. Inputs from this meeting are given back to the core 
team and the last version of this document is dated 30 January 2003. 
The strategy document titled “Strategy for Agder as an innovative region” is 
written by the core-team, it is a 70-page document that discusses a long range of topics. 
In the introduction, we write:  
This document is meant as an input to an ongoing debate on regional development 
strategies for Agder. That it is an input does simply imply that we do not believe that we 
have the final answers on how the region best should organise itself. We do however 
think that some of the questions we ask are valid and could hopefully stimulate a 
necessary discussion not only among the members of the Value Creation Alliance but in 
the public sphere in general at Agder. The main message from the authors is the strong 
call to the members of the Value Creation Alliance to thoroughly discuss the partnership, 
its content, mandate and role. The document wishes to stimulate thinking that is wide, 
where more principle aspects of the collaboration is discussed parallel to the more 
practical aspects of the work. We mean that clear roles and clear mandates are necessary 
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in order to secure the legitimacy of the work that is being done. New ways of working 
together requires and demands new roles, new interpretations of roles, and new divisions 
of roles. It is important that we examine closely how new and multiple roles and multiple 
interests are handled in the context of the partnership. If we use ourselves, Agder 
Research, as an example of the challenge this could be. Agder Research holds the project 
leader position and is an equal partner in Value Creation Alliance. Agder Research is in 
this case a receiver of projects, a giver of projects, and a premise giver for projects. Such 
problematic aspects of the partnership work is not unique to Agder Research but it 
exemplifies the need for principal clarifications on the partnership model of work. We 
therefore encourage the Value Creation Alliance to take time to discuss the principle 
grounds for right to participation in the Value Creation Alliance, how different roles is 
handled and should be handled, the impact of role conflicts and potential role conflicts 
and how this best could be handled within the context of a partnership. (H. C. G. Johnsen, 
Lysgård, Normann, Fosse, & Kvåle 2003). 
Seen in retrospect this report was gas on an already burning fire, however, in the 
report we also discuss a long range of topics connected to regional development in a 
fairly general manner. In the first chapter, we discuss some of the development trends 
and challenges at Agder and the need for a regional strategy on how to deal with these 
in a coherent way. In the second chapter, we discuss some of the changing perspectives 
and policies on regional development. For instance the renewed role of the counties 
connected to regional development, cluster thinking, triple-helix, the knowledge 
economy etc. In the third chapter, we do an in-depth discussion of the learning regions 
concept. In the fourth chapter, we outline the dimensions that a strategy for regional 
development at Agder could centre around. In the fifth chapter, we outline a strategy for 
Value Creation 2010 Agder in this context and in the last chapter; we outline a research 
strategy and principles for the organisation of research. 
The last meeting in the Value Creation Alliance where Hans Chr. Garmann 
Johnsen is project leader for Value Creation 2010 Agder is 6 February 2003. The main 
issue on the agenda is to discuss the draft of the report produced by the core team on a 
regional strategy. The document gets a mixed reception. Some of the partners are 
positive, others are more passive, and some are very critical. For instance, it is argued 
that it is important to link the strategy of the Value Creation 2010 project clearly to the 
county plans, something that is coherent with the statements in the document. Some are 
more concerned with the language being too scientific and too absolute in its form – it 
should be relativistic. Other questions if such a document represents a commitment to 
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the partners and argue that the document must be more in line with the current regional 
strategy. 
Overall did the document receive more positive attention than what the authors 
maybe had feared in advance. It is agreed that the working committee in an internal 
meeting should address the report and decide on what shall be done with it in the 
continuation.  
The Project Leader is Fired 
On 18 February 2003, the core team at Agder Research is informed via e-mail by the 
director at Agder Research that Robert Helland Olsen, who wrote the HF-B application 
that was rejected, is going to be project leader of the HF-B project. The project leader of 
Value Creation 2010 Agder is asked to give all relevant documentation to the new 
project leader and bring him up to speed on the activities in the project. The director of 
Agder Research writes in the e-mail that he has discussed this change with the leader of 
the Value Creation Alliance, Tine Sundtoft, and that they wish to discuss enterprise 
development in Value Creation 2010 Agder on a meeting in the working committee On 
13 March. 
In an e-mail from 19 February 2003, Tine Sundtoft invites to the meeting in the 
working committee on 13 March. She writes that we now must discuss how we are 
going to do the HF-B project and other enterprise development activities in Value 
Creation 2010 Agder, and that she also has invited Harald Furre, the director of Agder 
Research, and Robert Helland Olsen, the leader of the enterprise development 
department at Agder Research to participate to that meeting. 
Hans Chr., the project leader of Value Creation 2010 Agder, responds to this e-
mail the same day. He refers to the e-mails from her and Harald Furre, and writes that 
he has problems with seeing exactly what she and Harald Furre have in mind for the 
project. He writes:  
As far as I can see, you now attempt to split the enterprise development part away from 
the rest of the Value Creation 2010 project. I think this is an unwise strategy. It could be 
very problematic in relationship to the Norwegian Research Council and the policy 
signals they have given on the Value Creation 2010 project. Have you cleared such a 
separation of the Value Creation 2010 project centrally in the HF-B system? I thought 
that they wanted an integrated project. If we are going to discuss this in a working 
committee meeting shouldn’t also some of the national representatives in the project be 
present. This is something, as I see it that touches upon some fundamental issues in the 
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Value Creation 2010 project. I will, as project leader of Value Creation 2010 be depended 
upon them, the Norwegian Research Council, agreeing to such a separation if it must be 
done.  
On 25 February 2003, me and Geir Jørgensen inform the participants in the HF-B 
project about the situation via e-mail. The reason for us doing this is that the CO2 key 
figure report is being sought after. We write that disagreement on how the project 
should be organised, and that this disagreement concerning whether the Value Creation 
2010 team shall have the professional and practical responsibility for the network that 
was discussed on the meeting at Elkem Aliminium Lista. We also write that the work of 
setting up such a network has been initiated, but that we will put our efforts on hold 
until the current situation is clarified, and that this hopefully will happen at the meeting 
13 March 200315. 
On the 13 March 2003 meeting, Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen is informed that he 
is fired as project leader of Value Creation 2010 Agder, by Tine Sundtoft and Harald 
Furre. The core team is informed about the decision the same day. Hans Chr. Garmann 
Johnsen disputes the decision and answers to them via e-mail the following day, an e-
mail he also sends to the core-team and the secretariat in the Norwegian Research 
Council. He writes that he sees no factual grounding for the decision, that the problems 
of collaboration between him and Tine Sundtoft that it refers to is related to the use of 
the HF-B project and not the Value Creation 2010 project as a whole. That he never has 
heard of any criticism from the Value Creation Alliance before the 13 March meeting 
and that the separation of enterprise development from regional development is in 
violation with the intent of the Value Creation 2010 programme. He ends by saying that 
he does not accept this verbal firing of him as a project leader because it is not based on 
matter-of-factness, and that he will continue to act as project leader until he get such 
groundings for the decision. 
The response from the director of Agder Research to this is then to fire Hans Chr. 
Garmann Johnsen from his job at Agder Research. This firing is in judicial terms 
phrased as a personnel matter, and neither the Norwegian Research Council, nor the 
core team, or anyone else can get insight into the reasons behind the decision. This 
means that for the outsider the reason for firing Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen can be 
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anything from economical fraud to sexual harassment, no one is supposed to know, and 
the director cannot answer why with reference to this being a personnel matter. 
The core-team therefore thinks it in its place to inform other employees at Agder 
Research on what their interpretation of the situation is. An e-mail is written on 18 
March 2003, signed by all involved in the project. In this e-mail, a four-page letter, we 
urge the director to reinstate Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen, support his account of the 
situation, and put the reason for his decision to fire Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen on the 
disagreement on how the HF-B project should be handled in relationship to the Value 
Creation 2010 project. We also strongly warn that this unjust decision will damage the 
Value Creation 2010 project at Agder if it is not changed. This e-mail reaches all of the 
employees at Agder Research, and many at Agder University College. The director also 
responds by e-mail urging us to keep this matter internal, that we do not know 
everything about the matter he writes. I also send a copy of it to the Norwegian 
Research Council. I get a call back from the Norwegian Research Council thanking me 
for the information, and I am informed that the director of Agder Research has informed 
the division leader of the Norwegian Research Council that a personnel matter has been 
initiated against the project leader of Value Creation 2010. This is problematic for the 
programme secretariat since information about changes in the project is supposed to go 
through them. When the director finds out that this support memo has been sent to the 
Norwegian Research Council he initiates an investigation internally at Agder Research 
into who did it. When confronted with this by the director I report that I was 
responsible. The board at Agder Research later collectively withdraws from their 
positions. The personnel matter against Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen is dropped, and he 
gets his job at Agder Research back, he is however not reinstated as project leader in the 
Value Creation 2010 project.  
5.7 – Stalemate 
The following phase description is my interpretation of the researchers in the project 
team’s perspective. The described timeframe is April 2002 to January 2004. 
In the period following the two firings, everyone is supportive of the Value 
Creation 2010 project and the core team. The goal is now to save what is left of the 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 222 - 
Value Creation 2010 project and get the project back on track. The core team uses much 
of its energy in this period to argue, unsuccessfully, that the only sensible thing to do is 
to reinstate Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen as project leader. None of the important and 
urgent issues addressed in the strategy memo are however addressed (H. C. G. Johnsen 
et al. 2003). 
The problems for outsiders entering into the issue, is that they are not able to 
differentiate between the different stories about what has happened –no smoke without 
fire, everybody must have done something wrong etc. Different middle of the road 
solutions are tried out; Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen can be part of the project but not be 
a project leader, Value Creation 2010 can do enterprise development but cannot use HF-
B resources etc. The history of the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder is now 
becoming a story that most people only want to forget as quickly a possible. At least 
two fundamentally different stories exist about why and how the Value Creation 2010 
project at Agder ended up in its sorry state. We cannot really know what happened, it is 
too complex to sort out, it is too painful, Agder Research is a business and must be 
sensitive to its stakeholders etc. The new management mantra therefore becomes –let us 
look forward and not dwell in the past. 
To what extent this was something that the core team should be pragmatic and 
accept was heavily debated within the core team in the period following these events. 
What was particularly frustrating for the remains of the core team in this period, was 
that not only were we without any project leadership and direction in the project, but the 
core of the conflict as we saw it, the decoupling of the enterprise development part of 
the Value Creation 2010 project and the regional projects, were unaddressed by the new 
management at Agder Research. We knew that this was in direct violation with the 
intent that HF-B and the Norwegian Research Council had for the programmes, and that 
this in the end would have serious consequences and maybe result in Agder Research 
“loosing” the whole Value Creation 2010 project. This were however arguments 
without a receptive audience. 
In my notes from 2003, I have a lot of meeting memos from many meetings but 
nothing is really happening. It seems that we use this period to get to terms with new 
situation, to accept that the project will not get back on track. The participants in the 
core team are frustrated, and some quit, and those who are left focus most of their time 
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on other projects, everyone involved in the Enterprise Development 2000 project at 
Agder, with the exception of Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen is now effectively out of the 
Value Creation 2010 project. 
There are meetings between the core team and representatives from the Value 
Creation Alliance, it is meetings between Agder Research, members of the Value 
Creation Alliance, and the Norwegian Research Council. None of these meetings lead to 
an agreement on a way forward. Most of the project initiatives that are not connected to 
the doctoral projects in Value Creation 2010 Agder are not systematically followed up 
on. The HF-B project is being managed by Robert Helland Olsen, and he does not 
communicate their activities to those occupied with the Value Creation 2010 project. He 
later quits Agder Research and gets to take the HF-B project with him into his new 
consultancy HKKR, no one, now involved in the HF-B project had ever been directly 
involved in a Value Creation 2010/Enterprise Development 2000 project. In an 
expanded meeting in the Value Creation Alliance working committee in Flekkefjord 
municipality on 7 May 2004 the consultancy HKKR was invited to tell about the 
progress in the project, we were then told by Gunnar Kulia that it was “impossible” to 
sell the Value Creation 2010 methodology to the enterprises, but that they would 
continue to do their best. In a later meeting when HKKR was invited to tell about the 
progress directly to the Value Creation Alliance on 24 June 2004, it was a no show from 
HKKR. The HF-B project has as far as I know, after it was taken over by Robert 
Helland Olsen, not initiated a single substantial activity. The NOK 1.5 million HF-B 
used on enterprise development at Agder is therefore probably best described as a waste 
of money. 
The Norwegian Research Council is in 2003 playing hardball with Agder 
Research and demands that the project is structured according to the intents of the 
programme. The Norwegian Research Council does not however say that they prefer 
Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen back as project leader. However, in their communication 
with Agder Research, they stress the importance of continuance and long-term thinking 
and development in the project. Signals that are largely ignored and misinterpreted by 
the management of Agder Research, they lend their ear to the regional stakeholders’ 
preferences instead. The management at Agder Research tries out four different project 
leaders in the following year. Most of them are temporarily instated to salvage the 
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project. The last one, Jon P. Knudsen, is meant to be permanent but the Norwegian 
Research Council does not accept that he is only in a part time position at Agder 
Research. The lack of support from the Norwegian Research Council results in Jon P. 
Knudsen withdrawing late in November 2003. In this period Value Creation 2010 
Agder is slowly turning into to what it was towards the end, three Ph.D. projects partly 
financed through the Value Creation 2010 project. 
5.8 – Restart and Reorientation 
The following phase description is my interpretation of the researchers in the project 
team’s perspective. The described timeframe is January 2004 to present. 
Agder Research does in the latter part of 2003 get a new permanent director, 
Torunn Lauvdal. She is also given the role as the new project leader of Value Creation 
2010 Agder. The Norwegian Research Council accepts her as project leader on 19 
December 2003. She initiates the process of redesigning the Value Creation 2010 
project at Agder. The point is to solve what has become the impression of a conflict 
between the Norwegian Research Council and the local stakeholders. Torunn Lauvdal 
chooses a pragmatic solution, by separating the project in two, halves, one-half, the 
regional funds, that the members of the Value Creation Alliance will decide on how to 
use, Agder Research decides on the other half and primarily use it to finance the 
ongoing Ph.D. projects.  
The principle learned from the conflict is that you cannot decide on more than you 
pay for. This principle seems to be accepted by the members of the Value Creation 
Alliance, alternatives was not put forward anyway. How the Norwegian Research 
Council perceived this arrangement is more unclear. They did not veto it, but they most 
likely did not applaud it either. 
To understand this you must recognise that the Value Creation 2010 project 
always was indented as an Action Research project. Meaning that practical problems 
and research efforts should go hand in hand, be the same. When you split the project, 
you do not promote such dynamics. However, since the Norwegian Research Council 
could not find themselves to communicate this in any clear way to the actors in the 
Agder region, or come up with any sensible alternatives. The Norwegian Research 
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Council therefore cut the budgets in half once more so that the annual Value Creation 
2010 budget at Agder is a quarter of what it was in the beginning. By doing this, they 
also avoid taking any serious discussions on the important and principal question on 
how a Value Creation 2010 project best can and should be organised. 
This arrangement did however have some interesting side effects. As part of this 
Ph.D. work, I was directly following the Value Creation Alliance and their work to 
reorient themselves given the new situation. 
The Value Creation Alliance 
Since the Value Creation Alliance in this new situation only is supposed to make 
decisions concerning the resources they put into the partnership it does after a while 
become apparent that this also drastically reduces the significance and meaningfulness 
of the partnership. In 2004 there where three meetings in the Value Creation Alliance, a 
“start up” meeting on 24 June, and two meetings in the autumn of 2004. There were also 
three working committee meetings. In these meetings there are mainly two activities 
that go on, foremost presentation of the projects, the reorientation of Value Creation 
2010, and project presentations of for instance the Vennesla development coalition etc. 
The second activity was of an administrative nature debates over budgets etc. 
These are activities that in itself do not defend the existence of the Value Creation 
Alliance. Agder Research presents different project ideas that the Value Creation 
Alliance can decide upon if they want to support or not. Some of these projects are 
supported. However, when the 2004 budget is presented in 2005 it shows that the Value 
Creation Alliance has not been able to use all of the resources that they had allocated to 
the project, NOK 528 000 is left unused in 2004. Moreover, the tendency for 2005 was 
similar. The Value Creation Alliance had not been able to generate enough project ideas 
themselves. 
Earlier in the project the researchers were very active in facilitating the process, 
doing a lot of work, making many initiatives. When we now took on a more passive 
role, saying – this project is your responsibility, you all have to find out what to do, we 
cannot do this for you etc. This led to inactivity – almost nothing were done and nothing 
happened. However, this did not stop the partners in the Value Creation Alliance from 
continuing to meet on a regular basis. Talk about quitting popped up here and there, 
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discussions about purpose emerged, however they communicated that it was important 
to meet in order to support the Ph.D. projects in Value Creation 2010 Agder, well this 
might be flattering but hardly sufficient in terms of being the only reason for them to 
meet. The networking dimension was also communicated as important, exchange of 
information etc. In addition to this, it looked like the level of creativity in the group 
reached point zero, - we just sat there discussing different subjects in general, e.g. the 
reduced budget situation, a budget we/they were not able to consume anyway. I think 
everybody just waited for someone to take the first step and close the whole thing down. 
Interestingly, no one seemed able to do this. No one wanted to be the one that took the 
initiative. 
In a meeting in the Value Creation Alliance on 31 August 2005, the current 
situation in the Value Creation Alliance is discussed openly for the first time. No one is 
satisfied with the current arrangement. The purpose of the Value Creation Alliance is 
discussed in general terms. The researchers suggest to approach this systematically, 
even though it is not said in a direct way, the idea is to continue the work that was 
initiated through the strategy report that was presented to the Value Creation Alliance 
on 6 February 2003. However, this time I would take on a different approach than what 
we unsuccessfully had tried earlier. Instead of doing all of the work alone and use the 
Value Creation Alliance as a reference or reading group, I would use the Value Creation 
Alliance, interview them, and use their voices into the report and in this way making it 
theirs. At least that was the idea. On a meeting in the Value Creation Alliance on 14 
October 2005, I outline an approach and strategy for achieving this ambition in a memo 
to the Value Creation Alliance, and we agreed to proceed with this approach. All of the 
current members of the Value Creation Alliance are then interviewed and a report is 
written. When the 30-page report is to be presented to the Value Creation Alliance it is 
only 15 minutes dedicated to do the presentation and discussion of the report in the 
meeting programme, and since no one actually had read the report the whole thing was 
quite pointless.  
Reorientation 
In the new application from 2006 to the Norwegian Research Council Hans Chr. 
Garmann Johnsen is once again the project leader of Value Creation 2010 Agder. He 
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has no longer anything to do with the Value Creation Alliance, except that he now and 
then must present the project and the project progress to the Value Creation Alliance. 
The Value Creation 2010 project at Agder has adapted to the new steering signals from 
the Norwegian Research Council, that is to say that Value Creation 2010 shall be more 
like Enterprise Development 2000. The new Value Creation 2010 Agder project focuses 
on the knowledge economy and will work together with knowledge enterprises (firms 
working with information technology) in the Grimstad area. When this is written it 
looks like Value Creation 2010 is going to merge with some other Norwegian Research 
Council financed project into a new structure called VRI (policy instruments for 
regional innovation).  
5.9 – Summary 
Even though many of the ambitions we had with the Value Creation 2010 project in the 
Agder region were not realised, I believe that it is many things we can and should learn 
from this experience. Value Creation 2010 Agder does in my opinion only become 
meaningless if we refuse to reflect and learn from it.  
One important aspect is that the Value Creation 2010 project has shown just how 
difficult, complicated, and fragile the network working method is. This work method 
requires other mechanism for coordinating activities than development activities that are 
conducted by people originating from the same hierarchical structure. This case should 
be a good illustration of how important it is that involved actors understand how their 
own role changes when they enter into a formally flat network structure. The Value 
Creation 2010 project in the Agder region and in particular, the work done through 
Value Creation Alliance provides important insights into why such structures are so 
dependent of consensus, trust, and commitment in order to function. The story also 
gives us insight into how entangled such structures often are with other networks, 
organisations, institutions, and not the least interests in the region. It is therefore not 
strange that so many believe that there must exist a regional policy platform in order to 
make the regional governance system function (see discussions in the next chapter).  
It should also be obvious based on a read through of this case description that the 
Value Creation Alliance in the Agder region in practice operated significantly different 
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from the industrial democratic ideals inherent in the development coalition idea (Ennals 
& Gustavsen 1999; Fricke & Totterdill 2004). This should not be interpreted to mean 
that the regional development coalition is a futile idea, and something that should not 
have been tried out. A parallel Ph.D. project to this, discusses experiences with a 
municipal based development coalition oriented towards the same theoretical and 
practical framework as that discussed here, and also involving many of the same 
researchers (Fosse 2007). This development coalition also initiated through the Value 
Creation 2010 project at Agder located in Vennesla municipality functioned 
significantly better than the Value Creation Alliance, and thus is an indication that even 
though there are room for improvement the idea of a democratic development processes 
in it self is not a futile idea. However, it should also be obvious that the idea of the 
regional development coalition must be addressed differently than what was the case 
with the Value Creation Alliance. The big question out of the case description given in 
this chapter is however, why the Value Creation 2010 project in Agder ended in conflict 
and essentially collapsed. This is also one of the research questions of this thesis and is 
discussed and analysed in chapter 7.  
The following chapter gives a description of the development of the regional 
governance system in the Agder region. The very politico economical system in which 
the Value Creation 2010 project and the Value Creation Alliance were integral 
components. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 My own role in the project throughout different the project was discussed in the methods 
chapter. 
2 See also the next chapter and the appendix for further references to these two governance 
network institutions. 
3 NHO: Norwegian Federation of Business and Industry (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon). 
4 LO: Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen). 
5 Aetat is the Norwegian Public Employment Service. Its main tasks are to monitor 
developments in the labour market and implement the labour market policy set out by the 
political authorities. Aetat has 18 regional directors and 163 local employment offices (2004), 
Aetat it is now part of NAV. 
6 SND/IN: Innovation Norway As of 1 January 2004 the new state owned public company 
Innovation Norway has replaced the following four organisations: The Norwegian Tourist 
Board, the Norwegian Trade Council, the The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development 
Fund, SND and the Government Consultative Office for Inventors, SVO. Innovation Norway 
promotes nationwide industrial development profitable to both the business economy and 
Norway’s national economy, and helps release the potential of different districts and regions by 
contributing towards innovation, internationalisation and marketing. 
7 KS: The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (Kommunenes 
Sentralforbund) KS is a national member's association for municipalities, counties and public 
enterprises under municipal or county ownership. All municipalities and counties are members. 
KS is an employer and central bargaining organisation, an advisory and consultative body, and 
acts as a representative and advocate vis-à-vis central government on behalf of its members. As 
central bargaining agent, KS is the largest in the country and negotiates on behalf of employers 
of approximately 370 000 employees. 
8 The following text is based on minutes and personal notes from the meetings in the Value 
Creation Alliance. 
9 HF-B, short for "Hovedorganisasjonenes Fellestiltak — Bedriftsutvikling", collaborative 
project between the social partners (LO and NHO), established in 1991. HF-B is working for 
increased value creation through broad participation. Gives economical support to different 
measures and initiatives, collaborates with the Norwegian Research Council and Innovation 
Norway through R&D programmes in enterprises and regions. Homepage: 
http://www.fellestiltak.no/ 
10 Norwegian term is “Fylkesmann”. 
11 See also chapter 6, and the subchapter lessons learned. 
12 Including the revision of the 211-page application. 
13 Several of those I interviewed as part of this thesis work mention this. However, Trygve 
Reinertsen had already used the concept on the opening conference of Value Creation 2010 in 
the Agder region on September 14 2001.  
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14 See also chapter 6, under the regional policy agenda subchapter  
15 The key figure report was later in the spring finished as an Agder Research project. The HF-B 
enterprise network that should have been initiated on 3 April 2003 was never commenced. 
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“Formally everything is in order, we are all elected or represent legitimate organisations 
— no one can catch us on that. But we have become a little clan and no one can hold us 
responsible, it isn’t democratic and it isn’t right…” 
— Excerpt from regional stakeholder interview, Agder spring 2006. 
 
6.1 – Introduction 
This is a descriptive data chapter, where I try to give an overview of some of the most 
central events in the development of the modern regional governance system in the 
Agder region. These data are analyzed using the theoretical framework in the next 
chapter 7.  
This is a story that starts in the early 1990s and ends in 2006, with emphasis 
placed on the period from 1999 to 2003, and I would claim that it contains some of the 
more spectacular events in modern Norwegian local politics. My sources for this story 
are mainly publicly accessible documents; media, newspapers, public records etc. The 
people I have interviewed have for the most and to their credit been very forthcoming 
about their roles in these processes, but some have declined to go on public record and I 
have respected this. This means that the following story, with a few exceptions, does not 
contain any information that has not been available before. What is new is that these 
events are systematically placed into context, and given a coherent look.  
It is impossible to cover everything and every process that has occurred during 
this period within the boundaries of this text. I have therefore chosen to focus on what I 
have interpreted as some of the main and larger lines and in particular, a few events and 
the role of a few institutions that I think are principally important in order to understand 
the workings and development of the regional governance system in the Agder region.  
The first event I choose to focus on is the development of a regional policy 
agenda, this sub-chapter tells the story of how a few men’s vision on regional 
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development became the regional policy for the Agder region in the early 1990s, and 
that the direction and policy out-put from these developments were set from the start. 
In order to realize the ambitious plans in the regional policy agenda many hurdles 
had to be surmounted. The biggest of these challenges was to finance the new 
governance networks and evolving institutions aimed at addressing the defined 
challenges. I have therefore placed much emphasis on giving a relatively thorough 
account of the processes surrounding the sales of the stocks in the publicly owned 
Agder Energi company, as the result of this process was that many new governance 
institutions were financed.  
Following this story, I take a closer look at some of the steering practices of the 
newly developed governance institutions, and an excerpt from a public debate about 
governance in region ends the chapter, as it can be interpreted as a small but significant 
counter reaction. I believe the debate was healthy for the region because it raised 
awareness and changed many regional stakeholders’ attitudes towards the network 
model of work.  
6.2 – The Set-Up 
A Man and his Wife had the good fortune to possess a Goose which laid a Golden Egg 
every day. Lucky though they were, they soon began to think they were not getting rich 
fast enough, and, imagining the bird must be made of gold inside, they decided to kill it in 
order to secure the whole store of the precious metal at once. But when they cut it open 
they found it was just like any other goose. Thus, they neither got rich all at once, as they 
had hoped, nor enjoyed any longer the daily addition to their wealth. Much wants more 
and loses all (Aesop n.d.). 
By now it should be painstakingly obvious to everyone that cares to look that the 
municipalities that chose to sell their stocks in the Agder Energi Company in 2001 
already has lost billions of NOK on just that decision1. I have estimated that the loss in 
real value, for the municipalities in the Agder region that decided to sell, amounts to 
between NOK 3.1 and 4.8 billion from 31.12.2002 to 2006 (see appendix). In 2001, the 
majority of the municipalities in the Agder region decided to sell 45.4 % of their Agder 
Energi shares to Statkraft. In 2006 Agder Energi is good business, and the owners of 
Agder Energi is in 2006 opting for NOK 600 million in share dividends (Udjus 2006). 
The municipalities in Norway that in 2000/01 decided to sell their energy shares did so, 
as the table below shows, probably at the worst time possible.  
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Fig. 6-1: El-Prices and GWh Production on the Spot Market, Weighted Year Averages 95-062 
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The spot market (Nord Pool) price in 2000 was on average NOK 0.10 per kWh, 
the lowest average since the spot market opened. The municipalities that sold Agder 
Energi AS decided to do so when the value of the company was, according to a lawyer 
from Wiersholm Mellbye & Bech, NOK 11.773 billion3 and not the NOK 14.4 billion 
figure that was in the media at the time (Skøien 2001d). In 2004 Pareto, an energy 
analysis company that was paid NOK 54 million for their role in the sale of Agder 
Energi to Statkraft, made a new estimate on the value of Agder Energi and they 
concluded that Agder Energi had increased 25 % in value in the last three and a half 
years, from NOK 11.8 billion to NOK 14.8 billion (KraftNytt 2004). In 2004 external 
value estimates indicated that the market value of the company had increased by 30 
percent since its establishment in 2000, the main index at Oslo bourse increased in the 
same period with 22.81 percent (Henden 2005). In the first half-year of 2006 Agder 
Energi improved its results before taxes with 75 percent compared to the previous year 
(AE 2006b: 2). Before this increase, in January 2006, Agder Energi was by the acting 
CEO Fred Sæther, estimated to be worth approximately NOK 20 billion (Janse 2006). 
That is probably not an unreasonable estimate and could be higher since Skagerak 
Energi that produces less THw than Agder Energi in 2006 is valued at NOK 20 billion 
(Altmann 2006). The real net value that was set to Agder Energi, when 45.5 percent of 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 234 - 
it was sold to Statkraft in 2002, was NOK 11.4 billion, if the whole company had been 
sold NOK 1.9 billion would have been paid in taxes, the real net value of the company 
after tax was therefore NOK 9.5 billion (PwC 2005). Agder’s exclusive advisor to the 
sales process, Arthur Andersen, argued at the time of the sale that the absolute 
maximum price on electricity was 0.20 NOK/kWh, and that they could not see that it 
would reach that level in the foreseeable future (Arnesen 2003: 112).  
The municipalities in Agder’s alternative financial uses of the funds from the sales 
are nowhere near of compensating for the massive loss this represent in real value for 
the municipalities that sold their shares. It is estimated that the municipality of 
Kristiansand alone has lost between NOK 1.6 and NOK 2.4 billion in real values since 
31.12.2002, and that is a careful estimate. On Cultiva alone Kristiansand municipality 
has lost close to NOK 1.1 billion up until 2006. If Kristiansand municipality had used 
the share dividends from Agder Energi directly, instead of using the Cultiva instrument, 
they could have used NOK 135 million more on culture purposes in the 2003-06 period, 
and that without selling a single share in Agder Energi4. The municipalities in Vest-
Agder’s investment in CDFSN represent an estimated loss in real value close to NOK 
340 million from 31.12.2002 to 2006 (see appendix). 
Given international and national energy consumption trends, combined with a 
very probable renewed international commitment to reducing green house gas emissions 
is it very reasonable to assume that this loss in real value is only going to increase 
steadily in the years come. I have also been told by people involved in the sales process 
that independent energy market insiders at the time of the sale only laughed at the 
judgements made by the municipalities that decided to sell their energy stocks at the 
beginning of the 2000s. 
Necessary information and analysis saying that companies producing clean 
hydroelectric energy would dramatically increase in value was present at the time when 
the decision to sell was made. The Kyoto protocol opened into signature on 11 
December 1997, more than 180 countries gathered in Kyoto, Japan, in search of a 
coordinated international response to global warming. They reached a provisional 
agreement known as the Kyoto Protocol. This signalled an international commitment to 
reducing greenhouse gases. A large portion of greenhouse gases comes from energy 
production that is either nuclear or based on coal, oil or gas that all are in light of the 
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Kyoto protocol and environmental concerns in a disadvantageous competitive position 
compared with the relatively clean and renewable production of hydro-electric power.  
Late 1999 it was also well known that Sweden was going to shut down its two 
Barsebäck nuclear reactors that produced 12 TWh a year into the Nord Pool market 
(Rønningsbakk 2000a). The first of the two Barsebäck nuclear reactors closed on 30 
November 1999 and the second was shut down 31 May 20055. The background for this 
is that Sweden in 1980 held a referendum that decided that the nation should close down 
all of its nuclear reactors within 2010. In December 1998 Sweden had an installed 
nuclear capacity of 100.52 TWh (IAEA 2000: 730), and an actual production of 70.5 
THw (IAEA 2000: 734). This nuclear capacity provided electric energy to the same 
(Nord Pool) market as Agder Energi operated in. In January 1998, the “Nuclear Power 
Decommission Act” became law in Sweden. The Act allows the government, within a 
specified framework to decide that the right to operate a nuclear reactor will cease to 
apply at a certain point in time. It was this law that was used to shut down Barsebäck, 
then operated by Sydkraft (IAEA 2000: 732-3). Analysis showing that world energy 
consumption was steadily rising, as exemplified in the figure above, and not stagnating 
or declining was easily available and rather common knowledge in 2000 and 2001.  
The decision to sell can neither simply be explained by Kristiansand municipality 
who led the sales process being governed by the conservative party who traditionally is 
sceptical towards public ownership. Stavanger in the neighbouring Rogaland County, 
had at the time approximately the same political configuration as Kristiansand with the 
conservative party in position6, Stavanger decided not to sell Lyse Energi the hydro-
electric producing company they owned together with the other municipalities in 
Rogaland. Lyse Energi, a company that was equivalent to Agder Energi in both size, 
history, and organization, was six municipal owned hydroelectric energy producers in 
Rogaland who in 1999 merged into Lyse Energi AS.  
The population of Norway has not expressed eagerness to sell energy stocks in 
polls. Representative polling data from MMI, a national polling company, in 2003 and 
2004 shows stability in that only 1 percent of the population want foreign ownership of 
hydroelectric power production, and two thirds of the population want public actors to 
own these production assets. A 2002 poll from Norsk Gallup, another national polling 
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company, showed that 87% of the population wants hydro electric power resources to 
continue to remain in Norwegian control (Rønningsbakk 2005a). 
In addition to this, it was no clear majority for selling these stocks among the 
political parties in Kristiansand that were represented in the City Council when the 
election period started in 1999. In fact, none of the political parties expressed 
willingness to sell anything more than up to 49% of KEV that again only was a part of 
what later become Agder Energi. The Conservative Party in Kristiansand had in the 
media before the 1999 elections drawn the line at 49%, the Progress Party in 
Kristiansand had drawn the line at 33%, and one month before the 1999 municipal 
elections did the labour party in Kristiansand also state that they could agree to selling 
up to a 33% of KEV. The table below shows the parties represented in the City Council 
in the 1999-2003-election period, and the position the political parties communicated to 
their voters through their local party programmes on public ownership and competitive 
tendering, and the Agder Energi issue.  
Tab. 6-1: Parties (99-03) Position on the Agder Energi Question7 
Parties in 
Kristiansand 
City Council 
99-038. 
Position on public ownership and/or competitive tendering in 
the 99-3 municipal party programme, and/or in respective 
national programmes. 
Position on the Agder 
Energi question in the 99-3 
municipal party 
programme9. 
The Socialist 
Left Party 
(SV)10 
The Socialist Left Party is not opposed to efficiency improvements, 
but the total number of public jobs should rather increase than 
decrease. In a society where market liberalism is given increasingly 
more leeway on the expense of the weak in society it is important to 
secure political control of parts of the production apparatus (SV 
1999: 11). 
The Socialist Left Party will 
work to secure and further 
develop municipal 
enterprises and services (SV 
1999: 12).  
The 
Environment 
Green Party 
(MDG) 
MDG’s municipal programme from 1999 was not available. In the national programme from 1997 
is however, the following passage relevant. “MDG will stabilize the economy, among other factors 
through de-capitalizing the means of production. This means that propriety rights are brought into 
settings where they are not subject to purchase or sale, this does not have to indicate public 
ownership. We seek diversity in ownership structures, and we will prioritize collective, local 
ownership and worker/employee owned enterprises (MDG 1997: 10).  
The Norwegian 
Labour Party 
(DNA) 
One of the fashionable terms of our times is competitive tendering. 
This means nothing else than private companies doing public 
services. Municipal activities are largely driven by tax incomes. That 
is the reason for efficient and rational management within the 
framework the demands for quality raises. A public institution can do 
this just as well as a private enterprise (DNA 1999b). Society is to a 
large degree steered by the market and by market forces. We are 
convinced that a society with strong political steering will prevent 
larger differences between people, and secure the social security 
nets that we are proud of today(DNA 1999a: 2).  
KEV is not directly or 
indirectly addressed in the 
99-3 municipal programme 
(DNA 1999a).  
The Liberal 
Party (V) 
Topic not explicitly mentioned in the local programme (Venstre 
1999). The national party programme from 1997 states that public 
ownership must be justified based on considerations to the 
KEV is not mentioned in the 
99-3 municipal programme 
but suggests advisory 
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Parties in 
Kristiansand 
City Council 
99-038. 
Position on public ownership and/or competitive tendering in 
the 99-3 municipal party programme, and/or in respective 
national programmes. 
Position on the Agder 
Energi question in the 99-3 
municipal party 
programme9. 
administration of important national recourses, and/or control with 
natural monopolies where it is difficult to imagine ordinary 
competition. Other activities will also naturally lie with the public 
because other considerations than private cost-benefit analysis’s 
must be emphasised (Venstre 1997: 6)11. 
referendums on important 
issues (Venstre 1999: 2). 
The Christian 
Democratic 
Party (KrF)12 
We will work for public assets to be made available to those that 
need it the most. In relation to this can competitive tendering be tried 
out (KrF 1999b: 4). 
KEV is not mentioned in the 
99-3 municipal programme 
(KrF 1999a). 
The 
Conservative 
Party (H)13 
The Conservative Party will continue competitive tendering of 
municipal services (Høyre 1999). 
The Conservative Party will 
release capital through 
opening for new part owners 
in Kristiansand Energiverk 
(KEV) (Høyre 1999).  
The Progress 
Party (Frp) 
The Progress Party will work to increase competitive tendering in 
order to get more value for each krone (Frp 1999).  
The Progress Party will 
improve the municipality’s 
economy through selling up 
to 33% of Kristiansand 
Energiverk (KEV) (Frp 
1999). 
Sørlandslista 
(DEM)14 
Representatives were elected on the Progress Party’s political 
platform. 
Representatives were 
elected on the Progress 
Party’s political platform. 
The Pensioner 
Party (PP) 
PP municipal programme from 1999 was not available. In a flyer 
from 1999 PP don’t mention local/public ownership or competitive 
tendering (PP 1999). 
No data. 
  
The result of the vote (under case 128/01) was that 34 of the 53 representatives in 
Kristiansand City Council voted in favour of sale and 19 voted against a sale. However, 
as voters we cannot expect that the political parties can foresee every relevant political 
issue that will come up during an election period, and tell the voters how they are going 
to vote on the issue. However, in 1999, the merger between three publicly owned 
hydroelectric producing companies (AAE, VAE, and KEV) was well advanced on its 
way in the political system, and Agder Energi AS was a reality in 2000. The sales 
process had in reality been in the political pipeline since 1996 when KEV was 
transformed into a public limited company (Altmann 1996). The sale of these stocks 
was therefore something that should have been directly addressed in the local party 
programmes, given the magnitude of the issue, and the planned alternative uses of the 
funds. The result of this process was the largest outsourcing of municipal resources in 
Norwegian history (Arnesen 2003: 15). Approximately NOK 2.1 billion was taken out 
of democratic control and placed into a new set of governance institutions, other 
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municipalities in Aust-Agder also set up smaller but similarly oriented institutions in the 
Agder region. 
It was however only two political parties that were addressing this issue directly 
in their party programmes. The Conservative Party (H) and The Progress Party (Frp), 
and then only as selling up-to a third (Frp) and a part of KEV (H), that in the summer 
2000 again became part of Agder Energi AS. None of the parties address that 
Kristiansand later literally gave all of their shares in VAE to CDFSN, or that they in 
2001 together with the labour party opted for selling all of the Agder Energi shares. The 
Environment Green Party (MDG) and The Socialist Left Party (SV) vote against a sale 
and they where sufficiently covered by general statements to do so in their respective 
party programmes.  
This means that only the Conservative Party and the Progress Party in 
Kristiansand had the political mandate from their electorates to sell a part of the Agder 
Energi shares. As for the other parties, the public was left to vote based on a general 
interpretation of the respective party’s views on public/local ownership, and/or 
competitive tendering.  
If we compare the actual voting to the statements in their respective political 
programmes available prior to the 1999 elections the following pattern emerges: 
Tab. 6-2: Actual Voting on the Agder Energi Question in Kristiansand Municipality 
Parties represented in Kristiansand 
City Council 1999-2003 
Representatives 
in the City 
Council 
Expected voting on the 
Agder Energi question 
(under case 128/01), 
given the relevant 
statements in the local 
party programmes  
Actual voting on the 
Agder Energi 
question (under case 
128/01). 
The Socialist Left Party (SV) 4 Against Voted against sale 
The Environment Green Party (MDG) 1 Against Voted against sale 
The Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) 9 Against Voted in favour of sale 
The Liberal Party (V) 3 Against Voted against sale 
The Christian Democratic Party (KrF) 10 Ambiguous Voted against sale 
The Conservative Party (H) 15 In favour Voted in favour of sale 
The Progress Party (Frp) 10 In favour Voted in favour of sale 
The Pensioner Party (PP) 1 No data Voted against sale 
 
The table shows that it was not any clear mandate or majority given from the 
electorate in the 1999 elections to sell the Agder Energi shares, and that it was The 
Kristiansand Labour Party that most clearly broke their “contract” with their voters. 
About a month before the 1999 municipal elections, 10 August 1999, Bjarne Ugland 
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signals to the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen that the labour party in Kristiansand also 
can agree on selling up to a third of Kristiansand’s shares in KEV (Vindsland 1999). 
What should have been done in this situation was to postpone the sales decision 
until after the 2003 elections, or alternatively arranged for an advisory referendum on 
the issue in 2001. I believe this is both a reasonable and relevant approach to the 
problem given the magnitude of the issue, the long-term consequences of a sale, the new 
dispositions and usages of the available funds. In particular, because of the weak 
anchoring the decision had among the electorate in Kristiansand City Council, and the 
weak anchoring the decision had among the citizens in the Agder region. 
However, this did not happen and Kristiansand City Council decided on 27 June 
2001 to sell its shares in Agder Energi AS, and to put these funds into foundations. The 
big question then is if we cannot use the respective party programmes from the 1999 
elections, pure financial rationales, or the particular political configuration in 
Kristiansand municipality to predict the outcome of the Agder Energi sales process, 
what was it then that determined the outcome? An account of why and how this 
happened is given in the following.  
This text will show why it was so important to sell Agder Energi and why it was 
so urgent to do so, even though most people probably knew, or should have known that 
financially it was a bad deal for the Agder municipalities. I will present an argument in 
the following that is supportive of the view that the relevant arguments supporting 
contradicting views were present in the local debate but these views were systematically 
characterised as irrelevant, and undermined, by what in the next chapter is 
conceptualised as a regional regime. A regime, which in the embrace of its own 
interpretations of the implications of the “new economy” was determined to sell “old 
economy” energy shares, almost regardless of the consequences. 
6.3 – The Regional Policy Agenda 
One of the central architects behind what here is conceptualized, as the regional policy 
agenda in the Agder region was Victor D. Norman. He is an economy professor from 
NHH Bergen (The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration). He 
has close ties to the Agder region, he was born in Risør in Aust-Agder, and from 1993 
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to 1995, he was working as a professor in international economy at Agder University 
College, in addition to this was he also working at Agder Research from 1993 to 1998. 
In 1994, Victor D. Norman worked on a project in Agder financed by KS (The 
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities). The project was called 
“Common Goals on Agder – A development programme for Sørlandet” (Norman et al. 
1994). The final document was built on a basis for discussion that was developed by 
eight chief officers in Agder, among them Erling Valvik. Victor D. Norman (Agder 
University College/Agder Research), Jon P. Knudsen (Agder Research), and Helge 
Røed (KS) constituted the secretariat and thus responsible for putting the document into 
writing.  
This document was submitted to hearing in the municipalities in Agder before it 
was finalised late in 1994. The fourteen-page document contains a description of what 
the challenges for the region are and it suggests solutions to these problems. In the 
following, I will give an account of the recommendations given in this document. I 
believe these are important since this document later is being used as an argument in 
favour of, and a legitimatisation of, many of the policy- and network initiatives that later 
are taken in the region, such as Knutepunkt Sørlandet, Agderrådet, Sydspissen, the 
competence funds and Cultiva. In this sense, the document gains status over time as a 
common point of reference for many of the regional governance initiatives that are 
taken in the following years. In addition, I would argue that this document is a 
significant part of the explanation for how regional governance in the Agder region 
essentially develops into a self-referring system, as many of the new governance 
initiatives refer back to this document for justification. The document is, as the 
following text shows, unmistakably biased towards the “new-economy”, and does in a 
way set the standard for how regional stakeholders in the Agder region gain preference 
towards and conceptualise the implications of the “new-economy”.  
Common Goals on Agder starts out with a rather gloomy depiction of the 
economic and social situation in the region. The unemployment level is too high, the 
level of average income is too low, and it states that a series of medical and social 
indicators show that many of the citizens in the region struggle. On the positive side is 
the region marked with good conditions for living and recreation. When it comes to 
predicting the future trends, Common Goals on Agder states that:  
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One should expect decline in employment within many of the traditional industrial 
enterprises in the region – especially within energy-intensive industries. Even without the 
problems the region have today an action programme would be needed. If we look at the 
future developments in employment combined with today’s problems, concrete measures 
become twice as important (Norman et al. 1994: 2)15.  
Given that this brief introduction, the Common Goals on Agder continues with an 
argument that essentially says that the necessary measures must have a certain profile. 
Because it is not industrial developments which have created immigration to, and 
growth in, the region, it is immigration itself that has created industrial development. It 
is the image or perception of an attractive region to live in that has made people move 
to the region – and this has in turn led to the establishment of a large number of smaller 
enterprises within industry and the service sector in the region. Common Goals on 
Agder states that this phenomenon is not unique for this region. Internationally, the 
same phenomenon lies behind the economical growth in “sunny” California, South-
England and Provence. On this basis, Common Goals on Agder argues that: 
The best way to promote economical development in the region is to support this 
tendency. Empiric data shows that many municipalities achieves limited effect of pure 
support measures aimed directly against the industries, while much can be achieved 
through making the region an attractive place to live and to do business. The means that 
development measures must be concentrated towards measures aimed at improving 
service levels, infrastructure, and physical environments (Norman et al. 1994: 2).  
In Common Goals on Agder it is argued that it is important that the region 
develops one regional geographical centre, and that the development programme is 
focused on infrastructure, education, culture, milieu, and public service (Norman et al. 
1994: 3). The dominating part of financing the programme must be done using state 
funds. However, there are also possibilities for regional participation in financing the 
programme, and Common Goals on Agder identifies two sources:  
One source is the incomes the municipalities have from producing hydro-electrical 
power. Traditionally has hydro-electrical power resources been the main source of the 
workplaces in the region. We cannot count on this being the case to the same extent in the 
continuation. Owners of hydro-electrical power will increasingly get access to financial 
resources. This resource, that the municipalities as future oriented owners have created, 
can be used to build tomorrow’s infrastructure in the region and thereby lay the 
foundations for an attractive industry. It is important that these incomes are not used on 
running expenses, among other things because of shifts in the prices on hydro-electrical 
power and interests rates. The second source is the funds that municipalities and counties 
today use to directly support industrial developments. Even though many of these 
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resources yield positive results, will they be more profitable if they are fuelled into long-
term developments of the regions infrastructure (Norman et al. 1994: 3).  
The concrete suggestions and elements in Common Goals on Agder are listed in 
the table below: 
Fig. 6-2:  Common Goals on Agder, Norman et al. (1994) 
Main elements in 
Common Goals on 
Agder: 
Description: 
1) Physical infrastructure 
 Good and attractive physical infrastructure is decisive for a location being 
attractive as a place of residence and as a location for industries (Norman et al. 
1994: 4)  
1a) New trunk road. 
 It is decisive for the development of the Agder region that the road between 
Stavanger and Oslo through Agder gets upgraded to motorway standards 
(Norman et al. 1994: 4).  
1b) Development of a 
central port in 
Kristiansand and 
increase the capacity of 
the airport in 
Kristiansand. 
 In the long term it is only basis for a few central ports in Norway. Kristiansand 
will be one of these. But if this port is going to be competitive must all the 
resources in the region join together around this. In the same fashion must the 
region join up on Kjevik as the regional airport (Norman et al. 1994: 5). 
1c) The larger cities in 
the Agder region must 
focus on urban renewal 
and centre 
developments. 
 Suggest development of city renewal plans and development of centre 
functions in all of the cities in the region (Norman et al. 1994: 7). 
1d) Strengthening of 
public transport. 
 Common Goals on Agder states that collective transport based on railways not 
is realistic, but collective bus transportations must be strengthened in the aide 
of the elderly, handicapped and those too young to drive themselves (Norman 
et al. 1994: 7). 
1e) Railway. 
 Common Goals on Agder suggest that the ongoing work to upgrade 
Sørlandsbanen continues but that the motorway initiative must be prioritised 
(Norman et al. 1994: 8). 
2) Research, education 
and culture. 
 Good education- and culture services are decisive in order to attract people and 
enterprises to the region. Close contact with industries on one side and 
research and higher education on the other side is just as decisive for the 
further development of the existing industries (Norman et al. 1994: 8). 
2a) Strengthen of Agder 
University College. 
 Support the process of developing Agder University College into a University 
(Norman et al. 1994: 8). 
2b) Build premises for 
culture institutions. 
 The region must have permanent and professional culture services if the region 
shall be able to compete for key personnel and key industries. The region has a 
long way to go before it can offer fully developed culture services (Norman et al. 
1994: 9). 
2c) Make history visible. 
 The region has many places of historical interests, museums, collections etc. 
These offers must be more marketed and coordinated in order to be of benefit 
to tourists and permanent residents (Norman et al. 1994: 10). 
3) Physical environment 
and recreation. 
 In the competition for citizens and enterprises natural environment and 
recreation possibilities are increasingly becoming more important. Today 
tourism is in the skerries, acid rain, local pollution from the heavy industries, 
and local sewage problems contributing to weakening the image of the region 
as a “pure” area (Norman et al. 1994: 11). 
4) Public service. 
 The quality of public services is among the most important things individuals 
and enterprises assess when they decide place of residence and localisation 
(Norman et al. 1994).  
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Main elements in 
Common Goals on 
Agder: 
Description: 
5) National state 
workplaces localised to 
Sørlandet. 
 Initiate systematic work to promote the development of and the establishment of 
larger national units to the region (Norman et al. 1994: 13). 
6) Living conditions at 
Sørlandet. 
 Initiate a research project about living conditions and health in the region, in 
order to find out more about the reasons behind the problems (Norman et al. 
1994: 13). 
 
References to Common Goals on Agder are later used in order to legitimate many 
other institutional developments in the region for instance Knutepunkt Sør (see 
appendix). The governance network Cultiva, where the Managing Director is Erling 
Valvik, also uses references to Common Goals on Agder in its main strategy document 
(Cultiva 2006: 2). Here it is also stated that:  
Today Agder Energi is still a vital energy company with hydroelectric production of 
energy as its core activity. We still have energy-intensive industries in the region with 
new possibilities for value creation. But no-one believes that growth in employment will 
come here [my emphasis] (Cultiva 2006: 2). 
The most direct effect of Common Goals on Agder was that it served as the 
political platform for Agderrådet that was set up in 1995. Agderrådet is a regional 
partnership where all of the thirty municipalities and the two counties in the region are 
represented with their chief officers and their mayors. In addition, NHO and LO from 
both counties are represented and a representative from Agder University College is 
also present, thus making it possible to later identify Agderådet as a triple-helix 
institution. The main purpose of Agderådet was from the start to realise the ambitions in 
Common Goals on Agder. Since then Agderrådet has gained status and authority in the 
region as a coordinating policy institution between sectors and administrative levels. 
Agderådet has no actual formal authority and is based on the members’ sense of “moral 
obligations” to follow up Agderrådet’s suggestions. (J. P. Knudsen 2002a). 
When the network Sydspissen was set up in 1999 this initiative was also based on 
a follow up of Common Goals on Agder. Sydspissen was set up as a broad regional 
public-private partnership that was meant as a coordinating instrument between the 
private and the public sector in the region. In practice it was set up as an umbrella 
organization that had other industrial interest and development organisations as 
members, the main idea behind Sydspissen was to market the Agder region nationally as 
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a competence based and innovative region (Sydspissen 2005). On its web page, 
Sydspissen phrases its statutes in the following way [my translation]: 
(i) Sydspissen shall influence decision-making processes in the public sector through 
being a serious collaborator and body entitled to comment for authorities on a regional 
level and create understanding to the needs of the private sector in relation to decision-
making processes in the public sector. (ii) Sydspissen shall make the most of public 
development programmes such as ARENA [a nationally financed development 
programme], so that enterprises in the Agder region get an increasingly larger portion of 
these funds. (iii) Sydspissen shall secure that enterprises in the Agder region collaborate 
more efficiently and together identify solutions for a common good. So that more and 
sustainable milieus that are competitive also on a national level develops. (iv) Sydspissen 
shall lift the general competencies among fellow workers in the Agder industry in such a 
way that the enterprises become more competitive and less dependent on outside 
competencies16 [My emphasis]. 
Sydspissen was established in November 199917 by a number of interest 
organisations and public actors in the Agder region18. After a while some regionally 
based companies also join, and in November 2001 Kjell O. Johannessen was hired as a 
daily manager19. In addition, Sydspissen had a written manifest called Common Agenda, 
which contains many of the same elements as Common Goals on Agder. Common 
Agenda was first communicated to the citizens in the Agder region July 1999 by the 
director of NHO Vest-Agder who at the time was Theis H. Pedersen (T. H. Pedersen 
1999), Common Agenda contains eleven separate elements:  
1) Contribute to Agder University College becoming a University, through close 
collaboration between the college and the industry. 
2) Develop a strong R&D milieu between the College, Agder research, and other R&D 
milieus and the industry. 
3) Stimulate the development of research parks in Grimstad and Kristiansand, in addition 
to a growth of parks and technology centres other places in the region. 
4) Continue to develop good collaboration between the industry, the public sector, and 
knowledge milieus in the region independent of geography. 
5) Create an entrepreneurial and innovation friendly culture in the opinion, the industry, 
the educational system, and in public administration. 
6) Contribute to the development of an improved physical infrastructure in the form of 
roads, ferries, and railroad. 
7) Stimulate to the development and active use of an “electronic motorway” in the region 
(broadband). 
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8) Document, profile and market the regional competence demanding an innovative 
“industrial milieu” within the region, externally towards the rest of the country, and 
towards some defined areas abroad. 
9) Collaborate on finance projects from external national and international sources. 
10) Inform each other and collaborate on strategies and activities that lie with the 
different actors that participate in Sydspissen. 
11) Contribute to the realization of other measures for increased quality of living in the 
region (Sydspissen 2000). 
Both Common Goals on Agder and Common Agenda resulted in a lot of “spin-
off” institutions and networks in the region, the ambitions of realising a University in 
the region were integrated in CDFSN’s working agenda but also through two other 
networks called the University committee and the University foundation. The work to 
realise the trunk road was set up in a separate “activist” programme called “better trunk 
road to Sørlandet”, the initiatives to build broadband in the region were addressed in a 
similar fashion, and the same goes for measures aimed at stimulating entrepreneurship 
and innovation. The list of new network institutions that have emerged as a result of 
Common Goals on Agder and Common Agenda is very long and has resulted in a very 
complex and diffuse institutional landscape in the region (see the appendix in order to 
get an indication). 
In 2003 Common Goals on Agder was updated, and a very similar process as the 
one in 1994 was executed. This time the secretariat consists of only Jon P. Knudsen and 
Helge Røed. Victor D. Norman does not participate, but Erling Valvik as chief officer 
represents Kristiansand municipality as he did in 1994, together with seven other chief 
officers from the Agder region. The group responsible for developing the “updated” 
document also consists of Tine Sundtoft representing NHO Agder.  
This time around the regional policy document is called Common Goals on 
Sørlandet (J. P. Knudsen & Røed 2003). Common Goals on Sørlandet does in reality 
not contain much new things compared to the Common Goals on Agder and the 
Common Agenda documents, and is with a few exceptions in practice a merger of 
Common Goals on Agder and Common Agenda. The overreaching perspective on 
regional development as a marketing challenge remains from Common Goals on Agder 
and Common Agenda. In addition, the idea of regions in competition with each other is 
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also articulated vividly throughout the document. It also contains the same main 
preferences towards the new economy as previously discussed in relation to the other 
two policy documents. In addition to this, a plan on how to restructure Agderrådet is 
outlined, here is it, among other things, stated that the competence fund’s in the region 
in addition to Cultiva shall be included in Agderrådet as part of a reference group (J. P. 
Knudsen & Røed 2003: 24). The main points of Common Goals on Sørlandet are 
outlined in the table below: 
Tab. 6-3: Common Goals on Sørlandet, Knudsen and Røed (2003: 8-9) 
Main elements in 
Common Goals on 
Sørlandet: 
Description: 
The main goal for 
the development 
work on Sørlandet 
is to: 
 Develop a robust region that is competitive with other regions nationally and 
internationally. 
Competence and 
learning: 
 Develop Agder University College into a University, in close collaboration with the 
industry and the public sector in the region. 
 Build a competence milieu in Arendal, based on the FN-university in Arendal, GRID, 
Havforskningsinstituttet in Flødevigen, the hospital, and Agder University College’s 
activities. 
 Sørlandets Hospital HF, develops capacities which are competitive with other 
hospitals in Norway as well as internationally when it comes to competence, quality, 
and capacity. The competence funds and other regional actors must contribute to this. 
 The project “the digital Sørland” is realized in such a way that both the municipalities 
and the industry become leading in the use of information technology. 
 The services on decentralized college education are further developed. 
Culture and 
experiences: 
 The municipalities and the counties in the region must increase their combined 
contribution to culture significantly. 
 The region [Sørlandet] must still work to get their fair share of the national state 
support to culture institutions such as Agder Theater and Kristiansand Symphony 
orchestra, in such a way that these develop into adequate institutions. 
Trunk roads: 
 E-18 between Grimstad and Kristiansand (as four-lane motorway) and the Lister 
package are realized as OPS projects within the defined timeframe. 
 The work to upgrade the other parts of the trunk road is given high priority ahead. 
 RV 9 through Setesdal (inner part of Agder) to Vestlandet (West-Norway) is upgraded 
to adequate standards. 
Agder Express: 
 Through increased coordination of the existing services is it developed an express 
bus route along the trunk road through the region and to central road junctions in the 
inner parts of Agder. 
Airport: 
 More airlines traffic Kjevik airport, and more competition and better services both on 
price and frequency. 
 The road to Kjevik from E-18 is improved. 
 The future utilization of Lista airport is investigated. 
Port:  Kristiansand port retains its position as one of the most important ports in Norway. 
Broadband:  The whole region gets access to broadband services. 
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Main elements in 
Common Goals on 
Sørlandet: 
Description: 
Marketing and 
internationalization: 
 It is done a systematic investigation of what expectations youth under the age of 30, 
has to the region. 
 It is established a united and more coordinated marketing of the region as a travel 
destination, place of residence, and place to localize business. 
 It is built regional competence on regional EU-collaboration. The region establishes 
regional representation in Brussels. 
 It is built heavier international activities associated with aid, human rights, 
environment, and democracy, also in our region. 
Equal 
opportunities: 
 It is developed a programme on increased equality and female participation in all parts 
of societal life. 
 The municipalities in the region commit to the realization of full kindergarten coverage 
within 2007. 
Partnership for 
implementation: 
 Municipalities in Agder engage in closer regional collaboration to promote 
development work within the different functional regions. 
 Both counties in their work on regional development engage in close collaboration 
with the municipalities and the regions that now are under development within and 
cross county boarders. 
 Region state institutions should be organized in such a way that they can better 
collaborate with the other regional development actors. 
 Evje’s role as regional centre for inner Agder is strengthened through re-localization of 
some regional and smaller national responsibilities. 
 Municipalities and counties engage in closer collaboration on regional development 
within the framework of a strengthened Agderråd. 
 Roles and responsibilities within the public, semi-public institutions, and organizations 
that shall look after regional interests are clarified. 
 
Only a few things are unique to Common Goals on Sørlandet and I believe these 
changes could be important if they are addressed with the same vigour and intensity as 
other policy measures in Common Goals on Agder and the Common Agenda. In relation 
to this, I would highlight three separate elements from the table above. Firstly, this 
relates to the introduction of equal opportunities as a separate point. Secondly, the sub 
point, under the partnership for implementation heading, relating to the importance of 
clarification of roles and responsibilities within the governance system (last point). And 
thirdly, the small subordinate end sentence, under the marketing and internationalization 
heading, implying that also democracy in the Agder region, in addition to the 
international dimension, should be addressed more.  
Something That Everybody Agrees Upon 
The regional policy agenda as it has developed in the Agder region has proven to be 
very influential, and probably much more influential than its originators dared to 
anticipate back in 1994. See discussions of this under the regional meta governance sub 
chapter. The regional policy agenda has gained status as “something that everybody 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 248 - 
agrees upon” to use the phrasing applied by some of the stakeholders that I interviewed 
as part of this thesis work. The regional policy agenda is on the surface a little bit of 
everything, so generally phrased most will be able to identify and sympathize with one 
or more of the bullet points, thus being effective in the sense that a flat out refusal of the 
regional policy agenda becomes practically impossible.  
The regional policy agenda also unquestionably represents a full-hearted embrace 
of the “new-economy”, and it anticipates a rapid “goodbye” to the “old-economy”, and 
represents in this sense bad news for the thousands of people in the Agder region that 
are in the “unlucky” position of being employed in the “old” industries. The regional 
development capital is hereby reserved for the creative and intellectual class. The 
regional policy agenda thus represents a regional embrace of regional development 
concepts such as triple-helix, creative class, regional cluster thinking, and the embrace 
of the idea of the new knowledge driven economy itself, almost as if knowledge was a 
phenomenon that just has emerged. 
For people interested in culture as a value on its own merits it should be 
heartbreaking to see culture instrumentally used only as a marketing and image-building 
instrument – as a cold tool to promote economic growth. The perspective on equal 
opportunities is here also growth friendly because it contributes to the mobilisation of a 
larger work force and increased value creation, and is in the perspective of the policy 
agenda important because it enables the region to attract working and “creative” moms 
and dads. I have not seen a single regional policy document or interviewed a single 
regional stakeholder who emphasised equal opportunities, and many of them both male 
and females did, as an obvious and natural component of any modern democratic 
society; equal opportunities was always legitimized as part of either an economic 
growth, innovation, or marketing argument.  
Because this regional policy agenda is not a broad and inclusive societal oriented 
development plan, it is narrow in its focus on economic growth for the sake of economic 
growth. The regional policy agenda is virtually stripped of any normative justifications 
and reasoning around what constitutes a “good society”. It nourishes the idea of regions 
in competition with each other, and it promotes the idea that regional development as 
primarily a marketing strategy where image and perception is everything. The regional 
policy agenda is also in many instances so bluntly self-serving that you almost can read 
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out of the finished strategy plan which one of the group members/institutions who 
contributed to the separate bullet points.  
The very idea that the regional policy agenda represents the common interests of 
the citizens in the Agder region is therefore difficult to follow using reasonable 
interpretations of the words common and interests. Why and how it was possible that 
only small group of unelected people, representing special interests, was let to forge 
these important documents is a question that many people in the region should ask 
themselves, and in particular how this was possible in what we thought was a society 
governed by democratic values. That elected representatives sanctioned two of the three 
documents do not change the reality and importance of this question. 
6.4 – Financing Governance 
In 1994, the Agder region got a plan on how the region should face the challenges of the 
new millennium. This was however, a plan that required that regional development 
resources were restructured and funnelled in a different direction than what traditionally 
had been the case. The liberalization of the Norwegian energy market provided actors 
willing and able to act with just such an opportunity. 
The Market Set-Up 
In 1990, the Storting decided that the Norwegian electrical power market should be 
deregulated, with effect from 1 January 1991. The Norwegian electrical power market 
was institutionalized as Statnett in 1992, and in the following year a Norwegian 
electrical power exchange Statnett Marked AS was initiated. In 1996, Swedish Svenska 
Kraftnät came in as a 50 % partner, and the exchange is renamed to Nord Pool, and 
with this the Nordic electrical power exchange market was a reality. The European 
market was liberalized in 1997, the Finnish energy market became part of Nord Pool in 
1998, and the Danish joined in 1999/2000. 
The developments in Norway did in a sense mirror similar developments all over 
Western Europe. It is however said that Norway was a pioneer in the privatization and 
liberalization of the energy market in Western Europe, and it is still one of the countries 
that has gone furthest in terms of market liberalization (Arnesen 2003: 8). 
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Preparing the Market Competitors 
A parallel development to the institutionalization of Nord Pool, was the development to 
turn municipal owned hydroelectric power production into public companies, and first 
in line was Bergen, Trondheim, and Kristiansand (Altmann 1996). 24 September 1996 a 
unanimous board of directors in Kristiansand Energiverk (KEV) voted to transform 
KEV into a public company. This is by the newspaper Aftenposten the following day 
interpreted as the first preparing step in order to sell the company (Altmann 1996). The 
chief officer in Kristansand, Erling Valvik, said in a responding comment that:  
There are many reasons for restructuring the energy companies. That it opens up to 
further restructuring is one thing, another is that it limits the municipalities exposure to 
risk. Today that risk is exposed straight into the municipalities’ funds. This is not an ideal 
situation. If we use the corporation model, which means to divide the company into many 
limited companies, we spread this risk. Another reason is that it is not just the 
responsibility of municipalities and counties to provide its citizens with electricity 
anymore. Restructuring gives the energy companies increased latitude, and limited 
companies can now plan their tax policies more efficiently, thus protecting the values in 
the company in a better way, and last if we sell the stocks KEV can be supplied with 
more competencies in the board of directors (Altmann 1996). 
In the same newspaper article a representative from The Progress Party (Frp) 
Vidar Kleppe, second chairman of the board in KEV, says that he wishes to sell a third 
of the stocks in KEV20. The two representatives from the Labor Party on the KEV board 
say in a comment that selling is not an option at this time. The rest of the newspaper 
article is devoted to how attractive the energy stocks are and contain interviews with 
some of the potential buyers of these stocks (Altmann 1996).  
The tax issue mentioned by Valvik is important because the municipalities could 
change the status of the capital in the newly formed shareholders’ companies from 
equity capital to subordinated loan. Municipalities and the new companies would save a 
lot in taxes. In 1999 alone, municipalities in Norway changed NOK 4 billion worth of 
equity capital into subordinated loans. Oslo Energi Holding AS and Viken Energinett 
saved NOK 100 million in taxes on such moves, Lyse Energi AS saved approximately 
NOK 70 million on a similar action (Bjørnestad 2000). 
Jan Pedersen is the new director in KEV, and he is given a 32% salary raise, that 
makes him the highest paid person employed by Kristiansand municipality. The salary 
raise does not just happen in KEV but is a trend in all of the previously 
municipal/county administrated companies that has been turned into public limited 
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companies. In Kristiansand, representatives from all of the political parties except The 
Conservative Party protest the salary raise, fearing that this will have implications for 
the salary demands elsewhere in the municipality. Jan Pedersen says in a comment to 
the newspaper Aftenposten that politicians must stop squinting at the chief officer in 
Kristansand, Erling Valvik, when they discuss the salary of the director in KEV 
(Altmann 1997a). 
In June 1997 electrical power is just as cheap as it was before deregulation on 1 
January 1991. KEV sells power to consumers at a variable price of NOK 0.2590 per 
kWh, the lowest level in ten years. The newspaper Aftenposten gathers some market 
expert opinions to comment and get a divided feedback, some believe that the price will 
continue to drop, others believe that it has reached a low level and will start to rise again 
(Altmann 1997b). A year later is the price still at a record low level, the price in the spot 
market is between NOK 0.04 and 0.05 per kWh, and the dams are overflowing. The 
hydro electrical producers are on average running on just 20-30% of their full capacity; 
the only reason that anything at all is produced is that most dams already are full. In the 
meantime Norway is importing 5.7% of its electric power consumption from coal 
producers in Denmark (Rønningsbakk 1998).  
Early 1999 the consultancy Arthur Andersen here working for Statkraft, delivers a 
report that is meant to provide arguments to the process of deregulating the electric 
power market even more. The issue is that 60% of Statkraft’s production is tied up to 
long-term contracts with the process industry; the Storting decides the prices on these 
deliveries. Statkraft believes that it would be more profitable if they could produce 
directly for the open market. The Arthur Andersen report therefore states that foreign 
investments in industries that have such beneficiary contracts have gone up from 4 % in 
1990 to 51% in 1998 (Rønningsbakk 1998). The problem with the Arthur Andersen 
report is that it in 1998 only was 44 enterprises in Norway with such contracts, and that 
foreign investments in just one of these enterprises influence the percentages 
significantly. For instance, when Elkem sold their mangan production in Sauda to 
French Eramet, the percentage of foreign investments rose with 3% in the long-term 
energy contract segment of the industry. In light of this, an 11% rise in foreign 
investments in eight years is not very dramatic. However, these long-term contracts are 
probably an important incentive for Statkraft to buy up as many municipal owned 
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electrical power producers as possible. At the time Statkraft had ambitions of becoming 
the dominant actor in the Nordic market, as well as a provider of electrical power to 
customers all over Northern Europe (Rønningsbakk 1999a). 
In November 1999, the Conservative majority in the executive committee of the 
City Council in Trondheim decided to sell 49 % of it shares in Trondheim E-verk 
(TEV). The Labor Party in Trondheim was opposed to sales of these shares, and a 
representative from The Socialist Left Party (SV) Knut Fagerbakke, made a couple of 
statements that now has become painstakingly true for all of the municipalities that 
decided to sell their shares in this period, he said: 
If we sell, we loose control of our natural resources, we loose employment, and the 
municipality looses future incomes. Another thing is that this is the least beneficiary point 
in time to sell, because when oil probably is going to be more heavily taxed in the future 
then will the value of hydroelectric production rise. This means that this is the most 
beneficiary time for those who wants to buy hydro-electric production to do so, we should 
therefore not sell, and not now (Rønningsbakk 1999b). 
In Agder the sales process is at a deadlock at the same time as Trondheim decides 
to sell their shares in TEV. Fifteen municipalities in Vest-Agder County together own 
Vest-Agder Energiverk (VAE). VAE is estimated to be worth several billion, but the 
municipalities cannot agree upon how the statutes are going to be interpreted and 
consequently how the wealth is going to be distributed among them, the threat of 
arbitration lingers. The statues originating from the 1930s say that every municipality 
owns an equal 15th part of VAE, and that it has to be an unanimous vote to change the 
statutes. The larger municipalities in Vest-Agder County contest this equal distribution 
because they contribute more to the wealth because they have more inhabitants. The 
chief officer in Flekkefjord, Helge Nilsen, said at the time that it is wrong that a small 
municipalities with less than on thousand inhabitants shall get just as much of the value 
creation as the larger municipalities. While the chief officer in Åseral, Rune Stokke, one 
of the smaller municipalities, said that they have the natural resources (the dams) and 
therefore they shall count just as much as the larger municipalities (Larsen 1999). In 
Aust-Agder County things are going a bit smoother, the municipalities here are able to 
agree upon a merger between Arendal Energi, worth NOK 618 million and Aust-Agder 
Kraftverk, worth NOK 3.7 billion. The new company is named Aust-Agder Energiverk 
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(AAE). Arendal municipality realizes NOK 320 million as a result of the merger and 
owned in addition 7 percent of the new AAE company (Altmann 2000).  
However, the planned merger between KEV, AAE, and VAE in June 2000 forces 
the 15 municipalities in Vest-Agder County to reach an agreement on the distribution of 
the VAE wealth, and they reach an interesting compromise. Three of the four large 
municipalities got 7.33 percent each (22 percent of VAE). A 15th part would have 
surmounted to 6.67 percent. The eleven small municipalities got 5.73 percent each (63 
percent of VAE). A loan for NOK 500 million in VAE, is distributed equally among the 
fifteen municipalities in Vest Agder. The municipality of Kristiansand and its chief 
officer Erling Valvik is instrumental in providing for the solution to the VAE problem. 
Kristiansand who owns KEV alone gives up its claims in VAE, and places its share and 
in return the remaining 15 percent of VAE is put into a competence fund for Vest-
Agder, this is what later becomes CDFSN (Skøien 2000a).  
Kristiansand gives up its rightful 6.67% share of VAE, on the condition that the 
other municipalities in Vest-Agder County provide the new fund with enough shares 
that it amounts to 15 % of VAE in total, at the time estimated to be worth NOK 840 
million. The other 14 municipalities agree on this, thus making CDFSN the largest 
shareholder in VAE before the merger with KEV and AAE (Rønningsbakk 2000b).  
Magne Dåstøl administrates CDFSN. The plan is to mobilize the municipalities in 
Aust-Agder County in a similar fashion. The municipalities in Aust-Agder are asked to 
put in another 15%, approximately NOK 50 million each, a total of NOK 750 million, 
into CDFSN. If this had succeeded it would have put CDFSN and Kristiansand 
municipality with a solid negative majority in the new Agder Energi company, the end 
result was however that their combined ownership position remained at 33.6 percent in 
Agder Energi. The attempt to include the Aust-Agder municipalities into CDFSN did 
not succeed, but the first major governance institution in the Agder region was now 
financed, and an important alliance partner for Kristiansand municipality, in its attempt 
to sell all of the shares in Agder Energi, was secured. 
Selling Off Agder Energi 
In the merger between VAE, AAE, and KEV it was agreed that no one should start to 
sell energy shares before 45 days had passed. 15 August 2000 the owners met to discuss 
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their strategies. Chief officer in Kristiansand, Erling Valvik, and the mayor Bjørg 
Wallevik emphasize to the local newspaper that it is a process that has only started and 
that a sale of Kristiansand’s shares not is imminent. The other municipalities in Agder 
are however given a 45-day deadline to answer if they wish to join in on the sales 
process. The plan is to clarify the sales process within the year. Valvik emphasizes to 
the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen that it not is in the best interest of the municipality of 
Kristiansand to have billions locked up in energy shares (Skøien 2000b).  
During the autumn of 2000 the Arthur Andersen consultant Frank J. Berg, go 
hunting for potential buyers, and more municipalities other than Kristiansand signal a 
wish to sell shares in Agder Energi AS (Reinertsen 2001b). The mayor in Arendal Alf-
Eivind Ljøstad, said in a comment to the newspaper Agderposten that Arendal’s 
decision to sell depends on the offer that is given on Agder Energi, - it has to match the 
value estimation of Agder Energi that we are being pictured, and that is NOK 15 billion 
(KommunalRapport 2000).  
17 October 2000 Kristiansand municipality assembles all of the municipalities 
interested in participating in the sales process, 23 of 30 meet and in addition CDFSN 
with 5.8 percent of the Agder Energi shares, making them the second largest owner 
represented. The Arthur Andersen consultant reports that he has been in contact with 
15-20 potential buyers, he says that between 5-10 are interesting, and that the goal is 
five concrete bids, and that it of course are foreign investors among the potential 
bidders. He also argues the view of Kristiansand municipality, –Agder Energi needs 
both capital and an industrial partner in order to develop, and the municipalities owning 
Agder Energi need money for important and good purposes.  
On 23 November 2000 Victor D. Normans turns to contribute publicly, the 
economy professor from NHH Bergen gives a speech to the City Council in 
Kristiansand where he says that, –Many people seem to believe that it is in Agder 
Energi’s best interest to have the same owners as now in the future. That is a “pretty 
special” opinion, Victor D. Norman said (Reinertsen 2001b).  
In December 2000, Lyse Energi comes forward as one of the potential buyers of 
Agder Energi. The final closing date for bids is set to 16 Mach 2001. Later in January it 
is known that Statkraft also is a potential bidder. In February 2002 it is known that the 
third bidder is Belgian Electrabel (Reinertsen 2001b). The consultant from Arthur 
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Andersen comments to a newspaper that he is very satisfied with the bids for Agder 
Energi (Skøien 2001e). It was expected that Lyse Energi and Statkraft would be 
interested in buying Agder Energi. If Lyse Energi bought Agder Energi, they would also 
control Sira-Kvina with a production capacity of 6 TWh, which includes the largest 
hydroelectric power station in Norway, Tonstad Kraftverk, with an average annual 
production of 4169 GWh, and an effect of 960 MWh (KraftNytt 2006). It is said by 
market insiders that if you control Sira-Kvina, you can control the price in the Nord 
Pool market21 (Skøien 2001b). 
In February 2001 Magne Dåstøl, the chairman of the board in CDFSN owning 
5.81 percent of Agder Energi, goes on public record saying that CDFSN wishes to sell 
all of its shares in Agder Energi. He also opts for a merger or close collaboration with a 
similar fund to be set up in Aust-Agder County (Skøien 2001g).  
The problem for the two Norwegian buyers to Agder Energi, Statkraft and Lyse 
Energi, is that neither of them have 15 billion available. Statkraft is however supplied 
with NOK 6 billion by the government represented by the oil and energy minister Olav 
Akselsen (Labor Party), and an additional increase in Statkraft’s credit (NOK 10 billion) 
is also given (Flemming 2001b). Lyse Energi’s prime strategy was a merger between 
Agder Energi and Lyse Energi. The Managing Director in Lyse Energi said to the 
newspaper Aftenposten that they primarily was not interested in buying Agder Energi 
shares, but that Agder Energi was not interested in this. Lyse Energi therefore had to 
find a partner in their attempts to buy Agder Energi (Flemming 2001a). Lyse Energi 
therefore partner up with German EWE and offers NOK 14.3 billion for the Agder 
Energi shares in May 2001 (Lyse 2001). On 12 May 2001 it is reported that the board of 
directors in Agder Energi has accepted the offer made by Lyse/EWE, they presented a 
better financial offer than Statkraft (Aftenposten 2001a).  
Bjarne Ugland, leader of the labor party in Kristiansand, opposed to Agder Energi 
being sold to Lyse/EWE. He lobby with the labour government to get advice on how to 
get rid of Lyse/EWE (Reinertsen 2001b).  
On 29 May 2001 Ove Gusevik, director in the finance company First Securities, a 
man reported to have close ties to the labour party, and previously engaged by 
Kristiansand municipality to estimate the value of KEV, gives a speech at a national 
energy conference. Here he argues that if Lyse Energi bought Agder Energi then the 
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company would end up on foreign hands very quickly, he then strongly urged the 
audience, (most of the influential stakeholders in the Norwegian energy industry was 
present), to support Statkraft in their attempt to buy Agder Energi.  
The twist is that First Securities was partly owned by Lyse Energi’s prime bank 
association Sparebank1. Gusvik was therefore later forced to apologize to the managing 
director of Lyse Energi, Eimund Nygaard, for his behaviour as a non party to the Agder 
Energi case (Lillehammer 2001).  
At a closed ownership meeting in Agder 1 June 2001 it is decided that the 
negotiations with Statkraft shall be reopened. No official explanation is given 
(Reinertsen 2001b). One of the arguments that emerges later is that a merger between 
Lyse Energi and Agder Energi would not have given any room for selling any shares 
(Altmann & Natvik 2001). A very important implication of this is that the CDFSN’s 
chairman Magne Dåstøl and the chief officer in Kristiansand Erling Valvik’s plan, that 
were publicly announced in September 2000 (Henriksen 2000), to put NOK 2 billion 
into a planned culture foundation and NOK 800 million in CDFSN would not become a 
reality if Agder Energi merged with Lyse Energi.  
Eimund Nygaard later criticizes Arthur Andersen for their involvement in the 
sales process, and the consultancy is reported to The Financial Supervisory Authority of 
Norway, both for their role in the Agder Energi issue and for their role as auditors to 
Lyse’s bank association Sparebank1. It is rumoured that Statkraft who also used Arthur 
Andersen as consultants/auditors got a NOK 10 million bonus if Agder Energi signed 
with Statkraft (Aspaas 2001). This is later denied by Frank J. Berg, Kristiansand’s 
Arthur Andersen consultant, and has never been documented (Lillehammer 2001)22. 
In a record tempo, Arthur Andersen and Frank J. Berg negotiate a new contract 
with Statkraft. 10 June 2001 Statkraft has valued Agder Energi to NOK 14.4 billion, 
thus now exactly matching Lyse/EWE’s previous offer23. Bjarne Ugland, the leader of 
the labor party in Kristiansand, then said in a comment to the local newspaper that 
Kristiansand now can sell all of its 27.8% shares in Agder Energi, and that the City 
Council in Kristiansand can reach a decision to sell before the summer holidays. This 
stirs up much frustration among representatives from many of the other municipalities 
in the Agder region, because this could mean that regional control over Agder Energi is 
lost (Rønningsbakk 2001c). 
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Some of the municipalities that oppose Kristiansand’s strategy and want regional 
control to remain then organize themselves. This group led by Hans Fr. Grøvan the 
mayor from Lyngdal municipality, Alf-Eivind Ljøstad the mayor from Arendal 
municipality, Knut A. Austad the mayor from Bygland municipality, Sigmund Oksefjell 
the mayor from Kvinesdal municipality, and Kristian Sundtoft from Lillesand 
municipality. They are in August 2001 formalized as “the reference group for 
coordinating the sales of the Agder Energi shares”, and are given a mandate from the 
board of directors in Agder Energi. This group’s power over Kristiansand, and others 
that want to sell all of the shares in Agder Energi, lies much in the demand from 
Statkraft that there has to be at least a 2/3 majority in favour of selling the Agder Energi 
shares among the share holders. In addition, Statkraft demands that it must gain a so-
called negative majority in Agder Energi (34%) in order for Statkraft to be interested in 
buying Agder Energi at all. CDFSN and Kristiansand municipality own only 33.6% of 
the shares in Agder Energi, and is therefore dependent upon collaboration from some of 
the other municipalities in order for them to sell their shares to Statkraft (Skøien 2001c).  
In this setting, many of the other municipalities in the Agder region see 
themselves forced into a position where they must sell all of their shares in Agder 
Energi if Kristiansand and other municipalities decide to sell. The consultants are 
willingly contributing with advice for them to sell. Lars Ove Skorpen in Pareto 
Securities argues in the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen that if Statkraft gets more than 
50% of the shares then everybody must sell. Similar advice is given by a lawyer from 
Wiersholm Mellbye & Bech, – if Statkraft reaches 50% everyone must sell. 
Municipalities have little in return for owning hydroelectric companies and these 
companies have little in return for having municipalities as owners. The lawyer also 
“sabotage” the public image provided by Arthur Andersen and Kristiansand 
municipality, that the sale figure is NOK 14.4 billion, but the reality is NOK 11.733 
billion, the rest is loans, and interest and has nothing to do in a sales figure he says, but 
he emphasizes that it still is a good price.  
The “reference group’s” led by Hans Fr. Grøvan task is to coordinate sale/no sale 
among the 30 municipalities within 30 August 2001, and secure that the “magical 
threshold” of 50% is not passed. Grøvan said in a comment to the newspaper that he had 
the impression that 5-6 owners including CDFSN, were determined to sell all of their 
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shares in Agder Energi, that 16-17 municipalities would restrain from selling if it means 
that Agder Energi remains under regional control, and that 7-8 were considering to sell 
some of the shares (Rønningsbakk 2001b). Also the deputy mayor in Kristiansand, 
Harald Sødal (the Christian Conservative party) weighs in on the issue. He is indignant 
that Kristiansand is acting greedy and arrogant, and that the collaboration in the Agder 
region that has been built during the last 15 years is put back many steps. Further, he 
argues that – our generation of politicians now trade off what 20 political generations 
have built up. This is terrible. In addition to this, the price on Agder Energi is based on 
last year’s prognoses, and is therefore outdated now. Economically this is a bad deal, 
Sødal concludes (O. Pedersen 2001). Sødal also criticizes Statkraft for only giving the 
municipalities up until 31 August to agree on the deal that Statkraft has offered (Skøien 
2001f)24. 
Kristiansand is now more or less forced to move into a more moderate position, 
and agrees to secure regional control over Agder Energi. Kristiansand Labour party’s 
leader Bjarne Ugland opens up for Kristiansand to reduce Kristiansand’s sale with a 
couple of percent when they see how much the other municipalities in Agder wish to 
sell, so that the total sales figure for the Agder region combined is below 50% (Skøien 
2001d). 
The end deal is that Kristiansand sells 22.5% of their shares and agrees to keep 
5.2% of their Agder Energi shares, and that Arendal keeps 8.8% of their shares. Eleven 
municipalities in Agder decide not to sell any shares, the municipalities in the Agder 
region sells in total 45.5 percent of the shares in Agder Energi to Statkraft. Early 
September 2001 the deal with Statkraft goes into effect, the municipalities that have 
decided to sell believe that they have sold 45.5% of their shares to Statkraft for the price 
of NOK 5.9 billion, a figure that later is going to get significantly smaller. 
When questioned by a newspaper if this will mean that Kristiansand also is going 
to get financial returns from owning, Kristiansand’s chief officer, Erling Valvik, 
answers that this is bad business. –The average rate of return on mutual funds is much 
better than keeping the money in Agder Energi. This is a probability estimate on my 
side, which the other municipalities in the region do not agree on (Rønningsbakk 
2001d). The Arthur Andersen consultant, Frank J. Berg also weighs in, –it is worth 
NOK 3.6 to 3.8 billion more to sell the Agder Energi shares and put the money into 
Chapter 6 – Regional Governance 
- 259 - 
mutual funds than for the municipalities in Agder to own the shares themselves, he 
argues (Skøien 2001f).  
The Norwegian Competition Authority 
During the autumn 2001, Statkraft bought 49.9% of BKK in Bergen (price NOK 3.3 
billion), 100% of the shares in Trondheim Energiverk (price NOK 4.25 billion) in 
addition to 45.5% in Agder Energi. Statkraft had with this ownership control of 53% of 
the Norwegian hydro electrical power production, and was close to reaching its goal of 
55-60% market control (Aftenposten 2001b). Statkraft’s new market position due to the 
2001 acquisitions results in serious criticism from many market actors. The director in 
Nord Pool, Torger Lien, argues that Statkraft becomes so large that they destroy the 
market mechanism (Bjørnestad 2002a). A representative for PIL, the interest 
organization for the process industry that uses 40 of the 118 TWh annually consumed in 
Norway at the time, argues that Statkraft with this will be able to determine the market 
price, and that when Statkraft gains so much weight is it impossible to sell it (Ask 
2001).  
The “father” of the new energy law from 1991, Einar Hope, economy professor at 
NHH Bergen and previous director in The Norwegian Competition Authority, argues 
that this is an example of concentration of market power, and for the consumers the 
market competition is disappearing. The director in BKK and a researcher in ECON 
provide similar arguments to the debate (Altmann 2001). 
Following this, The Norwegian Competition Authority signals that it will assess 
the implications of Statkraft’s new market position, and deliver a verdict within 26 
March 2002. In January 2002, The Norwegian Competition Authority signals to the 
involved parties that it believes that the price of electricity will increase if Statkraft buys 
Agder Energi (KommunalRapport 2002b), and that only new arguments from either 
Agder Energi or Statkraft can change the Competition Authority’s intention of stopping 
the deal (Flemming 2002b). In January 2002 Statkraft’s acquisition of TEV in 
Trondheim is also reported to the Competition Authority (Bjørnestad 2002c), and in 
March is also Statkraft’s acquisition of BKK in Bergen in the Competition Authority’s 
spotlight (Danbolt 2002f).  
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In Agder the result is a regional mobilization against the Competition Authority 
and everyone else relevant opposed to the sales. Two main lines of argumentation are 
pushed forward. The first is that Statkraft is a minority shareholder in Agder Energi and 
that Agder Energi thus is not part of the Statkraft group. This is immediately disputed 
by the Competition Authority, it argues that the shareholder agreement between Agder 
Energi and Statkraft means that Statkraft will have considerable influence over Agder 
Energi, and that Agder Energi does not represent an effective competitor to Statkraft. 
Statkraft will as a result of the Agder Energi sale increase its market power in southern 
Norway from 40 to 50% argues the Competition Authority (Danbolt 2002a). The second 
line of arguments provided by Agder relates to the alternative usages of money from the 
sale, a regional competence fund (CDFSN) and a foundation for arts and culture 
(Cultiva) (Danbolt 2002e). 
None of these arguments bite with the Competition Authority and it formally 
decides in mid March 2002 that Statkraft’s acquisition of Agder Energi will lead to 
increased prices on electricity in the wholesale market and to the consumers, the 
Competition Authority therefore forbid Statkraft’s Agder Energi acquisition. In a 
response the mayor in Kristiansand, Bjørg Wallevik, emphasizes that this is a terribly 
dramatic development for Agder, and that the Competition Authority’s decision 
immediately will be appealed to Victor D. Norman, who in October 2001 became the 
new work- and administration minister (Danbolt 2002b).  
On 18 April 2002 the appeal from Agder and Statkraft reached Victor D. 
Norman’s table. To the newspaper Aftenposten Norman says that he more or less 
support the decision made by the Competition Authority, the power net in southern 
Norway lacks capacity, Statkraft’s acquisition of Agder Energi could destroy 
competition in this part of the market (Bjørnestad 2002b). A week later the Competition 
Authority signals that it is not going to forbid Statkraft’s acquisition of BKK in Bergen, 
but it looks like both Statkraft’s acquisition of TEV (Trondheim) and Agder Energi are 
formally going to end up on Victor D. Norman’s table simultaneously (Haraldsen 2002). 
In the meantime Statkraft is arguing that their dominance in the Norwegian electrical 
market must be seen in relation to their minor position in the Nordic/European market. 
This, combined with a formal complaint on procedures written by the law professor 
Geir Woxholth, all ends in that the Competition Authority is being asked to look at the 
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purchases once more (Flemming 2002a). However, the second time around the 
Competition Authority does not change the March outcome. In Early July 2002 
Statkraft’s TEV purchase is also rejected by the Competition Authority, and ends up on 
Victor D. Norman’s table together with the Agder Energi issue (KommunalRapport 
2002a). 
This also starts a massive lobbying effort from Agder, and Statkraft threatens to 
sell both TEV and Agder Energi out of the country if their purchase is not accepted by 
Victor D. Norman (Flemming 2002c). The industry minister Ansgar Gabrielsen 
representing the Conservative Party and previously mayor in Lindesnes municipality in 
Vest-Agder County, also works Agder and Statkrafts case (Flemming 2002c). The oil 
and energy minister, Einar Steensnæs, the Christian Conservative Party, also gives 
support to Statkraft’s views that competition must be seen in a Nordic and not a 
Norwegian perspective, and that Victor D. Norman therefore should allow for Statkrafts 
purchase of Agder Energi (Aftenposten 2002). Hans Fr. Grøvan, Kristian Sundtoft, 
Bjarne Ugland and some others travel to Oslo to talk with the work- and administration 
minister, and argue that he has to look at the larger political picture (Rognerud 2002a), 
and in this larger political picture the planned usages of the available funds are a central 
element.  
Cultiva, Kristiansand municipality’s new culture foundation, has just appointed its 
first chairman of the board, the job has been given to Ellen Horn, the former culture 
minister from the labour party. She says to Victor D. Norman that – I hope Norman will 
consider this very carefully. Cultiva is a unique project. I do not know of any other 
municipality that stake so much on culture in the widest meaning of the word. Cultiva 
will lead to new workplaces in the region. The purpose of Cultiva is to secure 
workplaces and good living conditions through allocating resources to projects that 
supports building new art, culture, and knowledge institutions and organizations that 
contribute to innovation, development and competence building milieus in Kristiansand, 
Horn argues (Andreassen 2002). In September 2002 Hege Skjeie also weighs in. She is 
born in Kristiansand and is a professor in political science25 at the University in Oslo 
and at the time also one of five senior researchers in the power and democracy study 
(1998 – 2003). In an article published on the website of the power and democracy study, 
she carefully portrays the potential positive implications the new Cultiva foundation can 
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have on regional identity, and that the disappointment in the region would be enormous 
if Norman turned Agder down is more than implied in the text. She suggests that Victor 
D. Norman should discuss the issue more with his college in the cabinet Ansgar 
Gabrielsen (Skjeie 2002).  
In mid October 2002 is the verdict from Victor D. Norman ready; he had decided 
to overturn the decision made by the Competition Authority. In February 2003 he 
decides that Statkraft cannot buy TEV in Trondheim, and that the Competition 
Authority’s judgment in this case was sound (Rønningsbakk 2003)26. However, 
Statkraft can buy Agder Energi, all of it if they want to. The condition is that Statkraft 
sell one TWh worth of production capacity, and sell E-CO to Vannkraft AS and 
Hedemark Energi AS (HEAS) (Danbolt 2002h). Statkraft complies with this and in 
2004 Statkraft sells HEAS back to the regional owners for NOK 2.1 billion, Statkraft 
make some profit on this deal since they bought it in 2001 for NOK 1.9 billion 
(Aftenposten 2004). In Agder, the news from Victor D. Norman is greeted with 
jubilation and much enthusiasm, but there are still hurdles that must be passed. Statkraft 
wants to renegotiate the deal, because of the terms set by Victor D. Norman about 
selling HEAS. 
On 17 October 2002 it is reported that the values in Agder Energi has been 
estimated wrong, the value on some long term contracts has been wrongly estimated and 
this reduces the price with NOK 500 million. Agder also compensates Statkraft with 
NOK 300 million since they had to reduce their production capacity with 1 TWh and 
sell HEAS. In addition to this, Statkraft wants its share of the returns the Agder 
municipalities took earlier in the year, in addition to an interest compensation because 
the sale process took so long to finish. The price on the 45.5% shares that are to be sold 
has been knocked down over NOK 900 million. Statkraft’s right to renegotiate the deal 
was already implemented in the original contract.  
In Agder, is it comforting that a lower sales price also means less tax. Bjarne 
Ugland, part of the renegotiating team said that they had to accept the deal. Hans Fr. 
Grøvan who later became chairman of the board in Agder Energi was also part of the 
renegotiating team and said – we had many good arguments and purposes, but we soon 
understood that we had to use arguments that related to the competitive market 
situation. This is a good deal, it is unrealistic that we should come any better off if we 
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start up all over again, Grøvan said (Rognerud 2002b). The result of the new deal is that 
Agder Energi’s value is set to be NOK 11.4 billion, that is NOK 3.6 billion less than 
when the municipalities agreed to let the sale process start, and NOK 3 billion less than 
what was offered by Lyse Energi. 
Hans Fr. Grøvan is in late October 2002 very satisfied with the deal he has 
participated in renegotiating on behalf of the Agder municipalities. Grøvan’s advisor, 
Roy Slettvold, from the lawyer firm Selmer that hired Frank J. Berg when Arthur 
Andersen went out of business, compliments Grøvan for his efforts. Hans Fr. Grøvan on 
his side is relieved that the sales process was not finished earlier.  
Many of the municipalities that sold their energy shares in 2000/2001 and put 
their money into the stock market lost hundreds of millions when the IT-bubble burst in 
2000/2001. The municipality of Bærum decided to put NOK 1.8 billion of their money 
from selling energy shares on the stock exchange, a year after their ownership was 
worth NOK 1.5 billion. In a similar manner Porsgrunn lost NOK 95 million in 2002, 
something the chief officer at the time said was the equivalent of 300 man-labour years 
in the municipality (Rønningsbakk 2005c). 
Grøvan’s own municipality Lyngdal in Vest-Agder decided not to sell any of their 
shares in Agder Energi. –Grøvan said he believed that Lyngdal’s money was worth 
more when placed in Agder Energi than on the stock market (Danbolt 2002d). Hans Fr. 
Grøvan then got the job of being chairman of the board in Agder Energi, and remains 
there until he must step down late in 2005 because of a rather bizarre “scandal”, that 
also resulted in that several others on the management level in Agder Energi had to 
leave their posts (Norborg 2005).  
The municipalities in Agder agree on the new negotiated deal in early December 
2002. Eleven municipalities in Agder decide not to sell their shares to Statkraft, and 
Statkraft’s requirement of 2/3 majority for selling is just barely met because of CDFSN 
being the 31st Agder Energi owner. On 5 December 2002 the payment from Statkraft’s 
main office on Høvik arrives, and the deal is financially closed (Reinertsen 2002). 
Arthur Andersen Global Corporate Finance AB Norwegian Branch 
In 1999 alone hydro electrical shares and enterprises worth NOK 23.5 billion bought or 
merged with larger enterprises. In early 2000 is it estimated that values in the range of 
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NOK 50-100 billion were on the move (Skaslien 2000). All of the large consultancies 
were heavily invested in the market of advising Norwegian municipalities in what they 
should do with their newfound wealth, and were all more or less giving the same advice; 
—Sell! Sell! Sell! There are many very good bids!, it is a great risk to own!, There is 
much urgency and haste in doing this now etc.  
In Stavanger, politicians are advised to sell by the company Energi Analyse AS, 
represented by Eivind Devold, a company that monitors the power market on behalf of 
the larger consultancies. Devold argued that the average share dividend on energy 
shares makes it meaningless for the municipalities to own these shares. The risk, he 
argues, is too large in both in the trade and the production parts of Lyse Energi AS. 
Devold goes on to predict that units with fewer than 120 000 customers will have 
problems with surviving in the market, and he strongly recommends that other 
municipalities do not to exercise their first option in buying shares from other 
municipalities that wish to sell. He ends with emphasizing the benefits in getting 
professional owners with good market knowledge (KraftNytt 1999b).  
In Sør-Trøndelag the consultancy First Securities, represented by the advisor 
Trond V. Thompson gives the good advice. The municipalities are advised to sell their 
ownership in electric power producing companies because the average share dividend is 
so low and that there are many willing buyers (Rønningsbakk 1999c).  
In Kristiansand it is Arthur Andersen represented by Frank J. Berg that gives good 
advice. He argues that KEV is bad business for the municipality, and that it is running a 
“power-train” and that the municipalities in Agder need to hurry if they want to get on 
the same “train” as KEV (KraftNytt 1999a). In a presentation given in a “seminar” to 
the representatives in the City Council in Kristiansand by Arthur Andersen on 5 and 6 
November 1999, the Arthur Andersen representative argues that investments in the 
hydro-electrical industry are attended with considerable risk, that large and risk filled 
investments are needed for this industry to survive, that the margin of return only is 
going to get slimmer and slimmer, and that it therefore only are the large actors that are 
going to survive in the market (Arnesen 2003: 34).  
In 2000 yet another record in the buying and merging hydro electrical energy 
companies is set. Pareto Securities estimates that 60 emissions, sales, and mergers worth 
NOK 50 billion were undertaken in 2000. The largest of these were the merger between 
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Vest-Agder Energiverk (VAE), Aust-Agder Energiverk (AAE) and Kristiansand 
Energiverk (KEV) into Agder Energi AS on 17 June 2000. A company which in the 
agreement between the three companies is estimated to be worth approximately NOK 
15 billion (Rønningsbakk 2001a). 
One of the more spectacular aspects of the process of selling the Agder Energi 
shares is not the enormous financial loss it represented for the municipalities that sold 
their energy shares but how the process was orchestrated and manipulated by those who 
were determined to sell Agder Energi. Not only simple principles of fairness, morality, 
and democracy were systematically neglected, formal laws and regulations were also 
broken. The prime instrument for Kristiansand municipality’s efforts for realizing the 
sales of Agder Energi were the consultancy Arthur Andersen. 
At the time, Arthur Andersen was one of the largest consultancy and audit 
companies in Norway, it had approximately 590 employees and a market share between 
20% and 40% depending on the market segment (Rønningsbakk 2002a; 2002c).  
Arthur Andersen systematically manipulated the decision-making process; it 
provided decision-makers with false and biased information. It had a double role in the 
sales process, in that it effectively and strategically was set to look after the interests of 
both Statkraft, and the shareholders in Agder Energi AS. Arthur Andersen and its 
representatives in Agder protected itself, its involvement, and its contracts in a veil of 
secrecy, and Arthur Andersen was in the end heavily criticized by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway. The Financial Supervisory Authority’s investigation 
into Arthur Andersen’s role in the Agder Energi sales process would probably had gone 
further and deeper if Arthur Andersen Norway had not been “saved” by the Enron 
scandal and Arthur Andersen effectively went out of business in May 2002, and that 
Statkraft signalled to the Financial Supervisory Authority that it would change audit 
company. 
The agreement that chief officer in Kristiansand municipality, Erling Valvik, 
made with Arthur Andersen is kept from public access. This was probably a standard 
requirement for Arthur Andersen. Kristiansand’s City Council discussion on the 
contract between Arthur Andersen and Kristiansand municipality on 17 October 2000 
(under case 111/00) is also kept from public access with reference to the law of public 
access (offentlighetsloven §6), thus without specifying what part of the law.  
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Some of the elements in the agreement between Kristiansand and Arthur 
Andersen are known publicly through other sources. The Arthur Andersen account was 
composed of four parts, which the Arthur Andersen consultant Frank J. Berg confirms 
to the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen 21 June 2001. The first account component is a pay 
per hour of NOK 1750, the second is a fixed fee of unknown size, and the third is a 
“success fee”, a sign on fee that was 0.1% of the sales sum, and the fourth component 
was travels and expenses (Skøien 2001a). The NOK 10 million bonuses from Statkraft 
to Arthur Andersen if Statkraft buys Agder Energi is reported by at least three separate 
newspapers Aftenposten, Fædrelandsvennen and KraftNytt.no, but has as far as I know 
never been confirmed.  
In June 2001 when Statkraft signed their first agreement about Agder Energi the 
City Council in Kristiansand was informed that the consultancy bill was NOK 30 
million. In February 2002 Fædrelandsvennen reports that the bill is NOK 34.7 million, 
and that the final bill is going to be NOK 40 million plus, and that a couple of these 
millions are just travels and expenses (Rønningsbakk 2002d). We do not know what the 
exact result was since the municipalities signed confidentiality agreements with Arthur 
Andersen. However, a reasonable estimate based on this information would mean a final 
figure in the area of NOK 40-45 million. In addition to this, Kristiansand and Agder 
Energi had hired Pareto as brokers to sell the Agder Energi shares. For this job they 
were paid NOK 54 million (Rønningsbakk 2002b; KraftNytt 2004). In addition, other 
consultancies were involved in the sales process. First Securities and Elcon Securities 
were for instance involved at an early stage in the KEV process, and others are also 
involved as advisors, for instance Victor D. Norman, Agder Research, and a series of 
lawyer firms, and other consultancies contributed. What the final consultancy fees 
amount to is therefore only guess work, since much of this information is disclosed 
from the public. I would however be very surprised if it is less than NOK 115 million, 
and I would not be much surprised if Kristiansand and the other Agder municipalities in 
sum have paid close to NOK 130 million in consultancy fees for selling Agder Energi27. 
When you pay this much for advice, you would expect that the advice given are as 
high-end as the bill. The quality of the advice given was in this case determined from 
the start. It is obvious to most that if you hire a consultant and includes a paragraph in 
the contract stating that a certain percentage of the sales sum is going to be a bonus pay, 
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you are not going to get advice telling you not to sell. It is also obvious that the 
presumably intelligent people responsible for signing the contract with the consultancy 
is aware of this reality, and that this therefore is done deliberately. Thus, the only 
meaningful interpretation of this particular clausal is that stakeholders sought a process 
aimed to get a sales price that was as high as possible, and not a process aimed at 
unveiling relevant information, a process that would provide arguments both in favour 
of and against sale of Agder Energi shares, and thus providing the ground for an 
informed decision on that basis. This is also an indication of the KEV/Agder Energi 
processes being rigged from the beginning so that a specific outcome of the process 
could be reached.  
The double role of Arthur Andersen who delivered audit and consultancy services 
to Statkraft at the same time as it advised Kristiansand and the other municipalities to 
sell power shares to Statkraft was also public knowledge at the time. This means that if 
Arthur Andersen gave Kristiansand and Agder a bad deal, Kristiansand must have 
known of this possibility, but also that they decided to ignore it, and carry out the sales 
anyway, a decision that in retrospect has proven to be extremely costly for the citizens 
in the Agder region. This also tells us something about the level of commitment 
traditional business and economically oriented regional stakeholders had towards the 
alternative uses of financial funds from the Agder Energi sales. 
In the case material there are many examples of how Arthur Andersen consultants 
and others systematically manipulated the decision-making process, through providing 
democratically elected representatives and others with false and biased information, 
doing their job poorly, or alternatively just working the interest of Statkraft. In the 
following, I will give a few examples of such instances that are publicly available, but 
also some examples that have become publicly available during the process of writing 
this thesis28.  
Arthur Andersen led by consultant Frank J. Berg, started their work for 
Kristiansand municipality in relation to the process of selling KEV shares. When the 
merger of AAE, VAE, and KEV was complete, the Agder Energi sales process becomes 
the new job description, the initial contract was renewed, and became a consulting 
contract between Kristiansand municipality and Arthur Andersen Global Corporate 
Finance AB Norwegian Branch (hereafter AAGCF). This contract was titled “Tender 
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for assistance associated with full or partial sale of Kristiansand municipality’s shares in 
Agder Energi AS from AAGCF w/Frank J. Berg to Kristiansand municipality w/Erling 
Valvik. This contract letter of 1 September 2000 opens up so other municipalities in the 
Agder region that wish to sell shares, at a later stage can connect to the agreement; this 
contract had the following content:  
AAGCF will partly or fully execute: 1) Go through and analyze value assessments of the 
company, and “agree on the minimal amount that you are willing to sell the company 
for”. 2) Put together relevant information material in a prospect “Information 
memorandum”, and do active introductory sale to central actors. 3) Identification and 
analysis of potential buyers, “through using our network of contacts nationally as well as 
internationally, including their knowledge of potential interested party”. 4) Ask potential 
buyers to make indicative bids. “Within the frame of this activity will we, with legal 
assistance, set up a draft of a contract of sale”. 5) Arrange a “data room”, which is a 
room with archives and documentation with detailed information about the company. “A 
lesser number of potential buyers, which we jointly choose based on their indicative bids, 
will get access to this information in a limited time”. 6) “We will together with you, 
choose one or more potential buyers that we will negotiate with. We will coordinate the 
buyer’s due diligence, and assist you in all aspects of the sales process towards 
completion. In connection to this will we seek to map solutions that are optimal for both 
parties, the company, and remaining shareholders” (Kredittilsynet 2003: 12). 
Frank J. Berg is in the letter cited as responsible for the project, and in an 
appendix to the letter is it stated that: “We will suggest that the assignment is settled to 
the time used with a pay per hour of NOK 1750. On sale will the honoraria constitute 
0.1% of the sales sum up until NOK 10 million” (Kredittilsynet 2003: 13)29. It is also 
written that AAGCF is to be the employer’s exclusive advisor in connection to the sales 
process in a period of 12 months from the signing of the letter (Kredittilsynet 2003: 13).  
When the chief officer Erling Valvik oriented Kristiansand City Council, on 20 
June 2000 (under case 117/01), about the strategy on the Agder Energi issue, was Erling 
Valvik asked by a member of the City Council if the Arthur Andersen consultant had a 
self-interest in realizing the sale of Agder Energi shares. According to the newspaper, 
Fædrelandsvennen, Valvik initially responds with an argument about closing the 
meeting from the public, secondly he states that he would not discuss parts of the 
contract agreement with Arthur Andersen when outsiders were present. However, after 
a short break, Valvik and Frank J. Berg returns to the issue and Frank J. Berg provide 
the City Council in Kristiansand with the following information:  
The job we are paid for is to negotiate a bid for acquisition of shares. This we have done, 
the honorary is not dependent upon a sale being realized. Our honoraria is composed of a 
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fixed figure, and a paid-by-the-hour agreement, and in addition a 0.1% commission of the 
bid. This commission is therefore not dependent upon a sale being realized. We would 
not risk our commission being dependent upon the decisions in the City Council 
(Reinertsen 2001a). 
Given discrepancies between the actual contract between Arthur Andersen and 
Kristiansand municipality, as it is reproduced by The Financial Supervisory Authority, 
and the information, Frank J. Berg and Erling Valvik provided the City Council in 
Kristiansand with, as it is reproduced by the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen, is it hard to 
reach another conclusion than the one that Erling Valvik and Frank J. Berg deliberately 
misinformed the elected officials of Kristiansand City Council on 20 June 2000 in order 
to further their cause of selling Agder Energi. This is important because if the relevant 
contract information had been known, if the elected officials had known that 
Kristiansand municipality’s exclusive advisor had economical motives associated with 
realizing the sales process, it could very well also have had a significant effect on the 
deliberations and outcome in Kristiansand City Council. 
AAGCF had not only access to every strategic information concerning the sales 
process it also participated in constructing that information. However, as mentioned 
Arthur Andersen does also work for Statkraft at the same time, and their work for 
Statkraft is direct consulting on the Agder Energi issue. 
A few months after AAGCF signs with Erling Valvik in Kristiansand 
municipality, Arthur Andersen signs a contract with Statkraft, which states that they are 
going to assist Statkraft in estimating the value of Agder Energi. The contract letter 
from AA to Statkraft is signed on 8 January 2001, it has the following content: 
Statkraft is considering a possible buy of shares in Agder Energi AS. In connection to this 
is Arthur Andersen asked to assist Statkraft in value estimating the company [Agder 
Energi]. A value estimate of Agder Energi AS must build on value estimates on each of 
the different business areas (production, nets, and trade). These assessments would 
naturally include different forms of insecurity, especially with respect to assumptions 
about future price developments on power, and on tax regimes. We aim for a similar 
process that we did when Statkraft acquired ownership in HEAS30. We will, in 
relationship to this, inform Statkraft that AAGCF are assigned to assist by the owners of 
Agder Energi AS to assist them in the sales. We can therefore only assist in the value 
estimation of Agder Energi, and not participate in further negotiations with the seller 
(Kredittilsynet 2003: 17).  
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The product that Arthur Andersen delivered to Statkraft was an Excel sheet (a 
value estimate model) that contained all of the relevant information about Agder Energi 
(Kredittilsynet 2003: 18).  
The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway acquired as part of their 
investigation what they described as a substantial amount of PowerPoint presentations 
used at different presentations. In their report, they emphasize the following from a 
presentation held by AAGCF at a project group meeting in Agder on 11 May 2001. 
Two companies delivered binding offers 16 March 2001: 
1) Lyse Energi, alternative A and B. (alternative A and B refers to merger between Lyse 
Energi and Agder Energi (Lyse’s first option), and the second alternative is the 
acquisition offer made by EWE/Lyse). 
2) Statkraft (Kredittilsynet 2003: 13) 
In a presentation given to the extended project group meeting 26 June 2001, 
certain milestones in the process are described: 
22 January 2001  Deadline indicative bids. 
16 March 2001  Deadline final bids. 
11 May 2001  Consultant forwards his recommendation to the project group. 
1 June 2001 Consultant recommends to terminate negotiations with Lyse and 
to resume the contact with Statkraft. 
8 June 2001 The results of the negotiations (with Statkraft) are presented to 
the project group (Kredittilsynet 2003: 13). 
 We note the 1 June entry, where the AAGCF consultant recommends the group 
to turn down Lyse Energi and to resume contact with Statkraft. This shows that the 
AAGCF consultant directly expressed preferences towards Statkraft. In the same 
presentation, there is a slide with the following text. The headline is: “What is 
economically the best option – to sell or to own?“, and AAGCF gives the following 
recommendation: “A business economic based judgment says that the municipalities 
should sell its shares now”. In a later memo of 21 June 2001 from AAGCF to the 
participants in the project group themed: “Agder Energi – Sale of shares vs. continued 
ownership”. Its introduction reads: 
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Based on the negotiated offer from Statkraft SF concerning acquisition of shares in Agder 
Energi AS has AAGCF completed some economical profitability estimates that 
illuminate the profitability of selling the shares compared to the expected profitability of 
keeping the shares. We emphasize that this is preliminary estimates. Based on pure 
economical estimates do however, conclusions appear to be extremely robust 
(Kredittilsynet 2003: 14).  
This is followed by a passage that shows that the value of (100%) the shares in 
Agder Energi is per 31 December 2001 worth NOK 14.110 billion. The memo ends 
with the following passage:  
The negotiated price appears based on our estimates as very good, compared to the values 
today’s municipal owners can expect to realize by continued ownership, and eventually 
selling at a later stage. The economical risk associated with having a large portion of the 
assets placed in a single stock, which is not on the exchange, is significant. If one 
estimates the value of this risk into the value of the share, it is our opinion that the 
negotiated price is so good that one should, based on pure economical considerations, sell 
the shares now (Kredittilsynet 2003: 14). 
In a letter dated 8 June 2001 to all of the shareholders in Agder Energi the 
negotiating team puts forward the bid made by Statkraft for the shares in Agder Energi. 
This letter has the following introduction: 
Following the project team’s decision, in a meeting 1 June 2001, to terminate the 
negotiations with Lyse Kraft AS and EWE, the negotiating team, consisting of Eivind 
Krokmo, Jan Pedersen, Frank J. Berg, and Roy M. Slettvold has carried out negotiations 
with Statkraft SF. These negotiations have resulted in an united bid-document 
(“Tilbudet”) which follows as appendix 1. The bid-document contains all of the 
significant elements that will be included in the final contract arrangement (“Avtalene”).  
The letter ends with:  
There is an acceptance form in the appendix where the Agder shareholders must give a 
binding answer to how they will respond to the bid-document and the contract 
arrangement. This document must be returned to Arthur Andersen Global Corporate 
Finance co/Frank J. Berg through telefax [number] within 31 August 2001 1600. [The 
four members in the negotiating team, including the AAGCF partner Frank J. Berg, sign 
the letter] (Kredittilsynet 2003: 14).  
In this text Arthur Andersen and AAGCF is used interchangeably, this is because 
in every practical meaning of the word this is in essence the same company. It is 
however a bit imprecise. One counter argument against Arthur Andersen having a 
double role in the Statkraft/Agder Energi negotiations is that Arthur Andersen had a 
fragmented business model, meaning that Arthur Andersen at the time consisted of units 
that legally were separate. You had Arthur Andersen & Co (AA) that provided the audit 
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services to Statkraft, and you had Arthur Andersen Global Corporate Finance AB 
Norwegian Branch (AAGCF) that were Kristiansand’s and Agder’s contract partner, 
and you had Arthur Andersen Business Consulting (AABC), that among other things 
delivered consultancy services to Statkraft. The Financial Supervisory Authority of 
Norway had this to say about the relationship between AA and AABC: 
The Financial Supervisory Authority base its assessments on that it was a very close 
relationship between AA and AABC. These companies are indeed independent judicial 
units, owned by the partners in the respective firms, but a series of factors implies that 
AA and AABC had a collaborative constellation that legally was problematic in relation 
to the deliverance of consultancy services to AA’s audit clients. The Financial 
Supervisory Authority wishes to point to the following factors: 1) Both of the companies 
were part of the Andersen-group in Norway. 2) There is a considerable similarity in the 
names. AA and AABC used “Arthur Andersen”-logo in their letterheads, in marketing 
etc. 3) These companies appeared to the outside as a unit, and to the Financial 
Supervisory Authority it does appear that these companies marketed themselves as one 
unit. 4) There was considerable common infrastructure and management collaboration. 5) 
AA and AABC used the same office premises, and had the same visiting and postal 
addresses. 6) These companies had collaborative agreements with Arthur Andersen & Co 
in Switzerland (Kredittilsynet 2003: 7).  
Frank J. Berg, who was an authorized public auditor and partner in AA, was 
through a formal agreement with AAGCF made available as the leader of the AAGCF 
consulting assignment in Agder. AA also formally employed many of the other 
consultants involved in advising Agder. The Financial Supervisory Authority of 
Norway does therefore not find any basis for emphasizing that AAGCF formally was 
the contract partner with Agder and not AA. The Financial Supervisory Authority 
therefore finds that AA has broken the Norwegian audit law §4-4, §4-1, and §4-5, which 
says that [my translations]: 
[§4-4 first paragraph] An accountant or audit company cannot participate in, or have 
functions, in another enterprise when this can lead to the person/or enterprise concerned 
interests is in conflict with the interests of the employer, or in another way is suited to 
weaken the trust put in the accountant or audit company (Kredittilsynet 2003: 15).  
[§4-1 first paragraph] If an auditor or an auditor’s close associate (ref. fourth segment) 
has a relationship to the auditable or this employees or representatives that can weaken 
auditor’s independence or objectivity, the person concerned cannot audit the auditable 
annual financial statements. The same is the case if there are other circumstances which 
are suited to weaken auditors trust (Kredittilsynet 2003: 2). 
[§4-5 first paragraph] On Consultancy services. Auditor who audits annual financial 
statements cannot execute consultancy services or other services for the auditable, if this 
is suited to influence or raise doubt about auditor’s independence and objectivity. Auditor 
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cannot provide services which belongs under the auditable own management- and control 
responsibility. Auditor cannot act as auditable (legal) agent. Except when assisting in tax 
matters following court of justice law §218. In audit companies this rule applies 
accordingly for auditors that not are responsible auditors (Kredittilsynet 2003: 2-3).  
The Financial Supervisory Authority concludes that: 
The consulting assignments on behalf of the selling share owners in Agder Energi AS, 
with the double role this involved for AA in relationship to their audit client Statkraft SF, 
is in the opinion of the Financial Supervisory Authority’s in violation of the audit law §4-
4, and under any circumstance in violation of the audit law §4-1, first paragraph second 
full stop. These special conditions are connected to the scope of the consultancy 
activities, the considerable influence AA had in the decision-making process, and the 
condition that the honorary was made dependent upon on the result in an instance where 
the potential buyer was a buyer/negotiating part to the audit client. The Financial 
Supervisory Authority finds that the audit company AA’s consultancy behaviour in 
relation to this sales process is clearly to be blamed and are unacceptable.  
[…] The compilation of a value estimate model for Statkraft SF can under certain 
conditions be acceptable consulting. In this instance had the company AAGCF, which 
must be identified with the audit company AA, through consultancy assignment insight 
into the selling shareholder’s strategies and price expectancies. AA should on this basis 
avoided to involve themselves in circumstances that affected Statkraft SF’s interests in 
acquiring Agder Energi shares. 
It can be that even if the single consultancy assignment viewed isolated can be acceptable 
in relationship to the audit law’s requirement of independence and objectivity, so can the 
commission and the delivered services seen in connection to each other give another 
result. Seen together the combined consulting that the audit firm AA gave in relation to 
the acquisition of shares, the Financial Supervisory Authority is of the opinion that this 
consulting has been in violation of the audit law §4-5 first paragraph and §4-1 first 
paragraph second full stop. The Financial Supervisory Authority finds the audit firm 
AA’s consulting in relation to this criticisable. 
[…] The Financial Supervisory Authority finds the above circumstances unacceptable 
and blameworthy. This especially applies to the consulting services connected to the sales 
of Agder Energi to Statkraft […]. The Financial Supervisory Authority is made aware of 
Statkraft’s decision to change audit firm in effect from 2004, and find on this basis not 
necessary with any further investigation of the matter (Kredittilsynet 2003: 19-20).  
An example of how inadequate and biased AAGCF’s advice was follows. As 
previously mentioned did AAGCF not believe that the price on electric power on the 
spot market in the unforeseeable future would be higher than NOK 0.20 per kWh. Their 
reasoning was that the price previously had been low, that AAE, VAE, and KEV gave 
little returns for their investments, and that the municipalities’ money consequently 
would be worth more when paced elsewhere.  
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AAGCF and those wanting to sell ignored the fact that the budgeting in AAE, 
VAE, and KEV was done based on a secure balance and not maximum profit. Any 
surplus was according to the statutes in AAE, VAE, and KEV, supposed to benefit the 
consumers. This was according to the former general manager of KEV, Olav Egeland, 
done by directly feeding the surplus back to the consumers through the energy 
companies directly holding the price on electrical power low. Every year the price on 
electricity was determined by the city council. He writes that the debate could be very 
tempered, because canvassing was also a factor here, and he also mentions the fact that 
these companies were managed as zero sum-companies and were used for what it was 
worth by those wanting to sell Agder Energi (Egeland 2005).  
 AAGCF and those wanting to sell were also ambiguous concerning the tax 
question. In hindsight is it difficult to see the professional rationale for arguing that for 
instance foundations would not have to pay tax, this should have been on the table as a 
realistic and probable outcome, and not as the surprising and unexpected outcome. It is 
also interesting to compare the agreement between TEV in Trondheim and Statkraft to 
the deal Agder got, two contract agreements that were developed almost simultaneously 
with Statkraft. TEV who did not use AAGCF as consultants, made Statkraft take the 
risk if the Norwegian Competition Authority turned down the sales of TEV, which they 
did. Statkraft had to pay the TEV shareholders NOK 5.8 billion regardless of whether 
Statkraft could keep the shares or not (Danbolt 2002c). In Agder the situation was 
opposite, Agder took all the risk and was only stuck with the consultancy bill if 
Norwegian Competition Authority turned down the sales of Agder Energi to Statkraft, 
which they did.  
Assessment of the Political Process in Kristiansand Municipality 
When the City Council in Kristiansand decided to sell the Agder Energi shares, the 
minority supported by the labor party commissioned an evaluation of the democratic 
aspects of the sales process in Kristiansand municipality (under case 128/01). This 112 
page evaluation report was written by Tor Arnesen (2003), and was discussed by 
Kristiansand City Council on 4 June 2003 (under case 71/03)31. He forwards in his 
report hash critique of many of the procedural and democratic aspects of the political 
process in Kristiansand municipality in relationship to the process of selling Agder 
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Energi. I will in the following not give a detailed account of the processes in 
Kristiansand municipality, these are, as far as I can tell, covered in a satisfactory manner 
by Arnesen’s evaluation report32. I will therefore limit this section to a brief 
recapitulation of some of the main findings from Arnesen’s report.  
Two things are however worth noting, the agreement/contract between Arthur 
Andersen and Kristiansand municipality is kept from public access. The qualities of this 
agreement are therefore not part of the discussions in the evaluation report (Arnesen 
2003: 74). There is also a question raised by the evaluation report on when the sales 
process started and when it ended. The report chooses to define the Agder Energi sales 
process when the first talks about an ownership strategy started in Kristiansand 
municipality dated to mid 1997, and that it ended when the dispute with the Norwegian 
Competition Authority was completed at the end of 2002. The alternative interpretation 
is that the sales process started when the strategic considerations was finished mid June 
2000, and ended when Kristiansand municipality formally decided to sell in June 2001 
(Arnesen 2003: 27). Reading between the lines in the paragraphs discussing when sales 
process started and when it ended, you get the feeling that there has been some 
disagreement in the interpretation of the mandate of the evaluation, between chief 
officer Erling Valvik and the evaluator. This point is important because if you apply to 
the narrow interpretation the mandate to initiate a sales process is clearer, while this 
mandate to initiate a sales process is more dubious if you apply the wider definition.  
The evaluation report discusses several questions that are central in order to 
address the democratic aspects of the case. The first issue raised by the evaluation report 
concerns to what degree people involved have been consistent with respect to their 
arguments and opinions: 
This does not seem to have been a problem, thus there have been a couple of exceptions: 
The shift in the labor party connected to Statkraft as potential buyer – it was this 
turnaround that created a majority in Kristiansand municipality. The Christian 
Conservative party’s management of the issue seems insecure and at times unsteady, 
initially the party is part of the group that pushes the sales process forward, thereafter it 
votes together with the opposition against a sale (Arnesen 2003: 76)33.  
To this, I can also add a reference to the previous discussion of the 1999 party 
programmes, were the conclusion was that is was very difficult to find arguments in 
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favour of saying that relevant statements in the local party programmes had played a 
significant role in determining the outcome of the process.  
The second issue raised by the evaluation report is with respect to transparency, to 
what degree is it possible to see what goes on from the outside, the evaluation report 
concludes that:  
It is our opinion that the process has acceptable but also weak sides in this respect. The 
orientations given to Kristiansand City Council contributed to increasing transparency. 
However, the City Council involvement on a decision-making level was limited. This 
contributed to the debate surrounding in the municipalities formal structures as well as the 
public debate was limited. This was the “price” that was paid for running the process in 
smaller forums such as the municipal committee, and the reference group/strategy 
committee. In our opinion was also the secrecy surrounding the contract between the 
consultant and the municipality unnecessary, the same goes for that a meeting in the 
municipal committee on 31 October 2000 was closed from the public. Such incidences 
contribute to actors feeling left out of the process – something that is the idea – and in our 
opinion should have had a more solid justification. The press has done a significant job – 
both nationally and regionally – to illuminate the issue to the public, in addition has 
politicians in the municipality’s readers letter been important. Press publicity has had a 
“dramatic” form – partly because this is how the press operates, but also here should the 
municipality take on responsibility because the process in to little extent has been run in 
the most available forums (Arnesen 2003: 76).  
See also discussion in the section below that provides the basis for an argument 
that the press (Fædrelandsvennen) played an independent and significant role in 
determining the outcome of the process.  
The third issue raised by the evaluation report discusses to what extent personal or 
private economical interests were suppressed on behalf of judgments of the common 
good:  
Generally speaking this has not been a dominating problem, with some exceptions: The 
secrecy surrounding the agreement with the consultant about honorary associated with 
sale of shares created dissatisfaction among many. The opinion was that the consultancy 
Arthur Andersen served its interests best if all of the shares were sold, and that this would 
overshadow what was in the best interest of the municipality in the case. This was to some 
extent corrected when the City Council was given a verbal orientation regarding the 
content in the agreement before the final decision to sell was made. It has gotten negative 
attention that central actors in the municipality in this process – the chief officer and the 
group leaders in position in the end got central positions in the heaviest of the new 
finance instruments - the [Cultiva] foundation. It is nothing procedurally wrong with this, 
but the morality of this has been questioned (Arnesen 2003: 76). 
See also previous sections where the role of AAGCF is discussed. This orientation 
given to the City Council by the consultant and the chief officer, just prior to the 
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decision to sell was made, contained factual errors regarding the sign-on-fee. The issue 
is if the 0.1% honoraria were dependent upon the size of the bid or the sales sum.  
The fourth issue raised by the evaluation report is to what degree the information 
that has been used has been correct, balanced, relevant, communicated in an 
understandable fashion, and that relevant views are represented, involved parties heard 
and placed emphasis on: 
The trust, from the outside, to the consultants’ judgments when work-conditions are 
secret on the honorary side, are transmitted as a suspicion that only those options that 
provide the consultant with most money is sufficiently examined and explored. The 
societal aspects and alternative energy politics for Kristiansand municipality is to a lesser 
extent illuminated. The minority is relevant but this group has largely been referred to the 
City Council as their arena – but since the case to a lesser extent has been managed in the 
City Council, is the interpretation the view of the minority to a lesser extent has been 
expressed (Arnesen 2003: 77). 
A telling example of how information strategically was acquired in order to reach 
the desired outcome is when Agder Research during the autumn 2000, by the board of 
directors in Agder Energi, got the job of considering the societal consequences of 
continued regional ownership of Agder Energi, alongside some other aspects. Agder 
Research produced three reports as part of this assignment, one of these reports was 
authored by Helge Røed and Harald Furre, and it contained four different scenarios for 
Agder Energi (Røed & Furre 2000). One of the things emphasized in the report and in 
reality is a “new” element in the debate at the current stage is the strategic role that 
Agder Energi can play in the continued development of the region. This role is 
positively integrated as an important aspect when the scenarios are discussed in the 
report, in one of the scenarios this role becomes the main purpose of Agder Energi. This 
is a role and an element that is in conflict with the ambitions to realize the “alternative 
usages” of the available funds from selling Agder Energi, and the report represents in a 
sense a clear counter argument against selling all of Agder Energi out of the region.  
This report was presented to executive committee of the City Council in 
Kristiansand on 25 April 2001. Such cases are prepared by the chief officer, his case 
preparation (under case 104/01) was criticized by the Christian Conservative party 
because the portrayal of “the strategic role”, as it was introduced in the Agder Research 
report, was unreasonable negatively portrayed (Arnesen 2003: 54). Harald Furre, who 
was the director at Agder Research at the time, confirms34 that “people in favour of 
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selling” Agder Energi, put Agder Research under considerable pressure to change the 
content of the report. In particular, those parts of the report that expressed scepticisms 
towards what would be the faith of Agder Energi if Statkraft was allowed to buy the 
majority of the shares in Agder Energi. This pressure was exercised at several 
occasions, but the report was to Harald Furre and Agder Research’s credit did not 
changed because of this35. 
Fædrelandsvennen writes, on 10 October 2000, that Kristiansand municipality 
commissioned a “counter report” to meet the “societal ownership perspective” that 
would be introduced in the Agder research report. In a memo from chief officer Erling 
Valvik to the CEO at Agder Energi Eivind Krokmo, that “leaked” to the press. Valvik 
writes that on the ownership meeting in Agder Energi on 20 September 2000 he posted 
the question of “alternative usages of the ownership”, that Agder Research could not 
take on this assignment, and that he gave this assignment to Victor D. Norman. The task 
was to find out how much the alternative usages was worth if they were placed in bank 
deposits, mutual funds, local infrastructure, research, and in culture purposes 
(Fædrelandsvennen 2000c). This report, written by Victor D. Norman and Eva 
Benedicte Norman from NHH in Bergen concludes that alternative usages give more 
return and lower risk than the reference solution, which was that the municipalities kept 
the shares in Agder Energi (Arnesen 2003: 45).  
The fifth issue raised by the evaluation report is to what extent decisions could be 
modified and decisions not be regarded as already made: 
It is our interpretation that the decision-making process has been “tormented” by this – 
that the administration is ascribed a “will of their own” which was to sell the shares. In 
many ways the administration is regarded as a part of the majority in this issue, and not as 
an instrument for both the minority and the majority. Decisions have been regarded as 
“already made” and difficult to contradict, and in particular has departing views in the 
municipality felt “put against the wall” with small opportunities to change decisions and 
suggestions to decisions. This last moment partially also applies to the smaller parties in 
what constituted the majority (Arnesen 2003: 77). 
In this respect there are examples of “peculiar” methods that have been used. The 
Arthur Andersen consultants applied a method known as Borda-vote36 in order to reach 
a consensus in the reference group/strategy committee on the KEV/Agder Energi issue. 
Arnesen writes in his report that it in the reference group/strategy committee, was 
used a type of voting where each member gave a vote to a series of sub points which in 
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the end was aggregated to a joint standpoint on the individual sub points. As basis for 
the vote was a report with recommendations from Arthur Andersen used (Arnesen 2003: 
39). I have been told that the Arthur Andersen consultant brought in a computer to aid 
the consensus building process and that this computer was programmed to do the 
aggregation of preferences for them. The chief officer in Kristiansand’s office later 
refers to the strategy committee’s recommendations as an unanimous agreement (under 
case 143/01). This is strange since no voting records are available, and that some of the 
participants from the reference group/strategy committee later vividly opposed selling 
Agder Energi shares, for instance Harald Sødal (KrF), and the employee representatives 
from KEV. 
The last issue raised by the evaluation report is to what extent the “time-budget” 
(which often is a limited resource) has been disposed in a fair fashion, has not restrained 
exchange of views:  
Here is it only one thing to say: The strategy discussion – the debate the City Council had 
about how Kristiansand municipality, as owner, should manage its role under the new 
energy law-regime and the new situation that emerged in the late 1990s and into the new 
decade, should have been finished long time before the decision to sell was made. As the 
situation became, the decision on strategy, and decision to sell was practically made in 
the same meeting. Without regard to cause of this […] was this unfortunate. The City 
Council can hardly be held responsible for this, and that on principal groundings 
(Arnesen 2003: 77). 
On 19 September 2000, both the municipal committee (under case 89/00) and the 
City Council on 12 December (under case 155/00) in Kristiansand decide that it would 
not take position on the issue of selling Agder Energi at that time. That it must prepare a 
case to the City Council where a strategy for ownership is presented, and that this case 
must be presented to the City Council well before the case to sell Agder Energi shares is 
submitted to the City Council (Arnesen 2003: 53). This case, concerning a strategy for 
Kristiansand’s ownership, is not presented to Kristiansand City Council before 20 June 
2001 (under case 117/01), one week before the decision to sell is made on 27 June 2001 
(under case 128/01). 
Arnesens’ evaluation report raises fundamental and critical questions about both 
the content and organising of the political processes surrounding the decision to sell 
shares in Agder Energi. The main criticism from a democratic perspective is that the 
elected official not was sufficiently involved, that the case continuously was presented 
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to them as an orientation issue, and when it finally was put to the vote, it was too late to 
change the realities in what was the biggest political decision in Kristiansand 
municipality’s history.  
Tor Arnesen was criticized in the media after the report was published. Arnesen 
was accused for being unbalanced in his portrayal of events, and that he argued the case 
of the minority in the City Council. Olav Messel (DEM) who sat in both the strategy 
committee and the executive committee said to Fædrelandsvennen that he could not see 
anything undemocratic about this process – No issue has been managed as well as this, 
Messel said (KommunalRapport 2003). 
Critical Press 
As part of the data collection for this thesis work I have gone through all of the volumes 
of the largest newspaper in the Agder region, Fædrelandsvennen, from January 1999 to 
December 2001. Looking for how the newspaper covered the events relating to the 
Agder Energi issue. I did not find a newspaper that asked the hard-hitting questions, 
which went looking for arguments that were not present in the local debate, which 
confronted stakeholders with many of the illogical and clearly biased statements that 
were put forth. In stead, I found a newspaper that uncritically put forth the arguments of 
those wanting to sell energy shares, and I found editorials that submissively praised the 
stakeholders in their wisdom for selling and for the alternative usages, and when the 
newspaper finally picked up the ball in mid June 2001, was it all too late to matter. In 
the following, I will give some examples from my findings. 
On 14 June 1999, Erling Valvik recommends that it be appointed a reference 
group (under case 93/99) to explore the possibilities to find partners that can be 
potential owners of the KEV shares (Arnesen 2003: 87). This group is later known as 
the strategy committee and consisted of politicians, municipality administrators, board 
members from KEV, the KEV general director, and the consultant37 (Lillesvangstu 
1999b). When Bjarne Ugland signals to the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen that also the 
labour party can agree to sell up to a third of the shares in KEV on 10 August 1999 
(Vindsland 1999). The editorial in Fædrelandsvennen on 12 August 1999 reads: 
It was from an unexpected side that it was expressed a wish to sell out a minority position 
of KEV. Kristiansand labour party has traditionally applied thinking rooted in the 1950- 
and 1960s on this type of questions. It is therefore even more pleasant to hear these new 
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tones. […] We believe that the suggestion to sell a third of KEV is sensible both for the 
owners, which are the citizens of Kristiansand, KEV which are too weak on its own in a 
market in furious development. From an ownership position can one just determine that 
the enormous values that KEV represents not give satisfactory share dividends. Given this 
is it a good solution to sell, provided that the price is right (Fædrelandsvennen 1999a). 
On 15 December 1999, when four meetings in the reference group/strategy 
committee have been held (Arnesen 2003: 89), Fædrelandsvennen again chooses to 
cover the story. The story is that Frank J. Berg gives a presentation to the executive 
committee in Kristiansand municipality on 14 December 1999. The main arguments for 
selling KEV shares are presented in an article; no alternative views are put forth, no 
discussion of that selling all of KEV now is the alternative on the table, the mayor Bjørg 
Wallevik declines to comment to the newspaper and refer the reporter to Frank J. Berg’s 
presentation (Lillesvangstu 1999a). The editorial in Fædrelandsvennen on 16 December 
1999 reads: 
A broadly composed committee in Kristiansand municipality suggests that the 
municipality should sell whole or parts of KEV. We have earlier belonged to those that 
believed that municipal energy companies were important societal institutions with 
important task of securing power to the industry in the region. […] However, after the 
introduction of the new energy law, were electrical power is a commodity traded on an 
open power market, is also the rationale for public ownership and political steering gone. 
[…] Besides, politicians are not particularly suited to manage enterprises that shall 
survive in an open market. Because of this, the suggestion to sell KEV is well justified. 
Conditioned by the funds from the sales is just not only used to balance municipal 
budgets, but used to purposes that give lasting values (Fædrelandsvennen 1999b). 
16 February 2000, the strategy committee gave a new orientation to the executive 
committee in Kristiansand municipality, and Fædrelandsvennen was present covering 
the story. The possibility of a merger between AAE, VAE, and KEV is now on the table 
and recommended by the strategy committee. Fædrelandsvennen coverage is dominated 
by Erling Valvik’s presentation where he lays out his plan for how it can be prevented 
that politicians use the money from the sale. Valvik tells the executive committee that 
the money should be put into a new foundation, he is however not explicit on what type 
of foundation this is, except that it should be a foundation that shall secure workplaces 
for our children and grand children (R. Ø. Reinertsen 2000). Some of the politicians 
opposed to the idea of outsourcing public funds are also quoted in a minor article on the 
same page (Damsgaard 1999). The editorial in Fædrelandsvennen on 17 February 2000 
reads: 
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It is far between chief officers with visionary thoughts and future oriented suggestions for 
solutions in this country. […] It is therefore liberating to read about Erling Valvik’s 
initiative in Kristiansand executive committee yesterday, which is reproduced in today’s 
paper. […] KEV has a value on the open market that is about NOK 3 billion. Today this 
is largely dead capital. […] Given the development on the power-market, have all 
arguments for keeping KEV in municipal ownership disappeared. […] Chief officer 
Erling Valvik wishes to use the power-millions to competence development that shall 
secure the future for our children and grandchildren, before using them to short-sighted 
consume. […] This should not be interpreted as lack of confidence in today’s politicians, 
but sooner a challenge. […] We will therefore request politicians to treat chief officer 
Erling Valvik’s suggestion with an open mind, and with the responsibility, it invites to. 
Because here Kristiansand has gotten a unique opportunity to pass on to our ancestors an 
inheritance we have been given by our forefathers, and that in a refined state 
(Fædrelandsvennen 2000a). 
 Wednesday 23 August 2000, the front-page on Fædrelandsvennen is dominated 
by a large picture of chief officer Erling Valvik, accompanied by the headline “Wants 
two billion to culture”. The subject is that Erling Valvik has suggested that 2/3’s of 
Kristiansand’s municipality’s return from selling Agder Energi shares shall be placed in 
a culture foundation. The purpose of the foundation is to support creative milieus and 
arts and culture (Kubens 2000). The editorial, the following day, 24 August is headed 
“Epic idea”: 
Chief officer Erling Valvik in Kristiansand municipality suggests selling Kristiansand’s 
share of the recently merged Agder Energi AS in order to raise money for schools and 
culture. This is a suggestion that we support. It is probably also sensible to put the funds 
from the sale into separate foundations for schools and culture. Then the politicians can 
determine how much that shall be allocated to the different foundations. The point is, as 
the chief officer points to, to build tomorrow’s infrastructure. […] We therefore hope that 
the chief officer’s ideas resonate with the politicians in Kristiansand City Council and that 
this idea can inspire other municipalities to act accordingly (Fædrelandsvennen 2000b).  
In the following six months there are a substantial amount of reportages and 
reader's letter in the newspaper discussing the different options for Agder Energi. Some 
of the parties that before the 1999 elections were in favour of selling KEV shares, had 
limited this to up to a third of the shares. It also becomes apparent that 
Fædrelandsvennen is leaning towards Lyse/EWE and not Statkraft. In an editorial on 2 
April 2001 the newspaper presents its position on the issue: 
[…] On our part, we do not understand the point of limiting the sales to only a third of the 
shares, when the process has come this far. The chief officer Erling Valvik has presented 
constructive thoughts on how the large values can be managed more securely and more 
future oriented than being placed in a single share. […] But eagerness after kroner and 
good purposes must not be so dominating that Agder Energi’s role as locomotive in 
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Agder’s industrial development is endangered because the price on the share alone 
becomes the deciding factor. In addition, we cannot help the feeling that Statkraft’s plans 
does not reach much further than to become a large international producer of electricity. 
Lyses ambitions seems to be wider (Fædrelandsvennen 2001).  
In May and June 2001 Agder Energi is the main news story and media issue. All 
of the different fractions position themselves in the media in order to influence the 
process. The shift from Lyse/EWE to Statkraft and the question of regional control over 
Agder Energi are the central questions of the controversy. There is a regional 
mobilization of dimension against those in Kristiansand City Council that wish to sell 
all of the shares in Agder Energi. The relevant arguments essentially making the case 
for keeping the shares are also presented in the newspaper on 19 June 2001. When 
Oddvar Tesaker, from the Christian conservative party in Kristiansand, debunks the 
figures used to estimate the future value of Agder Energi by Erling Valvik and the 
AAGCF consultant (Tesaker 2001).  
In a series of editorials spanning from 16 June to 17 August 2001 the editor in 
chief in Fædrelandsvennen apparently has had enough of what he on 16 June calls 
“Agderpowers worst”, on 28 June calls “Power arrogance”, and on 29 June poses the 
question “Was Lyse duped?”. On 17 August 2001 an editorial in Fædrelandsvennen, 
suggests that Agder should cancel the deal with Statkraft. In order to put the 
temperature of the debate at the time into words the following quotes from editor 
Holmer-Hoven does the job: 
Yesterday night I sat together with employees and employee representatives in Agder 
Energi and witnessed the rawest political locomotive and the most powerful party whip 
that has sounded in Kristiansand City Council. These scars will not be healed in many 
years if ever. Because yesterday Kristiansand City Council addressed the most important 
issue that ever has been presented to politicians on a municipal level in Agder. […] 
Together with chief officer Erling Valvik it is Bjarne Ugland that are the architects 
behind the decision to sell that was made in Kristiansand City Council yesterday. The last 
two weeks public debate and last day City Council debate have been a shewbread and 
make-believe over a decision that was made years ago. […] In Kristiansand City Council 
yesterday it was the teachers Bjarne Ugland and Tore Austad that were kings on the hill. 
If Agder Energi disappears out of the region because of yesterday’s decision in 
Kristiansand City Council, will these two industrial amateurs have much to answer for 
(Holmer-Hoven 2001b). 
However, it is not only the Agder Energi sales process that is heavily criticized by 
Fædrelandsvennen’s editor in chief. In November 2001 the board in the new Cultiva 
foundation is presented to the public. It is the “winners” of the sales process Bjarne 
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Ugland, Bjørg Wallevik, Tore Austad that are “rewarded” by a place on Cultiva’s board 
of directors. Holmer-Hoven makes references to North-Korea and the Politburo in the 
old U.S.S.R to communicate the message to his readers (Holmer-Hoven 2001a).  
A couple of years later are however, Cultiva yet again a pioneering and epoch-
making institution in Fædrelandsvennen’s editorials, when Cultiva for the first time 
distributed money in 2003, Fædrelandsvennen’s editorial read:  
[…] Friday made visible a small part of the significance Cultiva will get for Kristiansand 
and the provinces’ social and cultural development for future generations. […] We also 
hope the elected officials now whole-heartedly can support the purpose of the foundation. 
The process surrounding the establishing of Cultiva has been criticized, also by us. But 
now we must put this fight behind us and look ahead and contribute to a constructive 
public debate about the use of the millions. There will of course be disagreements and 
debate on how Cultiva should allocate its resources when the grant applications supersede 
available founds. This is how it should be. Therefore should it also be full openness and 
publicity concerning the application process. In addition, with reference to this years fund 
allocations one should acknowledge that the distribution of funds best is done by a broad 
committee that consist of persons with a high degree of personal and professional 
integrity. The allocation of the Cultiva funds is not a theme suited for majority votes and 
compromises in the City Council (Fædrelandsvennen 2003b). 
Culture policies are according to Fædrelandsvennen apparently only suited to be 
decided by people with a high degree of personal and professional integrity. If this is 
correct, it is principally difficult to see why this reasoning not also would apply to other 
policy areas, and Kristiansand municipality should then immediately outsource the 
decision-making powers it has left. 
Epilogue 
In the sales deal between Agder and Statkraft it was stated that Agder Energi was 
protected from further acquisitions from Statkraft until 1 July 2004 (Danbolt 2002g). 
mayors from 27 of the 30 municipalities in Agder decided 20 June 2005 to continue to 
protect regional ownership for three additional years, and Kristiansand, is now in the 
frontline fighting for continued regional control over Agder Energi (Sved 2005). 
Kristiansand has for instance refused to participate in the new sales process initiated by 
Lillesand municipality in 2005 (Egeland 2005). Twelve to thirteen municipalities in 
Agder have also signalled that if any of the other municipalities’ wish to sell their shares 
in Agder Energi to Statkraft, they would organize and buy the shares back themselves 
(Rønningsbakk 2005b). Olav Egeland, the former general manager in KEV, who in 
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1993 foresaw that Norwegian export of electricity would contribute to increase the 
prices on electricity dramatically (Flemming 1993), wrote in the local newspaper 
Fædrelandsvennen that the billiard fortune that was securely placed in Norway’s most 
secure shares, in environment friendly and renewable energy, with free raw materials, 
and with a return three times as large as the alternative usages for the funds, practically 
was given away (Egeland 2005). Although few, if any at all, have publicly admitted to 
it, does it almost seem like it has dawned on most politicians at Agder that the decision 
of selling Agder Energi shares was a mistake.  
In 2002 when Arthur Andersen & Company went out of business globally because 
of the Enron scandal, paper shredding and more, Arthur Andersen in Norway merged 
with Ernst & Young. Statkraft that used AA audit and AABC consulting services now 
use Ernst & Young as their audit firm. Agder Energi now partly owned by Statkraft also 
use Ernst & Young as their audit firm. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
emphasizes in their letter to Ernst & Young of 19 November 2003 that they has noticed 
that the management in Ernst & Young has an objective to actively adept to the 
regulatory framework set by the Financial Supervisory Authority (Kredittilsynet 2003: 
1). Information director Ragnvald Nærø in Statkraft confirms on 22 November 2003 to 
the newspaper Aftenposten that Statkraft’s shift from Arthur Andersen to Ernst & 
Young is a direct result of the Financial Supervisory Authority’s investigation (Dyrnes 
2003).  
It is however, questionable how deep-felt Statkraft was by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority’s severe critique of Arthur Andersen. The public image was of 
course important, but since Arthur Andersen ceased to exist, they had to change their 
audit firm anyway, and they changed to Ernst & Young, that merged with Arthur 
Andersen in May 2002. In 2003, Statkraft also hired the former director of AAGCF 
Norway (2000-2003), Ingelise Arntsen, Frank J. Berg’s old boss, and gave her the job as 
corporation director, second in command after CEO Bård Mikkelsen at Statkraft 
(Statkraft 2003). Therefore, it is really no indication that Statkraft was anything but very 
satisfied with the services that Arthur Andersen provided38. 
In Agder, Erling Valvik quit as chief officer in Kristiansand municipality and took 
the position as Managing Director in the Cultiva foundation in 2003, the financially 
largest governance network in the Agder region (A. L. Fimreite & Aars 2005: 138). 
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Valvik also became chairman of the board in Helse Sør RHF in 2004, making him 
responsible for all of the hospitals in southern Norway, managing a budget of NOK 16.7 
billion, with 25900 employees, something that makes Helse Sør among the 20 largest 
enterprises in Norway, a position he had up until 26 January 2006 (HelseSør 2005). In 
2004 did the regional newspaper Fædrelandsvennen rank Erling Valvik as the second 
most powerful person in the region, after its own editor-in-chief Finn Holmer-Hoven, 
who in November 2006 announced that he was going to step down as editor-in-chief in 
Fædrelandsvennen during the fall of 2007, a position he has had since 1995 (Vindsland 
2006). The former general director of KEV Jan Pedersen, is chairman of the board in 
Agder Research, and concern director in Agder Energi, second in command after CEO 
Tom Nysted. Nysted, after some interlude, took over the top position in Agder Energi 
when Eivind Krokmo, the former general director in VAE, stepped down as CEO in 
Agder Energi early 2006, because of an investigation into misuse of company funds. At 
the Competence Development Fund of Southern Norway (CDFSN) Magne Dåstøl is 
still chairman. CDFSN and Cultiva are both discussed more in the next sub-chapter. The 
mayor in Kristiansand for 12 years Bjørg Wallevik, lost the mayor position following 
the 2003 municipal elections, when the Christian Conservative Party decided to 
collaborate with the labour party and Bjarne Ugland. In 2003 Bjarne Ugland became the 
first labour representative that held the deputy mayor position in Kristiansand for 
several decades. Bjarne Ugland announced in July 2006 that he would retire from 
politics after the 2007 elections (Uleberg 2006a). When Arthur Andersen went out of 
business in May 2002, Frank J. Berg found new employment as partner in the lawyer 
firm Selmer. He has as late as 2005 continued to advice Kristiansand municipality on 
how Kristiansand municipality should manage its properties. Tor Sommerseth who took 
over as chief officer in Kristiansand after Erling Valvik, hired Frank J. Berg as 
consultant to work with a project group that prepared a strategy for ownership of 
property in Kristiansand municipality (Sommerseth & Løhaugen 2005). 
The realization of the sales of Agder Energi shares to Statkraft had the direct 
effect that the Agder region now got several new foundations, institutions that 
distributes financial support based on application. The financially largest of these new 
regional governance institutions are Cultiva and CDFSN. These institutions possess 
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considerable power in the region, and this newfound power is used to steer the 
development of the region in very specific directions.  
It is difficult to see that the processes surrounding the Agder Energi sales could 
have been conducted in the way they were, if not regional stakeholders’ pushing and 
organising for a sale also was not very confident that they in fact were acting in the best 
interest of the region. This level of confidence I would argue stems from the regional 
policy agenda, and that there is not just a few people that are working this agenda. 
However, this initiative and work were part of a broader and coordinated effort to 
facilitate the Agder region with governance institutions that would support the Agder 
region in its efforts of meeting the development demands of the new millennium. The 
realisation of this task is more than one person or one institution can manage, it has to 
involve certain number of people and institutions in order to be possible. Individuals 
that share such perspectives and have the capability to act, is in the next chapter 
conceptualised as a regional regime. In the following, I discuss what the regional regime 
actually does and how it operates is more detail, where there is a discussion of some 
more aspects of regional meta governance.  
6.5 – Regional Meta Governance 
The concept of regional meta governance or meta steering of governance networks is 
introduced and discussed in chapter 3. Some illustrative examples of what constitutes 
meta governance in the Agder region have already been presented. In the following, I 
will provide additional examples in order to thicken the description of meta steering 
processes that have occurred in the Agder region in recent years. These data will, as the 
other bits of data in chapter 5 and 6 serve as the groundings of the analysis in the next 
chapter. 
The Regional Policy Agenda 
The most important aspect of regional meta governance in the Agder region is the 
regional policy agenda, introduced earlier in this chapter. The rationales and 
justifications of the regional policy agenda, as they are expressed in Common Goals on 
Agder (1994), Common Agenda (1999), and Common Goals on Sørlandet (2003) are 
found in the regional development concepts and in the new regional narrative (ref. 
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discussions in chapter 2 and 3). In a way, you could argue that the regional development 
concepts have set the premises for regional meta governance in the Agder region. 
Another way of seeing it is that they just provided arguments to actors and stakeholders 
with a will and ability to act, a group of people that would have acted in one way or 
another, regardless of the development concepts.  
Institutional Developments 
Just to give an indication of how effective this meta steering strategy has been in the 
Agder region have I put together a table, that outlines some of the policy points in 
Common Goals on Agder, Common Agenda, and Common Goals on Sørlandet, and 
compare these policy elements with some examples of the policy- and institutional 
outputs they have resulted in. Please note that the list is far from complete (see also the 
appendix for further reference): 
Tab. 6-4: Examples of Outputs from the Regional Policy Agenda  
Policy Elements in Common Goals 
on Agder (CGA) (1994), Common 
Agenda (CA) (1999), and Common 
Goals on Sørlandet (CGS) (2003):  
Examples of institutional- and policy outputs in the Agder region 
resulting from the regional policy agenda: 
New trunk road, found in CGA, CA, and 
CGS. 
A lobbyist network was set up called “Better trunk road on Sørlandet” 
led by Knut Dannevig, ambition also included in regional development 
plans, and in many local party programmes. The most recent result is 
the actual start-up of the construction of what essentially is a new 
motorway between Grimstad and Kristiansand. This roadwork initiative 
is one of the largest single road investments in Norway worth about 
NOK 3 billion, called OPS (public private collaboration) E-18 Grimstad-
Kristiansand). 
Development of a central port in 
Kristiansand and increase the capacity 
of the airport in Kristiansand, found in 
CGA and CGS. 
This has become central components in the industrial policies of both 
Kristiansand municipality and Vest-Agder County and Agderrådet, and 
are sought realized through projects such as “Euroterminal 
Kristiansand” and collaborative efforts with Avinor about developing 
Kjevik airport. 
Strengthening of public transport, found 
in CGA, and CGS. 
Addressed in partnerships such as Knutepunkt Sørlandet through for 
instance the Interreg IIIb project Urbal. 
Broadband extensions and an 
increased focus on information 
technology, found in CA and CGS. 
These issues are addressed through networks and organizations such 
as “The digital Sørland”, ”The digital district Agder”, “Sørlandets 
Teknologisenter”, “IT-ringen Agder”, CDFSN, FIKS, AgderLink, E-
remote and more. 
Increased focus on culture and quality 
of living, found in CGA, CA, and CGS.  
Cultiva is the obvious example, but it is also observed an increased 
focus on such issues within counties and municipalities in Agder. One 
example of this is when the chief officer in Vest-Agder County, Tine 
Sundtoft, in June 2006 announced that the "county" now took on 
regional responsibility, when the county contributed to secure a total 
financial package to a new theatre and concert building in Kristiansand. 
The county committed to use NOK 105 million on the project. The 
project is co- financed by Kristiansand municipality, Vest-Agder County, 
Cultiva, and the national government (Uleberg 2006b). 
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Policy Elements in Common Goals 
on Agder (CGA) (1994), Common 
Agenda (CA) (1999), and Common 
Goals on Sørlandet (CGS) (2003):  
Examples of institutional- and policy outputs in the Agder region 
resulting from the regional policy agenda: 
More (inter-) national resources to the 
Agder region, found in CGA, CA, and 
CGS. 
One example is when Victor D. Norman, who in October 2001 became 
the new work- and administration minister, decided to relocate “Post-og 
Teletilsynet” to Lillesand municipality. Other examples are work done 
through Agderrådet, IKON, OPS, new culture institutions, Value 
Creation 2010, NODE, Agder University College, etc.  
Develop a university in the region, 
found in CGA, CA, and CGS. 
The most central ambition of CDFSN, but is also addressed through 
Cultiva, “Universitetskomiteen”, “Universitetstiftelsen”, etc. (see also 
discussion below). 
Quality of public service, reorganisation 
of public service institutions, more 
collaboration between etc. found in 
CGA, CA and CGS. 
In addition to the national focus on New Public Management, is it in 
Agder networks dedicated to improving public service quality, for 
instance “Trainee Sør”, “Kompetansering sør”, “Nettverk for 
virksomhetsstyring”, “FDV-Forum Sør”, etc. 
Focus on strengthening R&D milieus 
and triple-helix institutions, facilitating 
an “entrepreneurial culture”, found in 
CA, and CGS. 
CDFSN, Centre for Entrepreneurship, "Nettverk av næringshager og 
kunnskapsparker", some 30 incubators, growth parks, knowledge parks, 
Interests organisations, regional-state institutions, counties, and 
municipalities has such issues as part of their main development focus. 
Equal opportunities, found in CGS. Some research projects both on Agder University College and in Agder 
research has gotten regional financing, see for instance (Magnussen et 
al. 2005). Some networks have also been set up, for instance “Female 
Future” and “Kvinner på Agder”. 
Market the region, found in CGA, CA, 
and CGS. 
In addition to the work done in the public sector, this has been 
articulated directly through institutions such as “Destinasjon Sørlandet”, 
Sydspissen, and is an important aspect of institutions such as Cultiva 
and CDFSN. 
Living conditions at Sørlandet, found in 
CGA.  
A large research project got regional financing in the late 1990s (Agder 
Research/ Agder University College). There are few examples of 
network structures that address this issue directly, and is probably 
thought to be addressed indirectly, Cultiva and CDFSN do not prioritise 
such projects.  
Democracy in Agder, found in CGS Democracy and information technology project at Agder University 
College, Enterprise Development 2000, Value Creation 2010, this 
thesis…  
 
The projects, networks, and institutions in the list above have involved a lot of 
resources, efforts, commitment, and many people. Among these people whom most 
probably only have relatively vague ideas about how the project they are involved in 
links to other seemingly uncoordinated projects, and networks in the region. What they 
have in common is that most of them at the least are co-financed by and through 
regional sources. These people and networks work to “move” the region, and regional 
development, in more or less the same direction, even though many of the involved 
probably do not realize how and that they contribute to the realization of a regional 
policy agenda, a policy agenda that as discussed has all the hallmarks of the regional 
development concepts.  
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The Use of Regional Development Concepts 
You do not have to go to the regional policy agenda to find references to the regional 
development concepts in the Agder region. Most of the institutions discussed in this 
thesis apply directly to one or more of these concepts. To give a complementary 
overview of how widespread the use of these concepts has become is more than I aim 
for through this work. However, in order to give an indication of the steering potential 
inherent in the concepts, some examples are beneficiary for the further discussions, the 
concepts themselves were introduced and discussed in chapter 2 and 3. 
One of the most prominent of the regional development concepts is triple-helix 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 1997b), which describes the institutionalized collaboration 
between academia, industry, and public government. Most of the dominant governance 
institutions in the Agder region can and do make use of the triple-helix concept as a way 
of rationalizing its own existence, and the integration of academic institutions into 
private-public collaborative efforts. Examples of networks and institutions in the Agder 
region that can make use of the triple-helix concept are: Kristiansand municipality 
(Sommerseth & Østmo 2004), Agderrådet, Sydspissen, NODE, Value Creation 2010 
(the Value Creation Alliance), and Kompetansering sør to name a few39. 
A second influential regional/industrial development concept is Michael Porter’s 
concept of regional clusters (Porter 1998a; 1998b). The idea of building new and 
strengthening existing regional clusters is central to much of the regional development 
work in the Agder region. Kristiansand municipality uses the cluster theory in its 
guidelines for the distribution of resources to industrial development purposes 
(Sommerseth & Langevei 2006). Various Norwegian Research Council financed 
projects such as for instance NODE use cluster theory, many Innovation Norway 
financed projects also use cluster theory40, etc. CDFSN for instance writes on its 
homepage that:  
CDFSN has consciously chosen to prioritize a few industries and branches, instead of 
spreading the resources on to many sectors. This use of policy instruments is well 
anchored within economical theory, especially within the so-called cluster theory 
(CDFSN 2003). 
A parallel but not fully similar issue to this is Cultiva’s use of the creative 
cluster’s concept (Rambøll 2006). The uses of the learning regions concept (Florida 
1995), the regional innovation system (RIS) approach (Asheim & Herstad 2003), the 
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creative class concept (Florida 2002; 2005), and the knowledge economy (Cooke 2002) 
are all previously discussed in this thesis. 
One of the people interviewed as part this thesis work; a consultant experienced 
with several network-building initiatives in the Agder region explains the significance 
of the development concepts in the following way: 
Question: Can you say something about your perspective on the significance of working 
through networks and partnerships? 
Consultant: Two dimensions are noteworthy. On the one hand it is the perspective on 
how innovations occur. In a modern interactive understanding of innovation, this says 
that innovation occurs in the firms, and that it is the firms that are in the centre of the 
realisation of commercial innovations. However, the way to go in order to realise this, 
there must be interplay with external partners. Where customers and competition always 
rank highest when we look at who inspires innovation. Where the research and educative 
milieus of course are present and become more and more important. In addition, the link 
towards the public sector is important. The triple-helix understanding of innovation that 
occurs is one dimension of why working through networks is important. The second 
dimension is more from a public perspective and a public policy system perspective. That 
one coordinates and develops strategies in the region to gain as much effect as possible. 
In order to realise these networks and vision based leadership it is necessary to get these 
partners to interplay.  
[…] 
Question: What are the forces driving this development as you see it? What are the 
reasons for us sitting here talking about networks, clusters, triple-helix, and the role of the 
public sector plays in channelling resources into these types of structures? Is it for 
instance a result of a genuine demand from the industry? 
Consultant: It is difficult to pinpoint where it comes from. I think it is difficult to 
precisely identify cause and effect here. However, innovation happens in more interactive 
ways now than it did before. That is one dimension. Another is that innovations occur 
faster now than before. The human resources mean much in the enterprises, humans are 
complicated entities that not only are preoccupied with work, but also family etc, the 
increased focus on equality issues. Employers are therefore concerned with the totality of 
the offer that they can give to their employees. They are therefore concerned with the 
profile of a given place. They would be concerned with the educational facilities in that 
place. Both as the competence it gives but also in terms of attractiveness, also e.g. 
Kindergartens, transportation facilities…  
Question: So your point is that the industrial structures have changed because of e.g. 
globalization therefore must we also organize ourselves in new ways? 
Consultant: Well the demands of the “input factors” have increased; the markets for 
human resources have become tougher. Potential employees have become more 
demanding. I would have put more emphasis on that − globalisation is a big word. 
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Question: I was refereeing to globalization as the quick age; everything supposedly going 
much faster, travel, information etc… 
Consultant: Yes, my point is that innovation is not only linked to money and technology 
it has much to do with the humans as well.  
Working the Public Sphere 
If we see the development of the regional policy agenda, the regional development 
concepts, the massive institutional developments in recent years in relation to each 
other, is it difficult to argue against the view that they represent a message and rationale 
that it can be difficult to question. In addition to this it has it been a relatively massive 
effort to “win” the public discourse associated with regional development. A read-
through of some of the volumes of the largest (and only) regional newspaper 
Fædrelandsvennen reveals that the message, of the regional policy agenda, has been 
communicated to the larger public by many actors at many occasions. Some examples 
of some of the arguments put forth in the crucial period when the decision to sell Agder 
Energi was made are presented in the following.  
On 23 July 1999, Theis H. Pedersen director of NHO Vest-Agder argued in a 
chronicle in Fædrelandsvennen that a competence fund is crucial in order to realize a 
University in the region, that the regional industry misses politicians that dare to be 
unpopular within their municipal borders on behalf of addressing regional challenges, 
and that collaboration, innovation, quality of life and competence must be put in the 
centre of the regional agenda (T. H. Pedersen 1999).  
On 14 February 2000, Trygve Reinertsen entrepreneur, director in Telenor, and in 
an IT firm, and board member at Agder Research (where he later becomes chairman) 
writes a chronicle in Fædrelandsvennen where he outlines the challenges facing the 
region: 
The development on Oslo bourse the last years has demonstrated dramatic changes in the 
way of thinking in industrial development. Our traditional enterprises are falling behind. 
Businesses are no longer primarily valued based on good economic results, or good future 
income estimates. What you can hope to earn in the long term has become interesting. 
[…] Out in the big world it is large amounts of risk willing venture capital available. 
These funds are put into future oriented businesses, especially within information 
technology, telecommunication, and entertainment. […] We must be willing to gamble on 
local entrepreneurs. […] We must establish even closer collaboration between Agder 
University College and the industry. If we are gong to succeed, Agder University College 
must prioritize and directly support these developments. Agder University College must 
participate actively in this type of development. The education at Agder University 
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College must be about how innovation can be done, and research must be supportive of 
this development. Good regional development will condition us to think and act as one 
Agder. Even in sum are small. Only through active collaborations can we create 
something new with dimensions (T. Reinertsen 2000).   
17 April 2000, Tine Sundtoft, regional director in NHO Vest-Agder, tells a story 
in a chronicle in Fædrelandsvennen, when she was introduced to the three C’s, 
competence, communication, and culture, in Malmø. Based on the conclusions of this 
experience does NHO support Sydspissen’s Common Agenda (Sundtoft 2000b). On 15 
September 2000, Sundtoft returns to Fædrelandsvennen’s chronicle pages: 
[…] Newer research shows that growth theory, innovation systems, and clusters are 
extremely important when it comes to a positive and competitive industrial development. 
[…] The growth of communication technology based on information technology has 
revolutionized the possibilities for communication. A consequence of this is that also 
regional and district based industries operate in an international market. […] Research has 
focused much on how the important role economical clusters play for value creation 
processes. A main reason for the success of industrial clusters is that the communication 
is swift and effective. Especially where it exists informal meeting places, the information 
exchange is extremely effective. In Sweden researchers have examined what represents 
the basic driving forces in successful regions. They have found that the road to success is 
long. Some of the important factors are: A mobile workforce. Diversity in industrial 
structure. A regional culture supportive of innovation. That there are regional political 
ambitions. That there is a university that is integrated in the region (Sundtoft 2000a).  
In an chronicle in Fædrelandsvennen on 14 October 2000, chief officer Erling 
Valvik in Kristiansand municipality argued that Culture, Communication, and 
Competence are as important conditions for development of the city (Kristiansand) as 
securing electricity was in the beginning of the 20th century (Valvik 2000). 
On 18 January 2001 Knut Dannevig, director in Sørlandets Teknologiforum (STS) 
and leader of the trunk road initiative, writes a chronicle in Fædrelandsvennen where he 
emphasizes his perspective on regional development, he writes that: 
[…] The development of strong regions happens primarily where an active industrial 
development occurs, which creates a broad labor market. Sørlandet is in the beneficiary 
situation that we have an industrial and living region, where Agdercity (Agderbyen), 
which has significant growth, is at the centre of gravity. If politicians and the industry 
work jointly and intentionally we have all that is needed in order to develop the Agder 
region into one of a few national centres for innovative and competence intensive 
industrial developments. Such collaboration requires close collaboration between the 
counties, municipalities, the industry, on important issues such as developing a university, 
coordinating the new competence funds in the two counties, building broadband 
connections, strengthen culture in the region etc. It is also important that we collaborate 
in marketing the region; in relation to this Sydspissen and Common Agenda are important 
(Dannevig 2001).  
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On 23 February 2001, the regional director in NHO Vest-Agder and board 
member in Sydspissen returns to Fædrelandsvennen’s chronicle pages to explain the 
implications of the new economy.  
[…] The so-called new economy is not only something that happens on the side of the old 
economy − the new economy is a network economy that is changing the whole economy. 
Old challenges are solved in a new way. The transition from the industrialized society to 
the competence society is a bigger transition than when the farming society became 
industrialized society (Sundtoft 2001).  
Shortly after these chronicles were published in Fædrelandsvennen, the IT Bubble 
burst globally. The rapid growth in the value estimates of the dotcom companies in the 
late 1990s has later been known as the bubble economy (OECD 2005). The end of the 
1990s was characterized by fast “bubble driven” growth in the dotcom industry, which 
was flooding with private venture capital, and soaring stock markets feeding a too rapid 
expansion of telecom (Mariussen 2003: 74). We must therefore assume that arguments 
relating to the implications of the new economy get somewhat toned down because of 
this; at least they did in the public sphere. Most independent thinkers probably start to 
realize that maybe the “new” and the “old” is not so new and old after all, but governed 
by many of the same politico economic principles. However, if the collapse of the 
dotcom bubble did something about regional stakeholders’ public confidence, it did 
little to change the planned direction and configurations of the emerging regional 
governance institutions.  
The Public Sector and Networks 
One of the central questions when we shall assess the nature of the governance system 
and the questions of regimes relating to meta governance issues concerns the 
relationship between the elected representatives and the network level. This is a 
complex question where you would find different arrangements and structures even 
within the same municipality and county depending on the policy area in question. 
When regional actors in the Agder region where interviewed as part of this thesis work I 
asked them for their perspective on the relationship between the elected representatives 
and the network level. Some of the responses given to such a line of questions are given 
in the following:  
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Question: The overreaching strategies you point to, strategies that we find present in for 
instance Sydspissen and Agderrådet, can you say something about the processes you went 
trough in order to agree on them? 
County-level official: In Agderrådet there were groups that worked out work-plans and 
action programmes etc. These were then formally sanctioned and agreed upon in 30 
municipality councils and both county councils. In addition, in the board of NHO, I am 
not sure exactly how it was done in LO but I am sure it was formally anchored there as 
well. What happened was that some people had some thoughts and took some regional 
leadership, which then subsequently became anchored formally in different institutions in 
the region. Regional leadership is about taking leadership, but you cannot run too fast, 
you have to get the processes anchored formally. Without formal anchoring these efforts 
become useless. It is about working together, co-operation, in this way, more consensus 
emerges than if some just had taken on regional leadership on their own and ran with 
some specific agendas. Then we would not have the level of regionally anchored agendas 
that we have today. For instance would we not have the regional cheering of a university 
at Agder that we have today without these processes. 
Question: How well would you say that these strategies were anchored in the industry, 
within the business community at Agder? I would imagine that NHO, who represents the 
business community, saw it as important to articulate these interests in particular into 
these processes. How well did the agendas that came out of Sydspissen and maybe in 
particular Agderrådet match the interests that the industry had?  
County-level official: Everything I did was anchored in the board of NHO Agder. I also 
reported on every annual meeting what things we worked with and what we planned to in 
the continuation. But of 900 members, 900 members don’t participate on an annual 
meeting. It would be a cross-section of the smallest and the largest business at Agder that 
did participate on these annual NHO meetings. These businesses have frequently 
supported this way of working, through signals given through the board of NHO and the 
annual NHO meeting. In addition to this, we had more informal meetings when we 
visited member businesses. It has not been any solo run on my part.  
Question: So you say that these strategies are relatively broadly anchored? 
County-level official: Yes. 
Question: As I mentioned I write about regional development. I am concerned with on the 
one hand a type of system effectiveness, meaning the time the system uses to agree upon 
a strategy and get something done in practice. Including that they are working the 
strategies that are “useful” for the region. Useful with quotation marks, because it always 
will be debatable what is the most “useful”. In addition, I am concerned with democracy, 
meaning democracy in a process; broad participation was the term we used in the Value 
Creation 2010 project. In addition, democracy meaning representative democracy, the 
role the representative institutions plays in this system. This is broadly speaking what I 
write about. Can you given your perspective say something about how networks and 
partnerships in this system contribute to regional democracy in these two understandings 
of the concept?  
County-level official: I mean that what we have done has been anchored in formal 
forums, notably in the county. Everything has been put in front of the county when the 
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county allocates resources to this. It is anchored. I am not sure where you are heading 
with this question.  
Question: What we are talking about is the workings of a system of governance, the 
interplay between civil society, private interests, and elected officials. In a classical 
understanding of the workings of representative democracy, people elect their 
representatives based on their preferences, representatives that in turn take on societal 
leadership based on the platform they are elected on. This represent an ideal version of 
representative democracy, it has probably never worked like this in practice anywhere 
and it doesn’t work like this now. However, this was what we learnt in school about how 
the system worked. Even if you point to the decisions being formally anchored. Can you 
say something about the border, when interplay and co-operation are placed at the centre? 
One could think that this does affect the border between the strictly political elected level, 
and the network and partnership level. That this border becomes dimmer than it used to 
be.  
County-level official: The goals that we have worked towards have been as passed and 
anchored as possible. Common Goals on Agder is passed in 30 municipalities at Agder; 
these municipalities are as broadly put together as the political scene is. I therefore do not 
think that just because partnerships and networks do not consist of elected politicians, it is 
ombudsman representatives’ women and men sit there on behalf of some. As long as they 
do not do anything that crosses their mandate, I think it is as democratic and anchored as 
it can be.  
[…] 
Question: If we return to our previous topic, the relationship between partnership and 
network structures and the strictly political level. In the classical understanding, the 
bureaucracies are neutral; the elected politicians initiate processes based on their 
platform. If governance structures are present, you could put up the argument that this 
picture is not as clear as it used to be. If you shall say something about where the 
direction of influence goes then, sticking to the policy field of regional development. 
Does the arrow of influence mainly go from the networks and partnerships into the 
representative level or does it mainly go from the representative level into the partnership 
and network level? What is the picture here? 
County-level official: The arrow goes in both directions. 
Question: Earlier we talked about the interests present in these network institutions. You 
mentioned that mainly triple-helix actors are present. However, what about all of the 
other societal interests that are not represented in these processes? What about for 
instance other interest organizations, the handicapped organizations, the church aid, save 
the children etc.? If the network institutions are influential in shaping societal 
development should other interests also have their say in a democratic society? 
County-level official: What we have used these partnerships for up until now, has been 
regional development; it has not been societal development. We have not included every 
societal topic. We have worked with industrial development and regional development.  
Question: Your argument is that those affected have been those involved. 
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County-level official: Yes. If we think societal development, it is another thing. When the 
counties now generate a new regional plan then this is societal development. Where we 
must use broader partnership thinking than what we have used on regional development. 
We must be able to differentiate between the different roles and the different ways of 
thinking here.  
One of the people interviewed as part this thesis work; a consultant experienced 
with several network-building initiatives in the Agder region had the following 
perspective on the relationship between the public sector and the networks: 
Question: […] if you shall say something about the external power structure; let’s say in 
respect to representative structures, municipalities, county municipalities, national level. 
How do these institutions articulate its interest facing this level?  
Consultant: […] 
Question: For instance, is the message first coordinated internally, and then 
communicated externally or is it more of a reciprocal…?  
Consultant: My take is that it is the continuous and relentless influence towards that type 
of political structures that is weak, - all too weak in my opinion. However, when it comes 
to concrete agendas and “stunts” I think that these structures are very significant. For 
instance, the trunk road action is an example of that, where there has been a partnership 
between Agderrådet and the industry in order to realise it. In addition, I think that the 
things we did towards the municipality in Grimstad, were we mobilised the media and put 
up a lot of pressure, were significant in order to realise the competence fund in Aust-
Agder. It is more “stunts” than continuous influence when we want to influence 
representative structures. That is how I experience it. 
Question: If we look at the trunk road action that was one of Agderrådet’s embedded 
policies. However, we can find the trunk road agenda in many other forums at Agder as 
well. From my perspective, it looks like many of the same actors are working the same 
agenda in different forums here. Do the agenda follow the person or the institution here? 
Consultant: I think this is one of the ways of working in networks, and in innovation 
systems, in this region this became very apparent, around 1997-98, when we got two 
persons from South-Sweden, the Blekinge region, Åke Uhlin from Nordregio was one of 
them. They talked about the developments in Karlskrona municipality, where it in 
Karlskrona hadn’t been constructed any strong formal institutions, but where important 
actors had gone together in order to organise around a common agenda, almost like a 
common action plan41, they then had worked systematically in order to realise that agenda 
from their different positions and organisations. This is similar to what we have worked 
to realise in this region, and partly has succeeded with. For instance through Agderrådet 
only having a limited number of initiatives that they focus on, this was also the idea 
behind Sydspissen, to have a common agenda, where everyone within their own domain 
worked in the same direction. This was the way to do regional development successfully. 
In this sense is it what you say, that the issues follow the persons involved and not the 
settings that they are in. When it comes to the trunk road action, I do not think that we 
shall underestimate the signal effect when the industry enters the field and engage them 
selves in society this has much weight. A demonstration in Oslo with just municipality 
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mayors would not even get a second on the news, but when ship-owners go hand in hand 
with bishops and others - then it is noticed.  
Question: How often does that happen? Are the industrial leaders aware, you think, of the 
political force that they possess? If we look at central politicians aren’t they relatively 
servile towards the … (industry) 
Consultant: I’m not so sure of that, on the other hand, you can sometimes experience 
industrial leaders who think they can write a letter to the municipal council the day before 
a decision is made and turn around a decision, which has been prepared for 6 months, just 
by doing that. That is a naïve overestimation of their influence on the process and their 
own significance. The most prominent feature of the large portions of the industry is that 
it does not understand how they must work in order to influence political structures.  
Question: If I try to look at the big picture here at Agder, and the relationship between 
politics, administration, the network level, and the industry, and if we distinguish between 
them as different spheres. Would you say it is a correct interpretation to say that the 
network level is the prolonged arm of politics towards the industry? Alternatively, are 
networks the industries’ prolonged arm into politics? Thirdly, does the arrow of influence 
go in both directions? What would be your analysis of this?  
Consultant: My analysis is that it goes in both directions.  
Question: Equally?  
Consultant: Yes, I think so. If you expand politics to encompass education and research 
milieus, it definitively goes in both directions. You must be aware of that if you look at 
what the counties actually are responsible for, their activities have very limited 
significance for the industry as such. They have a few million available for regional 
development, if you compare this to Amersham with NOK 1.5 billion investments only at 
Lindesnes, the counties development efforts are just peanuts.  
Question: The counties are supposed to lead regional development… 
Consultant: Yes, it is interesting. The counties must find their role as a legitimate and 
unifying force, more than through what they formally are responsible for and have 
budgets for. This says something about what type of competence they must have etc.  
Question: I asked a person in the county what it was that gave them room to act in this 
field; the answer was that partnerships enabled them to increase their budgets. This is an 
expression of the county seeing their own legitimate role in this field as very much tied 
up to the size of the resources that they are able to put into projects.  
Consultant: Well the counties have not succeeded in being a regional development actor. 
An evaluation done by Nordregio for the ministry last year shows this. It is mostly due to 
that they have not been staffed correctly administratively and politically to take on that 
role. In just two years, they went from being a hospital board and administration to being 
a regional development actor. It is so obvious that what is needed is a different set of 
people both in the administration and in the political level to take on that role properly. 
The counties never had a chance at succeeding, in my opinion. However, I think that the 
county or the future region can have a legitimate role in coordinating this type of 
Chapter 6 – Regional Governance 
- 299 - 
activities. However, this will be a result of their legitimate role and not their resources. 
Nevertheless, they have not taken on that role at all.  
Question: Would you agree to a statement indicating that much policy is developed at the 
network level in Agder? Not party politics, but politics in a wider sense of the word.  
Consultant: Yes, on the things that are connected to regional development this is true. 
Again, this is so interactively done, that no one can say who did what, who took the 
initiative, and how the chain of events has been on a particular subject. 
Question: Can anyone do it? This is my interpretation also, a central feature of networks 
is that issues and agendas jump back and forth in and the end you do not know if you 
thought of it your self or someone else did it for you.  
Consultant: Yes, and the more people that think in the same way, the higher up on the 
political agenda does the subject come. If you take those things that are on Agderrådet’s 
agenda today, this definitely are issues that the industry has been instrumental in 
promoting over time, for instance University, trunk road, Kjevik (airport), equal 
opportunity promoted by NHO, etc. However, I do not experience that this happens in a 
way that are feta-compli for the industry; I do not experience any imbalance in the power 
there. The problem is more that it is to little politics in the political structures.  
Question: Would you describe this kind of network working as a strength to democracy? 
Do we honour the idea of the democratic society when we work in this way?  
Consultant: Yes, I think so, if you look at the third sector, on the voluntary organisations 
that operates there, I think more such organisations are a strength, as long as we are 
careful and do not mix roles connected to administration and allocation of money too 
much with it. Then I cannot see any big problems with public actors and the industry 
sitting down together to discuss development issues. I think the quality, the 
implementation force, is much larger when people work together. This is because 
implementation does not happen just because a municipal council makes a decision. You 
cannot move a region only through constructing a county plan document. You only get 
movement when you get many actors to move in the same direction. In this sense, we do 
increase the trust of democracy in the region through working in this way, and that is a 
strength to democracy. If you put much money into these types of structures, you would 
move much resource allocating authority into the networks and that could be in conflict 
with classical administrative roles.  
Question: If this is as you say, necessary to work in this way in order to get anything 
done, if this description is correct and we have to work in this way. Do you then believe 
that the “democratic society” is dependent upon that the processes in these networks are 
executed in a democratic fashion also, e.g. that they are transparent, open, inclusive etc.?  
Consultant: Yes, but at the same public institutions cannot dictate how these structures 
should be designed. That would be very wrong. They cannot have a say in how the 
industry shall organise and represent. However, if they should give input to a public plan 
on for instance area planning, or other such typical public administrative issues. Then the 
public sector must think through if the inputs they get are reasonably representative. For 
instance if Gimlemoen, where Agder University College is located, should be regulated 
once more you ought to be sure that the width of inputs is adhered to.  
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Both of the interview extracts reproduced are given by people that have a genuine 
political engagement to the Agder region and to the development of the region. Both of 
them give us what I believe are an honest view of their perspective on how the 
relationship between the private sector and the public sector has and is influenced by the 
new governance structures. To what extent their views are “representative” in any 
formal, meaning of the word is not discussed in this thesis. However, my personal view 
stemming from participating in the Value Creation Alliance and doing interviews with 
many regional network participants is that they articulate views that are not uncommon 
or viewed as particularly controversial among the majority of network participants in 
the Agder region. The criticisms put forth against the political level, especially at the 
county level, also resonates with elected officials at the county level that I have 
interviewed, that all to well recognise that their direct influence on the development of 
the region is severely hampered by their lack of development resources. When policies 
despite the lack of effective political structures are to be developed and executed at the 
regional level, it is understandable that governance structures of the kind discussed in 
this thesis emerge.  
These structures without any “formal” power have to be effective in other ways, 
one of the central steering mechanisms in regional governance in the Agder region is 
therefore to focus on consensus, loyalty and a sense of moral obligation to the larger 
policy framework, a topic that is discussed more in the following.  
Regional Consensus 
One of the aspects of the emerging regional governance system in the Agder region that 
I believe is one of the most unfortunate from a learning and development perspective is 
the “regional commitment” to consensus. It is relatively straightforward to understand 
why focus on consensus is perceived to be so important for regional development − it is 
a central meta steering mechanism, and without it would most governance networks end 
to function as intended, as moving in the same direction. In addition, two other aspects 
of the regional policy agenda strengthen the focus on consensus in the Agder region 
further.  
One of the network consultants interviewed as part of this thesis work emphasized 
the results that had been achieved just because the region had been able to stand 
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together as one entity when “it went to Oslo” to lobby. Quarrelling between regional 
interests outside the office of the minister in question was not a “successful” strategy, 
and this consultant had an example from when such an unfortunate event had happened. 
When the culture committee on the Norwegian Storting was about to decide on where to 
locate the new TV2 channel, Agder together with Bergen was both part of the final 
discussions in the committee. The lobbyist group representing Agder’s interests 
reportedly had a good working relationship with the committee chairperson. The 
problem was only that the Agder group could not point to a regional consensus on 
which city that should host the new TV station, Arendal or Kristiansand, and Bergen 
ended up being the committee’s choice of location. 
Another aspect of the regional emphasis on consensus is the significance given to 
regional development as a marketing strategy in order to attract businesses and an 
“able” workforce. It is almost as there exists a view that such an image building effort is 
in conflict with too much public “conflict”. 
However, as a meta governance mechanism consensus is most important to the 
topics of this thesis because it touches upon the power structures embedded in the 
networks. Two of the people I interviewed explain how in the following way: 
Question: Has something about the political system and its interactions with its 
environment changed in your opinion? Do I understand you correctly as saying that since 
these processes are as well anchored nothing has changed significantly if we look at the 
period from the mid 90s up until now? 
County-level official: When you work in partnerships, it is more consensus, we must 
agree, when these decisions are anchored in formal forums, some people can always say 
that had if it had just been my interest the decision could have been more to the point. 
However, I am willing to give some slack to my specific interests in order to gain more in 
co-operation with others. We do some allocations of resources under the premise that 
others also allocate resources. It is some careful pressure in that. There are some 
processes towards formal decisions. Those commitments that are inherent in the 
partnership and this way of thinking partnership mean that some special interests have to 
be put away. You make some choices when you enter a partnership. Partnership is a 
work-method that means that you do not stand 100% freely to do what you want. You 
must readily do it, but then you must also accept and risk that you are not part of the 
partnership in the continuation, and risk that your agenda up the road does not benefit 
from this. That there are some judgements that are made around this field is a part of the 
change towards this way of working.  
Question: But this understanding of what a partnership is, that these processes are so 
consensus driven, where you are critically dependent upon everybody being very much in 
agreement on where the roads lead and what needs to be done. It seems to me as being 
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very conservative, what if some immediate needs emerge, if someone sees something that 
is critical to attend to. If someone then address this do, s/he then risks to be excluded.  
County-level official: It is not that simple. If you are used to work along these lines, and 
are confident with this way of working, then you also learn to know the system and the 
people in it. If someone brings in an idea that we must act swiftly on, then it is easier to 
do this because you trust the process, the system and those involved in the process, people 
that you have worked with before. This means that we also can handle new things that 
must be acted on immediately. 
Question: What you are saying is that the system is dependent upon it being a certain 
level of trust inherent in it. That you can trust others and that, others can trust you. 
County-level official: Yes, and you should not underestimate this. This is something that 
we have gotten out of Value Creation 2010. We now know how important trust is in order 
to get anything done. We now know whom we trust and we know whom we do not trust. 
You then choose who you want to co-operate with and who you do not want to co-operate 
with. You know who you want to do additional projects with because you know that this 
will probably work.  
The county-level official who is a person that is experienced from most of the 
central governance institutions in the Agder region here gives us what I believe is an 
important insight into the finer dynamics of what makes the governance institutions 
work as they do. In a sense, it is a revival of the classical image of a carrot and a stick. 
There is a reward if you collaborate, a reward that can enable you, or your institution 
with benefits in the future if you abide to the discursive framework and the work 
process. However, it is also a stick, if you are difficult and do not collaborate as 
expected you could very fast find yourself and your institution out in the cold and with 
no direct influence on the regional development agenda.  
There is no reason to believe that such mechanisms work particularly different 
between networks participants possessing different roles, for instance politicians, 
consultants, administrative officials, interest organisations, R&D intuitions etc. 
However, some actors are more dependent upon being accepted than others are, and 
some issues tend to be more focused than others, and not all work sanctions are soft 
either. These are all issues that are addressed more by another consultant I interviewed:  
Question: I will return to where we started. If we look at the larger set of networks, 
partnerships, and other collaborative structures and forums here at Agder. To what extent 
would you say that they represent / mirrors interests in the larger society? To what extent 
would you say that these structures represent plurality of interest? 
Consultant: What we are talking about now is innovation-oriented things, its regional 
development, etc., where the industry plays a strong role, because it is there value 
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creation to a large extent occurs. I think that the sum of these structures is relatively 
representative for what the industry means and stands for.  
Question: But what if you take on a wider perspective, […] do these institutions represent 
any wider interests besides those of the industry?  
Consultant: No, I would say that they represent the industry’s interests, understood as the 
businesses interests as firms, but also what I would describe as industry people and 
industry leader’s interests. I think it is useful to differentiate between the interests of those 
working in the industry; personal development and quality of life etc, and that these 
explicitly are the industry’s interests. These things go hand-in-hand. I do not think that 
these structures (networks etc) have expressed that they are something more, or want to 
be something more, to take on a larger societal role. They are just one of many groups of 
actors that try to influence the development of society in relation to what is legitimately 
elected political institutions.  
Question: This might be a tricky question to answer… If we move ourselves on the inside 
of one of these networks, I have a question relating to the “voices” that are articulated 
here and where these “voices” come from. For instance if you represent the county, it’s 
also expected that your position is politically cleared, if you represent LO its expected 
that you have some sort of mandate from your members and can speak and act on their 
behalf, and so on. But at the same time we know that when you are working in a network 
structure or a partnership, there should be and are supposed to be meaning constructing 
processes going on there. If not it is just exchange of information. However, there could 
of course be many voices behind the actor’s expressed voices, for instance those speaking 
on behalf of a particular location, a political party etc. Is this process working according 
to how it should ideally work in your opinion? 
Consultant: Networks are a difficult way of working, and you are now touching upon 
some of the problematic aspects of it. People participate and partly represent their 
organisation, and partly themselves, the development occurs in a forum where people are 
present as single individuals, much of the challenge is then to safeguard the link back to 
the organisation they represent. […] It is regrettably so that it is those networks and 
meeting places where the top management meet that have the greatest value, because they 
have the power to talk and act on behalf of their organisations. There are many networks 
where the balance between representing the person and the institution become faulty. If 
you for instance take Vest-Agder County, there you could say that the county mayor 
represents the county 80% and himself 20%. If you look at [name] in the industrial 
development department in Vest-Agder County, this situation is the other way round. He 
is much more influenced by his own personal opinions, opinions that not necessarily are 
completely reflected in the county’s representative forums and strategies. […] However, 
this does not mean that working in networks is not valuable. It is “regrettably” so that it is 
important that the top-leaders meet, but it can also be sensible sometimes with lower level 
forums where enterprise employees meet together with the management.  
[…] 
Question: […] give me some examples then of some results from the work that has been 
done in networks at Agder. What has come out of it? 
Consultant: The establishment of ‘CDFSN’ is one concrete example, on what came out of 
it. Likewise, for the competence fund in Aust-Agder of course. I remember we stood in 
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Grimstad municipality council and held strong appeals for the importance of that 
establishment. That was network at work, the network was able to realise that initiative. I 
am not in doubt that the E18 trunk road action had a significant impact on the speed of 
realising that improved road, especially the distance between Grimstad and Kristiansand.  
[…]  
Consultant: Yes, and another good example is “Sørlandets teknologisenter” STS that was 
established in 1998. That is also an example of something that without doubt was a 
network-based initiative. […] If I had time to really think about this, I could have 
mentioned many more examples of structures and activities that have been realised 
because of this way of working. On the more political sphere, we have Agderrådet, but 
also the knowledge park in Kristiansand, just this has taken a very long time but it will 
probably turn out valuable in the end. You could also ask what new firms have been 
established because of this. I would say that you could argue a link through STS in 
Grimstad, that firms have been established as a result of that initiative. You will also find 
new academic subjects on Agder University College as a result of this work, and much 
more. Therefore, I mean that you could identify many concrete things because of this 
work. “Fortunately”, if you ask around, you will find many people that would identify 
themselves as potential mothers and fathers of the results of this work.  
Question: There were many involved you say? 
Consultant: Yes, many involved, but many think that they took the original initiative and 
therefore should have credit for it. Thank you for that, I say. This is an example of how it 
works.  
Question: We should talk a bit about power and influence in this type of institutions. I 
take it for granted (that you agree) there is power in these collaborative institutions, how 
would you describe this power? 
Consultant: Along two dimensions. One is that those that are skilful, creative, good at 
communicating their message will, almost independent of what firm they represent, be 
influential. The second is rooted in, size, money, resources. For instance, 
Rasmussengruppen42 has power because of their cash funds, even though they are 
secluded and little exposed. Agder Research has traditionally had a role that, in my 
opinion, is much bigger than its size should indicate. Because they have had a 
professional basis to speak out from when it comes to regional development, and could 
take initiative, have opinions in this respect. So this is an example of a little actor with 
relatively much more influence than its size should indicate, and a big actor that doesn’t 
make a big number out of itself publicly, but is listened closely to when it decides to 
speak and is actually one of the most powerful actors in the region.  
Question: Are you describing these forums as relatively open? Open in the sense that it is 
possible to have influence. It is not a strict hierarchy?  
Consultant: No, but sometimes you experience that money and power rules. For instance, 
I experienced sometime that it was not difficult to put research on the sideline, when the 
“big boys” wanted something done. Similarly you can experience this in relation to the 
College, and the relationship between Agder Research and the College. There are many 
examples of Agder research being the proactive development actor, and the University 
College wondering about what really happened. However, in the second that the College 
Chapter 6 – Regional Governance 
- 305 - 
is able to decide on something, then they can just snap Agder Research away if they want 
to. This has to do with size and volume. 
For those occupied with regional development and who have taken on the 
ambition of developing the region in certain directions it is much that can be done 
through skilful and direct participation in various governance networks, as the 
interviewees here depicts. However, sometimes careful and skilful participation is not 
enough in order to realise the regional development ambitions. In such instances, 
institutions, networks, and organisations must be seen as important for the realisation of 
the regional policy agenda and be steered more directly, and given that communication, 
competence, and culture, are at the heart of the regional policy agenda, are there 
institutions oriented towards such topics that get the most of this type of attention.  
Changing and Controlling Existing Institutions 
The largest public actor in the Agder region that has taken on a regional development 
“responsibility” is Kristiansand municipality. Jan Oddvar Skisland from the Christian 
Conservative party who took over from Bjørg Wallevik as mayor in Kristiansand 
municipality held a presentation at a conference arranged by KS (The Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities) in March 2006. In this presentation, 
Skisland shares his and Kristiansand municipality’s perspective on regional meta 
governance.  
Fig. 6-3: “Many actors shall contribute…” slide from (Skisland 2006) 
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The slide above says: 
“Many actors shall contribute…” 
“Partnership model as basis for the work”  
“Locally − regionally − nationally − internationally” 
The figure with the arrows pointing in every direction lists many institutions, 
(Kristiansand municipality, Agder Research, other municipalities, the state, the counties, 
culture institutions, foundations, the voluntary sector, the industry, Agder University 
College, and LO the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions) which all seemingly act 
much too uncoordinated. 
Fig. 6-4: “…co-ordination is decisive” slide from (Skisland 2006) 
 
 
The slide above says: 
“…co-ordination is decisive” 
“Locally − regionally − nationally − internationally” 
The figure with the arrows pointing in every direction now lists the same institutions as 
before but now the arrows are pointing in the same direction. 
The point of showing these slides from mayor Skisland’s presentation is that they 
tell us something about how many central development actors in the Agder region think 
about how the regional development challenges are best addressed. In brief, this is as 
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simple as this; it is better that everyone is moving, thinking, and acting in the same 
direction, than that the same actors are not moving, thinking, and acting in the same 
direction. However, how can you get academic institutions such as Agder University 
College and Agder Research to move in the same direction as for instance the industry, 
the state, and interest’s organizations? Many of the most central elements that are 
necessary in order to realize such meta steering ambitions have in fact already been 
presented, and to repeat they are to…  
1) …develop a regional policy agenda.  
2) …finance the agenda. 
3) …set up new institutions and networks that are supportive of this agenda.  
4) …use the rationale inherent in the regional development concepts to legitimize both 
the new structures and the policy agenda.  
5) …attempt (and succeed with) to dominate the public sphere and discourse with this 
agenda.  
6) …work systematically for a closer integration of the public sector and the new 
governance networks.  
7) …be relentless in your focus on the importance of regional consensus relating to 
regional development issues.  
It is however the last measure that is the most effective in order to secure that 
everyone actually is “moving” in the same direction, and that is 8) to change and 
control existing institutions directly. The obvious way of doing this is to place actors 
that are supportive of these interests in key positions in the regional institutional 
landscape. For instance through giving certain actors board positions or director 
positions in what is perceived to be key regional institutions, and like ways preventing 
actors that you not are so friendly towards from being placed in such positions. It is 
regrettably relatively uncontroversial to argue that such direct steering measures are 
taken on a regular basis both in Norway and in Agder. If you do not believe me, look at 
the web pages of some of the competence and culture institutions in the Agder region, 
for instance Agder Research, Cultiva, CDFSN, and Agder University College, and 
check for yourself who is on the board of directors. You would then find out something 
about the regularity of this phenomenon, and I promise that you not would find a 
majority representing what commonly is believed to be the “old-economy”.  
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More interesting and clever is however the meta steering potential that is 
embedded in the control of governance institutions with a significant financial 
capability. In the Agder region particularly two governance institutions were set up with 
just such steering potentials, because of the sales of Agder Energi shares, namely 
Cultiva and CDFSN.  
Consultancies, research institutions, other R&D milieus in the Agder region as 
elsewhere, and even academics in Agder University College are dependent upon 
external financing in order to work. After 4-5 years of experience with application 
writing to these institutions should most engaged in R&D work in the Agder region, by 
now have understood how an application to these institutions should be written in order 
to get grants. Even though the board meetings in CDFSN still are closed to the public43, 
a list of what type of projects are supported has been publicly available through their 
web pages. I shall not do a detailed analysis of the projects that got support here, 
CDFSN distributed funds to 71 projects in 2006 (CDFSN 2006). However, is it 
regrettably so that I have no difficulty in placing the majority of the financed projects 
within what here is conceptualized as the regional policy agenda, and if you look at the 
projects that Cultiva have financed you find a similar picture44.  
It is therefore really no excuse if your project application does not get support 
from these institutions; it is just an indication that you have not done your homework 
properly. To give you a hint –applications should start with a sincere orientation 
towards practical developments in “new-economy” industries. In addition, it should 
contain some careful combination of some of the concepts, such as for instance culture 
based industrial development, innovation system, regional clusters, creative clusters, 
knowledge clusters, knowledge-based economy, marketing, etc. 
Even though this might seem cynical, is it no hiding that academics alongside 
consultants and others, relatively easily will understand and adapt to predominant 
discursive frameworks, and especially when their job security and careers depend on it. 
You can of course think that as long as you get a grant you can do what you actually 
wanted to do anyway, but such strategies are short sighted and are not going to work in 
the long term, because there is always another project that must be financed, and these 
institutions are here to stay. In addition, it is also only human to be flattered when you 
are granted for a project application that you maybe have used months and even years to 
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prepare, what easily happens is that people starts to conform and believe in the project 
that they dedicated their work-life into realizing. Then the danger is that they slowly 
become very vary of expressing too much public critique of the governance institutions 
that “feed them”, and we could find that the “creative” people we intended to stimulate 
into being supportive of innovative processes start to find themselves tacitly ignoring 
new ideas and thoughts that do not fit the finance worthy framework. Then “knowledge 
lock-in” is the better description of the situation than the desired and sought after 
“knowledge expansion”. What consequences this system will have for future 
competence development, innovation, and alternative thinking in the Agder region is 
still for us to see. However, one thing that we already now know for certain is that if 
both Cultiva and CDFSN had not gotten their analysis of future regional developments 
completely right, there would be troubles “up the road”. The absurdity is that the 
development of the Agder region paradoxically could risk to decline because of these 
institutions rather than to do what is the stated intention −to support the creation of new 
workplaces and to develop new and useful knowledge, and to support “untraditional” 
thinking.  
It is a not only individuals that applies for grants from these governance 
institutions that is meta steered and controlled. Regional culture and competence 
institutions in the region actively adapt their strategies and mission plans to this 
framework, and as a result of these strategies they systematically hire people that 
enables them in being better at addressing the topics of interest to the relevant regional 
governance institutions.  
The triple-helix development model is in essence a very hierarchical and brute 
steering model that under-communicates the different roles and societal responsibilities, 
and interests held by the different triple-helix actors. It can also represent a highly 
managerial approach to development –set a strategy and implement it. That 
development essentially is to move into something new, and thus is about exploring, 
learning, and asking questions about the direction, going “back” and trying anew if you 
do not succeed, is often under communicated or to a lesser extent understood the 
importance of. The thing is that if you “know” what needs to be done, and maybe also 
know how it shall be done, then democracy becomes something that only slows down 
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the process, and diversity, critique, and involvement become in essence only elements 
that make it more difficult to realize the planned development efforts. 
It is probable that no institution in the Agder region have experienced the effects 
of this triple-helix rationale more than Agder University College and Agder Research. 
At the heart of the rationale of the new knowledge driven economy and embedded in the 
regional policy agenda knowledge bearing institutions are given central and 
instrumental roles. As previously discussed much of the rationale and legitimacy of 
setting up CDFSN was that it should contribute to developing Agder University College 
into a University. In Rogaland were also economical resources stemming from hydro-
electrical power production used to develop a university. Here the municipal owners 
used NOK 100 million of the share dividends from Lyse Energi to develop Stavanger 
University (Farsund & Leknes 2005). In Agder CDFSN has used approximately a 
similar figure to develop Agder University (Reinertsen 2006). The significant difference 
between Agder and Rogaland is not that Rogaland was much quicker in realizing their 
University ambitions, but that the University ambitions in the Agder region were much 
tighter controlled and steered through CDFSN. This combined with a new control 
regime and restructuring efforts at Agder University College has resulted in several 
people within Agder University College publicly protesting the developments.  
On 10 October 2005 Harald Knudsen Dean and professor at Agder University 
College wrote that the industrial democracy in Agder University College was 
pulverized, and that the economists45 had taken over, and he is an economist himself (H. 
Knudsen 2005). Later that month another professor at Agder University College, Arild 
Sæther, published an article on Agder University College’s online discussion board 
were he presents similar arguments as those put forth by Harald Knudsen, arguing that 
top-down steering had replaced academics independence at Agder University College 
(Sæther 2005). Similar critiques of the downscaling of democracy within Agder 
University College have been put forth by employee representatives working at Agder 
University College, see for instance (Nilsen 2006).  
Agder University College is a large organization with many people that is difficult 
to change even if you are willing to use NOK 100 millions to do so. Personally, I 
remain optimistic on behalf of academic freedom and democracy within some of the 
larger academic institutions, if for no other reason than because of the stubbornness of 
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those working there. Moreover, if industrial democracy does not survive here, where in 
society will we then find it? However, the “control” of a large academic institution such 
as Agder University College is important, and it is as one of the people interviewed 
said, important to control what such institution do.  
[…] if we use Agder University College as an example. If we take a researcher from the 
technology department, then the industry will think that this person represents the college. 
However, he does only represent himself. If the rector of the college is present he will 
represent the college, but he has minimal influence on his own organisation when it 
comes to the professional activities on a personal level down in the different departments. 
So there are many challenges here that I am not exactly sure how is best dealt with. 
The neoliberal writers Mikal Lindholm and Kim Møller present in their book “Let 
the innovation loose. Denmark as a Creative Superpower” a solution to the “problem” 
of too much academic freedom (Lindholm & Møller 2004). Their solution to the “triple-
helix challenge” is in their book also backed up by “expert” recommendations for 
Denmark, the “expert” report suggests:  
1) Reforms in the public school system, 2) that one should invest in the elite, 3) double 
the numbers who are studying science and technology, 4) remove democracy from the 
Universities, 5) send researchers out into the world, 6) choose a strategy and deselect 
other strategies, 7) use 3% of GDP on research, 8) take leadership in the next IT-wave, 9) 
confront Danish inwardness, and 10) expel Jante from Denmark (Lindholm & Møller 
2004: 238).  
When Lindholm and Møller (2004) suggest reforms in higher education it is 
implied that these reforms mean getting rid of mediocrity. When they suggest investing 
in the elite, they refer to the creative “super” segment of Florida’s creative class. When 
they suggest doubling the numbers that study science and technology, this means 
serious consequences for other “unprofitable” academic disciplines. When they suggest 
removing democracy from universities, they do so because this type of radical change is 
not possible or compatible with industrial democracy and academic freedom.  
This type of thinking represents an extreme variant of triple-helix thinking and 
academic reform, and maybe something we in Norway should expect more of? The 
question is however not if this is an extreme way of thinking, but if it rings true and 
relevant to those thinking and having the power to forge policy agendas and reforms 
also in the Agder region? 
If CDFSN still has some way to go before Agder University College fits its image 
of what a relevant academic institution should look like, in order for Agder University 
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College to gain status as a university there had to be four operative Ph.D. programmes, 
and of these only two are interpreted as “useful” for the region. It should however be 
found some comfort in that CDFSN has been more “successful” in their steering efforts 
associated with Agder Research.  
Agder Research, which is a much smaller organisation than Agder University 
College, has CDFSN had almost full success, and has met very little resistance. CDFSN 
has stated that Agder Research is its most important tool in the Agder region. CDFSN 
had in 2002/3 a problem with Agder Research. Agder Research was not good enough at 
what it did, and it was not run economically sound enough to do it. CDFSN then 
commissioned an evaluation report from the consultancy firm Inno46. The evaluation 
report outline what the problem with the current work model was and how Agder 
Research could be transformed into a more managerial and rational organisation. 
The Inno report, evaluated Agder Research and the Value Creation 2010 project 
(see also chapter 7). The report was heavily debated after it was made known to the 
employees at Agder Research; many of those who sat the tone in the organisation were 
critical towards the report. The report offers a classical SWOT- analysis combined with 
descriptions of the external image and internal structures. In the report, it is argued that 
Agder Research should take better care of its core marked, the regional stakeholders. 
The report for instance focuses on the important role Agder Research can have in the 
triple-helix model since Agder University College according to the report is useless in 
this respect:  
As long as Agder Research’s neutrality and independence is secured, an intensified 
collaboration with Agder University College will further boost the positive image. 
However, a total integration into Agder University College is endangering the reputation, 
as a significant number of clients hold (justified or not) prejudices about the 
professionalism of a University as a supplier and its capability of serving as a bridge 
between the different dimensions in the triple-helix: research, industry and policy (Inno 
2003: 29). 
The Inno report also dwells on what they regard as the “big” problem in Agder 
Research –the gap between research and consultancy. This was an issue in the 
organisation at the time, and it was also present in the Value Creation 2010 project team 
where the so-called core-team was dominated by the “researchers”, Inno writes that:  
Agder Research can and should be a system supplier of regional development, offering all 
key services including awareness raising, idea generation, strategy development, concept 
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building, project planning, and management of implementation projects. Today, most of 
the necessary competence is available at Agder Research. However, Agder Research does 
not adequately exploit this rather unique asset. This is due to sharp disputes between 
members of different departments/lines of thoughts within Agder Research, e.g. between 
the “researchers” and the “consultants” (Inno 2003: 38). 
The consultancy firm solution to this problem is that Agder Research should use 
consultancy projects to generate data that researchers then can write up and publish: 
There must be a greater focus on how the consultancy operations can generate good 
research, which could result in publications. This must be systemized within Agder 
Research! (Inno 2003: 27). 
The report signals Agder Research as one of CDFSN core instruments in realising 
its policies, Agder Research is a tool to realise the development agenda set by CDFSN: 
CDFSN is dedicated to boost competence-based economic growth in the region and to 
position Sørlandet internationally. Thus, it is responsible for contributing to the mastering 
of the above challenges. Agder Research has a lot of potential in becoming a prime mover 
in achieving this ambitious target (Inno 2003: 35). 
Competence-based economic growth is the key objective of CDFSN. Agder Research has 
the potential to be a powerful implementation partner for CDFSN, other players do not 
hold this potential on their own, but should be integrated in the process (e.g. STS). It 
appears, therefore, as quite obvious that one should try to match challenges with 
opportunities and define ways of how Agder Research could fully develop and exploit the 
necessary competencies and attitudes and how this can be financed (Inno 2003: 37). 
One of the most important channels of CDFSN in implementing its strategy is Agder 
Research (Inno 2003: 3). 
Inno recommends also more concrete changes that needs to be implemented in 
order for Agder Research to be efficient in realising CDFSN’s strategy: 1) More 
business orientation in Agder Research’s organisation: 
Agder Research conducts a serious amount of high quality work comprising both 
theoretical (literature analyses, model building) and sophisticated empirical dimensions 
(data collection, sophisticated analyses etc.) on behalf of mostly public bodies. In-house, 
this type of work is referred to as research whereas we would call it consultancy work. 
The differences in labelling themselves would be of no importance if they had no 
conclusions on the working philosophy. There is a definite need for securing that this type 
of work can and should be done profitably, implying e.g. full-scale implementation of 
project management and controlling routines (Inno 2003: 3). 
This recommendation from Inno has been addressed, and at least partly 
successfully implemented as Agder Research in 2005 and 2006 has turned out a profit 
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and has a solid equity, much of it is a result of a reduced conflict level in the 
organisation and. 2) Project profitably focus also in core mission projects47: 
At current stage, there appears to be a feeling of: “We have given them so much money 
now they must do something for us”. However understandable, this line of thinking is 
dangerous. It leads to a relationship which best can be characterised as between 
sponsor/financier and receiver of subsidies. The ideal relationship between Agder 
Research and the responsible bodies for economic growth would be that between a 
preferred client and a preferred supplier, the mutual preference is being based upon trust 
and previous good experiences. A starting point would be to introduce more performance 
based payments than input-based ones (Inno 2003: 3-4). 
This Inno recommendation has been addressed; Agder Research management has 
in recent years clearly pushed for more performance based payments, this has lead to 
conflicts with a union at Agder Research and therefore remains to be fully implemented. 
In addition, the relationship between Agder Research and CDFSN is of a nature where 
Agder Research as the “core instrument” is not simply funded directly, but writes 
applications where the relevance for the applied projects for CDFSN’s strategy usually 
is emphasised. This charade of a grant application process is officially to secure the 
quality of the projects, but it is a control mechanism to check that the projects are 
relevant for CDFSN’s strategy. 3) Strengthen the attractiveness of Agder Research as 
an employer:  
Recent studies on employee satisfaction (an Agder internal study and an Inno study) show 
alarming signals (Inno 2003: 3). 
These recommendations from Inno were also addressed, as the salaries were 
raised and the management at Agder Research were replaced. 4) Change the 
organisational set up of the institute: 
The basic framework conditions for Agder Research have to be sorted out quickly. We 
recommend two actions: 1) Strengthen the organisational bonds with Agder University 
College. 2) Change the legal status of the institute into a shareholder company, […] it 
would mirror the increased dedication to business philosophies both towards clients (e.g. 
in terms of professionalism, keeping deadlines) and staff (Inno 2003: 3-4). 
Both of these recommendations from Inno were addressed promptly, Agder 
Research changed its legal status from a non-profit foundation to a shareholders’ 
company, and in the process Agder University College became the majority 
shareholder, (owning 50% +1 share). 5) Anchor a new strategy in the organisation that 
the different stakeholders are fully committed to. 
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Should Agder Research pursue the goal of stimulating competence based economic 
growth in Sørlandet as its number one priority? From CDFSN’s point of view, the answer 
is: Yes, because Agder Research can become a very competent player and no alternative 
to Agder Research is at hand. A coordination with other organisations like STS 
(Sørlandets Teknologisenter) is advisable (Inno 2003: 3). 
Both of these recommendations are addressed in recent external and internal 
organisational changes. A closer collaboration with STS is its starting phase in 2006 and 
new priority areas are in place at Agder Research, for instance services concentrating on 
“Culture, media-technology and industry”. This initiative is introduced like this in an 
advertisement on Agder Research’s homepage:  
“The future of business is experiences – culture, entertainment, design, leisure, travels 
with that extra something... A bold statement? Of course, basic needs such as food, 
clothes and a roof over your head is still what is most important. But culture and 
experiences are gaining more ground in international economy48”.  
The relevance for the regional economy should be obvious; the new priority areas 
at Agder Research are all fully or co-financed by CDFSN.  
In sum, almost all of the internal and external changes that Inno suggested in its 
report been addressed an implemented in full at Agder Research. It almost seems like it 
has been used as a template for every strategy discussion in every forum discussing 
Agder Research since. It is interesting though, that a report that was dismissed as 
rubbish when it was presented for the employees at Agder Research, who judged it 
based on its scientific qualities and empirical accuracy, could have so much impact. The 
only reason it had was of course that Inno was able to pinpoint the regional policy 
agenda and the role they wanted Agder Research to play in the regional triple-helix 
system, thus not by chance – Inno “happened” to know whom to interview. 
Summary 
Regional meta governance as it is executed in the Agder region is as shown a many 
faceted phenomenon. It is governance aimed towards very specific ends, it is almost 
exclusive in its perspective on economical growth, but not just any economical growth, 
and it is economical growth in what is believed to be the coming and “new-industries”.  
It is actually relatively difficult to argue against the rationale behind the regional 
policy agenda. This is because it is not based on any current empirical facts, it is based 
in some “visionary” thoughts on what the future brings. The truth is that neither I nor 
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anyone else knows what the future brings; we only know that we do not know. What we 
do know is that what is conceptualized as the knowledge economy currently occupies 
about 4% of the workforce in the Agder region (H. C. G. Johnsen & Isaksen 2005). This 
figure could of course become 50% or 60% in coming years, but if this is to happen, it is 
still long way ahead, and what do we do in the meantime? Similar critique can be 
forwarded against the promoters of the creative industries, where many are notorious in 
their efforts of including industry segments that have been a part of the Norwegian 
economy for decades in order to provide substance to the argument that the “creative” 
part of the economy is large and growing. However, when you see it necessary to 
include industry segments such as news media, architects, museums, publishers, 
libraries, hotels etc. into your definition of the creative economy in order to argue the 
case of the coming of the experienced based economy, then better people then I should 
ponder the question of what is wrong. 
The rapid expansion in the regional governance system in the 1990s and around 
the turn of the new millennium in the Agder region did not go unnoticed; it provoked 
what is probably best described as a counter reaction. Where a single newspaper 
interview with a local Save the Children representative made many people in the region, 
including me, engage themselves in questions relating to regional governance in the 
Agder region. 
6.6 – Lessons Learned 
In the spring of 2003, something changed on how regional stakeholders publicly spoke 
about governance structures in the Agder region. The reason for this change can be 
traced back to a debate that dominated the media picture in the largest regional 
newspaper Fædrelandsvennen in May and June 2003. The debate gives important 
insight into how central stakeholders thought and think about how the regions best 
should organise and work in order to best face its challenges.  
The debate started when two people, the county doctor and a spokesperson for 
relatives of psychiatric patients, called out for more focus on people’s living conditions 
in the Agder counties. The regional newspaper followed up on this story by 
interviewing the regional leader of the organisation Save the Children Inger Tonstad. 
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Tonstad argued that the region is characterized by development efforts with a narrow 
focus on old-fashioned growth thinking and material values. She pointed to regional 
stakeholders being very active in the public debate on regional growth strategies, but 
that she had not seen a single initiative or mobilisation relating to e.g. living conditions 
in the region. Tonstad argued that the problems relating to living conditions and class 
gap would increase in the region as a result of this, if the people in charge did not totally 
change course. She said, –To achieve this we must change the power structures in the 
region. Today it is a few power people who think alike, which decides everything. She 
continued to explain the urgency of her argument with reference to recent institutional 
changes in the region. In the Agder region a series of institutions are developed; 
Sydspissen, Knutepunkt Sørlandet, different regional funding institutions like Cultiva 
and two competence funds which are a result of the privatisation of the energy resources 
in the region, all based on a one-sided economic growth-philosophy, and they are all 
adding to this negative trend, she argued (Fædrelandsvennen 2003h). 
Tonstad’s criticism was then more or less ignored for a couple of weeks, and the 
debate probably would not have continued if the regional research institution Agder 
Research had not almost went bankrupt at the same time. The director of Agder 
Research had already left his position, and on 21 May 2003 the board of directors at 
Agder Research announced their resignation (Fædrelandsvennen 2003i). This event led 
to a revitalization of the debate initiated by Tonstad. 
Magne Dåstøl, the chairman of the board of CDFSN, the institution that bailed 
Agder Research out of its “bankruptcy”, then criticized what he called “the straight 
boys’ club”49 powers over the competence milieus at Agder. Dåstøl saw it as a problem 
that many of the same people were in the board at both Agder University College and 
Agder Research (Fædrelandsvennen 2003c). Dåstøl’s criticism was then swiftly 
dismissed by the previous director of Agder Research Harald Furre. He said that “the 
straight boys’ club” was a concept he did not agree with used in relation to Agder 
Research and Agder University College (Fædrelandsvennen 2003a). The director of 
Agder University College Tor A. Aagedal, who was in the board in Agder Research that 
had to leave, did not either recognise “the straight boys’ club”, but he noted that it 
would probably be beneficiary if more and a more diverse group of people were 
involved in competence development in the region. Aagedal then points the finger to the 
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point made earlier by Tonstad, that it had grown up a lot of networks in the region, and 
he points to Sydspissen, Kompetansering sør, Kristiansand knowledge park, STS 
“Sørlandets teknologiforum”. Regarding these he said, we should have fewer forums, 
but more broadness in those that remain (Fædrelandsvennen 2003j). 
The next day Magne Dåstøl returns to the headlines of the regional newspaper, 
arguing that he is tired of the same people making the same arguments. –Too few 
people are present too many places, he said. When asked by the reporter who he thinks 
these people are he refuses to answer, saying he will only get in trouble if he did. But he 
puts his finger on Sydspissen and Kompetansering sør, where he says the reporter 
should go and look for himself (Fædrelandsvennen 2003k). 
Tonstad the regional leader of the organisation Save the Children is then 
interviewed anew. She is asked to comment that for a member’s fee of NOK 10 000 a 
year to Sydspissen, enterprises get access to the regions innermost power circles and 
that Sydspissen is partly financed by public means. She states this as a problem for 
democracy. –We must remember that these networks and power elites build their 
region, not necessarily ours. This is why it is so important to focus on these types of 
organisations. We have to ask, she continues, which other groups than the corporate 
power elite has ever been able to get into a comparable position. I am sure Sydspissen 
do a lot of good things for the region, but no one has elected them, we are here talking 
about a very influential pressure group which steals attention, and by that put other 
important societal tasks in the background of attention (Fædrelandsvennen 2003f). 
After this, the newspaper naturally turned its attention to the networks in the 
region, and they sent reporters to interview the manager of the now much mentioned 
network Sydspissen. As shown, this interview came to have much impact on how 
regional stakeholders later publicly spoke and expressed themselves regarding the 
governance system in the region. 
The manager of Sydspissen at the time Kjell O. Johannessen argued that 
Sydspissen is a unique tool to get anything done in the region. He said, –the interaction 
between corporations and public authorities is institutionalised in the region through 
Sydspissen. We do not have to lobby anymore. We can “march in step”, and get things 
done. No other region in Norway has done what we have done; this gives this region an 
advantage over others. He is then asked by the reporter, – what about democracy, 
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transparency and control? Johannesen then answers, – we are not democratic, I agree, 
but that is not a problem. Networks, relations and teamwork are necessary to get 
anything done in our times (Fædrelandsvennen 2003f). 
Kjell O. Johannessen then visions the future of Sydspissen as a regional 
corporation with subgroups and committees which work on their separate development 
sectors: competence, tourism, culture, industry, and transportation and such, he sees 
himself as the information director of this corporation which can market and sell the 
region all over Norway. The reporter then asks if this is not best left to politicians. He 
then responds that he himself had many opportunities to become a politician, but that he 
is able to get much more done in the connections he now is a part of. –It must be the 
results that matters for the region that is the point, he says, and dismisses that he is 
involved in politics. When confronted by criticism made by Torbjørn Urfjell, a 
representative from the socialist party, that it is problematic that more and more power 
is moved out of representative channels, Kjell O. Johannessen’s answer is, –a socialist 
must say such things (Fædrelandsvennen 2003f). 
The reporter then turns to the board of directors of Sydspissen, Kristen Strat (also 
regional director of the telecommunications company Ericsson), Strat argues that 
Sydspissen encompass all milieus in the region, and that they all have a shared agenda 
and understanding of what is important in the Agder region, so there is no democratic 
problem, Strat concludes. 
The county mayor in Vest-Agder, Thore Westermoen, who also was on the board 
of directors in Sydspissen, is then interviewed. He argued that it only is a democratic 
problem if the decision-making process itself is moved into networks such as 
Sydspissen and that this has not happened yet, Sydspissen has been used to fight for 
agendas that everybody agrees upon, he says. However, he adds, –if partnerships 
between public departments, politicians and corporations become important and 
genuine, we must also endure that discussions and decisions are made there. We must 
do this in order to create the necessary collaboration that we need, he concludes 
(Fædrelandsvennen 2003d).  
The politicians become the target for many criticisms after this debate, and 
different explanations for why the region was in such a mess turned up. The bluntness 
of the manager in Sydspissen’s response to the journalist’s questions made the chief 
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editor in Fædrelandsvennen, Finn Holmer-Hoven, describe in a commentary the Agder 
region as the corporative Agder. The editor drew parallels to the fascist corporativism 
and anti democratic movements of the 1930s. The editor called for politicians to regain 
their composure (Holmer-Hoven 2003).  
Otto Geheb, an owner of a chain of baker's shops, and former representative in 
NHO, and member of Agderrådet, argued that the explanation for the failure of 
politicians and the growth of undemocratic institutions and networks is that the region 
consists of two counties. –If there only had been one county these “bastard” decision-
making organs could have been obsolete, he argued (Fædrelandsvennen 2003g). 
Geheb’s analysis of the origin of the problem is thereafter supported in 
Fædrelandsvennen’s editorial section. The two-county problem, and frail politicians is a 
satisfactory explanation for the existence of undemocratic networks in the Agder region 
(Fædrelandsvennen 2003e). 
The newspaper debate is then more or less concluded with a chronicle by a 
political scientist working at Agder University College, Dag Ingvar Jacobsen. He 
argued that local corporation’s faces shifting times that make structures such as 
Sydspissen and Agderrådet necessary. His point is that the time when we had few and 
dominating actors in the local industries in the Agder region is passé. Traditional 
industries are downscaled; main offices are often located in Oslo or abroad, what we see 
is smaller and more transitory firms, and a general fragmentation of the industry. Who 
the spokespersons are, for the industry in the region, becomes unclear just because they 
are more numerous and smaller. Thereby is also local corporations’ possibility to 
mobilise resources e.g. to influence national decision-making processes reduced. This is 
the rationale for finding new ways of governance and that traditional ways of 
government has lost the effect they had earlier, because politicians have partly lost and 
partly given away their traditional policy instruments. It is in this light we must 
understand why structures such as Sydspissen and Agderrådet have emerged; they fill in 
were traditional representative structures do not work anymore (Jacobsen 2003). 
Jacobsen also points out that this is a process that would happen independently of 
the fact that the Agder region consists of one or two counties. He points to that Oslo is 
the county and municipality that have the highest presence of such network and 
collaborative structures in Norway, and that Oslo is only one political administrative 
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unit. Jacobsen thereby debunks the argument put forward by Geheb and 
Fædrelandsvennen that it is the county structure that is the root of the problem. 
Another explanation for the emergence of the new governance structures put 
forward by Jacobsen is the regional competition in Norway, where Agder fights west, 
north fights south, and Oslo fights the rest of the country. Agder must, Jacobsen argues, 
in order to gain position in this regional competition stand united, in order to make their 
demands heard. What we should do, he concludes, is not to suppress these organisations 
but ensure that they work according to democratic principles (Jacobsen 2003). 
Early 2005 did Kjell O. Johannessen leave the position as managing director of 
Sydspissen. The board of directors in Sydspissen decided that the role of Sydspissen 
should only be to act as a mouthpiece for the region’s industry, and the municipalities 
and county municipalities should withdraw from direct participation in the network. The 
new chairman of the board in Sydspissen Knut C. Gjermundsen said that this change 
happened as a result of the debate in Fædrelandsvennen (Fædrelandsvennen 2005a). 
Epilogue 
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen, the political scientist from Agder University College, that in 2003 
argued the necessity of the emerging governance institutions, did in 2006 argue almost 
the opposite view now focusing on the problems such institutions represent for political 
steering at a municipal level (Jacobsen 2006). When I interviewed actors associated 
with the regional governance system in the Agder region as part of this work, we often 
touched upon this debate as part of the discussions we had, and it often became apparent 
that more people than Dag Ingvar Jacobsen had done some further reflections on the 
issue.  
Question: Can you describe your own role connected to networks and partnerships at 
Agder? I know that you have worked with the issue of fragmentation, something that also 
has resulted in a fragmented interest’s structure in the region. You where for instance part 
of initiating Sydspissen, an institution with an ambition of coordinating the business 
interests in the region, in order to communicate more clearly to the “outside”. Can you 
say something more about the Sydspissen initiative; did it work out as you thought when 
you initiated it? 
Consultant: I have worked with networks in this region many years now. […] I have been 
involved in many different things through these the years. It would take too long to 
describe it all. However, I can tell you about Sydspissen. You said it in a relatively 
precise manner yourself. The thinking behind Sydspissen was to construct an umbrella 
over the fragmented associations etc, in order to work with issues that crossed all of the 
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involved institutions that they could not manage on their own. We focused on making the 
region visible/marketing. I remember we formulated a marketing strategy where the 
ambition was that this region should be just as well known for its innovations as it now is 
known for its sunny summer holidays, and idyll among the skerries. We would not 
downgrade the holyday aspects, but make the innovation part just as well known. This 
was the essence of the thinking behind Sydspissen. It is however no doubt that this 
objective was impossible to realise. The idea that Sydspissen should do marketing on 
behalf of its members; be a marketing and information department of behalf of the region 
was not possible to realise. It was not possible to realise in relation to the public sector, 
and with the regards to the industry there was much interest for talking about these things, 
but less will to pay for it.  
My understanding of the situation now is that Sydspissen is just another business interest 
association that just adds more weight to the institutional fragmentation in the region, 
instead of pulling the threads together. As I see the situation now… well I do not really 
sense that they exist, […]. The current manager of ‘Sydspissen’ is a nice man, but I do 
not notice Sydspissen. They are in my opinion superficial now. But with a very important 
exception of, “Sørlandets teknologiforum”, which was an assembly of the largest actors 
within the industry at Agder, this constellation I still think is relevant. I think it is 
important that the large private corporations talk to each other. Another dimension that I 
think is interesting for you is that one of the reasons that Sydspissen collapsed, was the 
severe media attention it got some time ago, where it was said that Sydspissen was a 
suspect corporative structure.  
Question: You refer to the chronicle in Fædrelandsvennen by Finn Holmer-Hoven? What 
was said in that debate was that the purpose of Sydspissen was to design policy and to 
deliver it to the politicians and in addition, a criticism of Kristiansand municipality and 
the counties in direct participation with Sydspissen? That policies were developed there 
and not in representative structures?  
Consultant: That is the big discussion here. I have been involved in a project where we 
have mapped the success criteria for municipality based industrial development. What 
makes the best better? What we saw was that the municipalities that succeed are those 
characterised by a corporative work method. Places that have very near relations between 
leading actors from the business sector and the leaders within the public sector. […] In 
Stavanger the mayor and the county mayor sit in a body where the businesses are in 
majority. Here they develop the strategy for the industrial development in the region. This 
does not mean that is not the county or the municipality that passes these plans and how 
the recourses should be allocated. However, very much happens in that corporative 
forum. Therefore, you could definitely say that much of the work challenges are placed in 
this body. Nevertheless, it works. This is also a challenge for this region; we must also be 
able to have this close communication in these types of forums. We have let ourselves be 
duped by a newspaper editor that has another opinion. 
6.7 – Summary 
In this chapter have I told a story about how and why regional governance in the Agder 
region has developed in the way it has, and why it has taken on the form we can see in 
the current regional institutional landscape. It was a story that started with what at first 
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was a puzzling paradox, why did the municipalities in the Agder region decide to sell 
profitable energy shares. In order to find an answer to this question I turned to the 
regional policy documents, and the regional policy agenda. Here I found the rationale 
behind many of the recent developments we have seen in the Agder region. I have also 
looked at how the governance networks in the Agder region were financed, and that it 
here was a question of trading in the “old” economy with the “new”. I have also looked 
into some of the practices associated with working in such institutions and discussed 
aspects of regional meta governance, and hopefully also shed some light onto how and 
why such intuitions are so influential as they are. In the end, have I shown some extracts 
from a regional debate that could indicate that the regional consensus around many of 
these developments maybe is not so unison as many maybe would have it? 
The presentations in this chapter have primarily been of a descriptive nature. 
Some important questions therefore remain to be addressed. For instance, what is the 
nature of the emerging regional steering system, is it governance, is it a regional regime 
in the Agder region, a combination of the two, or something else, and how do the Value 
Creation 2010 project and the Value Creation Alliance link to these developments? I 
will also ask if regional governance practices necessarily represent deficits in terms of 
democracy? Moreover, if they do, in what form and under what conceptualisation of 
democracy do they represent a problem? These questions alongside discussions of the 
theoretical perspectives and the three subsidiary research questions are topic for 
discussion and analysis in the next chapter.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 This reality has been mentioned in several newspaper articles the last couple of years, see for 
instance Egeland (2005), Hiorth (2005), Altmann (2006), and others.  
2 GWh production data and spot price weighted year averages are updated to week 20 2006. 
Source: Statistisk sentralbyrå & Nord Pool ASA. Production up until week 20 2006 is 91 829 
GWh. Updated November 23. 2006, url: http://www.ssb.no/elektrisitetaar/tab-2006-07-27-
26.html  
3 The final sales figure was NOK 11.4 billion before tax and NOK 9.5 billion after tax if the 
whole company had been sold (PwC 2005). 
4 Cultiva capital base was NOK 1440 million, which was equivalent of a 12.6% ownership 
position in Agder Energi in 2002. Share dividends from AE 2003-06 based on a 12.6% 
ownership position amounts to NOK 227 million, in the same period has Cultiva disbursed 
NOK 92.1 million. 
5 See: http://www.svenskenergi.se/energifakta/karnkraft_roll.htm 
6 See: http://odin.dep.no/krd/html/valgresultat2003/bk2_11_3.html  
7 I have translated all of the excerpts of the party programs. 
8 Distribution of representatives on the relevant formal decision-making structures in 
Kristiansand municipality, number of representatives in each body in brackets: City Council 
(54) - executive committee (13) - municipal committee (7). Norwegian translations: “Bystyret”: 
City Council, “formmannskapet”: executive committee, “kommuneutvalget”: municipal 
committee. Issues relating to the management of municipal properties are ordinarily prepared by 
the chief executive officer “rådmann”, and is at first handled in the municipal committee, then 
given to the executive committee, and at last voted on in plenary sessions in the City Council. 
9 In the party programs and actions plans are there only reference to Kristiansand Energiverk 
(KEV), Vest-Agder Energiverk (VAE), and Aust-Agder Energiverk (AAE). These companies 
merged in 2000 into Agder Energi AS. 
10 SV: (Sosialistisk Venstreparti): The Socialist Left Party of Norway (socialist/left party) 
11 Retrieved from Fjerstad (2001). 
12 The Christian Conservative Party was holding the deputy mayor position in the period. 
13 The Conservative Party was holding the mayor position in the period. 
14 Sørlandslista later constituted the basis of a new political party, the Democrats. The 
Democrats was a breakout group, headed by Vidar Kleppe, from The Progress Party, that 
mainly consisted of people that were excluded from The Progress Party because of publicly 
expressing racist views, or for being too tough on immigration as it otherwise is called. 
Sørlandslista/Demokratenes position on the Agder Energi issue was however equivalent to those 
of The Progress Party. 
15 I have translated all of the quotations from Common goals on Agder. 
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16 Source: http://www.sydspissen.no/ (accessed 11.24.05) 
17 Earlier in 1999 before Sydspissen was formally established it was known as Sørspissen (T. H. 
Pedersen 1999). 
18 Agderforskning, Høgskolen i Agder, Sørlandets TeknologiForum, NHO, IT-Ringen Agder, 
Agder Maritime Forum, Markedsføringsforeningen, Kompetansering Sør, 
Petroleumsforeningen, Den Norske Dataforeningen, Aust-Agder Fylkeskommune, Vest-Agder 
Fylkeskommune, Kristiansand Kommune, Arendal Næringsråd, Grimstad Kommune, 
Sørlandets Teknologisenter AS, Longum Forum, Lister Næringshage (Sydspissen 2005). 
19 Position held by Svend Olav Leirvaag from 2005. 
20 This position is also represented in The Progress Party’s in Kristiansand 1999-2003 municipal 
program. 
21 In 2006 Sira-Kvina is an energy production company co-owned by Lyse Production AS 
(41.1%), Statkraft (32.1%), Skagerak Kraft AS (14.6%), and Agder Energi Production AS 
(12.2%). 
22 It is possible that the NOK 10 million-figure stems from the upper level set for Arthur 
Andersen sign on fee with Kristiansand municipality which is confirmed to be 0.1% of the sales 
sum but no more than NOK 10 million. 
23 The reader will note that it is Arthur Andersen that actually estimates the value of Agder 
Energi for Statkraft. 
24 Statkrafts urgency was probably much due to the company getting a new CEO on 1 
September 2001. 
25 She was Norway’s first female professor in political science. 
26 The denial the Norwegian Competition Authority gives to Statkraft and their attempt to buy 
TEV is also subject for a complaint, and on 7 February 2003 Victor D. Norman the Work- and 
administration minister complies, Statkraft can own also TEV (Konkurransetilsynet 2003). The 
TEV issue is in 2006 still not finally closed. 
27 In addition, the municipalities in Agder paid approximately NOK 860 million in tax. 
28 I contacted the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway that oversees the activities of audit 
companies operating in Norway, with a series of questions with respect to their assessments of 
the role of Arthur Andersen in connection to the Agder Energi sales process. The Financial 
Supervisory Authority had conducted an investigation into the matter. Their report has been 
kept from public access, but in a meeting 4 December 2006 The Financial Supervisory decided 
to declassify their assessments, and returned in full their letter to Ernst & Young of 19 
November 2003 to me (Ernst & Young merged with Arthur Andersen in 2002). 
29 The exact phrasing in Norwegian is: “Vi vil foreslå at oppdraget avregnes ihht medgått tid 
basert på en timesats på NOK 1 750. Ved salg vil honoraret utgjøre 0.1 % av salgssummen og 
inntil NOK 10 mill.”.  
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30 AAGCF and Frank J. Berg also advised municipalities in Hedemark to sell shares to Statkraft. 
They sold shares in HEAS for NOK 1.9 billion to Statkraft. Because of Victor D. Norman 
intervention Statkraft later had to sell their shares back to the municipalities in Hedemark for 
NOK 2.1 billion. 
31 The discussions in Kristiansand City Council of Arnersen’s report, is according to the 
Krisitansand municipality’s online record kept from the public with reference to the law of 
public access (offentlighetsloven §5a) and to the law of public administration (forvaltningsloven 
§13). See: http://pa.kristiansand.kommune.no/politiske_saker/default.asp (under case 71/03). 
When the rationale for this was inquired into the response from the executive officer’s office 
was that this was a mistake, and that it should not have been kept from public access. 
32 This report is available online both from the homepage of Østlandsforskning: 
http://www.ostforsk.no/rapport/pdf/082003.pdf and from Kristiansand municipality’s 
homepage: 
http://pa.kristiansand.kommune.no/politiske_filer/0%5CVEDLEGG%5C2003019968-1.pdf.  
33 I am responsible for the translation of all of the quotes from the evaluation report. 
34 This is confirmed via e-mail to me on 21 November 2006. 
35 Others working at Agder Research at the time have also, and independently of each other, 
confirmed this representation of events to me. 
36 Borda-vote is named after its originator Jean-Charles de Borda. Borda-vote is a 
voting/decision-making method where rank of alternatives count more than voter’s first 
preference, Borda-vote is therefore also known as rank-order method. The procedure is to let 
each voter rank all the alternatives, giving rank 1 to the most preferred, rank 2 to the second, 
and so forth. Then assign to each alternative a score equal to the sum of the ranks assigned to 
him by all the voters, and choose the alternative for which the sum of ranks is lowest. Borda-
vote is well known from political science, voting-theory, and decision-making literature and is 
also thought at many business schools around the world. The premises set out by Jean-Charles 
de Borda can work satisfactory given certain conditions in large populations but is also known 
as a method that is relatively easy to manipulate in small group settings. One possibility for 
“cheating” is to give your own first preference the highest score and the “opponents” first 
preference the lowest score, even though it in reality is your second choice of preference. If your 
“opponents” vote honestly, you have increased your possibility for “winning” the vote 
significantly. Please note that I have no information saying that the voting procedure in the 
reference group/strategy committee actually was “manipulated” in any way. 
37 The reference group/strategy committee had the following composition: Bjørg Wallevik (H), 
Olaf Messel (DEM), Harald Sødal (KrF), Bjarne Ugland (Ap), Erling Valvik (Adm.), Solveig 
Løhaugen (Adm.), Oddvar Hodne (KEV), Tore Wiese-Hansen, Gunnar Kulia (KEV), Jan 
Pedersen (Director KEV), Øyvind Østensen (KEV), Vidar Jakobsen (KEV), and Frank J. Berg 
(AAGCF) (Lillesvangstu 1999b).  
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38 Arthur Andersen’s strategic work method - to generate consultancy assignments based on 
audit work, became in the late 1990s a business model that was widely copied by other 
consultancy firms. The Financial Supervisory Authority in Norway has investigated most of the 
largest consultancies in Norway because of suspicion of misuse associated with such practices. 
Arthur Andersen was also well known in the “business” for their work methods, and it is 
probable that people and institutions that hired Arthur Andersen were aware of how they 
operated. 
39 Sources interview data. 
40 Sources interview data. 
41 Karlskrona (Sweden) has a development plan that shares many similarities with Agder’s 
regional policy agenda. 
42 Rasmussengruppen AS, est. 1936, originally a shipping company, headquartered in 
Kristiansand, Norway, is an investment company, focusing on property, shipping and securities 
trading. The company is controlled by the Rasmussen family, headed by shipowner Einar 
Rasmussen and his son, Dag Rasmussen. Rasmussengruppen AS had a net equity of NOK 4.3 
billion in its parent company balance sheet for 2004 (source: 
http://www.rasmussengruppen.no/). The family has recently (2006) signalled a commitment to 
invest NOK 60 million in the local football club (Start).  
43 Cultiva’s board meeting has been opened up to the public probably because of a campaign run 
by the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen. It is difficult to see or understand what the justification of 
still having CDFSN board meetings closed to the public actually is.  
44 See: http://www.cultiva.no for an updated list of projects that are granted support. CDFSN 
strategy seems in addition to the mentioned factors to be very much a pragmatic approach. They 
seek to place money where they believe they get most short term and concrete results.  
45 The Norwegian term used was “Blåruss”. 
46 The consultancy firm calling themselves Inno group – “innovation excellence”, is a strategic 
management consulting company located in Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, and with a 
representation in Russia. Source: http://www.inno-group.com/  
47 Referring to larger stakeholder financed projects such as Value Creation 2010 and projects 
directly financed by CDFSN. 
48 Source: http://www.agderforskning.no/articles.php?tPath=133_201&language=en  
49 “Gutteklubben grei” in Norwegian. 
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Chapter 7 – Analysis 
Governance is not an act of will or domination, but coordination of efforts by those who 
have complementary aims. Community power accrues to those with a capacity to act in 
what is an otherwise diffuse system of authority. 
–Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics (1989: 230).  
7.1 – Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have seen how the work conducted through a regional 
development coalition resulted in a conflict, we have been given some insight into a 
regional policy agenda, we have seen some of the workings of new governance 
institutions and how they were financed, and we have seen some examples of regime 
practices in the Agder region. In this chapter, will I discuss and analyse the data that 
were presented in the previous chapters 5 and 6, using the theoretical framework that 
was developed in chapter 3. I will however begin with addressing some of the 
theoretical concepts that have been introduced and discussed, and ask questions to what 
extent and how the central concepts of this thesis, regional governance and regime, can 
be applied in a meaningful way to describe processes in the Agder region. 
Following this discussion I precede with a discussion of the first subsidiary 
research question which was: Why did the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder result 
in a conflict? I continue with the second subsidiary research question that was: What are 
the central characteristics of the regional regime and governance system in the Agder 
region? This question is analysed using the three perspectives on regional governance 
introduced in chapter 3. This discussion is then followed by a discussion of the last 
research question which was: What democratic values can justify some of the significant 
regional governance issues discussed? Chapter 7 then concludes with some ending 
reflections and a summary. 
7.2 – Conceptual Clarifications 
The concepts of regional governance and regional regime have so far been implicitly 
used throughout this thesis with reference to politico economical steering and 
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development practices in the Agder region, without proper justification of such usage. 
Now, when the relevant data needed in order to conduct such discussion are presented, 
the necessary conceptual clarifications can be conducted. 
On the Subject of Regional Governance  
In chapter 3, the relevant question concerning the nature of the politico economical 
development system in the Agder region was presented, this was: How do we, or can we 
know that the politico economical steering and development system in the Agder region 
can meaningfully be characterised as a governance system? Based on the theoretical 
discussions in chapter 3 we also derived a series of sub questions that should be 
addressed in relation to this issue. These are questions aimed at addressing to what 
extent the politico economical system in the Agder region in practice shares most 
similarities with government through representative democracy, market steering models, 
governance steering models, or by different mixtures of these.  
In order to address the issue of system scale I ask the question of: a) which policy 
areas are subjugated to governance process and control? In order to address the issue of 
“sphere” I ask the question of: b) Where are political decisions made? In addition, in 
order to address the issue of influence I asked: c) which and what type of actors have 
access to participating in making these decisions? These questions will in the following 
be discussed in the order that they were presented. 
Policy Area 
Some of those interviewed as part of this thesis work emphasised that the 
network/partnership model of working in the Agder region only was concerned with 
what we loosely can term industrial development in a regional context. The argument 
was that this was not a question of societal development but industrial development, and 
that the current limitation of participation into these processes on this basis was 
justified. My position is that such statements about the boundaries for network 
development work in the Agder region cannot easily be justified using such arguments.  
The main reason for my critique of such views is that what is identified as relevant 
for industrial development in the Agder region has taken on much larger proportions 
than what legitimately can be termed as just directly relevant for the industries in the 
region. That is to say that the terms are used so widely, that they encompass in reality 
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almost every citizen and interest in the Agder region. Something that is confirmed by a 
read through of what here is conceptualised as the regional policy agenda and its three 
main headings, competence, culture, and communications. It seems to me obvious that 
these areas are so broad, that to narrowly term them as just industrial development is to 
do both them and their application unjust.  
In addition to this we have also seen that the process of financing the new network 
structures in the region, have consumed significant amounts of common and public 
resources. Recourses that could have been applied on policy areas that were not related 
to the new network structures. It is therefore difficult to conclude other than if 
governance is the correct term to use on steering practices in the Agder region, so is this 
policy wise a question of a relatively broad and encompassing system, where it actually 
is more difficult to identify policy areas that is not affected than to find policy areas that 
are affected. The question of whether this is industrial or societal development, is 
therefore in this thesis no longer an issue. Governance in Agder is unquestionably about 
societal development that affects and concerns every citizen in the region.  
Where Are Decisions Made? 
The question of where political decision is made is at the crux of the governance 
steering model assumption. If we look at the regional policy agenda much of this was 
subjugated to a political decision making process in representative structures in the 
region, the municipalities, and the counties. Therefore, if we limit our view on 
“governance vs. government” to be about a question of formal decision-making, then 
the governance system assumption is probably also significantly weakened, and maybe 
not as relevant to describe the regional politico economical system. However, two other 
questions are also relevant in this respect. Firstly it is the question of where political 
decisions are developed, and secondly to what extent the “governance system” can and 
does influence the actual political decision-making process itself. If many relevant 
policies are developed outside formal representative structures, and if the “network 
sphere” in addition influences the decision-making process itself, then the question of 
formal decision-making in representative institutions is also less important to the 
governance steering model assumption.  
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In the interviews, I asked all to describe the relationship between the 
representative sphere and the network sphere in the Agder region. Most then 
emphasised the fact that most of these policies and agendas have been sanctioned by 
representative institutions, however when asked what the relationship between these 
spheres are some could also give many examples of how “weak” the counties where on 
the regional development arena. Some of the interviewed then used relevant examples 
of lack of, and little resources, and that the “political level” had little ability and 
competence to actually develop relevant regional development policies. This is also 
something that has been discussed and documented in recent research reports, see for 
instance (J. P. Knudsen et al. 2005).  
However when asked directly where the power was and who actually influenced 
who; are the networks steering through the political level or is it the political level 
steering through the networks. Most of the interviewed then concluded that “the arrow 
goes in both directions” or that this is “equal”. When I approached the two county 
mayors with such questions, their view was that through addressing the policies of the 
networks they secured that the county policies were “relevant” for the regions and its 
industries. However, when I asked how much direct contact they had with the region’s 
industries both of them had complaints of it being to little time and opportunity for such 
activities. 
In addition to this has we seen that it in the Agder region is set up governance 
institutions that have as part of its official agenda to directly influence political 
decision-making processes, not just to implement it. This is of course also central and 
legitimate purpose of regional interest organisations. In addition, if we let the largest 
political decision in Agder’s history be the telling example of how the system works, 
the sales of the shares in Agder Energi, then representative democracy in the region 
looks significantly weakened. We saw that it in the “Agder Energi story” many 
indications of a process that was planned and actually led by actors that were outside the 
elected political apparatus, a decision that seen in retrospect has been of crucial 
importance for the development of the regional governance system in the region.  
There are still many policies that are developed, decided upon, and executed 
within the representative political system, but there seems to be little question that 
significant aspects of this have changed in recent years. In this thesis, we have seen 
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examples of how and why the political levels are fed both policies and development 
plans by structures outside the representative system. In addition has much of the 
implementation of the policies been outsourced to the same networks that developed 
them in the first place, good examples of this in the Agder region is the development 
task and responsibilities given to both Cultiva and CDFSN. In this view representative 
democracy has, on certain important regional policy areas, become a temporary stop, 
that just sanctions policies on their path from development to implementation. I 
therefore find reason to conclude that; the regional policy agenda in the Agder region 
do not originate from broad political processes in representative and democratic 
institutions, even though parts of it were sanctioned there.  
Who Participates in Making the Decisions? 
The question then is; from where do the development policies originate. One possibility 
is that they originate from business leaders or industries in general in the Agder region. 
This was one of my “tacit” assumptions when I started this thesis work. I have however 
found few examples and indications of this actually being the case. People I have 
worked and talked with have also had the opposite view, the industries and businesses 
in the region were not particularly concerned with regional development issues, some 
issues and cases yes, but not deeply and systematically involved. The common saying in 
the region thus it is not the overflow of industries and enterprises that take on societal 
responsibility. The “phrase” is that too few enterprises and industrial leaders have seen 
it worthwhile to take on such a role. 
In addition, if we look at the member list of the governance institutions in the 
Agder region the dominating part of the members are not industrial or business leaders. 
It is the people who have it as their “job description” to run network processes that 
predominantly also run and actively participate in network processes. This group of 
people “talks” and “acts” on behalf of the industries and communicates the industries 
interest to the political level. In general, I have come to believe that this in common is a 
relatively uncontroversial and accurate picture of the major communication patterns 
between the representative political level and the region’s industry1. 
Then the question becomes to what extent the network level is just a 
communicative tool for the industry, or if it also plays a more independent role in 
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developing the regional policies. This is a question that is difficult to prove directly one 
way or another, and as one of the interviewees said –“in the network level the ideas and 
arguments move back and forth so much and in so many different forums that ideas that 
you thought were your own might very well be someone else’s. Thus, many people 
would not hesitate to take credit for the things that I and we were involved in setting up, 
and that is a good thing”. It is in a way the “nature” of the network system that 
responsibility is difficult to pinpoint precisely. It is after all not a system based on 
accountability.  
There is however one way that the question of the independent role that the 
network level has insofar policy development in the Agder region can be addressed. If 
the network level just was an “instrument” of the industry towards influencing the 
political level, then it would be expected that the regional policy agenda somehow also 
was a reflection of the current industries in the region’s interests. However, as we saw 
in chapter 2 the dominant feature of the industries in the Agder region is part of what 
commonly is interpreted as the “old-economy”. In addition, the Agder region has, as 
almost every other industrialised place, most of its “private” workforce placed within 
the service sector. While the regional policy agenda, as we saw in chapter 6, is an 
agenda that clearly is biased towards what commonly is interpreted as the “new-
economy”; the “coming” and by implication not yet existing industries. In addition, the 
private service sectors are neither particularly discussed nor emphasised as important 
for the region in these documents. 
It is then odd, if the network level is just an empty instrument for the industrial 
leaders and the enterprises in the region, that the industries would contribute to 
developing regional policies that are disadvantageous or not directly benefits the 
dominating majority of the industries in the region. Based on this, I find reason to 
conclude that: The network level plays an independent and very significant role in 
constructing regional development policies in the Agder region.  
The consequence of the discussions of these threes questions in relation to the 
politico economical system in the Agder region is that: The term regional governance 
can be applied in a meaningful way when describing significant aspects of policy 
development and implementation processes relating to regional development in the 
Agder region. 
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On the Subject of Regional Regime 
A governance network system is “just” a complex net of networks, institutions, actors, 
and policies, that in it self might have a large potential for steering, influence and 
power, but this potential is not necessarily and by definition realised. The effectiveness 
of the governance system is much determined by how well and in what way it is meta 
governed or steered. In chapter 3, we saw that most theories about governance 
conceptualise such meta steering bodies in relationship to the practices of governance 
systems. We also saw that such meta governing responsibilities can lay with different 
bodies. For instance they can very well lie with elected political institutions at the 
national, regional, or municipal level, it is also possible to theorise that such 
responsibilities might lie with one important and resourceful actor, institution or 
organisation.  
Central to this thesis is the idea that such responsibilities lie with a regional 
governing coalition or regime, and that this body performs such meta governing 
responsibilities. The question then is how and if we can know that this actually is the 
case. The question is: How do we, or can we know that the governance system or parts 
of it are meta steered by a regional regime? If we apply to the regime definition given 
to us by Stone (1989), and the specification of characteristics (Dowding et al. 1999; 
Dowding 2001), it becomes possible to meaningfully and systematically address the 
issue. Dowding (2001: 14), as we saw in chapter 3, identified eight components of the 
regime concept, where four were necessary in order to label any governing coalition a 
regime. I will in the following apply to this conceptualisation and compare it to the 
findings in the two previous chapters.  
The first frequent but not necessary components of a regime were: The policy 
agenda should bridge institutions and community interests by creating ‘partnership’ 
forms spanning the public-private-sector divide (Dowding 2001: 14). In this thesis it is 
given many examples of such institutions being set up in the Agder region, as a result of 
the regional policy agenda. The Value Creation Alliance where the social partners were 
central participants is an example of this. Here for instance the social partners were 
represented as they also are in Cultiva and Agderrådet, therefore does this first 
requirement clearly qualify to Dowding’s conceptualisation of a regime. 
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The second frequent but not necessary component of a regime was that: The 
policy agenda was associated with strong or exceptional leadership, capable of 
entrepreneurially assembling an unusual coalition and linking it with a distinctive 
political vision (Dowding 2001: 14). This criterion does also clearly qualify to the 
Agder region. The presence of the regional policy agenda in the Agder region, and this 
frequently being spoken of, “as something that everybody agrees upon” would not have 
been possible without strong leadership capable of creating a single vision out of 
diverse interests. 
The third frequent but not necessary component of a regime was that: The policy 
agenda primarily involved the mobilization of external resources, creating a positive-
sum game within the polity and the formation of public-private partnerships, often 
transcending partisan divisions (Dowding 2001: 14). The obvious example here is that 
the sales of the hydro-electrical power company was used to finance and set up new 
governance institutions in the region. However, there are also many others and less 
dramatic examples of such resource mobilising capabilities. In chapter 6, in the 
subchapter “regional meta governance” I presented a table that listed some examples of 
institutional- and policy outputs from the regional policy agenda. It seems clear that the 
realisation of these developments would have been impossible if there did not also exist 
a significant capability within the system to mobilise external resources. Therefore, this 
requirement also clearly qualifies to the definition. 
The last common but not analytically necessary component of a regime was that: 
The policy agenda should also survive personnel and leadership changes or political 
successions, reflecting a specific ideology or agreement over fundamental values for 
members of the coalition, which allows continued electoral success (Dowding 2001: 
14). The political leadership on both the county level and in the major cities in the 
Agder region is stable where it is not unusual that mayors held office for both two and 
three terms, and that this is positions that are held by one of two parties, either the 
Conservative Party or the Christian Conservative Party, see the appendix. I do not have 
any data indicating regime activities in the Agder region that goes further back than the 
period discussed in this thesis. If there were regime practices in the Agder region before 
this (1990), this regime did not have a regional development orientation, see also 
discussion in chapter 2. In addition to this, it is not an assumption in this thesis that the 
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regional regime originates in the political system, which is to say that if political re-
elections are a regime issue in Agder then it is a minor one. This is because this thesis 
sees regimes as a product of and part of the regional governance system, and not as 
exclusively tied to the political system.  
The last four criterions are those that according to Dowding (2001) are the 
frequent and necessary components for me to characterise meta steering of a governance 
system as governed by a regime. The first of these is: the policy agenda cross-sectoral or 
institutional boundaries (Dowding 2001: 14). One example of the regional regimes’ 
ability cross-sectoral and institutional boundaries in order to realise that vital policy 
aims were the sales process associated with Agder Energi, but also many of the other 
policy outputs, see chapter 6, are a result of such capabilities. The regional policy 
agenda in the Agder region works because it can be phrased “as something that 
everybody agrees upon”. 
The second frequent and necessary component for the conceptualisation of a 
regime was that: the policy agenda was sustained by coalitions of interests or personnel 
not formally or fully specified in institutional structures, often in the form of a ‘grand 
coalition’ or large-majority coalition of interests (Dowding 2001: 14). This is also an 
example of a criterion that immediately qualifies to the definition. In chapter 6 we saw 
that actors involved in what is conceptualised as regime processes in the Agder region 
do not originate from one organisation or institution, political party or just performs one 
societal role. The collaborations are very much informal and are based on that actors 
sharing certain perspectives and agendas have found a joint platform to act out of. What 
constitutes a regional regime is clearly not based in one organisation; therefore, this 
requirement also qualifies to the definition. 
The third and fourth frequent and necessary component for the conceptualisation 
of a regime were: the existence of a policy agenda that was relatively long-lived 
(Dowding 2001: 14). These requirements are also sufficiently documented in this thesis, 
and are presented and discussed in some detail in chapter 6, under “the regional policy 
agenda” and the “regional meta governance” subchapters. If we see the three central 
regional policy documents, Common Goals on Agder (1994), Common Agenda (1999), 
and Common Goals on Sørlandet (2003), as an indication of agenda stability it seems to 
be that the regional policy agenda since it initially was developed in 1994 has been 
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remarkably consistent. That this agenda also has served as a platform that different and 
shifting actors and institutions could use during the last decade in the Agder region is 
also apparent. The regional regime is not one group of people, but a policy platform that 
various actors and institutions could and have used as a platform for action in the 
regional governance sphere.  
Based on this discussion and the data presented in chapter 5 and 6, I find reason to 
conclude that: The concept of a regional regime can be used in a meaningful way when 
describing the meta steering processes of the regional governance system in the Agder 
region. The figure below can be seen as an attempt to graphically depict the role of the 
regional regime in relation to the regional governance system, the network participants, 
and the civil society. 
Fig. 7-1: Conceptualisation of Regimes in Regional Governance Systems 
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The concept of regional regimes is discussed in more in detail in relation to the 
second subsidiary research question. Based on the conceptual clarifications we can 
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proceed to addressing the first subsidiary research question of this thesis, the question 
that relates to the conflict in the Value Creation Alliance. 
7.3 – Regional Development Coalition 
The research question that was developed in relation to the case presentation in chapter 
5 was: Why did the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder result in a conflict? The 
presentation of the case, the development of the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder 
emphasising events relating to the Value Creation Alliance, has focused on those events 
that I believe are most relevant for understanding and interpreting this question. In 
chapter 5, data presentation was chronologically organised around seven phases: 
1) From Enterprise Development 2000 to Value Creation 2010 (2000) 
2) The Enthusiastic Start-up (2000/1) 
3) Full Exposure (2001/2) 
4) A Sneaking Sense of Realism (2002) 
5) A Conflict Unfolds (2002/3) 
6) Stalemate (2003/4) 
7) Restart and Reorientation (2004-) 
To simplify the analysis the main events in the data presentation are correlated 
with some dimensions that are of relevance to the research question, and are illustrated 
in the figure below: 
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Fig. 7-2: The Development of the Value Creation Alliance (VCA) 
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The first dimensions are commitment and engagement, with this I mean the extent 
that participants in the project, the Value Creation Alliance members and the research 
team, seemed to be fully committed and engaged to the project or not. In the data 
presentation it is clear that this has varied, and that the level of commitment in the 
project peaked in the period succeeding the official launch of the programme and 
reaching a low after the conflict. The second dimension is, efficiency in the project, with 
this I mean to what extent the project generated and implemented project activities, this 
is also something that we in the case presentation saw varied significantly during the 
project period. The third dimension that I have chosen to emphasise is consensus; with 
this I mean to what extent, there were agreement, shared understandings between the 
different participants to the project about the “direction” and orientation of the project. 
These indicators are roughly placed on three levels; high, medium, and low in order to 
make the illustration. The combination of these elements is graphically depicted with 
the figure above, note that these classifications solely are based on my interpretation of 
data. 
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I believe that the graphical representation correlates fairly well with the events 
and how they unfolded in the project. They do however not explain why the project 
resulted in a conflict situation. The data presentation should reveal and give many 
opportunities for different interpretations of why the project collapsed. This first 
research question is a question where the problem is not to find a reasonable explanation 
of the events that unfolded, but actually to sort between the many explanations that 
exist. This is because the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder involved many people 
professionally, and the conflict affected many of those involved emotionally as well, 
there is therefore no shortage of explanations concerning the conflict. It is also to be 
expected that people involved in these events felt the need to place the responsibility 
somewhere, I believe this is just as true if you point the finger at the research team, the 
working committee in the Value Creation Alliance, the other members in the Value 
Creation Alliance, or to the management at Agder Research.  
I will therefore systematically address the most common of these explanations in 
the following. These explanations of the conflict are all to varying extent supported by 
the graphical representation above, and data presentation in chapter 5. The following 
explanations have all been articulated in my presence by either members of the research 
team involved in the Value Creation 2010 project in Agder, by participants in the Value 
Creation Alliance at various stages, and others that in different ways have been 
associated to the project. These explanations are: 
1) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because of the gap between the 
expectations to the project and the practical results produced by the project. 
2) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because it is not possible to do 
enterprise development and regional development in a meaningful way within the 
framework of one project. 
3) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because of inadequate project 
management. 
4) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because of internal conflicts at 
Agder Research. 
5) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because of conflict seeking 
researchers. 
6) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because of lack of progress 
relating specifically to enterprise development. 
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7) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because the research team 
initiated a process aimed at rethinking roles and responsibilities in the project and in 
relation to regional development in Agder. 
8) The Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict because of crossing 
expectancies to the Value Creation 2010 project, a conflict in expectancies between a) 
those held by the research team, b) those held by the members of the Value Creation 
Alliance, c) those held by the Norwegian Research Council, and d) those held by regional 
actors external to the project.  
I believe that all of these explanations have some merit to them. However, there 
are just some of these explanations that give satisfactory understanding to why the 
conflict became a reality in the way it did. In the following, I will address each of these 
explanations to the conflict and discuss their merits in relation to data presented in 
chapter 5 and 6. 
The first explanation is that the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict 
because of the gap between the expectations to the project and the practical results 
produced by the project. This is an explanation that is true in the sense that there was a 
big gap between the ambitions in the Value Creation 2010 project as they were phrased 
in for instance the application to the Norwegian Research Council (H. C. G. Johnsen & 
Normann 2001c), and the concrete regional outputs and effects of the project. It was for 
instance ambitions and promises in the application relating to new workplaces, 
innovation, welfare etc. that it could not be given any direct indications of what 
indisputably could be traced back to the Value Creation 2010 project when the conflict 
occurred. However, given that this was a project that was planned and executed based 
on a ten-year plan It was probably none of the people involved in the project that 
actually thought that these high standard ambitions would be reached after just a couple 
of years of working? I therefore think that the explanatory force of this explanation 
should not be fully dismissed, but that it is relatively limited. For instance it does not 
provide any insight into why communication between central actors in the project 
suddenly broke down, and why the gap between expectations and practical 
developments could not have been addressed without developing into a conflict. 
The second explanation is that the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a 
conflict because it is not possible to do enterprise development and regional 
development in a meaningful way within the framework of one project. This is also a 
possible explanation, that also is mirrored in Technopolis’ national mid-term evaluation 
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report of the Value Creation 2010 programme, where it is argued that Value Creation 
2010 is too broad to be practical (Arnold, Muscio, Nählinder, & Reid 2005). This 
evaluation also present data indicating that it was the Agder module in the Value 
Creation 2010 project that had stretched its ambitions the farthest committing an equal 
amount of resources to all of the three “levels” in the project, and Technopolis write in 
the evaluation report: 
Value Creation 2010 is built on a sound set of principles. There is good research – both 
inside and outside the programme – that shows the importance and usefulness of labour 
force participation in innovation and organisational development. (On the other hand, 
there is no evidence that the labour force must always be involved, especially with 
technical product innovations.) Regional development through strengthening the 
capabilities of regional actors is undoubtedly important, and there is every reason to 
believe that more and better research into these questions will allow us to improve 
performance. Value Creation 2010 combines these ambitions in a single programme, 
aiming to work at the three levels of in-company organisational development and 
innovation, inter-company networking and establishing regional development coalitions. 
A key finding of this evaluation is that trying simultaneously to tackle all three levels is 
impractical (Arnold et al. 2005). 
There is no doubt that Value Creation 2010 was a very ambitious R&D 
programme, and that Agder, if we read the evaluation report, was one of the places that 
tried hardest to be present at the three “levels” simultaneously. As the first, this 
explanation is not unreasonable. Value Creation 2010 resulted in a conflict at Agder, 
and Agder was among those places that stretched its resources the most, and other 
Value Creation 2010 modules that did not follow this strategy did not have such 
conflicts. However, in it self this is not a satisfactory explanation. If the regional 
partners in the Value Creation Alliance shared such an understanding of the project, 
they could have addressed this situation and chosen to prioritise the resources in the 
project in a different way, and this could easily have been done without Value Creation 
2010 Agder developing into a conflict, a situation that effectively collapsed the project. 
I therefore regard this as an explanation with merit but also as an explanation that on its 
own is not satisfactory. 
The third explanation is that the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict 
because of inadequate project management. This explanation represents a possibility 
that should be seriously addressed, as it should in any project that ends up without 
realising its intentions. In the meeting between the Value Creation Alliance working 
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committee, the management on Agder Research, and the project leader in Value 
Creation 2010 Agder on 13 March 2003, when the project leader is fired, it is this 
explanation that is used. The main argument that verbally was presented to the rest of 
the research team from the leader of the working committee in the Value Creation 
Alliance was that the project leader was fired because of lack of communicative skills. 
However, this represents an explanation that it is tricky for me to address the merits of, 
if the working committee meant that the project leader did not do what he was told to 
do, then pointing to lack of communicative skills is a fair argument. What is odd about 
the explanation is that it does not explain why and how the project management 
suddenly should become so much worse at communicating. Data in chapter 5 do clearly 
indicate that the partners and others involved in the project in the first years of the 
project were very satisfied with how the project was conducted and how the project 
leader communicated with the Value Creation Alliance. I therefore regard this as an 
explanation that could have some merits, but also one that on its own is unsatisfactory in 
order to explain why the conflict occurred when it did.  
The fourth explanation is that the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a 
conflict because of internal conflicts at Agder Research. I have in chapter 5 presented 
much data that are supportive of such an assessment. For instance, the dominant role 
that the Value Creation 2010 got in the Agder Research’s organisation did pose 
problems for others working at Agder Research. When external financiers, and 
members of the Value Creation Alliance, expected that researchers and consultants 
working at Agder Research should coordinate their innovation-oriented project 
proposals with the Value Creation 2010 project leader this was understandably not 
popular in the organisation. In addition to this, there were problems and disagreements 
relating to the economic steering systems in the organisation. It was for instance very 
difficult to know precisely how many resources that was consumed by the Value 
Creation 2010 project. It is no doubt that this also was something that significantly 
added to the tension between the management and the project leader in the Value 
Creation 2010 project. I would however be very hesitant to use the internal situation at 
Agder Research as a central explanatory factor for the conflict. It did of course not help, 
and it probably speeded up the process of running the project into stalemate. It is 
however unclear how much of the internal problems at Agder Research that actually 
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were known outside the organisation. Myself and many others working at Agder 
Research had a “feeling” that something was wrong, but we did not know anything with 
certainty. That members of the Value Creation Alliance should be so much more 
informed about the situation at Agder Research than those who worked there is 
something I find to be implausible. It was always in the interest of Agder Research to 
have the Value Creation 2010 project as “healthy” as possible, since the project 
generated much ill needed economic recourse to the institution. Keeping a decent 
“façade” was in the strategic interest of Agder Research; I therefore find that this 
explanation has little merit to it also.  
The fifth explanation is that the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict 
because of conflict seeking researchers. This explanation has not been articulated by 
any of the members of the Value Creation Alliance as far as I know. It has however 
been articulated by people that were not directly involved in the project, but only 
observed the researches’ reaction to the conflict after it was a reality. The research team 
in the Value Creation 2010 project did react very strongly to the removal of the project 
leader. We were also very open in communicating our views about the situation both 
internally at Agder Research and to people on the outside of the organisation. Our 
attitude could easily have been interpreted as aggressive and conflict oriented. I 
therefore do not find it to be unreasonable that this attitude also could have been 
rationalised as an explanation to the conflict itself. However, as many of the other 
explanations this is also plausible but unsatisfactory. It does not explain why the 
research team suddenly should become conflict oriented, and how the Value Creation 
2010 project could function reasonably well for almost three years with the same 
“conflict oriented” researchers and consultants. Therefore I also find that this 
explanation has little merit to it. 
The sixth explanation is that the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a conflict 
because of lack of progress relating specifically to enterprise development. This 
explanation represents the second part of the official reason given for firing of the 
project leader on the meeting held on 13 March 2003. The issues that were discussed in 
chapter 5 in relation to this was that there were disagreements associated with how the 
HF-B project was going to be organised, what role it should play in relation to the Value 
Creation 2010 project, and who was going to be the project leader, etc. This is in 
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addition to less progress than expected in developing sufficient enterprise internal 
development projects in Value Creation 2010 Agder. The previously discussed Inno 
report (Inno 2003), also discusses this aspect of the Value Creation 2010 project. Value 
Creation 2010 is the only project that is directly mentioned in Inno’s report about Agder 
Research, and this report was as previously mentioned commissioned by the CDFSN. 
Inno states in its report that Agder Research enjoys a good reputation in the public 
sector, with satisfied customers, it is however a different story with the private 
companies. The responsibility for this is in the report almost solely put on the execution 
of the Value Creation 2010 project:  
Private companies, however, cannot either imagine at all what Agder Research could do 
for them or communicate explicitly their disappointment with Agder Research. To a 
significant degree, this is due to flaws in Agder Research’s PR and marketing in general 
and in respect to Value Creation 2010 in particular. The Value Creation 2010 target group 
companies misunderstood two core messages completely, which Agder Research is to 
blame for: the total project budget and the role of Agder Research. Agder Research 
reached out to the private companies by communicating significantly too high budget 
volumes and by letting the companies understand that Agder Research’s role was to win 
money for the companies. The companies wanted the cash and became upset when Agder 
Research – against their initial expectation – kept it for itself. It is going to be extremely 
difficult to win new clients in the current situation taking into account the very limited list 
of enthusiastic private companies that can be used as reference clients (Inno 2003: 36). 
I believe that this explanation is an important component in the broader 
understanding of why the Value Creation 2010 project in Agder resulted in a conflict. 
However, it does not represent the complete picture. At the time of the conflict, there 
had been less progress than planned in enterprise internal projects for quite a while. The 
main reasons for this were that two of the three process consultants had quit Agder 
Research, and thereby ended their participation in the Value Creation 2010 project. This 
was known to the working committee of the Value Creation Alliance and the 
management at Agder Research, and was something that the project leader of the Value 
Creation 2010 project hardly could be blamed for. In January and February 2003, the 
enterprise internal projects were also looking promising. The HF-B project funds were 
granted, and were going to be used to hire process consultants to the Value Creation 
2010 project, and a new business network was also close of being set up in April. In 
addition, two other business internal development projects were running as planned 
under the umbrella of the Value Creation 2010 project. Paradoxically, there were 
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actually more business internal development projects in progress at the time of the 
conflict than it had been all of the previous year. It is however no doubt that the dispute 
about how the HF-B project should be organised represented a tipping point concerning 
the actual conflict. Nevertheless, this dispute in itself is not a sufficient explanation. 
Inno’s assessment of the Value Creation 2010 project represents thus the simplified 
myth about the conflict that some external stakeholders to the project have 
communicated to Inno post-conflict. The HF-B dispute, and the issues relating to 
progress in enterprise internal development projects, is as I see it more symptoms of the 
underlying conflicts that did exist in the project than the actual causes to it.  
The seventh explanation is that the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in a 
conflict because the research team initiated a process aimed at rethinking roles and 
responsibilities in the project and in relation to regional development in Agder. This 
explanation is also plausible. It can very well be that the research team in some form or 
another provoked something or someone when we wrote the strategy report asking the 
Value Creation Alliance members to examine their roles and the legitimacy of their 
participation (H. C. G. Johnsen et al. 2003). The time this report circulated also 
correlates with the time of the conflict. There are however some difficulties associated 
with this explanation. First of all, it was the Value Creation Alliance itself that initiated 
the process of looking at their roles and the working methods in the Alliance, and the 
Alliance’s role associated with the larger development system in the Agder region. 
Secondly, if the participants in the Value Creation Alliance really did not like this 
report, it would be much easier for them to just ignore it, than to initiate a conflict based 
on a report that few others in the region would have bothered with. I therefore find little 
merit associated to this explanation.  
The eight and last explanation to why the Value Creation 2010 project resulted in 
a conflict is because of crossing expectancies to the Value Creation 2010 project. 
Conflict in expectancies between a) those held by the research team, b) those held by 
the members of the Value Creation Alliance, c) those held by the Norwegian Research 
Council, and d) those held by regional actors external to the project. Many of those 
involved in the Value Creation Alliance had associated themselves and their institution 
closely to the Value Creation 2010 project. Regional actors had used the Value Creation 
2010 project at many occasions as examples of what they did in the region relating to 
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both regional development and especially as examples of their relevance to the industry 
in the region. This is true for most of the members of the Value Creation Alliance, it is 
true for Agder Research, and it is true for the research and consultancy team responsible 
for running the project from Agder Research’s side. It is no hiding in that the 
researchers involved in the Value Creation 2010 project’s primary interest in the project 
was associated with the research aspects of it. At the time of the conflict, we were just 
starting to get a grip on how we should address the project as a research project and not 
just as a development project. Among the research team the main problem with the 
Value Creation 2010 project was actually that there was not much research writing in 
the project. We also knew that publications originating from the Value Creation 2010 
project at Agder was one of the major expectancies that the Norwegian Research 
Council had towards the programme. To write and publish was one of the central 
ambitions the research team had with the Value Creation 2010 project. We also feared 
that if we did not deliver on this important aspect we would loose funds from the 
Norwegian Research Council. In addition to this, the Norwegian Research Council 
increased their emphasis of the importance of the regional and municipal level in Value 
Creation 2010 as late as November 2002. Because the ministry responsible for regional 
and municipal affairs was becoming an even more dominant sponsor of the national 
Value Creation 2010 programme the research team found it impossible to just drop this 
work, and to just for instance focus on enterprise internally and network activities. 
Therefore it existed considerable cross pressure within the Value Creation 2010 project 
both nationally and regionally. In addition to the cross-pressure that existed internally in 
the project there was also pressure from the “outside”.  
 I therefore asked the former director at Agder Research why the Value Creation 
2010 project went as it went, and I will in the following give some space to his answer 
because I believe he shared important insights to why the project resulted in a conflict:  
Question: Can you say something more about how you experienced the atmosphere 
between the partners, and the relation to the industry at this phase? I remember one of the 
first conferences that Value Creation 2010 Agder held just after the start up, there the 
industry was heavily represented as I recall. That is more unusual now is it not? 
–I experienced very much enthusiasm in the region, many good things happened around 
the start-up of the Value Creation 2010 project, and the Norwegian Research Council 
appreciated our application. The industry was supportive; actors in the Value Creation 
alliance were optimistic. Everything looked very well. What I think then happened was 
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that one could not deliver the things that one had promised initially, simple as that. It 
develops a very strong mismatch between the expectations that the industry and the Value 
Creation Alliance had and the things that actually took place within Value Creation 2010 
Agder. This led to huge dissatisfaction on many fronts because of this mismatch, one 
played up large expectations and it did not become what we had thought it would. 
[…]  
Question: When you initiated the Value Creation Alliance, did you see this institutional 
building process in relation to other parallel institutional developments in the region? On 
the other hand, was this a separate issue without relation to anything else? 
–Well, I understood Value Creation 2010 as something very different from what we 
thought that Sydspissen should be. Value Creation 2010 was an initiative to get more 
content so to speak, in the processes in this region. What we thought of, we who took the 
initiative to set up Sydspissen were primarily national marketing of this region. It has 
maybe developed differently so that there will be overlap issues, and conflicts. However, 
this is due to, in my opinion that Sydspissen did not manage to hold on to the original 
idea behind the initiative - to be an umbrella over other organisations, and market this 
nationally. At that time, I did not see any conflict of interest between Value Creation 
2010 and Sydspissen. However, what after a while became clear to me were that the 
Value Creation 2010 structure came into conflict with the counties role as regional 
development actor. We had the county responsibility reform [ansvarsreformen] in the 
beginning of the 2000s, where the counties were given clear responsibility for 
development in the regions by the ministry, and also the responsibility for leading the 
regional partnerships. Then Value Creation 2010 became a wrong or at least a difficult 
construction, where Value Creation 2010 Agder and Agder Research as a commercial 
research institutes suddenly were a central hub in this, a position that the counties should 
have according to the counties. I do not know how much this has been exposed in the 
public debate, but I do not think there is any doubt that this eventually became a 
problematic issue for the counties.  
Question: If you look back at the project, now in 2006, it is not a big secret that it did not 
turn out as expected from Agder Research’s side, and the project teams point of view. If 
you shall explain this, what if anything, would you add to the two aspects you already 
have mentioned, the gap in expectations, and the regional reform?  
–Erik Arnold’s evaluation of Value Creation 2010, has actually explained what happened 
in Agder, something that actually was very dramatic. Others were maybe better at 
handling this. I do not disregard the possibility that the expectations to Value Creation 
2010 here at Agder were played out too loud. However, what in particular were played 
out too strong were the useful dimensions towards the industry. Too many enterprises did 
not understand what Value Creation 2010 was about. In addition, they talked out aloud 
about that, they did not experience any use of it. This did of course influence the social 
partners in the working committee of Value Creation 2010. They took this topic up for 
discussion repeatedly in the working committee, in relation to me, as project responsible 
in Agder Research. I experienced that this to a sufficient degree was not considered by 
the project management in Value Creation 2010, and followed up through practical 
changes in the project. To be concrete, back in 2002, the working committee of Value 
Creation 2010 wanted to appoint a separate person in the Value Creation 2010 project 
that should be responsible for contact with the enterprises, just because that they saw that 
Hans Chr was not particularly good at talking to the enterprises. The project leader of 
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Value Creation 2010 Agder (Hans Chr) chose not to accommodate this initiative. It 
therefore came to a very heavy conflict around this, and the working committee was over 
time very irritated that their wishes were not heard. That he chose to ignore the crisp clear 
message they were sending, signals that also to an extent are recorded in minutes from 
those meetings. That the project had to be organised differently when it came to Value 
Creation 2010’s intervention towards the enterprises. 
Question: This was important for them because the social partners had invested quite a 
lot; they had fronted this in media, at conferences etc?  
–Yes, they had invested both money and prestige.  
Question: So the perspective is that the social partners in a way shared destiny with the 
project’s relative standing in the enterprises. 
–Yes, and they came to me, I was not member of the working committee, it was the 
working committee that worked with this on their own. They came to me as director of 
Agder Research and explained the situation to me. I then took this up with the project 
leader in Value Creation 2010, and I experienced that nothing happened. There was no 
will to do the necessary changes, what was said were overlooked. This culminated with 
us seeing it necessary to do something about the project management just at the end of 
my time as director of Agder Research.  
Question: So now the project enters a new phase with conflicts on many fronts? 
–Yes, a vacuum emerges of many different reasons. Then things really went wrong. But it 
is clear in my opinion that all of this happened because the enterprises strong and clear 
said that they were so displeased, that they didn’t have any use of it, that they didn’t 
understand what this was about etc. I was even invited to a separated meeting by CDFSN, 
were the chairman of the board and the director in CDFSN. I even remember the date; 
because I became an uncle that day, 19 February 2003. Here CDFSN said very clearly 
that they think that Value Creation 2010 is a very good idea, but that the project does not 
work with the current project leader. This was a very clear message also from them, so it 
was not only the enterprises (that complained), CDFSN are of course not the enterprises 
in itself, but their point of view of course stem from the enterprises. Then much 
turbulence evolved around this, you (referring to the interviewer) were part of this team. 
Our understanding of reality with all of these signals from the industry, the working 
committee, and CDFSN was miles away from the understanding that you in this core 
team had. The understanding of reality was miles away.  
Question: Yes but also on what the project should be about.  
–Yes maybe. So then, it was much fuss. 
Question: If we skip ahead three years we see that what remains of the project becomes 
fragmented, and not much development work goes on at all except from the Ph.D. 
projects.  
–Yes, this is what I also have experienced, I have not heard much about Value Creation 
2010 after that.  
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I believe the account that the former director of Agder Research gives is relatively 
right concerning many of the main reasons to why the conflict unfolded, see also my 
discussion of the previous points. What was new to me and something that I did not 
realise before this interview was the scale of pressure that actually was put on the 
director by actors external to the Value Creation 2010 project. When the former director 
says that he more or less was instructed by regional actors outside of Agder Research to 
let the project leader go, there is no reason do doubt him. This does also tell us 
something about the role and status that once was attributed to the function that the 
Value Creation 2010 project was meant to have in the Agder region. The project did in a 
sense become too big for its own good, and it could not stay securely under the “radar”. 
That the CDFSN chooses to involve themselves directly in how projects at Agder 
Research should be organised is surprising but it is not sensational if we take into 
account the other meta governance practices that have occurred in the Agder region. See 
also discussions in chapter 6 in relation to this.  
Based on this discussion I find reason to conclude that the answer to the first 
research question: Why did the Value Creation 2010 project at Agder result in a 
conflict? is the following: There were many and crossing expectancies to the Value 
Creation 2010 project at Agder, what actually realised the conflict was however the 
presence of influential governance institutions with the capability and will to act on 
behalf of some expectancies and interests. 
7.4 – Regional Governance 
Based on the discussion and analysis of the first research question, I find reason to 
explore more into some of the characteristics of the regional governance system and 
regime practices in the Agder region. Both regime and governance represent 
independent bodies of theories, as we saw in chapter 3. Theories that individually can be 
used to describe and analyse regional and urban political economic steering systems. 
Seen independently, governance theories often tell us that representative democracy is 
weakened and/or that the relationship between the political sphere/ and the private 
sphere have changed in various and significant ways. On the other hand, regimes can 
very be well be anchored in representative democracy as they are in Stone’s text about 
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Atlanta (Stone 1989), and both regime theory and a theory about governance can and 
could have been used independently to analyse data presented in this thesis. However, I 
believe that when we combine theories about regimes with governance perspectives we 
also get a more accurate depiction of current practices. The combination of governance 
theories and regime theories do also have implications for our conceptualisation of the 
regime. It is not any more so closely and so necessarily connected to representative 
democracy and the market, as it would have been if it were not integrated in a theory 
and practice about governance. Representative institutions still play an important role in 
regional systems. However, since power in the regional political economical steering 
system no longer exclusively is associated with representative democracy in a 
governance system, the ‘regime’ in a way also “moves” with this shift in power and 
influence.  
In the literature about regimes, we find many different ‘types’ of regimes. 
Dowding (2001: 13), lists a few: ‘Maintenance Regimes’, ‘Growth-Machine 
Development Regimes’, ‘Privatist-Corporatist Development Regimes’, ‘Middle-Class 
Progressive Regimes’, ‘Mass Mobilisation (working-class) Regimes’, ‘Service-Delivery 
Regimes’, ‘Pluralist Regimes’, and ‘Hyperpluralist (or no) Regimes’.  
I therefore continue with a discussion of the second subsidiary research question 
that is: What are the central characteristics of the regional regime and governance 
system in the Agder region? This question is going to be analysed using the theoretical 
framework developed in chapter 3, the three perspectives on regional governance, and I 
start out with a discussion of the key elements within the three perspectives in relation 
to the data and analyses that have been presented so far.  
On Governance and Regime 
As previously discussed in chapter 3, the instrumental perspective represents an 
economical type of rationality, and it builds on Max Weber’s ideal model of the 
organization as rational and efficient instruments, meaning that that rules, regulations, 
instructions, etc. imposed by the leadership will be acceded to (Weber 1978). Rational 
steering of governance systems is in this perspective both desirable and possible. The 
reason for such steering being possible is primarily that actors act in predictable and 
rational manners. Actors are systematically pursuing to realise certain aims, and through 
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systematic manipulation of these aims the governance system can be controlled and 
meta steered. The instrumental perspective comes, as discussed in chapter 3, in two 
“variants”, with respect to collective actors’ dependences on each other. The central 
issue is whether actors are most meaningfully described as autonomous or 
interdependent within the governance system in the Agder region. The second question 
based on this perspective is to what extent data in this thesis support the idea that 
governance actors are utility maximizing and rational, are instrumental in their actions? 
We also saw in chapter 3 that the combination of the two ‘variants’ of the instrumental 
perspective also had implications for how we viewed society it self, if actors were 
autonomous then governance could work only if actors deliberately sought common 
good solutions. However, if they were interdependent then governance would also work 
when there were competing interests on a fundamental level at play in the governance 
system. Furthermore, governance networks are depending on how actors are 
conceptualised, in this perspective either horizontal interaction between resourceful and 
interdependent actors or horizontal coordination between autonomous actors. The 
rational purpose and legitimacy of governance is associated with the steering 
capabilities the system represents. Governance has in this perspective emerged because 
of institutional fragmentation, or to insufficiencies of other coordinative structures in 
society. Meta governance is in this perspective the regime’s manipulation of the 
institutional and organisational aspects of the governance framework. If actors are 
viewed as autonomous steering that seeks preserving the autonomy of individual 
governance institutions are emphasized.  
In the institutional perspective is individual and collective action shaped by 
values, identities, knowledge, and rules that are bound together in socio cultural systems 
and institutions. Further, they see action as conditioned by socio cultural identities, 
norms, and rules, which are bound together in a concept of a common good. The 
normative integration of individual and collective actors gives good conditions for 
stable societal steering (March & Olsen 1995). March and Olsen’s institutional 
perspective sees action as culturally conditioned –the logic of appropriateness. Where 
actors first reflect upon whom we are, and then identify what type of situation this is, 
and then act based on an assessment of what the institutional context of rules, norms, 
and conceptions define as appropriate in such a situation. Society is in this perspective 
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conceptualised as a place where actors intentionally seek common good solutions. 
Democratic steering and development of governance networks are therefore a central 
component of this perspective. Governance is in this perspective interactive steering 
based on institutional norms and rules. The phenomena of governance institutions are in 
this perspective explained in the same way as they are within the instrumental 
perspective. They emerge as a response to fragmented and complex steering processes 
in society. Governance networks can in this perspective, if they are democratically 
steered, be interpreted as a necessary part of a modern and complex society. Meta 
governance is in this perspective the regimes re-institutionalisation, shaping, and 
development of identities and capacities in specific and wanted democratic directions. 
Neither the ideological perspective conforms to an economical type of rationality, 
but that actors are bounded rational in their actions. In this perspective actors act based 
on discursively constructed, motives, strategies, and rationalities, which are embedded 
in practice, and as the case was in the institutional perspective actors could be 
understood in both individual and collective terms. At the core of the ideological 
perspective is the idea that society is an arena where different interests are in 
competition with each other. In order for societal structures such as governance 
networks to be viable, there must be a dominant idea or discourse about these 
institutions’ role in society, about development, and about democracy, that all 
contributes to rationalise and legitimise governance structures and processes in society. 
Unlike the institutional perspective, the ideological does not presuppose any idea about 
governance relating to democracy. On the contrary the case is that governance is 
understood as an institutionalised steering rationality and technology, and exerts a 
specific form of power. The purpose of this steering rationality and technology is to 
support the exertion of the dominant development agenda and policy. 
The interviews conducted, as part of this thesis work did not provide clear 
answers to these questions introduced through the perspectives. These questions must 
therefore be approached indirectly. When I interviewed those that were or could be 
expected to be involved in governance activities in the Agder region, we often touched 
upon topics relating to their experiences with working in and with governance networks. 
I also asked some of them directly why they had chosen to participate, and I asked about 
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their assessment of various strengths and weaknesses of the system both relating to 
effectiveness and of more normative issues relating to democracy.  
If network actors predominantly gave answers that related to personal or 
institutional interests, this could be interpreted as a support to the instrumental 
perspective; actors participate because they have a personal agenda. On the other hand, 
if actors gave answers that could be interpreted as political or if those interviewed had 
(in this case) a regional agenda, a vision for regional development that they wanted to 
participate in realising. An agenda that clearly was outside their personal or institutional 
interests, then it would indicate support for perspectives indicating that society is a place 
were common good solutions is sought and actors could very well also be autonomous. 
On the other hand, if actors showed little understanding for how they work related to the 
larger regional development picture, if they primarily were preoccupied with their 
concrete involvement in a development activity. Then this would indicate support for 
the institutional and/or the ideological perspective. In addition, if actors did little to 
question the activities they were involved in or other system features then this also 
would be something that could be interpreted as support for the institutional and/or the 
ideological perspective. If interviewees independent of my questions actively sought 
after, or responded unequivocally positive to direct questions relating to more 
participation and broader and more inclusive development processes, then this would 
indicate support for the institutional perspective emphasis of democratic governance, as 
a positive and sought after steering form. If actors “defended” the ‘system’, when 
approached with critical questions relating to critical issues for instance, participation, 
democracy, and system effectiveness then this would be something that could be 
interpreted as support for the ideological perspective.  
Data available to this thesis show, and not surprisingly, little support for such 
simplistic assessments of the system. The picture relating to these questions are in 
reality very complex, however, my attempt at addressing them begins with grouping 
governance network actors in the Agder region in one of three categories.  
The first group is those that showed little sign of being much involved in 
governance activities, this group could be involved in network work and or 
development activities, but seldom more than one concrete network or development 
activity. This group is here conceptualised as –the workers. This group of people has 
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very varying understanding for how “their” activity fit or relates to other regional 
development activities. This varies from them having a very sophisticated 
understanding, to them having almost no apparent knowledge about the regional 
governance system at all. The reason for them being involved in this activity was either 
that it was their professional business, that participating was part of their “job 
assignment”, or that the particular activity represented something that they were 
personally involved and engaged in. Some of the people in this group could be 
interpreted as rational in the sense that they saw participation as a business opportunity. 
However, I believe most of them participated more because of it being a part of their 
“job description”. This group showed few signs of political engagement or having a 
regional development agenda as something central to their thinking. This group of 
people is predominantly not the leaders of the organisations they are employed by, they 
could have managerial responsibilities but this is not the prime reason for their 
participation. They participate because of their professional expertise and/or because of 
their direct involvement in a concrete and practical development activity. This group 
could be project leaders or project participants from either research or academic 
institutions, consultancies, from the public sector or the industry. 
The second group of those interviewed and observed were those who were or had 
been involved in many governance network activities in the region, but without directly 
expressing a personal and “political” commitment to regional development plans. This 
group is here conceptualised as –the masses. This group could be visionary on behalf of 
the institution they represented, but they do not communicate and phrase this vision on 
behalf of the region. This represents the largest portion of the people I interviewed and 
have worked with in the Value Creation Alliance. This group of people represents in my 
opinion the usual governance network participant in the Agder region. To what extent 
they are personally involved in concrete development activities themselves varies much, 
and is not typical. This group of people tend to held manager, director, and leader 
positions in various institutions in the region, not necessarily the top position but they 
do have some kind of formal authority within the organisation that employs them. They 
often tend to delegate responsibility for implementation to others, and then act as 
controllers themselves. The interviews also showed to what extent this group of people 
participated from of a personal or institutional agenda varied much; the majority of 
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those I have talked to did not reveal any hint of any such agendas to me. They often said 
that they participated because they were either invited in, it was the defined role of their 
institution to be represented, or just participated because they believed that it was 
expected of them to participate.  
The third group is those that have a vision for regional development in the Agder 
region. This group is here conceptualised as –the visionaries. This group of people is 
very politically engaged and sees the governance network arena as a place where such 
ambitions can be realised. This group knows what regional development in the Agder 
region really is about, and misses no opportunity to communicate it to others. This 
group of people are engaged in these developments at a very personal level, and I 
believe that they seldom are in doubt about the legitimacy and justifications concerning 
this type of work. This group of people tends to possess considerable authority either 
because of the formal positions they held in the region, and/or because of the 
charismatic characteristics of their personalities, and/or because of the competence they 
represent, and/or because of their achievements in business, and/or because of the 
financial resources that are at their disposal. This group of people participates directly 
and indirectly (for instance through proxy) on many different arenas in the region. The 
regional regime in the Agder region is part of or “recruited” from this group of actors.  
I therefore found little support for an assumption that the majority of network 
participants participate out of self-interest. Some probably do, and some institutions 
have defined this as a strategically important arena to be present at, however, I find little 
support for the assumption that such mechanisms have driven the growth of governance 
networks in the Agder region. The idea that actors can act based on rational calculus is 
in this thesis believed to be an inaccurate and misleading conception about both human 
cognition and society. Society is simply to complex and many faceted for us being able 
to act towards our surroundings in what in the instrumental perspective is 
conceptualised as a strictly instrumental and utility maximising manner. The type of 
rationality and basis for action conceptualised in the institutional perspective is here 
believed to be far more accurate in depicting what in “reality” governs our actions than 
what is held in the instrumental perspective. In addition, the theory of appropriateness is 
not incompatible, but very compatible, with acting within a discursively constructed 
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framework. What is conceived to be appropriate action can very well be understood as 
action within the appropriate discursively constructed framework. 
The idea that governance networks have emerged because of institutional 
fragmentation and sector oriented state policies has some merit to it. It is true that the 
official institutional landscape; municipal and county borders, state ministries, public 
institutions tend to change at a much slower pace than what is interpreted as the optimal 
organisation and structure in order to effectively address current development needs. 
The problem with relying solely at this explanation is that governance networks do little 
to address this problem, as they only add to the problem of institutional fragmentation 
and complexity. It is therefore difficult to identify the rationality and logic to solving the 
problem of institutional fragmentation without adding more complexity and institutional 
fragmentation. Therefore, I neither see any reason to conclude that this is the major 
driving force behind the emerging governance networks. However, if we look at what 
the regional governance system actually does for explanation, then the ideological 
perspective provides the better explanation. The governance system is, as we have seen, 
effective in steering development work in specific and wanted directions. This is also 
the main purpose of regional governance and regime steering of governance networks. 
The instrumental and the institutional perspective have another conceptualisation 
about governance networks that I believe to be inaccurate. This conceptualisation 
concerns the assumption that governance networks should be primarily understood as 
horizontal structures. Technically and formally they are horizontal structures. There is 
very little formal decision-making power within this system. However, as shown here 
do participants in governance networks in the Agder region not represent a unified 
group. One could therefore pose the argument that there exists some kind of informal 
hierarchy within the governance network structures. For instance, some are more 
experienced than others, and some know more people than others, and some have more 
influence than others, and some have more knowledge about working in a network than 
others, and some participate on many arenas while others do not, and some have access 
to more information than others, and some are able to participate in meta steering 
processes, while others are not. I therefore find it hard to follow the assumption about 
governance networks, that they represent particularly egalitarian and flat steering 
structures, the hierarchies are there and they are visible, they are just not a formalised 
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part of the system. Power in governance networks is based on indirect rule; it is the 
informal hierarchy that is the central characteristic of the governance network, not the 
“formal” horizontal structure. 
The data presented in this thesis, my interviews with regional stakeholders, and 
my experiences from working with the Value Creation Alliance do little to support the 
normative notion found in the institutional perspective about democratic governance. In 
this instance are both the instrumental and the ideological perspective more empirically 
accurate, but these perspectives do not represent a normative standard on which societal 
development should be modelled. 
Within the instrumental perspective it was a question concerning whether 
governance actors best could be described as autonomous or interdependent of each 
other. The institutional perspective conceptualised actors as being both, and the 
ideological perspective stated that actors were dependent upon a discursive framework. 
It is no doubt that governance network actors’ dependence of each other has increased 
as an important component of the governance development process itself. However to 
go from that, and to say that the dominant picture is that governance actors are 
interdependent I have difficulties following. It is however one group that clearly is 
dependent upon governance networks. This group of actors belongs to the visionaries, 
because for the other two groups, the workers and the masses, absence of governance 
networks would mean little less than less meetings. Once again it is the ideological 
perspective that provides the better explanation, governance networks do not primarily 
work because governance actors are interdependent of each other, neither does 
governance networks work because actors are autonomous of each other and that actors 
intentionally seek common good solutions. Governance networks work because it is 
meta governed through a regional narrative, a discursive framework that prescribes 
governance networks as a necessary and beneficiary societal steering form, and that the 
aims set for regional development work is in the best interest of everyone.  
Those that examine the interview extracts reproduced in this text would observe 
regional stakeholders that actually are quite balanced in their answers as many of them 
acknowledge problematic aspects and challenges that still need to be addressed in the 
regional development system. We should also assume that this balance to some extent is 
reproduced in their practices when working in and with governance institutions. The 
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informal regional regime collaboration is not an institution that can do anything it 
possibly wanted to do. It can only act in a meaningful way within the boundaries of 
what is defined as purposeful for the region, that this is defined relatively broad is here a 
separate issue. However, my point is that I believe there is a sincere awareness towards 
being loyal in not saying or acting in such a way that the legality as well as the 
legitimacy of this work can be questioned. Because these are not dishonest, but 
politically engaged and visionary people that act in accordance with what they believe is 
in the best interest of the region. Many of them use much of both their free-time and 
ordinary work-hours working to realise successful regional development processes, 
something I doubt they would do if they were not sincere in their commitments.  
The question concerning society as a place where actors intentionally seek 
common good solutions, I can follow a long way. However, this idea becomes absurd if 
it is interpreted as being the same as it not existing diverging and conflicting legitimate 
interests in society as well. There are groups of people, organisations, institutions, and 
physical places where people live that are in conflict over the same limited recourses in 
society –not everyone can get everything they want, this is just as true in the field of 
regional development in the Agder region, as it is everywhere else where there is 
shortage of recourses. There are in a sense more ideas and workforces than there are 
available development resources. The question then is how and what principle to use in 
order to distribute these resources in a best possible way also mirrors the interest held 
by the people that actually lives in that region. The perspective held in this thesis is that 
such processes are both better, as in efficient, and more normatively justifiable when 
they are governed by democratic principles rather when they are governed through 
regime-steering practices. I believe society to be an arena where actors intentionally 
seek common good solutions. However, actors also need institutional frameworks that 
are supportive of such intentions, for such common good solutions to be realised. 
Regional development resources are limited so divergent and conflicting interest must 
be mediated, and the regional regime is such an interest mediating system, democracy is 
another. 
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Power and the Meta Governance Steering Paradox 
The regime/meta governance steering paradox was that if the development discourse is 
too hegemonic, one risks blocking new thoughts and loose development opportunities, 
and on the other hand, if it is too much conflict one risks undermining network 
negotiations. 
Within the instrumental perspective, we had a behavioural conceptualisation of 
power, the consequence of this was that power only could be observed where there was 
an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, interpreted as expressed policy 
preferences. Successful meta steering is dependent upon avoiding the exercise of this 
type of power. This is because the regime/meta governance steering paradox only can 
be “solved” indirectly, through the organisation of self-organisation. If actors are 
viewed as autonomous then it will also be a goal to increase actor’s dependences on 
each other. 
The institutional perspective had a slightly more “advanced” perspective on 
power and the execution of power. Through institutional design governance network 
can in this perspective be steered for instance through setting up institutions with 
specific purposes and orientations, and through allocating specific recourses and people 
to development initiatives that represents the sought after development paths. 
Influencing the institutional rules and norms in the network, produce specific forms of 
knowledge, tell stories of “best practice”, create symbols and rituals, and systematically 
work with attitudes towards more democratic practices are all examples of how the 
regime/meta governance steering paradox is addressed in this perspective.  
 Within the ideological perspective, power is exercised when there is general 
consent to a discursively constructed narrative. Regime steering is in this perceptive 
steering at a distance, and includes in addition to manipulation of the institutional 
framework, setting the ideological, and normative premises of development. The 
regime/meta governance steering paradox is in this perspective effectively solved 
through the regimes ability to mobilise actor’s energies and capabilities within a 
discursively constructed framework. If actors do not oppose this framework, the system 
will work. 
The exertion of the power in the “one-dimensional” view is, as far as I know, 
relatively uncommon in the workings of governance systems in the Agder region. The 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 362 - 
events relating to the conflict in the Value Creation 2010 project represent a maybe rare 
exception to this picture, and in this case “outside” involvement was not known until 
several years after the event in question. There are good reasons for why the exertion of 
this type of direct power is uncommon. First, it is a fact that there exists very little 
formal decision-making power within the system. Therefore, even if one wanted to it 
would be extremely difficult to sustain such use of power. Second, the use of such 
power tends to call attention to it self, and it is very easy to document and consequently 
also to criticize. Third, if such uses of power become common one would risk that 
network negotiations broke down, and one would have failed to address the regime 
steering paradox, where the single most crucial element is to preserve the impression of 
network and development autonomy in order to realise the creativity and capabilities of 
those who participates. 
The exertion of the “second-dimension” of power is as shown in chapter 6 more 
common. The “physical” set up and “staffing” of the institutions in governance system 
in the Agder region can be viewed as an example of the exertion of this type of power. 
In addition those development ideas and initiatives that did not make it into the regional 
policy agenda are in this perspective also organised out of the decision making process, 
they have become non-decisions. 
However, it is the exertion of the “third-dimension” of power that is most 
ingenious and sophisticated, in the sense that, it is the exertion of this power that has 
enabled the regional regime to facilitate its solution to the meta governance steering 
paradox. The challenge was how to coordinate and steer practice that involved many 
people, with different interests, originating from many different organisations, of which 
one had very little formal decision-making power, and such steering had to be done 
without direct involvement and instructional authority, and in a specific and wanted 
direction.  
Whether all of the initiatives and steering efforts that have gone into realising 
these regional ambitions have been deliberate or directly planned or not I do not know 
the answer to, probably much is done intuitively and ad-hoc. Nevertheless, looking at 
the system now, a few years later, and “from the outside”, you cannot avoid being 
impressed of the sophistication, and that it actually was possible to realise it, and almost 
without any public debate about the issue.  
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Summary of Discussions  
The instrumental perspective represented the architectural approach to governance and 
the belief that regional governance systems can be instrumentally designed to solve 
specific societal problems. The institutional perspective was the critique of the 
instrumental perspective, emphasising normative, cultural components of institutional 
design, but also expressing a belief in normative values of democracy and the 
governance systems’ potential in addressing democratic deficits and development 
challenges. Last, the ideological perspective was clear in its focus on governance 
systems and its institutions as power structures that exert specific views and ideas about 
society. The table below summarise the findings from the discussions so far: 
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Tab. 7-1: Summary of Perspective Discussions (I) 
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Tab. 7-2: Summary of Perspective Discussions (II) 
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Based on these discussions we can approach the second research question directly, 
but before I do, we should “revisit” the table from chapter 3 depicting what the central 
features of governance networks are. 
Tab. 7-3: Features of Governance Networks –Revisited 
Governance networks are: Description: 
Institutions  Governance networks represent relatively stable and institutionalised social interaction, governed by and understanding of shared cause.  
Self organised 
 Governance networks are seldom spontaneous and self-organised as they 
are deliberately set up to in order to realise certain development aims. The 
network participants themselves seldom directly decide upon whom it is that 
can participate and who cannot. 
Loosely coupled 
 The actors in a governance network are not formally linked hierarchically, but 
this do not mean that they are on the same footing. Governance networks 
are deliberately steered and controlled through informal and tacit means. 
Inter-organisational  In the Agder region it is organisational membership and representation that is the key to participation. 
Based on negotiations 
 Voting procedures occurring in governance network I do not know of any 
examples of. The strong emphasis on consensus, makes room for very little 
critical debate and disagreements. Few actors are willing or able to challenge 
dominant views on regional development. 
Based on trust  
 Trust is not evenly distributed within the system. Some people have a close 
and trusting relationship. However, there exist also clear conceptions of 
whom not to trust. Trust is not a central explanatory component of, or 
something that binds the governance system together. 
 
The second research question was: What are the central characteristics of the 
regional regime and governance system in the Agder region? Given that the regional 
regime in the Agder region is primarily oriented towards regional development 
activities, and that these developments are meta governed by a strong predisposition 
towards the implications of the “new-economy”. Based on this I find reason to 
characterise the regional regime and the governance system in the Agder region in the 
following way: Agder has a ‘New-Economy Development Regime’ (NED Regime), 
where policies and concrete development efforts are rationalised, justified, and 
legitimized by the regional development concepts –the new regional narratives. The 
regional governance system is a hierarchical steering structure; it is not based on or 
dependent upon trust to be present, but it is dependent upon consensus. 
Few of the participants in the regional governance system are able to challenge the 
dominant views on regional development, and if they did, they would relatively quickly 
risk finding themselves to be excluded from further participation. At current stage the 
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governance system in the Agder region is starting to mature, to find its form. Put 
another way, the regional governance system in the Agder region is well advanced on 
the process of being institutionalised into a natural and necessary component of the 
regional political steering and development system in the region. 
To the extent that regional governance practices increasingly is becoming present 
in regions, regional governance also represents something new in the sense that they 
represent both new possibilities for action and collaboration, and new in the sense that 
they represent new possibilities and problems for democracy. Regional governance 
processes aimed at exercising agenda setting, development processes, and concrete 
implementations by necessity possess considerable power and influence on society. If 
they did not would regional governance institutions simply be unable to act. The change 
and influence emerging governance and regime processes have on politico economical 
steering of regions necessarily also represents consequences for the exercise of 
democratic steering and practice. This is also the kernel of the main research question of 
this thesis. Therefore is the last component needed to address the main research question 
is to attend to the topic of democracy directly in relation to emerging governance and 
regime practices. In the following is therefore the third and last subsidiary research 
question of this thesis addressed. 
7.5 – Democracy 
We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive class, that class will 
knowingly and deliberately sacrifice the other classes to themselves; it suffices that, in the 
absence of its natural defenders, the interests of the excluded is always in danger of being 
overlooked, and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the 
persons whom it directly concerns2.  
–John Stuart Mill 
Introduction 
At the end of chapter 6, I gave a brief recapitulation of a public debate concerning 
regional governance in the Agder region. In retrospect, it is apparent that the debate that 
was represented here produced three major outcomes. Firstly, it produced a lot of anger 
among those who felt hit directly or indirectly by the criticisms presented in the 
newspaper. Most of them probably felt that the criticisms were unjust and inaccurate3. 
This is understandable, because as discussed here, most of those that are involved in 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 368 - 
such practices act out of what I understand to be a genuine political engagement and 
commitment to the development of the region. A political commitment that is both time 
and resource consuming, in addition, they were not engaged in illegal activities of any 
kind. On the contrary were they realising what many other regions where doing at same 
time in a similar fashion, and they was also acting according to what was the guidelines 
given by the national government on regional development. These activities were in this 
perspective both legal and legitimate. It is therefore very understandable that many of 
the involved actors meant that the criticisms were unreasonable.  
Secondly, did the newspaper debate lead to some minor institutional changes in 
the region, for instance did politicians withdrew from direct participation in Sydspissen.  
Thirdly, from now on regional stakeholders realised that they had to be 
painstakingly prudent in maintaining on every occasion possible that they were not 
involved in politics4. What has not yielded from the debate is also significant, for 
instance has… 
…it not been given satisfactory explanations into exactly how democracy is challenged 
by the emergence of governance networks.  
…few if any challenged the presumption that these structures so undisputedly are 
necessary in order to realise regional development aims.  
…no one given a proper answer the fundamental point articulated by the Save the 
Children representative in Agder, Inger Tonstad, who initiated the regional debate in the 
first place, that these governance structures represent specific interests, and when they get 
to dominate they take attention and resources away from other legitimate societal 
interests.  
…no one answered how the relationship between market interests and politics is attended 
to when the open interaction, like in for instance through Sydspissen not longer is an 
option. 
…no one answered what the relationship between democracy and development exactly is 
and should be. 
I believe these are all important unanswered questions that deserve attention and 
that they should consequently be dealt with systematically. What we also can deduce 
from the 2003 newspaper debate in Fædrelandsvennen is the articulation of it somehow 
exist a conflict between democracy and “getting something done”, and that we 
consequently must be willing to “sacrifice” some small bits and pieces of democracy in 
order for the region to be competitive. Therefore are all of these questions important and 
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urgent to address. To fully address and give satisfactory answers to them all exceeds the 
ambitions of this thesis work. The last part of this thesis can however be viewed as an 
attempt to start to give some initial perspective onto these important questions. 
A Democratic Benchmark of Regional Governance 
Based on this I continue with a discussion of the third and last subsidiary research 
question that is: What democratic values can justify some of the significant regional 
governance issues discussed? It is not possible within the framework of this thesis to 
discuss all relevant aspects of the events and issues discussed in this thesis against 
democracy. In the following are therefore the discussion limited to five issues and 
events introduced in chapters 5 and 6 discussed against the three conceptualisations of 
democracy that were introduced in chapter 3. The five issues and events are first the 
sales process associated with Agder Energi, second the conflict in the Value Creation 
2010 project, third the regional policy agenda, fourth the institutional setup of 
governance networks, and fifth the regional regime.  
There are many more elements than those discussed here that deserves discussion 
and analysis, however I have chosen to focus on a few elements believed to be useful 
both in illuminating the differences between the three theories of democracy and 
simultaneously contribute to analysis of practice. As shown in chapter 3, must, for a 
system to even be considered as democratic, at a minimum, satisfy the criteria of 
minimalist competitive democracy. As we have seen do the other conceptualisations of 
democracy put more stringent demands on what it is that qualifies democracy, and the 
strictest criteria are those put forth through procedural democracy. I have chosen to limit 
the discussions of procedural democracy when data not satisfy the minimum standard of 
approaching procedural democracy in a narrow sense (see chapter 3). In those instances 
when ‘voting equality’ and/or ‘effective participation’ is missing, are not other 
approximations of procedural democracy reachable. When this obviously is the case, I 
do not conduct any further detailed discussions and analysis of this.  
The sales of Agder Energi shares discussed in chapter 6, under the ‘financing 
governance subchapter’ were as a process that was concluded by majority vote in 
Kristiansand City Council. It has also here been provided arguments and examples of 
that this process seems steered and controlled in ways that des not satisfy the rights of 
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what came to constitute the minority, in that relevant information was withheld, 
distorted, and often biased, see for instance discussions of the role of AAGCF and the 
regional newspaper. The orchestration of the sales process itself was also blameworthy, 
in that the elected officials in Kristiansand City Council were too little involved and had 
too little influence on the sales process, see for instance timing of the strategy 
discussions and the general discussions of the process in Kristiansand municipality in 
relation to this. The sales process seems neither to have related to public opinion, public 
opinion that always has been very critical towards selling energy shares. The sales 
process it self has the hallmarks of being planned a long time ahead, see for instance 
discussions of the regional policy agenda in relation to this.  
If we were to discuss the sales process against a theory of participatory democracy 
what then is important is to what extent it involved participants affected by the potential 
outcomes were involved in the discussion to sell. We have seen here that the strategy 
committee/reference group (see chapter 6) was relatively broadly composed, in that both 
politicians, administrators from Kristiansand municipality, and management, board 
representatives, and employee representatives from Kristiansand Energiverk (KEV) 
were represented in this forum. This was a temporarily organisation that in itself 
addresses a participatory democratic understanding. However, given that the sales of 
Agder Energi came to involve and have consequences that were much wider than “just” 
involving this group, and those that these represented. This group was therefore not 
“broad” enough in its composition to sufficiently satisfy the demands put forth by a 
participatory theory of democracy. That involvement, of what came to constitute the 
minority in Kristiansand City Council, that the minority was so little directly involved, 
and that the decision was forced through by majority vote, is also in violation against 
the principles of participatory democracy. 
Assessing the sales process in terms of a competitive theory of democracy is 
relatively straightforward. The decision to sell is in accordance with a competitive 
theory of democracy. That the minority and its views more or less were ignored is also 
in accordance with this theory of democracy. It is not “undemocratic” that a majority 
uses its legal right to make majority decisions in this perspective; it is a sign of effective 
steering. 
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Assessing the sales process according to procedural democracy is also relatively 
straightforward. All of the criterions set forth in procedural democracy were also 
undisputedly and systematically broken.  
The conflict in the Value Creation 2010 project in the Agder region is, as 
discussed in chapter 5 and 7, an example of a conflict that was manifested because of 
conflict of interest and perspective, and triggered by external intervention. The 
existence of the conflict is in itself not in violation of a theory of participatory 
democracy, neither is its outcome. What is of interest here is what was done in order to 
resolve it. If the processes surrounding the build up to the conflict and attempts to 
resolve it had been opened up and involved for instance the whole Value Creation 
Alliance, and not just the working committee. If CDFSN, industry representatives, the 
researchers, management at Agder Research, etc. all had been directly involved in 
discussions surrounding the nature of the conflict and what could be done in order to 
resolve it, if they all had put forth their views in an open forum. Then could both the 
conflict and the outcome be legitimate in terms of a participatory theory of democracy. 
That this also probably would have resulted in that the conflict could have been avoided 
is also a relevant and interesting consideration here. However, as events played out the 
conflict is in violation of the principles of participatory democracy.  
A theory of competitive democracy cannot inform this conflict. The conflict itself 
is not in violation of the principles of competitive democracy.  
As for the participatory theory of democracy is the presence of a conflict in itself 
not in violation of procedural democracy. In addition, what is of interest is how the 
conflict situation is handled. Also in this instance are all of the criteria set forth in 
procedural democracy broken. For instance in that not all directly affected become 
directly involved in attempts to resolve the conflict. 
In chapter 6 and 7, I discussed the regional policy agenda and its role and function 
in the region. This agenda was formalised in three separate documents, which were 
relatively similar. Representative institutions sanctioned two of these documents. A 
group of unelected people did the construction of these documents and this group was 
not broadly composed.  
The existence of a regional policy agenda is in it self not in violation of a theory 
of participatory democracy. The central questions here are how the process of 
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constructing these documents was organised. Was for instance everyone affected by the 
policy content of these documents involved in some way or another. As this clearly is 
not the case in relation to the construction of the regional policy agenda in the Agder 
region, it is also in violation of a theory of participatory democracy. 
If we view the issue of the regional policy agenda in light of a theory of 
competitive democracy, is the central question what the role of representative 
democracy is in relation to these documents. As two of these documents are sanctioned 
by majority vote in representative institutions, and political leaders indirectly supports 
the third document both through fund allocations and through direct participations. 
Therefore is the conclusion that the construction of a regional policy agenda in 
accordance with a theory of competitive democracy. That the documents in it self were 
not developed in representative institutions or by elected officials is of no concern to 
this. 
If we shall interpret the regional policy agenda through the glasses of procedural 
democracy, we should ask whether the demos’ interest and opinion given equal 
attention, whether the demos had adequate and equal opportunity and possibility to 
discover what their interest were to the subjects in question, and whether those 
concerned with the outcomes were involved etc. As this is not the case, it is also in this 
instance, a question of whether not all of the criteria set forth in procedural democracy 
are broken.  
The intuitional set up of governance system in the Agder region is in particular 
discussed in chapter 6 and in this chapter. The goals set forth in these network 
institutions are predominantly to promote regional growth, innovation, and 
development.  
That many of these network structures are consensus driven do in itself lay the 
ground for processes that are in accordance with principles set forth in a participatory 
theory of democracy. More arenas do in it self represent more arenas and more 
possibilities for democratic participation. The perspective held in this theory is in a 
sense –the more arenas the better. The existence of many arenas with the possibility for 
democratic participation is in itself in accordance with a theory of participatory 
democracy. 
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Regional governance networks are also in accordance with a theory of competitive 
democracy, as long as and only if, they are approved by and sanctioned by 
representative institutions. As this is the case for the majority of networks in the Agder 
region, must also governance be in accordance with a theory of competitive democracy.  
If we look at the institutional set up of governance networks in the Agder region 
and compare it to the theory of procedural democracy, we should observe the following. 
If we start with inclusiveness, does this criterion say that demos must include all adult 
members of the association except transients affected by binding decisions. In chapter 7 
we saw that one of the arguments that where put forth in order to limit participation in 
governance networks was that this association only was concerned with industrial 
development in an regional context and not broad social development, and that 
limitations on the demos therefore were justified. Here I also provided arguments that 
repudiated such views. Given the validity of this repudiation, this implies that the 
regional governance system as it functions today does not meet the inclusiveness 
criterion. Thus, regional governance does not meet the full standard of approximating 
procedural democracy.  
The third criterion of procedural democracy was enlightened understanding. 
Simplified this criterion says that each citizen should have equal access to information, 
adequate and equal opportunity for discovering what his or her preferences are on the 
matter to be decided. Thus, alternative procedures for making decisions ought to be 
evaluated according to the opportunities they furnish citizens for acquiring an 
understanding of means and ends. Since participation in regional governance is skewed, 
it is also reasonable to assume that access to relevant information is skewed, and 
therefore the basis of making informed decisions is also skewed in the demos. 
Therefore, regional governance does not meet the enlightened understanding criterion 
either. Thus, regional governance neither meets the standard of approximating full 
procedural democracy with respect to an agenda and in relation to demos. 
The fourth criterion of procedural democracy was final control of the agenda. 
This criterion says that the demos must have the exclusive opportunity to make 
decisions that determine what matters are and are not to be decided by means of 
procedural democracy. If we compare this criterion to how the regional policy agenda 
was set up, developed, and exercised in the Agder region, (see discussion in chapter 6), 
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then it seems clear that neither this criterion qualifies to the standards of procedural 
democracy. Thus, regional governance neither meets the standard of approximating full 
procedural democracy in relation to a demos.  
The second criterion of procedural democracy was effective participation. This 
criterion says that the citizens must have an adequate and equal opportunity, for 
expressing his or her preferences as to the outcome. This means that citizens must have 
an equal opportunity for placing questions on the agenda, and for expressing reasons for 
endorsing one outcome rather than another. Since participation is limited and 
information is unevenly distributed in the regional governance system it is difficult to 
argue other than that neither this criterion of procedural democracy is met.  
The first criterion of procedural democracy was voting equality. This criterion 
says that in order to make binding decisions the decisive stage must be taken into 
account and equally into account, the expressed preferences of each member of the 
demos as to the outcome. In an agenda driven and consensus oriented system as the 
regional governance system, it is difficult to argue that different interests are equally 
looked after. It is therefore difficult to conclude otherwise than that neither this criterion 
is met, thus, regional governance neither meets the standard of approximating 
procedural democracy in a narrow sense.  
The last issue discussed in relation to democratic theory is the presence of a 
regional meta governance steering body, conceptualised as a regional regime. 
The presence of a regional meta steering institution is in it self not in violation of 
a participatory theory of democracy, if it is broadly viewed as necessary in order to 
achieve efficiency. However, a theory of participatory democracy would put relatively 
strict demands on how such an institution should be organised and what role it should 
have in relation to regional development. At a minimum should such a structure, if it 
was viewed as necessary, be open and transparent, its operating rules should be known, 
and it should be possible for everyone affected to join. As this clearly is not the case 
here, the existence of a regional regime is in violation of a theory of participatory 
democracy.  
The presence of a regional regime is also in accordance with the principles of 
competitive democracy. However, this is only the case if the regime is instructed by and 
act in accordance with instructions given by majority leaders in representative 
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democracy. As this thesis concludes that this is not the case in the Agder region, the 
existence of a regional regime is also in violation of the principles set forth in the theory 
of competitive democracy. 
The existence of a regional regime is also in clear violation of all of the principles 
set forth in procedural democracy. These findings are summarised in the table below. 
Tab. 7-4: Summary of Benchmark 
 Participatory Democracy (PAD) Competitive Democracy (CD) Procedural Democracy (PD) 
The sale of 
Agder 
Energi 
In violation of:  
As the decisions to sell was made 
by majority vote, and not involved 
all concerned, is the sales 
process in violation of a theory of 
PAD. 
In accordance: 
Decision to sell made through 
majority vote is in accordance with a 
theory of CD.  
In violation of : 
As all the criterions of PD 
clearly are broken is the sales 
process itself in violation of PD.  
The conflict 
in the Value 
Creation 
2010 project 
In violation of:  
The fact that a conflict of interests 
occurs is in itself not in violation 
of PAD. What is of interest is how 
conflicts are attempted resolved. 
A broad, open, and inclusive 
process where every interest 
surrounding the conflict is 
adequately and equally heard is a 
minimum requirement. This was 
not the case and the conflict is 
therefore in violation of PAD. 
 
Indifferent:  
The conflict as it unfolded itself is 
not in violation of principles in CD. 
The theory itself does not provide 
grounds for assessing one-way or 
the other. 
In violation of:  
Conflicts of interests are in it 
self not in violation of PD. The 
central question is how such 
conflicts are mediated. As all 
the criterions of PD clearly are 
broken is the conflict in violation 
of the principles set forth in PD. 
The regional 
policy 
agenda 
In violation of:  
The presence of a regional policy 
agenda is in it self not in violation 
of a theory of PAD. However, this 
presupposes that the 
development of the regional 
policy agenda is done through 
participatory processes. This was 
not the case here. It is therefore 
in violation of a theory of PAD. 
 
In accordance:  
As long as the regional policy 
agenda is anchored in 
representative institutions, or 
indirectly approved by the majority 
of elected official is this not in 
violation of a theory of CD. That the 
regional policy agenda itself is not 
developed in the political system is 
of no concern here. 
In violation of:  
The presence of a regional 
policy agenda is in itself not in 
violation of a theory of PD. 
However, this agenda must be 
developed on PD principles if it 
should be in accordance with 
PD. All of the criterions of PD 
are broken also in this case. 
Institutional 
setup of 
governance 
networks  
In accordance:  
In itself, is the set up of many 
arenas for development dialogue 
and participation, through 
temporary organisations, 
networks, development coalitions, 
partnerships, etc. in accordance 
with a theory of PAD. More 
arenas mean more possibility for 
democratic participation. 
In accordance:  
As long as it is anchored in 
representative institutions, or 
sanctioned by elected official is this 
not in violation of a theory of 
competitive democracy. As the 
institutional governance landscape 
largely is financed by public 
resources, and thus sanctioned in 
representative institutions is this in 
accordance with a theory of CD. 
 
In violation of:  
The set up of arenas for 
democratic participation 
represents a potential for 
democratic change and 
participation of the demos. 
However to the extent that such 
institutions are meta steered 
they are in violation of PD. 
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 Participatory Democracy (PAD) Competitive Democracy (CD) Procedural Democracy (PD) 
The regional 
regime 
In violation of:  
The existence of regional meta 
steering institutions as far as they 
are necessary to achieve 
efficiency is not per definition in 
violation of PAD. However, this 
requires at a minimum that such 
structures are open and 
transparent, that membership 
rules are known and that it in 
theory is possible for everyone to 
join. This is not the case here so 
this is also in violation of PAD. 
In violation of:  
The presence of a regional regime 
is only in accordance with the 
principle of CD, if the regime is 
instructed by, or is a part of the 
steering apparatus of representative 
democracy. As this thesis concludes 
that this is not the case the 
presence of a regional regime is in 
violation of a theory of CD. 
In violation of:  
The existence of regional meta 
steering institutions are in 
violation of all the principles of 
PD. 
 
 
The third subsidiary research question which was: What democratic values can 
justify some of the significant regional governance issues discussed? Discussions in this 
chapter have shown some of the complexity surrounding the concept of democracy. We 
have also seen that an answer to the third research question is that: Regional governance 
is best legitimated in terms of democracy if we choose the minimalist standard and 
value of democracy.  
If competitive democracy is the value and standard of which new regions shall be 
built can also almost all of the issues and events discussed in this thesis, with exception 
of the regional regime, be defended using arguments relating to democracy. However, 
we have also seen that the moment we raise above the minimalist standard, and apply a 
broader understanding of democracy, when we view democracy as something more than 
simply a method for achieving effective steering, then do many of the events and issues 
discussed in this thesis become much more problematic seen from a democratic 
perspective. This also is the basis for my conclusion that regime/meta steered regional 
governance networks not are making a positive contribution to a more democratic 
society. The main reason for why this is so is that the regional governance system, with 
its current configuration, is unable to address the plurality of interest in society. This is 
schematically outlined with the figure below: 
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Fig. 7-3: The Networked Region —Depiction of Some System Features 
The plural regional civil society
- exclusive of business/ market interests
Representative Democracy 
- Anchors policy agendas in 
representative bodies
Regionally located corporations/ 
market interests
- Executes processes
Networks, partnerships, co-operative 
institutions etc.
- Executes processes
Consistent 
with…Interests
REGIONAL REGIME
Sets the Policy Agenda
Reflecting 
pluralism of 
civil society
Consistent 
with…
Elections
Development 
results 
-Institutional
- Lobbyism 
Direction of authority / influence
Broken / no link
Feedback / quality check
Legend:
Market steered 
development
Consistent 
with…
 
 
The figure schematically illustrates the relationship between the regional regime, 
the governance system, civil society, the regional industry, and the interests articulated 
in the system. The figure should be compared with the similar figure presented in 
chapter 3 under the subchapter ‘Democracy’. The version that where presented there 
aimed at illustrating what a e major difference is that this version not addresses 
democracy and plurality of interest in development. 
7.6 – Summary 
Werner Fricke and Peter Totterdill’s Action research in workplace innovation and 
regional development (Fricke & Totterdill 2004) reveals shared and similar perspectives 
as them presented here on the challenges regions are facing. They also largely share a 
similar perspective on what the driving forces behind these challenges are. The 
globalisation of markets, the increasing willingness of some social democratic parties to 
embrace market driven approaches, the erosion of public services etc. (Fricke & 
Totterdill 2004: 1). They also share perspectives presented here on how these challenges 
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could and should be adhered to, sustainability in an uncertain environment has to be 
based on collective and cumulative learning. Traditional rules of public and corporate 
governance based on assumptions of predictability and instrumental rationality have 
been fatally challenged (Fricke & Totterdill 2004: 2). They therefore salute the trend 
within action research, starting in the early 1990s, to move away from only doing 
research on single cases or single organizations, to now also focusing on and doing 
research on regional development processes (Gustavsen 2003; Fricke & Totterdill 
2004).  
What we have seen in this thesis is that “just” introducing industrial democracy 
into the regional governance arena did little to address the underlying challenges 
relating to regional learning, democracy, and consequently regional development itself. 
The problem is that we do not have a theory on how to facilitate local learning when it 
contradicts the systemic power embedded in the region (Stone 1989). This implies that 
our perspective, viewed through the glasses of regime theory, is flawed, because only 
developmental efforts that are in line with or reinforces dominating views are likely to 
succeed. To paraphrase Stone, local stakeholders must be expected to utilize their pre-
emptive power if they sense that their position or interest is not best served. This also 
implies that the dynamic, innovative capacity or learning potential of a given region is 
not as large as one could be lead to think if we take the “birds-eye” perspective on 
regional development. 
There is however no question about the potential for democratic change still being 
present. Given that the public itself finance the clear majority of the work that is done 
within regional governance networks, there is really no room for arguing that these 
institutions in a democratic society not also should be governed by democratic 
principles. In reality it is so easy as if public funding were cut “today” governance 
would cease to exist “tomorrow”. Given this simple insight, do representative 
democracy still possesses the theoretical capability of taking control of and to include 
regional governance back into democratic society. 
Both democracy and regimes are oriented towards the same aim –to mediate 
diverging and conflicting interests. How the regime approaches the problem of 
addressing the problem of diverging and conflicting interest at the same time as regional 
development is secured has now been discussed, the question then is: what it is that 
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constitutes the democratic alternative to development based on regime meta steering? 
This is a question that not is directly answered in this thesis but that I still believe is an 
important question if we seek to challenge and change current practices, for the reason 
that the potential for change most of all lies in that democracy is the Achilles heel of 
regime steered governance networks. Because why cannot, and should not you and I as 
members of democratic society be allowed to participate and directly influence the 
development of the place where we live? In the next and last chapter of this thesis, we 
conclude the discussions trough addressing the main research question and summarising 
some of the consequences of applying to minimalist standards of democracy have had 
for regional development in the Agder region. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 A systematic analysis of such communication patterns, using social network analysis, was 
planned but not commenced as part of this thesis work, see also notes chapter 4, and 
recommendations for further research in chapter 8. 
2 Referred in (Dahl 1986b: 219) 
3 I know this through discussions with many of the involved parties. 
4 This point of not being part of politics has almost become a ritual; at one stage following the 
debate did someone at almost every meeting in the Value Creation Alliance mention it.  
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Chapter 8 – Democracy in Development  
The question of leadership has always been difficult to advocates of democracy, and not 
least for its theorists. To portray a democratic order without leaders is a conspicuous 
distortion of all historical experience; but to put them into the picture is even more 
troublesome. Whether by definition, by implication, or simply as a fact, leaders, as 
individuals, exercise more direct influence on many decisions than ordinary individual 
citizens. Thus the superior influence of leaders violates strict criteria for political 
equality. […] Because leadership is a general problem of democratic theory and practice 
we should neither expect nor require self-governing enterprises to solve it better, either in 
theory or in practice, than other kinds of democratic organizations, including local and 
national governments. Although some writers have tried to justify workplace democracy 
on the ground that it will be more participatory, more egalitarian, and generally more 
democratic than the democratic process applied to the state has so far proved to be, the 
justification given in this book does not hinge upon such a claim. For my argument is that 
self-government in work need not be justified entirely by its consequences, for, as in the 
state it is justified as a matter of right. And just as the imperfections of the democratic 
process in the government of the state do not justify abandoning democracy in favour of 
guardianship, so its imperfections in economic enterprises would not justify our 
accepting guardianship as better in the government of economic enterprises.  
– Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985: 152-3). 
8.1 – Introduction 
Dahl’s argument, quoted above, is easily and logically transferable from the context of 
the economic enterprise to the context of the region. In fact, one could argue that Dahl 
would have an easier task of arguing the validity of his claims in these contexts. 
Because he could then side-step the issue of property rights altogether. Dahl’s argument 
should be listened to, because what he says is that democracy need not be justified in 
terms of its consequences, it is justified as a matter of right.  
In previous chapters we have seen examples of that the new regional narrative has 
not lived up to its promises, the change paradigm has failed to address both emerging 
development challenges based on the concrete demands and needs posed by current and 
existing regional ‘realities’. In stead, one has found comfort and inspiration in 
transformational ideas that is rooted in contexts that are significantly different from the 
context it is meant to work and operate. The results produced by the current 
development system are more a result of creativity and local adaptations conducted by 
people directly involved, than a result of ‘visionary’ long term planning and agenda 
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setting. Regional meta steering bodies, “the regional guardianship”, as it now is 
structured fails to address the needs of the region, and it is not a fair system. In addition, 
the new regional narrative has failed to address, to find a solution to the challenges and 
problems its introduction poses to democracy. That a system is neither particularly 
effective nor particularly democratic is, in effect, an undisputable call for re-thinking 
and system redesign. 
8.2 – The Main Question 
The paramount research question of this work is: Why is democracy disappearing from 
regional development? Throughout this thesis, we have seen that there is one 
perspective on regional development that is dominant of others. This mechanism is well 
known and understood in the relevant literature. The state-market divide does, as it 
emphasised by the pluralists (Dahl 1961; Lindblom 1977; Dahl 1979; 1982) and within 
urban regime theory (Elkin 1987; Stone 1989), set the stage for regional stakeholders, 
politicians and administrators to give power to market interests over other societal or 
group interests. This would be the case in any capitalist system supported by democratic 
institutions. Politicians can only limitedly control or steer business priority setting at the 
same time, as they are dependent upon decisions from such settings.  
However, what we have seen in this thesis is that in the regional governance 
system not so much is a question of the market ‘finding’ the political level, and the 
political level ‘finding’ the market, but that a new and influential sphere of society has 
gained more influence through recent ‘regionalisation’ processes. We have seen that this 
system independently of the existing industries, and the pluralism of interest in society, 
has developed a significant capability of developing influential policies and agendas. 
This system of regional governance had to, to justify its existence, produce policies, be 
visionary, and show that it contributed in the best interest of everyone. In the process of 
doing so, it also wanted to show the supremacy of this system compared to 
representative democracy, it wanted to be more effective. Therefore does the regional 
governance system represent the effective short cut with respect to the development of 
regional policies, design of institutions, and steering of regional processes, and not the 
democratic and efficient path to development.  
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The meta governance steering paradox had to components effectiveness and 
efficacy. If the development discourses is too hegemonic there is a risk of blocking new 
thoughts and lose development opportunities – one looses on efficacy. On the other 
hand, if there is it too much conflict there is a risk of undermining network negotiations 
– one looses on effectiveness. We have seen the argument presented in this thesis that 
the regime/meta governance steering paradox in the Agder region has been addressed in 
terms of effectiveness and not efficacy. The meta governance steering paradox therefore 
remains to be solved. This also represents an answer to the main research question of 
this thesis, which is that: Democracy is disappearing from regional development 
because regional governance gives priority to effectiveness over efficacy. 
When the basic requirements set by ‘procedural democracy’1 not only were 
neglected but also systematically undermined, important components were also 
necessary for the establishment of socially robust development processes lost, 
mechanisms that could have provided necessary qualitative checks of development 
relevance and applicability. It is because of this, and that democracy is a right and a 
natural component of modern society, that democracy also is a necessary component of 
regional development. In this is also the recognition that democracy in itself poses a 
powerful alternative to current meta steered practices.  
Much of what is written in this thesis is done with the idea of a region in a 
transitional phase in mind. I have argued that central components in the workings of the 
societal structure of regions are changing. We do not know yet if the system that is 
developed represents a temporary interlude, or something that is here to stay into the 
unforeseeable future. What we do know is that influencing such systems and processes 
as those described here only can be done in ‘real-time’ and in the ‘real-world’. Just 
waiting and seeing what happens, to experience what the long-term consequences really 
are, seems to me a risky strategy. A strategy that seems equally uncertain whether your 
concerns are development or “only” democracy.  
What we do know is that more knowledge is needed in order to address these 
challenges forcefully. Examples of some tentative research strategies are therefore 
briefly outlined in the following. 
Democracy in Development – A Critical View on Regional Governance 
- 384 - 
8.3 – Recommendations for Future Research 
What not has been addressed in this thesis are the concrete intuitional changes needed to 
address the challenges posed by regional governance – the arenas that could facilitate 
democracy in development. Therefore, a central component of the future regional 
research agenda should be oriented towards more concrete, practical and theoretical 
work devoted to the institutional design of democratic regional development processes. 
This thesis has showed that it is a potential for development that is pent-up in current 
practices. The central questions should be concerned towards what we could do in order 
to unleash this potential. The central future research questions thus concerns 
institutional design and facilitation of more democratic regional development processes.  
Theories about governance and practical empirical studies have showed the need 
for some form of meta governance, if such structures shall be a part of how society 
chooses to organise itself. This thesis should be read as an argument in favour of 
making such meta steering processes more transparent, accountable and efficient. We 
should therefore systematically work to find a way that enables us to move from the 
“NED-regime” to the democratic development regime, a “DD-regime”. We should 
therefore also have as a central component of our future research ambitions to readdress 
democratic governance and democratic steering aspects. 
More concrete knowledge about the actual workings of the regional governance 
system is also needed in order to address these important questions. We need more in-
depth and detailed knowledge about how these systems work and operate in order for us 
to change them in wanted and desired democratic directions. Much can be achieved 
through traditional qualitative and quantitative studies and through practical 
engagements with practice through Action Research studies, a fourth approach should 
however also be tried and preferably in blend with other approaches.  
Social network analysis was developed in the 1960s as a quantitative method to 
study social relations. Social Network Analysis combined with software such as 
UCINET provides the user with graphical representations which show how close 
network actors are connected, how central they are, which clusters that are created, and 
how open or closed the networks are. Social network analysis is very useful if we want 
to say something about the structure of a governance network at a macro level (Freeman 
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et al. 1992; Wasserman & Faust 1994; Degenne & Forsé 1999; Monge & Contractor 
2003). I had early on planned to use social network analysis in order to provide this 
thesis with such structural analysis. Constraints on time did however make this a task to 
be done another time. However, as I read up on the literature on social network analysis 
I came to firmly believe that social network analysis is and will be an important 
supplement to other methods if we are occupied with research on regional governance 
and regimes. It is difficult just through using traditional methods of inquiry to trace 
information flow and knowledge generation processes, in systems as complex as 
regional governance networks. If used in this thesis social network analysis would have 
provided us with better documentation of the assumption that the network level has a 
substantial and independent policy making capability. 
In this thesis, I use the word discourse and I write about some discourses 
becoming dominant in relation to regional development policy and practice. The term 
discourse is in this thesis understood in sociological and not linguistic terms. Patsy 
Healy defines the term policy discourse as: “a system of meaning embodied in a 
strategy for action and expressed in concepts, metaphors and a storyline” (Healey 2006: 
277). This thesis does however not constitute a full attempt to perform an analysis of the 
discourse itself – a discourse analysis. Even though many of the elements of what could 
constitute the basis of such an analysis are present in the text. That the discourse 
performs an important influence on societal development is central in one of the 
perspectives discussed in this thesis (the ideological). The claim that the discourse 
performs such a “function” is in a sense preset in this thesis. This means that I assume 
the validity of the claim in the perspective without actually scrutinising or analysing the 
discourse itself.  
If I were to compare my discussions relating to the influence assumed preformed 
by neoliberal ideology, the regional policy agenda, the regional narratives, and the 
regional development concepts in this thesis to a discourse analysis of these phenomena, 
I would see the discussions conducted here most affiliated with empiricist use of the 
discourse concept. Empiricists and positivists argue that discourses are best viewed as 
‘frames’ or ‘cognitive schemata’, by which they mean “the conscious and strategic 
efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 
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1996: 6)2. When a discourse is viewed as frames, discourses become instrumental 
devices that can foster common perceptions and understandings for specific purposes, 
and the task of discourse analysis is in this perspective to measure how effective they 
are in bringing about these ends (Howarth 2000: 3). This understanding of a discourse is 
of the wide variety of different theoretical, epistemological, and ontological approaches 
to discourse, and discourse analysis probably the most common sense and generally 
accessible understanding, and the understanding of a discourse that most resembles 
what I have done in this thesis. This means also that the discussions and topics in this 
thesis are potential subjects of further research that in a better and more sophisticated 
way than done here utilises the potential that discourse analysis represents for 
understanding current practices and changes. Important question such as what the 
boundaries and limits to the discourse are, its non-instrumental functions and effects, 
how and why discourses and society can change if discourses are hegemonic or 
dominant are just some examples of important questions relating to discourse and 
discourse analysis that are not discussed in this thesis.  
My only defence of this, to discourse interested parties, is that context should be 
illuminated and understood before discourse analysis can be forcefully preformed. For 
instance before one could do discourse analysis and find out why e.g. the Apartheid 
regime in South-Africa was able to sustain as a legitimate and legal position among so 
many for so long, one would be required to provide empirical data documenting the 
existence and effects of the regime. The similar case can be that I use much space on 
documenting work-methods, institutional configurations, and practical effects relating to 
regional governance and regime steering, which should support others in their efforts 
for instance relating to scrutinising the discursive and meaning constructing effects of 
this system of governance and development. 
8.4 – Conclusion 
One important question that should be addressed in the end is if the findings in this 
thesis really matter. I have argued, and provided empirical examples to show that many 
of the practices and changes in the Agder region are best defended in terms of 
democracy if we apply to the minimalist standard. However, some could probably 
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argue, even if they were to accept that this regional system of governance and regime 
steering does not address the fullest potential of democracy, that it does not really 
matter. Because, this system does something else, it performs another function that is 
more important. A function that is so important that the future of the region, so to speak, 
depends upon it being preformed. They can argue that the system is effective, and they 
would be right in the sense that this system enables the realisation of predetermined 
goals and strategies in a very effective way. However, there are other standards, and I 
would argue, standards that are more important if the production of socially robust 
knowledge is the goal of regional development, and not the realisation of specific 
predefined goals.  
In chapter 3, I briefly discussed the distinction between effectiveness and 
efficiency, and related them to two different understandings of democracy. I said that 
the effectiveness standard was one of the central aspects of competitive democracy, and 
the realisation of an effective steering system, while I argued that efficiency becomes 
the central standard when more participatory understandings of democracy were 
introduced. The current regional governance system might score relatively high using 
standards relating to effectiveness, but it is not a very efficient system. In this thesis, I 
have provided many examples illustrating this distinction and in the following, I will 
conclude this thesis by summarising some of these.  
The regional policy agenda has been effective in the sense that it has achieved 
many of its predefined aims. The regional development discourse has become oriented 
away from the “old-economy” and is now strongly oriented towards “new-economy” 
industries. The consequence of this has been that much of the regional development 
resources also have been allocated towards these new regional and industrial 
development efforts. One should however question how efficient this strategy has been. 
Vest-Agder County was in 2006 the largest export county of processed products in 
Norway. It is the process industry, metal and metallurgical industries the “old-
industries” in Vest-Agder that have realised this regional excellence. Vest-Agder 
County exported processed products for NOK 28 billion in 2006 and was with this the 
number one county in Norway, the next county on the list, Hordaland, exported 
products valued NOK 18.6 billion in 2006. The average of all counties in Norway is 
NOK 9 billion3. If the regional policy agenda should have been viewed as efficient it 
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should have addressed the competence and restructuring needs of the process industry 
as its prime objective and not regional development as a marketing and/or cultural 
challenge. Instead of just wrongfully anticipating this industry’s disappearance, and thus 
reallocating development resources to other areas of the economy, that had not 
manifested but were believed to be the future, the regional policy agenda should have 
taken on this challenge. If plurality of interests had been addressed, if the development 
of the regional policy agenda had been an open, participatory, transparent, and an 
enlightened process, if the development of the regional policy agenda simply had been a 
more democratic process, I believe it is highly unlikely that such a mistake ever could 
have happened.  
The regional regime was also very effective in that it was able to realise the sale 
of “old-economy” hydro-electrical production facilities, and realise the sales into new 
governance institutions aimed at supporting the creation of new work places, culture, 
and competence. This is effective because the defined aims of just doing this were 
realised. However, as we have seen the strategy and implementation were not very 
efficient. In chapter 6 we saw that the municipality of Kristiansand alone has lost 
between NOK 1.6 and NOK 2.4 billion in real values between 31.12.2002 and 2006, 
and that Cultiva alone represents a loss in real value that is close to NOK 1.1 billion in 
the period. If Kristiansand municipality had used the share dividends from Agder Energi 
directly, they could have used NOK 135 million more on culture purposes in the 2003-
06 period, and that without selling a single share inn Agder Energi. So, also here does 
the central argument of this thesis find support. If the Agder Energi sales process had 
been conducted more democratically, if the process had been transparent and open, if 
plurality of interests had been addressed, then it is also highly unlikely that the process 
would have gotten the outcome that it got, and the citizens in the Agder region would 
not have lost so much resource and development capability.  
One can also view the conflict in the Value Creation 2010 project as effective in 
the sense that it realised the aim of changing the project management. This is also an 
example of an event that was effective but not very efficient, because after the conflict 
the Value Creation 2010 project in Agder project more or less faded away and 
constituted in the end “only” three Ph.D. projects. I cannot “prove”, but I do believe that 
the conflict could have been avoided and that the project could have gotten back on 
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track, if the processes surrounding the events relating to the conflict had adhered to 
democratic practices.  
The larger configuration of governance networks in the Agder region is in many 
ways more faceted than depicted in this thesis. However, I would argue, based on 
findings in this thesis, that the main purpose of the majority of governance networks in 
the region is to realise the regional policy agenda, and that the governance networks, as 
discussed in chapter 6, have been very effective in doing so. In this thesis, I have argued 
that the network level and the regional regime have a significant policy making 
capability, and that this capability is used to develop policies that are believed to 
address coming and future regional development needs and challenges. These networks 
are however not very efficient, at least if the goal is to provide politicians, academic 
institutions, and the industry with relevant information about current development 
needs. Therefore what I argue in this thesis is not that it is to much contact between the 
industry and the politicians, and between the industry and academic institutions, I argue 
the opposite, that it is too little contact. If politicians want to develop regional strategies 
that are relevant for its industry, if academic institutions want to work with the industry 
and support them, and if the industry wants to contribute directly back to society, then 
must the involved actors also talk directly with each other. The current set-up of 
governance networks is predominantly redundant in realising such ambitions, there is no 
need for the industry, politicians and academic institutions to filter their information 
through proxies and network representatives, even though it in many instances probably 
is easier and more convenient to do so. 
The regimes’ solution to the meta governance steering paradox is also effective in 
the sense that it has made it possible to realise many of the defined aims. However, I 
would argue that the solution not is efficient. Effectiveness in realising regional 
development strategies is qualitatively different from efficacy relating to addressing 
actual regional needs and interests and realising the full creative potential of people 
living in that region. It is this last part of the meta governance steering paradox that the 
regional regime so far has been unable to realise, this is because creativity and 
effectiveness, understood as realising predefined goals, in reality are incompatible 
entities.  
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The governing idea behind this research initiative was to make a contribution 
where a discourse on democracy is given renewed relevance onto the regional 
development sphere and discourse. Not only as a value in itself, but to make a 
contribution where democracy in everyday situations gains relevance as potentially 
changing outcomes of developmental processes. In itself, democracy holds the potential 
to support actors in their efforts to generate and execute new development initiatives. 
Initiatives that can break through ideological frameworks, that now restrain actors. The 
rationale behind this is given by how democracy can mediate interests and power, in 
such a way that outcomes not necessarily are given beforehand, but are a result of a 
process where different alternatives are given equal attention and an equal chance to 
sustain. Because; Democracy means that no interest or policy agenda by definition is 
given supremacy. Development means that the region faces up to its challenges. 
Democracy in Development means that the region uses its resources to face up to the 
right challenges.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 See discussions in chapter 3 under the ‘A Unifying Position?’ subchapter. 
2 Referred in Howarth (2000: 3) 
3 Source: http://www.ssb.no/emner/09/05/muh/tab20-01.shtml using Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC). 
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List of Chairmen (1976-2006) 
Tab. A- 1: Aust-Agder County Mayors 1976-2006 
Name Party Period Years in Office 
Kristian Sundtoft H (The Conservative Party of Norway) 1976 – 1983 8 
Erik Mørch H (The Conservative Party of Norway) 1983 – 1995 12 
Jon Fløistad Sp (The Centre Party)1 1995 – 1999 4 
Oddvar Skaiaa KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 1999 –  7 
 
Tab. A- 2: Vest-Agder County Mayors 1976-2006 
Name Party Period Years in Office 
Torvald Kvinlaug KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 1976 – 1979 4 
Niels-Otto Hægeland KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 1979 – 1987 8 
Ludvig Hope Faye H (The Conservative Party of Norway) 1987 – 1995 8 
Kjell Svindland KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 1995 – 1999 4 
Thore Westermoen KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 1999 –  7 
 
Tab. A- 3: Kristiansand Municipality Mayors 1976-2006 
Name Party Period Years in Office 
Harald Synnes KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 1976 – 1978 3 
Paul Otto Johnsen H (The Conservative Party of Norway) 1978 – 1991 13 
Bjørg Wallevik H (The Conservative Party of Norway) 1991 – 2003 12 
Jan Oddvar Skisland KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 2003 –  3 
 
Tab. A- 4: Arendal Municipality Mayors 1976-2006 
Name Party Period Years in Office 
Ørnulf G. Christensen H (The Conservative Party of Norway) 1972 – 1987 (16) 12 
Ivar Bollmann Pedersen DNA (The Norwegian Labour Party) 1987 – 1991 4 
Einar Livolden Sp (The Centre Party) 1991 – 1995 4 
Sigurd Ledaal H (The Conservative Party of Norway) 1995 – 1999 4 
Alf - Eivind Ljøstad KrF (The Christian Democratic Party) 1999 – 2003 4 
Torill Rolstad Larsen DNA (The Norwegian Labour Party) 2003 –  3 
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Interview guide 
Regional stakeholder interview-guide /translation of the Norwegian version 
 
Introductory text (read and explained to the interviewee): 
This interview represents parts of the data gathered in connection to an ongoing PhD 
thesis. Data from this interview is going to be presented to members of the regional 
partnership the Value Creation Alliance on Agder in form of a memo. The purpose of 
this memo is to serve as part of the background information in the process of developing 
a new strategy for the Value Creation Alliance. Questions I will ask you are concerned 
with regional development issues in general, what it is, what it should be, and the role 
that partnerships and networks can and should play in the context of regional 
development. My preference is to not make the interviews fully anonymous (unless you 
insist), I will not use your name in the texts but the function you held in the region will 
be accounted for. This means that it will be possible for insiders to identify your 
statements when reading the text, please keep this in mind when you answer. If you 
wish to contact me regarding your statements in the interview, you are free to do so and 
I will adjust to your revision. 
 
Bibliographical data 
 Name 
 Work role 
 Background/education 
1. I would as a start ask you to describe your understanding of these concepts. 
Regional networks 
 Regional partnerships 
 Value Creation 
2. What types of challenges do you mean that the Agder region is faced with now and 
further on? 
 Do different collaborative institutions in the region (networks/partnerships) add 
value to the process of facing these challenges?  
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3. Describe your own role in connection to networks and partnerships in the Agder 
region. 
 In your opinion what function does regional partnerships and networks in Agder 
have? 
4. How do you understand the significance of the set of networks and partnerships in 
Agder? 
 Has this set of institutions in your opinion changed significantly in the last 10 
years (numbers and characteristics)? 
 Should/can one rationalize the work around fever institutions, and if so, why? 
5. Describe your knowledge to the Value Creation Alliance at Agder. 
 Present and past partners are asked to give an account of the institutional history 
of the Value Creation Alliance, in addition to their understanding of the present 
situation. 
 Describe the development themes that have dominated the work in the Value 
Creation Alliance? 
 Is it and has it been a sufficient understanding for the roles and boarders of 
corporation within the Value Creation Alliance? 
6. What role do you mean that the Value Creation Alliance can/should play in the 
region? For instance: 
 Steering group for joint projects 
 Coordination function for projects that the partners co-finance 
 Creative forum 
 Project executioners 
 Fund 
 Other 
 Politicians, administrators, or development agents, are these different roles? 
7. What interests do the partnerships/networks reflect in society? 
 Is it much difference between the types of interests that are represented between 
the partnerships and networks at Agder in your opinion? 
 What and who do you believe that the partnerships and networks in the region 
represent? 
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 How and why do you believe that different partners and network participants 
argue the way they do on the direction that the region should develop? Do they 
get their inputs from: -whom they represent, other network actors, politicians, 
mostly personal opinions, other? 
8. Do the actors participating in networks and partnerships at large contribute towards 
what you would describe as beneficial societal work? 
 In what way do the networks and partnerships contribute towards industry and 
commerce in a way that is beneficiary? 
 Are there any results or events that you would like to highlight as beneficiary? 
 Does the work done in partnerships and networks in the region contribute to 
economical growth in the region? 
9. Are the networks and partnerships in the region important institutions in the sense 
that they have influence? 
 How and in what way? 
10. In what way do you see that regional networks and partnerships contribute to 
democracy in the region? 
 Is it a clear division between the political level and the network level connected 
to network and partnership work? 
 Are the partnerships and networks the prolonged arm of regional politics? 
 Is the work done in partnerships and networks political work?  
 How would you describe the set of actors that participates in networks and 
partnerships at Agder? 
 Should we think in new ways regarding participation in such forums? 
 In what way is participation bound and legitimized now? 
 Should other interests from civil society be more integrated than they are now? 
 What role do you think democracy plays in development processes? 
 Should democratic issues have a distinct function in development processes? 
11. What is the future for regional partnerships and networks at Agder? 
 What types of development themes should be on the future agenda? 
 Do you have any inputs for future strategies? 
 How should this work be organized? 
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Key figures Agder Energi 2002-2006 
 
Tab. A- 5: Key figures Agder Energi Sale and Value Alteration 31.12.2002-2006 (NOK mill.) 
Agder Energi (AE) key figures and estimates: NOK mill. 
a. AE net real value 31.12.02 before tax (whole company sold)2 11 400  
b. AE net real value 31.12.02 after tax (whole company sold)3 9 500  
g. | a-b | AE tax 31.12.02 (whole company sold)  1 900  
c. AE share dividend 2003-064  1 800  
d. AE value 01.01.2006 (est.)5 20 000  
h. | d-a | AE rise in value 31.12.02-06 whole company (est.) 8 600  
i. | h+c | Sum AE rise in value 31.12.02-06 and share dividend 2003-06 (est.) 10 400  
j. | d+c | AE rise in value total 31.12.02-2006 (est.) 21 800  
k. | i/a | AE percentual increase in real value 31.12.02-06 (est.) 91.2% 
 
Tab. A- 6: Cultiva and CDFSN Disbursements 2001-06 (NOK mill.) 
Institution: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 SUM u. SUM 2003-06 
Cultiva disbursement   67.66 24.57 92.1 92.1 
CDFSN disbursement 11.8 23.5 36.5 40 47.58 509 209.3 174.0 
 
Tab. A- 7: Key figures Cultiva and CDFSN Value Alterations 31.12.2002-2006 (NOK mill.) 
Cultiva and CDFSN key figures and estimates: CDFSN Cultiva 
e. Ownership position AE 31.12.01 5.805 %10 12.632 %11 
p. Market value capital 31.12.2002 59512 1 44013 
w. Market value capital 2006 75014 1 59115 
x. | w-p | Capital increase 155 151 
y. | u+x | Real value increase 12.31.2002-06 329 243 
q. | w+u | Sum value 2006 924 1 683 
m. | e*j | Sum AE rise in value 12.31.02-2006 and share dividend 2002-06 w/no 
sale (est.) 1 265
16 2 75417 
t. | q-m | Value difference sale vs. no sale (est.) -34118 -1 07119 
z1-2. | y/p | Percentual increase in real value z1:          55.3% z2:      16.9% 
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Tab. A- 8: Difference in Real Value between Selling AE Shares and Not Selling (NOK mill.) 
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Arendal 8.78% 2.39% 6.39%  1 913  1 393  520  227  352  265  434  -168  -255 
Audnedal 2.06% 1.67% 0.39%  449  85  364  158  246  185  303  -118  -178 
Birkenes 1.73% 0.47% 1.26%  376  275  102  44  69  52  85  -33  -50 
Bygland 1.11% 0% 1.11%  242  242  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Bykle 1.01% 0.28% 0.74%  220  160  60  26  41  31  50  -19  -29 
Evje og H. 1.53% 0% 1.53%  333  333  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Farsund 2.55% 1.25% 1.30%  555  283  272  118  184  138  227  -88  -133 
Flekkefjord 2.52% 0% 2.52%  548  548  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Froland 1.77% 0% 1.77%  386  386  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Gjerstad 1.35% 0.66% 0.69%  295  150  145  63  98  74  120  -47  -71 
Grimstad 4.56% 1.60% 2.96%  994  646  348  152  235  177  290  -112  -171 
Hægebost. 2.06% 0.70% 1.36%  449  296  153  67  103  78  127  -49  -75 
Iveland 1.06% 0% 1.06%  232  232  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Kristians. 27.80% 22.50% 5.30%  6 060  1 155  4 905  2 138  3 319  2 498  4 088  -1 586  -2 407 
Kvinesdal 2.33% 0% 2.33%  507  507  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Lillesand 2.67% 0.40% 2.27%  583  495  87  38  59  45  73  -28  -43 
Lindesnes 2.23% 0.74% 1.49%  486  324  162  71  110  82  135  -52  -79 
Lyngdal 2.35% 0% 2.35%  512  512  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Mandal 3.00% 1.00% 2.00%  654  436  218  95  147  111  181  -70  -107 
Marnardal 2.10% 0% 2.10%  458  458  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Risør 2.29% 1.12% 1.17%  500  255  245  107  166  125  204  -79  -120 
Sirdal 2.07% 0% 2.07%  451  451  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Songdalen 2.25% 0.75% 1.50%  489  326  163  71  110  83  136  -53  -80 
Søgne 2.38% 0.79% 1.59%  519  346  173  75  117  88  144  -56  -85 
CDFSN 5.81% 5.81% 0%  1 265  -  1 265  595  924  695  1 138  -341  - 
Tvedest. 2.08% 1.02% 1.06%  453  231  222  97  150  113  185  -72  -109 
Valle 1.13% 0% 1.13%  246  246  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Vegårshei 1.21% 0.40% 0.81%  264  176  88  38  60  45  73  -28  -43 
Vennesla 3.00% 1.00% 2.00%  654  436  218  95  147  111  181  -70  -107 
Åmli 1.22% 0% 1.22%  266  266  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Åseral 2.02% 0.99% 1.03%  439  224  215  94  146  110  179  -70  -106 
Statkraft 0%  45.53%  -  9 924  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
SUM: 100.00% 45.52% 100.00%  21 800  21 800  9 924  4 368  6 784  5 104  8 353  -3 140  -4 820 
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Governance Networks in the Agder Region 
Note that the list below containing organisations, institutions, and networks from the 
Agder region is not complete. The purpose is only to provide a schematic indication of 
the scale and complexity of the governance phenomena in the Agder region. I have 
therefore not prioritised a systematic quality check of all of the entries as part of this 
thesis work; it is therefore likely that the list contains entries that are invalid, and that 
there exist several institutions/networks that are not on the list that should have been on 
the list. This list contains some entries that are best defined as projects, some that are 
examples of public-public collaborative structures, some private-public structures, and 
some private-private structures. Some of the entries are financing and investments 
institutions. The common denominator between them is that all of the structures have 
collaborative features and in different ways are configured towards addressing regional 
and industrial development issues, and are located, and primarily operates within the 
Agder region. 
Tab. A- 9: Governance Networks in the Agder Region 
Network and institutions conceptualised as part of the governance system in the Agder region: 
17k 8k 
Agder Gass Forum Agder Maritime Forum 
AgderLink Agderparken Næringsforening 
Agderrådet Areal og transportutvalget for kristiansandsregionen 
Arena (project) Arendal Kunnskapspark 
Arendal Næringsforening Audnedal Næringsforening 
Aust-Agder Kompetansefond Aust-Agder Markeds-Forum 
Aust-Agder Næringsselskap as Bestra AS 
Birkeland Innovasjon, UiO Bykle og Hovden vekst 
Centre for Entrepreneurship Centre of Excellence 
Cultiva Den Norske Dataforening (national) 
Designformidling Agder Destinasjon Sørlandet 
Det digitale distrikts-Agder Digitale Sørland 
Easier Ectist 
EIC Elinor Agder 
E-remote Etablerersenter Vest Agder (EVA) 
Etablerersenteret Aust-Agder EtablererService Aust-Agder (project) 
Euro Info Centre (EIC) Evje Næringsbed AS 
Evje og Omegn Næringsforening og Nettkroken AS Evje Utvikling AS 
Farsund Næringsselskap AS Farsundsbassenget 
FDV-Forum Sør Female Future 
Flekkefjord Handelsforening/næringsforening Flekkefjord IT- og Kompetansesenter (FIKS) 
Forny Forum Longum Park 
Froland Handelsforening IKON 
Inkubatorprogram i Arendal – Grimstad – regionen Innovasjon 2010 
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Network and institutions conceptualised as part of the governance system in the Agder region: 
IT Ringen Agder IVAR (Indre Vest-Agder regionråd) 
Jernbaneforum Sør Knutepunkt Sørlandet 
Kompetansering sør Kompetansetorget 
Kristiansand Kunnskapspark AS (incubator & 
knowledgepark) 
Kristiansand næringsfond 
Kristiansand næringsforening camber of commerce Kristiansand næringsselskap 
KS Agder Kvinner på Agder 
Lillesand Handelsforening Lillesand Næringshage AS 
Lister Industrimiljø AS Lister Næringshage 
Listerregionen Listerrådet 
LO Aust-Agder LO Vest-Agder 
Longum Park Longum Teknologi og Kompetansesenter II AS 
Lygna Næringshage, Lyngdal Mandal Industriforening 
Mandal Næringsråd Maritimt forum (nasjonal) 
Markedsføringsforeningen i Kristiansand Mobil Kulturinkubator 
Møteplassen Nettverk av næringshager og kunnskapsparker 
Nettverk for virksomhetsstyring NHO Agder 
nHS NODE  
Nordiske Sommernetter Næringsforum Flekkefjord AS 
OPS E-18 Grimstad-Kristiansand Partnerskap Aust-Agder (county level partnership) 
Partnerskap Vest-Agder (county level partnership) Petroleumsforeningen for Sørlandet 
PFI Technology AS investment fund risør Rederiforening (Aust og Vest Agder) 
Regionalt Næringsfond østregionen Risør Etablerersenter AS 
Risør Næringshage AS Senter for Entreprenørskap 
Setesdal næringsråd Setesdal Regionråd 
Sirdal Næringsforening Sirdals Vekst 
SIVA - Selskapet for industrivekst Sjøsanden Næringshage AS (incubator) 
Stamvei aksjonen Stiftelsen Nera 
Sydspissen Søgne Handelsforening 
Sørlandets Gassforum Sørlandets Industrisenter AS (incubator) 
Sørlandets Teknologiforum Sørlandets Teknologisenter (Incubator & 
knowledgepark) 
Sørlandetskompetansefond (CDFSN) Sørlandskonferansen (annual regional conference) 
Sørlandsparken Næringsforening Sørlandsreiser AS 
Såkorn i Sør (Agder Energi) Såkorninvest Sør AS 
Trainee Sør Ungt Entreprenørskap Agder 
Universitetskomiteen Universitetstiftelsen 
Utviklingskoalisjon Vennesla Value Creation 2010 
Vennesla Næringspark incubator Vennesla Vekst AS 
Venturos AS investment company Farsund Verdiskapingsalliansen (Value Creation Alliance) 
Vest - Agder fylkeskommune - regionalutvikling og 
forvaltning 
Østregionen 
Åseral kommunale kraftfond  
 
In addition to the list above I have included some more detailed descriptions of a 
few of the regional governance institutions that have emerged in the Agder region in 
recent years, this in order to both illustrate some of the variety of the institutional set-
ups, but also provide additional thickness to the descriptions given in chapter 6 and 7.  
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Tab. A- 10: FDV-Forum Sør (public-private network) 
Brief description of FDV-Forum Sør: 
Description: 
FDV is short for Administration, conduct and building maintenance [Forvaltning, Drift og 
Vedlikehold], it is a non-profit organisation aimed at gathering all the FDV actors in the 
region under one umbrella. 
Sum members: 36 (2005) 
Type members 
Private businesses on the delivery side and some public institutions in addition to private 
enterprises on the buyer’s side, suppliers (3), building owners (12), consultants (11), 
contractor (9), and architect (1). 
Institutional history: The FDV-forum was formally established in 2003. 
Organisation: 
FDV-forum has a board consisting of members from all of its five member groups; 
suppliers, building owners, consultants, contractors and architects. The board consists of 
two public institutions, from Kristiansand municipality and Vest-Agder County. The rest of 
the board consists of representatives from firms. The board meets regularly, 8 meetings in 
2004. The FDV forum has a manager that coordinates the forum activities.  
Purpose: 
The FDV-forum states as its main vision; ”together for better property management”. They 
seek to improve the general knowledge on managing large building and maintenance 
projects in the region, increase communication between different actors involved in such 
projects. 
Vision for the region: 
None other stated than a general increase in the knowledge on how to best strengthen the 
competences and knowledge in the region concerning the management of large 
construction and maintenance projects.  
Work methods: Works-groups covering different topics of interest to the forum.  
Sources: http://www.fdv-forum.org/ (accessed 11.23.05) 
 
The FDV-forum Sør is by large an engineers network that consists of people with 
a technical expertise on a specific subject, namely how to build, keep in repair and 
manage buildings. It is set up in a way that all involved parties in such processes ideally 
should be and to a certain extent are represented in the network. Since the local and 
regional governments own a large agglomeration of buildings, they are attractive 
partners for the network, but also private building owners are represented. The majority 
of network participants are however, those who sell services and products connected to 
this type of projects. 
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Tab. A- 11: Kompetansering Sør (public-private network) 
Brief description of Kompetansering Sør: 
Description: The institution is set up to enhance the leadership competencies of its members and indirectly contribute to the competitive ability of participating businesses. 
Sum members: 32 (2005) 
Type members 
The members consist mainly of managers from private businesses, however are Agder 
University College, Kristiansand municipality, Vest-Agder County, and the local hospital 
members. Kompetansering sør is therefore listed as a private-public institution. 
Institutional history: 
Kompetansering sør was established in 1989 with public funding. Originally, the institution 
focused on international relations issues, especially relationship between local enterprises 
and the EU. In 1997 did the institution change to its current focus namely competence 
development in a broad sense for its members.  
Organisation: 
The institution has a board, which in 2004 consisted of 8 members, 6 private and one 
public (Agder University College) and one interest group (NHO). The board was relatively 
active with 6 meetings in 2004. The institution has a manager that initiates and oversees 
activities. The secretariat is located as a project at Agder Research AS. The possibility for a 
merger between Kompetansering sør and Sydspissen is being examined (2006). 
Purpose: Develop leadership and manager competencies in the region. 
Vision for the 
region: 
The main vision of the institution concerning the region is that it shall focus on contributing 
to competence development to the best for its members and through that contribute to a 
more vital region. 
Work methods: 
The internal organisation of Kompetansering sør consists of several sub networks within 
the main network. A top executive forum, a personal forum, a leader recruiting forum 
(NEXT), a network for those who previously have participated in the leader recruiting forum 
called X-NEXT, a mentoring forum where experienced leaders coach young leaders to be, 
and an economic forum. In addition to this, the network arranges lectures and seminars on 
various topics of interest to its members. 
Sources: http://www.kompetanseringen.no/ (accessed 11.23.05) 
 
Kompetansering sør is a network with a strong emphasis on leadership and 
management. Building competencies regarding the qualities required of a “good” leader 
are at the heart of the network’s work. The network does not discriminate between the 
management challenges in public and the private sector, it therefore consists of 
participants from both spheres. It is however fair to say that the network is dominated 
by private institutions, this is a network for managers by managers. 
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Tab. A- 12: Sydspissen (public-private network) 
Brief description of Sydspissen: 
Description: 
Sydspissen is an interest organisation for industry, businesses, commerce organisations, 
and growth parks located in the Agder region. I have categorised Sydspissen as a private-
private network, because there are no members from the municipalities or the county. 
Sum members: 43 
Type members 
Sydspissen is a network of networks. Many of the member institutions are networks and 
growth parks (15). Roughly, half of the members are businesses (19). There are few public 
owned institutions listed as members (3). Other members are two research institutions and 
an interest organisation (NHO), and a couple of consultancies.  
Institutional history: 
Sydspissen was founded in November 1999, by private associations and public actors in 
the Agder region. In 2001 a manager was hired to coordinate the activities on a full time 
basis. Up until 2004 did the municipalities and the two counties participate as members in 
the network, the municipalities, and the two counties left the institution in 2004. A 
collaborative agreement was drawn between the two counties, and the network to replace 
direct participation. A new manager was hired in 2005. 
Organisation: 
The network is organised with a board consisting of business representatives (5) and one 
representative from Agder Research. A manager oversees the activities, and the work is 
organised through project groups. 
Purpose: 
Improve the working conditions for business and industries in the region. The idea is to 
coordinate efforts for marketing and develop the region as a competence- and innovative 
region. In its statutes it says that Sydspissen shall work to coordinate regional business 
interests towards political authorities regionally and nationally. 
 
Vision for the region: It states; “contribute to make the Agder region [Sørlandet] into the most attractive region in Norway”, as its main vision. 
Work methods: 
Seven project groups are organised within the network focusing on topics such as; 
Conference arrangements (the annual regional conference), broadband (in the Agder 
region), drilling coast (work towards the maritime cluster at Agder), Interaction public sector 
and business, Agder University College (relevance to the Agder industry?), and a Foresight 
project (vision development).  
Sources: http://www.sydspissen.no/ (accessed 11.24.05) 
 
In Sydspissen’s statutes, it lists as one of its main purposes to influence decision-
making processes in local and regional government (see also chapter 6). This is 
interesting seen in the light of the network excluding representatives from the 
municipalities and counties in 2004. The given reason for this was clearer roles and 
more effective work methods. An argument that was presented by both local politicians 
and representatives from Sydspissen, probably partly as a result of a debate and much 
criticism in the regional newspaper Fædrelandsvennen, see chapter 6. At least part of 
the thinking seems to be that the network is more efficient at influencing public 
decision-making processes when public institutions are not formal members in the 
network (Fædrelandsvennen 2005a).  
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Tab. A- 13: Knutepunkt Sørlandet (public-public network) 
Brief description of Knutepunkt Sørlandet: 
Description: Partnership between 6 municipalities in Vest-Agder County, with the city municipality Kristiansand in the centre. 
Sum members: 6 
Type members: Municipalities  
Institutional history: 
In 1990 did the six participating municipalities sign a letter of intent where they stated a joint 
agenda for developing the municipalities into efficient service providers. The intermunicipal 
cooperation started with a joint focus on the municipalities’ work towards its industries. In 
the beginning Knutepunkt Sørlandet was a forum where administrators responsible for 
industry and entrepreneurial activities in the municipalities met to discuss joint projects. In 
1996 was this work formalised with basis in state regulations. Statutes were developed, 
and it was agreed that Knutepunkt Sørlandet should be an organisation for mayors and 
chief officers in the six municipalities. In august 2005 was a suggestion for new statutes 
forwarded (still pending) which would give the partnership wider warrants. 
Organisation: 
The municipal councils in the six participating municipals are the only body that decides 
upon statutes. The municipal councils delegate decision-making authority to the board that 
consists of mayors and chief officers in the six municipalities. Hierarchically below the 
board you have a body that steers the day-to-day activities, this body consists only of the 
chief officers in the participating municipalities. Below this level are a secretariat, and six 
committees and a project section. The project section has currently 8 active regional 
projects.  
Purpose: 
Coordinate intermunicipal cooperation between participating municipalities, work to 
promote measures that generates effective and good solutions to the regions citizens and 
the regional industry. 
Vision for the 
region: Not explicitly stated. 
Work methods: 
Knutepunkt Sørlandet uses its budget mainly on salaries to people working in the 
municipalities that participate in projects initiated by the partnership. In addition are several 
smaller funds set up to finance various projects.  
Sources: http://www.knutepunktsorlandet.no/ (accessed 11.24.05) 
 
This partnership is an example of an institution that seemingly has little direct 
contact with the local industry and business interests. Even if it originally was set up 
with this in mind, it is now a partnership with a much broader focus. Industry contact, 
and direct industry funding is in 2005 less than 10% of the total budget. The long term 
goal for at least some of the participating municipalities is that this partnership will be 
the basis of one large city municipality, 2010 is presented in the media as a possible 
timeframe for this (Fædrelandsvennen 2005b). Knutepunkt Sørlandet can also be 
viewed as a direct follow-up of Common Goals on Agder (see chapter 6), with its 
emphasis on improving the attractiveness and municipal service levels. 
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Tab. A- 14: IKON (collaborative project) 
Brief description of IKON: 
Description: 
IKON [InnKjøp-Offentlig-Næringsliv] purchase-public-industry is a project financed by the 
two counties at Agder and Innovation Norway. IKON is an office where interested parties, 
potential contractors, can take contact to get more information. 
Sum members: A consultant is financed by regional public institutions in order to help local businesses to be better sellers of products and services, in the national competition for tenders. 
Type members None other than the board and reference group. 
Institutional history: 
A new law on public biddings reduced the amount needed for public calls for biddings from 
1.6 mill. NOK to 200.000 NOK in 1999. This caused, or at least should cause more 
competition among contractors for publicly financed projects. For the Agder region this 
meant that local business to a much larger extent had to compete with other contractors on 
relatively small projects. IKON is set up to address this challenge.  
Organisation: 
IKON has a board led by a consultant working for Vest-Agder County, The rest of the board 
is: Agder University College (1), Vest-Agder County (1) Businesses (5). In addition has 
IKON a reference group consisting 12 members, Innovation Norway (1), municipality mayor 
(1), NHO (1), businesses (9). A project leader that runs his own private consultancy 
manages the project. 
Purpose: The main purpose of this project is to increase businesses in the Agder regions capabilities towards winning more public contracts; a “bigger slice of the public cake”. 
Vision for the region: How to use the public market to develop the industry in the region. 
Work methods: A consultant is hired in on fulltime basis to run the IKON office, in addition various seminar and conferences are being held. 
Sources: http://www.ikon-agder.no/ (accessed 11.24.05) 
 
IKON addresses one of the regional policy agendas set up in Common Agenda, 
(see chapter 6) as the explicit goal of IKON is to support the businesses in Agder to get 
a bigger slice of public resources. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 Sp: (Senterpartiet) The Centre Party (conservative/centre party). 
2 Source: (PwC 2005).  
3 Source: (PwC 2005). 
4 Source: (AE 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006a), NOK 600 mill estimated as share dividend in 2006 
(Udjus 2006). 
5 Estimated 2006 value of Agder Energi, see discussion in chapter 6. 
6 2003–05 source (Cultiva 2006).  
7 NOK 19.5 mill was distributed on 30. September 2006 an additional NOK 5.0 mill was 
planned (Valvik 2006).  
8 2001-05 source (Fjellstad 2006). Disbursement in 2001 and 2002 was possible because of 
share dividends from CDFNS’s ownership position in Agder Energi. 
9 Source: (CDFSN 2006).  
10 Source: (AE 2002). 
11 NOK 1440 mill. is equivalent of an 12.632% ownership position in Agder Energi when the 
company was sold to Statkraft. 
12 Source: http://www.kompetansefond.com CDFSN has paid NOK 77 mill. in taxes (Reinertsen 
2006), in addition did CDFSN get NOK 61.5 mill of Agder Energi share dividends (AE 2002).  
13 Source: (Cultiva 2006). 
14 Source: (Fjellstad 2006). 2002 capital base is consumption price index adjusted in addition is 
there buffer capital. 
15 Updated 30 September 2006 source (Valvik 2006). 2002 capital base is consumption price 
index adjusted in addition is there buffer capital.  
16 CDFSN has distributed NOK 69.5 million more in the period 2003-06, than what would have 
been possible through just using share dividends equivalent of a 5.8% ownership position in 
Agder Energi in the period (NOK 104.5 mill.), but the NOK 69.5 million figure is close to 
CDFSN’s part of share dividends from AE (NOK 61.5 million).  
17 If Kristiansand municipality, in stead of using Cultiva, had used a share dividend equivalent 
of a 12.6% ownership position in Agder Energi directly they could have used NOK 135.3 
million more on culture in the period (2003-2006).  
18 CDFSN break even if Agder Energi value is set to NOK 14.1 billion. The municipalities in 
Vest-Agder County have in reality lost NOK 340 million on the CDFSN investment (2006). 
19 Cultiva break even if Agder Energi value is set to NOK 11.5 billion. Kristiansand 
municipality has in reality lost close to NOK 1.1 billion on the Cultiva investment (2006). 
20 Source: (AE 2002). 
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21 Source: (AE 2003). 
22 Actual figures are lower, fees to lawyers, consultants, brokers in addition to other expenses 
associated with the sale should also be subtracted from this amount. 
23 CDFSN investments are reportedly giving very good returns, a part of the explanation for this 
is that CDFSN could use share dividends from Agder Energi (NOK 61.5 million in 2001) as 
buffer capital. I therefore believe it is highly unlikely that any of the investments from the other 
previous owner positions come close to matching that of CDFSN. 
24 Figures in the last two columns indicate how much the owners have lost up until 2006 on their 
Agder Energi sales. The losses are in practice higher since many of the municipalities have not 
invested all of their returns, but used much of it as a part of their ordinary municipal budgets. 
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